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ABSTRACT 
Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in 




 Why does reform of law enforcement remain so elusive in post-communist countries like 
Ukraine, despite political upheaval, a public mandate for reform and substantial international 
assistance?  Which components contribute to the success and sustainability of a police 
reform and which factors produce political will from political leaders to implement the 
difficulties of police reform?  This dissertation argues that in addition to massive corruption and 
the politics of insecurity, the greatest challenges to reform of Ukraine’s law enforcement 
system is political competition, resulting in the politicization of law enforcement institutions 
and law enforcement policy.  Political competition is based in Ukraine’s fractured political system 
which has been unstable since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This 
dissertation takes an inductive approach to studying the politics of police reform by providing 
a process-tracing narrative of previous and contemporary efforts to address ongoing issues of 
policing in Ukraine and demonstrates how reforms have been shaped by various political and 
social conditions over time.  The narrative of this dissertation is that while the problems 
plaguing Ukraine’s police are systemic and long standing, partial police reform become 
possible under certain conditions. While pluralism and political competition are often 
necessary to pressure political leaders to enact costly reforms of the police, an excess of 
political competition or political instability (as in the case of Ukraine) will typically 
disincentivize political leaders from supporting police reform by increasing uncertainty about 
the future political order, public fears of disorder, and will prompt more intense political 
competition over control of law enforcement.  This is because in hybrid regimes like Ukraine, 
the police play an essential role in determining the political balance through extra-democratic 
power politics such as arresting regime opponents or determining which protests will be 
permitted.  Hence the police’s support of the regime is critical to maintaining political power and 
since police are opposed to any reforms which will strip them of resources, powers or 
autonomy, enacting comprehensive police reform becomes a costly decision for political 
elites, undertaken only reluctantly in the face of intense pressure from civil society and 
international partners in the wake of a scandal which raises policing on the political agenda.  This 
means that the status quo towards policing policy is political inaction by decision makers and 
even in the event of a catalyst such as a police scandal political pressure for police reform is often 
difficult to sustain under the inevitable resistance from entrenched elite. 
This dissertation argues that in the case of Ukraine the keys to a successful and 
sustainable police reform in certain parts of the police have been: first, insulation of new police 
institutions from politicization and patrimonial staffing to ensure their independence and 
impartiality; and second, institutional design which mandates transparency mechanisms, 
accountability procedures and civilian oversight in the staffing, promotion and activity reporting 
of police.  In other words, this dissertation argues that the types of police reforms most 
iv 
likely to be successful and sustainable are those with large and effective coalitions including 
civil society, western support, and most importantly institutional design which allows for 
political insulation and mechanisms that allow for public participation, transparency and 
oversight.  In the absence of these components, reforms that lack a unified and stable reform 
coalition to produce continued political pressure will likely be abandoned shortly after the 
public attention moves on from a given police scandal.  Nearly four years after the Euromaidan 
revolution, events in mid- 2018 provides a colorful montage of the various challenges to reform 
of law enforcement in Ukraine at a critical juncture. Ukraine’s success in navigating these and 
the other challenges described in this dissertation will determine the future of its law 
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Introduction 
Why does reform of law enforcement remain so elusive in post-communist countries like 
Ukraine, despite political upheaval, a public mandate for reform and substantial international 
assistance?  This dissertation argues that in addition to massive corruption and the politics of 
insecurity, the greatest challenges to reform of Ukraine’s law enforcement system is political 
competition, resulting in the politicization of law enforcement institutions and law enforcement 
policy.  Political competition is based in Ukraine’s regional divisions and fractured political system 
which has been unstable since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.  This political 
instability and competition, coupled with the central importance of law enforcement in maintaining 
the political balance against opponents and the extraction of illegal rents means that much of the 
reform of law enforcement remains elusive despite intense domestic and international political 
pressures for reform.  As this dissertation will show, the only circumstance under which the deeply 
rooted practices of patrimonialism and competition over law enforcement can be overcome is in 
the wake of scandals involving the police.  Following these scandals, calls for reform emerge 
which produce brief windows allowing for institutional change, but most reform proposals 
typically fail to materialize into sustainable reform coalitions and are unable to institutionalize 
reforms.  This dissertation argues that certain reforms attempted after 2014 became sustainable 
because they pursued strategies of political insulation and accountability, which attempted to 
depoliticize the personnel process of law enforcement institutions and then included a variety of 
oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with reform goals.  Where these strategies were 
pursued, successful reform of certain law enforcement institutions has become possible and 
reforms have proven to be sustainable, whereas in other areas reforms have failed or been 
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abandoned.  This dissertation provides a brief snapshot of the politics of police reform in post-
Euromaidan Ukraine from 2014-2018. 
Like many states with authoritarian pasts, Ukraine has had major challenges in liberalizing 
its political system since gaining independence from the Soviet Union just over a quarter of a 
century ago.  Much of the enthusiasm for the democratic “transitions paradigm” of the 1990’s has 
abated (Carothers 2002), and only a few of the former Soviet states such as Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, made a clean break with their Soviet past and consolidated their democratic systems. 
Other Soviet success states such as Russia, Armenia and Belarus have reverted into consolidated 
authoritarian regimes; while states like Ukraine and Georgia have become “hybrid”, “mixed” or 
“competitive authoritarian” regimes combining competitive elections with elements of 
authoritarianism (Hale 2015; Levitsky and Way 2002; Stefes 2005).  Rather than using the term 
“transition” which makes teleological assumptions about an eventual democratic endpoint, this 
dissertation refers to the current chapter in Ukrainian politics that began with the Euromaidan as 
“political upheaval” or “turnover”.  While still acknowledging the impressive progress that 
Ukraine has made in increasing pluralism and competitive elections, freedom of speech and 
liberalization of media, the goal of using these terms instead of transition is to avoid presuming 
that Ukraine is necessarily transitioning towards democracy.  It is premature to make a definitive 
characteristic of the regime before another electoral cycle and Ukraine has had at least two cases 
of substantial democratic backsliding under the administrations of President Kuchma (1994-2004) 
and under Victor Yanukovych (2010-2014) (D’Anieri 2007; Kuzio 2015). 
 Ukraine has been a territory ruled by foreign powers for centuries, yet in the quarter 
century since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the country has failed to address 
systemic corruption, state violence, and authoritarian legacies despite experiencing two massive 
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social movements that overthrew sitting presidents in 2004 and 2014, competitive elections, and 
an ongoing conflict entering its fourth year in 2018.  Adrian Beck describes Ukraine as a country, 
“almost always on the verge of reform” (Beck 2005; 281) and Paul D’Anieri notes that, “the fact 
that Ukraine is on its fourth constitutional order in twenty-five years leads us to wonder if enduring 
change is possible” (D’Anieri 2016; 2).  
While Ukraine has many serious issues to address in its political, economic and 
bureaucratic systems; nearly all scholars of Ukraine agree that enduring issues in Ukraine’s law 
enforcement institutions have contributed to authoritarianism, corruption, human rights abuses, 
citizen insecurity, lack of trust in state institutions, and the persistence of an unattractive 
investment climate (Beck 2001; 2005; Kuzio 2012; 2015; D’Anieri 2011; Way 2005; Shelley 
1998; Foglesong and Solomon 2000).  Human rights abuses, police corruption, and ineffective 
policing present an important obstacle to quality state administration, state building, and citizen 
security in the former Soviet space and in many other countries throughout the world (Caparini 
and Marenin 2004; Taylor 2012; Hennsell 2012; Marat 2013; 2014; O’Shea 2015; Bayley 2001; 
2005; Pino & Wiatrowski 2006; Hinton and Newburn 2009).  
This dissertation examines a small, but significant component of the Ukrainian state, the 
police, which prior to 2015 were formerly known as the “Militsiya”.  The Ukrainian Militsiya had 
a long record of poor public trust due to these and other issues and Ukrainian politicians and leaders 
in Ukraine’s Ministry of the Interior (MoI), (which oversees the Militsiya), have declared countless 
unsuccessful rounds of police reforms in response to the ongoing systemic failures of the 
institution, police scandals, and political turnover.  These cycles of unsuccessful and unsustainable 
reforms date back to the Soviet period and have attempted to address issues such as police 
corruption and predation, the inability to solve crimes and address public insecurity, poor quality 
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and incomplete investigations, a lack of professionalism and high turnover in the Militsiya, little 
to no accountability or oversight of police, human rights abuses committed by police, and low 
levels of legitimacy and public trust (Chistyakova 2011; Shelley, 1996; Beck 2002; Harasymiw 
2003; Akulov 2014; Peacock and Cordner 2016; Friesendorf 2017).  These ongoing issues with 
Ukrainian police have persisted (and in some cases intensified) after independence and have 
plagued Ukraine through five Presidential administrations since 1991, two regime collapses, and 
a quarter century.  The Euromaidan movement of 2014 began as a small protest movement by 
those who favored European integration, but following mass repression of protesters by security 
forces, including the Militsiya, the movement resulted in the collapse of the regime of President 
Victor Yanukovych.  Following the death of nearly 100 protesters Yanukovych fled to Russia in 
2014, an interim government was formed, Russia annexed Crimea, and armed hostilities began in 
the Donbas (Kuzio 2015).  The effects and consequences of the Euromaidan on Ukrainian politics 
are still being debated by scholars who are not sure whether it represents a definitive break or a 
continuation of past political practices (Onuch 2014; Katchinovski 2015; Kuzio 2015; Sakwa 
2015, Marples and Mills 2014, D’Anieri 2015; Hale 2016).  It is without question that the 
Euromaidan, the political change, and the armed conflict have had several undeniable 
consequences for law enforcement in Ukraine.  First, the violence against protesters caused 
defections among steadfast supporters of the Yanukovych administration and the Parliament 
(Verkhovna Rada) voted unanimously to remove Victor Yanukovych from power following the 
worst violence on February 20th, 2014.  In other words, repression by police and other state security 
actors against protesters was an immediate (albeit not the sole) cause of the collapse of the 
Yanukovych regime.  Ukraine had not experienced this level of state violence in decades and 




less than 1% following Euromaidan1, and communicated an important message to political elites 
that Ukrainian law enforcement, and the previous regime were widely seen as illegitimate and 
would need to be substantially reformed (Peacock and Cordner 2016; Friesendorf 2017).  In 
addition to long process of the delegitimization of Ukraine’s law enforcement, there were other 
more immediate causes for the post-Euromaidan administration to focus its attention on reforming 
its police force as a central component of state building.  Shortly after the fall of Yanukovych 
regime, police in many communities around Ukraine simply vanished from the streets for several 
weeks2 leaving a security gap in cities and towns throughout Ukraine that in some cases was filled 
by activists and vigilantes (Puglisi 2015; 2016; Minakov 2016; Shukan 2016).  The ‘security 
vacuum’ left by the Militsiya allowed separatists to seize government buildings in many parts of 
Eastern Ukraine, and failed to provide protection for contentious political actions, often with fatal 
consequences3.  The reform of police presented itself as a fundamental state building challenge for 
the post-Maidan Ukrainian authorities.  These conditions set the stage for a convergence of elite, 
mass and international political pressure to seriously reform the system of law enforcement in 
Ukraine, starting with the police.   
A third consequence of the Euromaidan which had major implications for policing in 
Ukraine was the political demands by both Ukrainians and foreign donor states following 
Euromaidan for an open and transparent government through administrative reform.  Issues of 
national identity have long been salient in Ukrainian politics, and are often simplified in terms of 
                                                            
1  In fact, only 0.8% percent of Ukrainians said that they trusted in the Militsiya according to a spring 2014 poll by Sociology 
Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine- cited in Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs “Development Strategy 
for Police Reform” (11.21.2014).  Available at: http://www.mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/en/publish/printable_article/1240270 
2 Glenn Kates "In Eastern, Southern Ukraine, Police Sometimes Melt Away" RFERL. May 21st,  2014.  
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-police-disappearing/25393154.html 
3 For example, police failed to stop violence between pro-Russian and pro- Ukrainian protesters on May 2nd, 2014 which resulted 
in the exchange of gun fire between both sides and the deaths of over 40 pro-Russian protesters after the Trade Union Building in 
which they sought shelter was set on fire. “Council Of Europe Blasts Ukraine's Investigations Into Odesa Violence.” RFERL.   




“east vs. west” with the Western part of the country favoring more closer ties with Europe, more 
democracy, and more responsive and transparent government while the East is thought to trend 
towards closer ties with Russia and greater paternalism in public administration (Way 2016; 
D’Anieri 2016; Shevel 2016; Yekelchyk 2015). Others contend that the Euromaidan4 and the 
reforms it inspired have been better described as a movement by those who oppose corruption and 
demand improved and transparent government service and expanded democracy against those who 
resist change favoring the status quo of endemic corruption and managed democracy (Onuch 2014; 
Channel-Justice 2016).  As armed conflict broke out in Ukraine, pro-Russian political sentiments 
have dampened in most regions as evidenced by public opinion polls showing decreased support 
and trust of Russia and increased support for better ties with the West and greater democratic 
reforms (Shevel 2016, 30-31).  Despite this convergence in some areas of public opinion, current 
polls demonstrate that the Ukrainian public holds little faith its political leaders and is highly 
skeptical and cynical about the pace of reforms, living conditions, and their disposition towards 
democracy four years after the Euromaidan (D’Anieri 2016,13; KIIS 2015; 2016; IRI 2017; NDI 
2017).  The politics of reform in 2018 Ukraine demonstrate a situation where nationalist politics 
have taken center stage, but both reformers and “spoilers” opposed to reform claiming to oppose 
Russia and support European integration, all the while undermining many democratic and anti-
corruption reforms (Minakov 2016; Kuzio 2016).  On the international level, Ukraine became 
much more dependent on Western support as trade and financing from Russia virtually ceased in 
20145.  Shortly after the fall of the Yanukovych government, Ukraine received a 16 billion dollar 
EFF bailout package from the IMF to be delivered in several tranches, contingent on demonstrating 
                                                            
4 Some of the far nationalist groups on Maidan, while opposing Russia, held values that were antithetical to European values such 
as xenophobia and homophobia (Channel-Justice 2016). 




progress in democratic, economic, and anti-corruption reforms (Yekelchyk 2015).  Substantial 
financial and technical aid has also been provided by the United States, Canada, the European 
Union and individual European States, the OSCE and the World Bank.  One the one hand, western 
support has been critical to staving off complete economic collapse in Ukraine and has largely 
increased the west’s leverage in Ukraine, particularly in certain areas where western states have 
been able to insist on transparent and meritocratic institutions through political insulation. On the 
other hand, Ukraine and other countries in the region have a long history of accepting Western 
financial aid while resisting reform conditions (D’Anieri 2016; Hale 2016; Levitsky and Way 
2010).  There are also recent signs that Ukraine is increasingly willing to resist western 
conditionality despite the costs as attacks on civil society, political opposition, media, and anti-
corruption institutions have accelerated in 2017 and 2018.  Reform of law enforcement and justice 
systems has been one of the demands of both western donors and the Ukrainian public order to 
increase pressure on Ukraine to handle massive state corruption and insecurity.  The scandal 
caused by police repression of protesters during the Euromaidan, the immediate security vacuum 
on Ukraine’s streets, and a large increase in public and international political pressure for tangible 
reforms all converged to pressure Ukrainian political elites to enact police reform starting in 2014.  
The long-term impact of the Euromaidan on Ukraine’s political system may not be apparent 
for another generation, but it is undeniable that the immediate costs of the Euromaidan and its 
aftermath have been high for the Ukrainian state and society.  Since 2014, Ukraine has suffered a 
severe financial crisis causing hyperinflation and a contraction of the Ukrainian economy, with the 
Ukrainian currency losing 300% of its value against the dollar and GDP shrinking by 16% in 2015 
alone.  Even more destabilizing has been the armed conflict with Russian backed separatists in the 




Operation), which has already resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 individuals on both sides 
(roughly three-quarters of them civilians) and the displacement of millions of Ukrainians both 
within the country and abroad.  The security crisis caused by the ATO and the concurrent economic 
crisis have substantially increased crime and insecurity throughout Ukraine as law enforcement 
has struggled to halt the flow of small arms and munitions from the front which are increasingly 
used in crimes.  In an ominous invocation of Weber’s definition of the modern state (1965), 
Ukraine’s Interior Minister recently wrote that “the state is losing the monopoly on violence”.6  
While the conflict nears its fourth year, trust in Ukraine’s political and state institutions is 
extremely low (NDI 2017; IRI 2017) and many in Ukraine have increasingly begun to question 
whether all of Ukraine’s sacrifices may have been in vain and might not result in fundamental 
changes to the Ukrainian political system due to low political will, societal skepticism, donor 
fatigue, or even Russian sabotage7.  Ukraine’s internal political situation looks grim, as the 
coalition government under President Petro Poroshenko (2014-present) has failed to deliver on 
many promised reforms to address corruption in the political, economic and judicial systems of 
Ukraine8.  Reports abound in the press about continued high-level government corruption9, most 
of the international and domestic technocrats and activists brought into government after 
Euromaidan have resigned or been fired citing sabotage and low political will for reform from 
decision makers.  Some even argue corruption and patronage have even increased under the 
                                                            
6 “Interior Minister: The state is losing its monopoly on violence (part 1)" Interfax. June 11th, 2016.  
www.interfax.com.ua/news/interview/349567.html  
7 "Ukraine Reform Monitor: October 2017." Carnegie Endowment. October 10th, 2017.  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/10/ukraine-reform-monitor-october-2017-pub-73330 
8 ibid 





Poroshenko administration1011.  As the human costs of the war rises and the economic crisis persist 
into its third year, with little to show for their heavy sacrifice, Ukraine is at a critical juncture faced 
with the dilemma of continuing to endure economic hardships with little signs of improvement, 
rapprochement with Russia, or simply universal cynicism (feelings of betrayal or zrada)12 and 
political deactivation13.  Paul D’Anieri argues that Ukraine’s best defense against further predation 
by Russia is through deep institutional reforms which allow the country to prosperous democracy 
tethered closely to Europe, and that the decision now facing Ukraine is an existential one between 
reform or further dismemberment of the Ukrainian state by Russia (D’Anieri 2016; 1).   
Amid this grim landscape of the messy aftermath of a regime change, economic crisis, 
armed conflict, and deep societal cynicism at mired reforms, there appeared to be signs in 2015 
that change was occurring in one of Ukraine’s most corrupt and delegitimized institutions, the 
Militsiya.  Police reform came at the behest of the Ukrainian public, civil society and international 
donors and began with the recruitment of Georgian experts to develop a new Patrol Police in late 
2014.  The establishment off the new Patrol Police, which replaced the Traffic Inspectorate 
(GAI/DAI) in summer of 2015 and was operational throughout most major Ukrainian cities within 
a year (Friesendorf 2017; Marat 2016; Gessen 2015; Peacock & Cordner 2016).  Within a year, 
approval ratings of the new Patrol Police had reached as high as 60% in certain cities, a figure 
unprecedented in Ukraine’s history, and some have even referred to the establishment of Patrol 
                                                            
10 Oleg Sukhov, Vlad Lavrov. "Poroshenko Leads Ukraine Offshore In Paradise Papers: Poroshenko lawyers deny charges" Kyiv-
Post.  Nov. 10, 2017.  https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poroshenko-leads-ukraine-offshore-paradise-papers-
poroshenko-lawyers-deny-charges.html 
11 Oleg Sukhov. "Poroshenko, Ukraine’s ‘Putin wannabe,’ reveals his true face" Kyiv Post. Published March 29, 2017.  
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/oleg-sukhov-poroshenko-ukraines-putin-wannabe-reveals-true-face.html 
12 Lucy Sohryu describes Zrada as an inherent Ukrainian cynicism based in colonial exploitation and Soviet totalitarianism, and 
disappointment following independence.  “"ZRADA: the Ukrainian talent of feeling betrayed whenever, wherever".    
Euromaidan Press.  November 12th, 2015.  
13 Indeed, the standard practice for public opinion polling in Ukraine is now the ‘anti-rating’ meaning which politicians does a 




Police as the “first real reform” that Ukrainians can see from Euromaidan (Peacock 2016; 85).  
Reform of the traffic police was made possible by improved recruitments standards, support and 
oversight of reforms by civil society, extensive international assistance including financial and 
technical expertise and political pressure for independent and meritocratic agencies, and a surge 
of enthusiastic and civic minded (mostly) young Ukrainians who applied to work in the new Patrol 
Police and other units of the National Police of Ukraine.  Ukraine’s new Patrol Police officers 
comprise less than a fifth its entire police force, and most other divisions of police including Police 
Investigators, District Police, and police in the Criminal Block have so far experienced little 
change in operation, organization or personnel or their relationship with the Ukrainian public.  
Despite initial success in Ukraine’s insulated Patrol Police, most rest of the National Police are 
still plagued by issues of corruption, human rights abuses, ineffectiveness, and low levels of 
legitimacy in the communities they serve.14  Many of these same critiques of Ukrainian police 
today were true of the Militsiya in 2010, 2004, 1996, and 1991; and are a testament to the deep 
and systemic nature of these issues and the inability of previous attempts to produce sustainable 
reforms (Chistyakova 2011; Kuzio 2010; Beck 2005; Shelley 1998; Martynenko 2005, 2010).  
Despite high expectations following the launch of Patrol Police, change has been slow to come to 
the rest of the National Police.  Following the lackluster result of police vetting (attestation), 
continued reports of police corruption and abuse, and the departure of many new Patrol Police and 
top reformers (including the first Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze), the public began to temper 
their expectations for an expeditious reform of Ukraine’s police force.   
Countless reforms of police attempted under previous administrations were abandoned, 
sabotaged, or failed for a variety of reasons including poor planning and short horizons, 
                                                            




insufficient political will and police “buy-in”, and little to no public oversight.    Major problems 
persist in Ukraine’s police including continued corruption, political influence on police, poor 
quality of investigations, a reliance on quantitative measures and pretrial detention, a lack of 
accountability to local authorities and the community, and an entrenched distrust of the police by 
many Ukrainians which causes both poor compliance with the law and a lack of cooperation in 
criminal investigations.  Police reform has been on the agenda in Ukraine for many years and 
features prominently in both the legislative agenda and the agenda of the Cabinet of Ministers.  For 
example, the 2016 Cabinet of Ministers Action Plan called for a host of reforms including: 
increased policing hiring, police vetting, reform of criminal investigations and district police, the 
establishment of a new national emergency telephone system (102), the establishment of a new 
system of police discipline and police evaluation (Cabinet of Ministers Action Plan 2016)15  Many 
of these reforms however have not proceeded despite substantial political, financial, and 
diplomatic support. 
Main Argument 
This dissertation seeks to understand exactly why it is so difficult to implement sustainable 
police reforms in countries like Ukraine with high levels of corruption, insecurity, and political 
instability.  To answer this question, this dissertation examines the success and failures of 
contemporary police reform initiatives in Ukraine since 2014 in both historical perspective, 
through examining Ukraine’s previous attempts at reform of police, and international comparative 
perspective, examining police reform campaigns from other countries.  I use three stages of reform 
cycle to explain the life course of reforms through stimulus, political response, and institutional 
articulation and outcome.   
                                                            




I. Reform Stimulus  II. Political Response (will)  III. Institutional Articulation (outcome) 
In this dissertation I demonstrate that meaningful police reform is only possible when a 
certain amount of political will is generated.  Political will means substantive action on policing 
issues by political elites and often comes in the form of legislative changes, the creation of new 
institutions, or changing the rules, procedures and operations by which an organization functions.  
Political will is a calculus made by political elites and decision makers within the state that is in 
turn a function of five sources of reform stimulus: international pressure, political upheaval, state 
building, policing scandals, and civil society.  The relative effect of each of these five sources on 
political will varies for each reform and determines the type of reform that becomes possible, how 
much political support it will enjoy, for how long, and whether the reform ultimately becomes 
sustainable.   Political will is itself temporary, fickle, and fleeting and thus different sources of 
political will determine the political response and institutional articulation or outcome. 
Figure 1.1 Sources of Political Will 
1. International Pressure 
2. Political upheaval     
3. State Building       
4. Policing Scandals 
5. Civil Society 
 
These five sources will produce pressure on political elites to reluctantly engage in reform 
for a variety of reasons.  These sources of stimulus often have important implications for receiving 
international financial aid, tackling important state building issues of security and stability, and 
addressing issues of police scandal or crime that can be exploited by ambitious political opponents.  
While these decisions often require political elites to make some sort of decision, their ultimate 
POLITICAL RESPONSE/ 
POLITICAL WILL 




decision on reform is always tempered by another set of mitigating factors which constrain the 
possibilities of police reform.  These three mitigating factors are corruption, insecurity, and 
political competition over law enforcement. 
Many studies have documented how corruption and high insecurity are detrimental to both 
state capacity and reform efforts (Bayley 2001; 2005; Stefes 2006; Hinton and Newburn 2009; 
Taylor 2011; Ungar 2012).  The novel contribution of this dissertation is the argument that 
Ukraine’s inherent political fragmentation (what Lucan Way (2005) calls “Pluralism by Default”) 
and what I will call political competition serves as both an enabling and constraining factor of 
reform.   This is because political competition, while providing electoral incentives for political 
elites to deliver successful reforms, also produces intense political struggle over control of law 
enforcement.   
First, political forces exert persistent and intense competition over control of Ukraine’s law 
enforcement institutions in which they both attempt to expand their own powers while limiting the 
powers of other political factions over law enforcement. This competition, in conjunction with 
rampant corruption and increased insecurity, typically prevents the emergence of a political 
consensus needed to enact deep institutional reforms of Ukraine’s law enforcement system and 
needed policies, despite long acknowledged problems, a clear public mandate, and extensive 
western pressure to reform.   
Second, the post Maidan expansion of self-organized civil society groups (Puglisi 2015; 
Way 2015; Cleary 2016) has been considered one of the engines of democratization in Ukraine, 
but these groups are heavily susceptible to political capture and represent yet another area of 
political competition over public order.  Thus, the political pluralism and civil society activity in 




often later countered by the political instability and uncertainty over control of law enforcement 
in the second response phase. 
Figure 1.2 Police Reform Cycle 
I. Stimulus II. Response II. Mitigating Factors 
 
 
International Pressure  
State building Campaigns        Corruption 
Political Upheaval              Stimulus    Political Response      ↔ Insecurity 
Police Scandal           Political Competition 
Civil Society    ↓   ↓                              
     
 
III. Policy Outcome III. Institutional Articulation (Outcome)    
 
Public pressure and Political will   Political insulation and public oversight 
↓   ↓    ↓   ↓ 
Sufficient      insufficient   Yes   No 
↓   ↓    ↓   ↓ 
  Enacted  not enacted   sustainable    not sustainable 
                 
 
Finally, in the third outcome phase, political decision makers under simultaneous pressure 
from the first five sources of reform stimulus, and the three mitigating factors of corruption, 
insecurity, and political competition, arrive at a policy decision where the policy or institution is 
articulated.  This final product is a result of the tension between the first two stages of the reform 
cycle process and will shape the reform outcome and articulation.  In the case of legislation this 
means that the final bill is always a product of both the original stimulus which provoked the 
decision makers to action as well as the mitigating factors, some of which may fail to address the 
original problems or create unanticipated problems known as “backfire”.  As this dissertation will 
show, the key to passing legislative reforms is often the political pressure from a scandal, 




 In cases of institutional design, the amount of pressure from the first category and the 
second category have important implications for whether new institutions are “insulated” and 
include oversight and accountability mechanisms or not.  For decisions about institutional design, 
the most important factors are often international pressure (for insulation), the strength and ability 
of civil society to oversee and hold institutions accountable, and the level of political competition 
over the staffing and powers of the new agency, and the ability of the new institution to interrupt 
corruption schemes.  
 Political insulation is a strategy of protecting public institutions from becoming responsive 
to private or corrupt interests and should not be misunderstood as political impunity.  Insulation 
for police agencies means protection from following illegal orders from political elites and a 
meritocratic and impartial personnel system.  Insulated institutions are still accountable to the 
public and elected officials for their performance and conduct, but rather insulated institutions are 
protected from the worst practices of patrimonialism and from executing illegal orders through 
formal political independence, merit-based staffing, defined rules, and transparency mechanisms.  
  A central argument of this dissertation is that in a highly corrupt and competitive 
institutional environment like Ukraine, the reform of law enforcement institutions that are not 
politically insulated from nepotism and illegal orders and which do not include public oversight 
and accountability mechanisms will not be successful or sustainable.   
By successful and sustainable I mean that the institution is generally improving in its levels 
of public trust and approval and that it is politically independent, does not carry out illegal orders, 
and is not at immediate risk of being abandoned.  This dissertation examines reforms by observing 
various political, institutional, and organizational factors in five different reform categories: 
16 
Structural reforms, legal (procedural) reforms, professionalization (personnel) reforms, 
accountability reforms, and community relations reforms.   
These reform categories are not mutually exclusive, but rather emphasize different aspects 
of police organizations and police action which in turn require different types of reforms and 
changes.  For example, structural reforms of police organizations are premised on the logic that 
the key to reforming police organizations is in changing and structure of the police apparatus 
through changes in command, organization, and mission.  Legal and procedural reforms focus on 
changing the procedural and legal framework under which police operate, have authority to 
investigate crimes, and are constrained that determine police behavior.  Personnel reforms 
emphasize making police organizations more ‘professional’ though improving the systems of 
recruitment, selection, training, and internal discipline and personnel management practices. 
Accountability reforms focus issues of police oversight, transparency, and discipline.  Community 
relations reforms are focused on improving trust and cooperation between police and communities. 
The following table (Table 1.2) shows the issues and reform areas by chapter and includes 
the underlying problem or issue and their manifestation, various reform proposals, and the 
purported outcome or goal of each of the reforms that this dissertation will examine and detail. 
Table 1:  Issue and Reform Areas in Ukraine 




Decentralization Little or no local control over police 
Policing is inefficient, police are not 




-Transparent but not insulated/
partially sustainable
-Not implemented
Demilitarization Police are undemocratic, militarized, 
repressive 
Abuse of Protesters- heavy handed tactics 





-Police become a civilian institution
-Units remained and proliferated




Poor Quality and 
inefficient 
Investigations 
 Investigators are overly dependent  
Poor cooperation on investigations 







conducted   in less time
-Passed in first reading, not yet
implemented
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An in-depth case study of Ukraine’s police reform since 2014 presents itself a worthwhile 
research project for several reasons.  The first reason is that any success is unexpected given that 
the police had been so delegitimized in the eyes of the Ukrainian public, heavily politicized, and 
resistant to previous reform campaigns.  The dozens of failed and abandoned law enforcement 
reform programs in the nearly quarter century between Ukraine’s independence in1991 and the 
Euromaidan in 2014 provide a bleak perspective for the feasibility of future police reforms, yet 
many areas of the police are showing a noticeable improvement in several metrics.  Second, police 
reform is a rare and difficult phenomenon even in stable democratic systems with relatively low 
corruption, functioning democracy, trusted institutions, and effective and organized civil society. 
Human Rights 
Violations 
Reliance on crime clearance rates 
Over use of Pre-trial detention 
Fabrication of Evidence, Torture/ Coerced 
Confessions, Unrecorded Crime 
-Switch to evaluations on
public trust & approval
-Massive reduction in
pre-trial detention
-Not yet implemented, no clear plan







Corrupt/ incompetent personnel 
Police lack the ethics, skills, and knowledge 





The establishment of a higher quality 
cadre in Patrol Police 
-Police Commissions implemented
throughout U kraine 
Training Police are undereducated in procedure, 
technology, tactics and human rights 




of training from MoI
Establishment of Patrol Police 
Academy PPA- (sustainable) 





- institutional knowledge loss






Partial Establishment of independent 
and meritocratic leadership 








Human rights abuse of citizens  




-NPM & HR Dept.
- Failure to create State Bureau of
Investigations
- Weak oversight by parliament &
society/ no compliance mechanisms
Corruption 
Control 
- police predation on citizens




-Increase in DVB enforcement but





Public Trust The public distrusts police 
-Unwillingness to provide information to




Surveys demonstrate an initial 
increase in public trust of all police, 
particularly Patrol Police 
Insecurity The public feels unsafe 
-Public doesn’t rely on police, may use other
security actors (private, criminals, vigilantes)
-Increased officer
presence
-Police are more effective
(POP)
Failure to implement systemic 
Community Policing in Ukraine 
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Why should police reform be expected to work in a country with much less nearly all of these 
conditions are absent?  Studying policing in a hybrid political system16 (Levitsky and Way 2002; 
Taylor 2012) and in a state where the political and social institutions are unstable (Kadar 2000; 
Hale 2016), provides insight into larger processes of administrative reform in a dynamic and 
unstable institutional environment which have important implications for questions relevant to 
political science such as democratization, state building, citizen security, corruption and public 
administration in hybrid regimes.  An examination of Ukraine’s police also allows for an analysis 
and application of various theories and arguments from the literature on international policing, 
which is often heavily prescriptive but rarely reflects on the conditions of successful reform 
(Bayley 2001, 2005; Shearing; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006).  Furthermore, there are relatively few 
in-depth case studies of actual police reform campaigns, particularly in transitioning and post-
Socialist countries (with the exception of Caparini and Marenin 2004; Light 2014; Marat 2013; 
O’Shea 2015).  Police reform is also a central, although underappreciated, area of state building, 
and many attempts at western assisted state-building result in failure.  Police are the state agents 
that citizens are most likely to interact with on a day to day basis (Bayley 2001; Grabowski 2013; 
Moncada 2009) and therefore the relationship between citizen and police, and the public’s attitudes 
towards law enforcement condition citizen’s attitudes toward the state in which they live (Caparini 
and Marenin 2004; Gonzalez 2015).  This dissertation uses Ukraine as a case study to show how 
social, political, and institutional changes which occur during political upheaval create both 
windows of opportunity for reforming police; while simultaneously creating conditions of political 
and institutional uncertainties which mitigate the possibilities for successful and sustainable police 
reform.  In tracking the progress of police reform in Ukraine since Euromaidan this study attempts 
16 Hybrid regimes are political systems which combine elements of democracy with authoritarian practices (Diamond 2002; 
Levitsky and Way 2002).   
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to provide a better understanding of what political and social conditions police reforms becomes 
possible under, including which factors have enabled certain reforms to become sustainable while 
others fail.  It is my hope that through the research and findings of this dissertation, greater 
knowledge can be generated into the study of police reforms during political turnover in hybrid 
regimes which can be useful for scholars and practitioners of police reform.   
Organization of the Dissertation 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapters 1 introduces the history of 
Ukrainian policing and shows how many of the problems of Ukrainian policing have persisted for 
decades, surviving countless reforms attempts despite widely acknowledged institutional 
malfeasance, a public mandate for reform, international assistance, and public commitments to 
reform from political elites.  This chapter looks at the effects of different political actors and 
administrations on policing, from the Soviet period through independence to post-Euromaidan 
Ukraine, to show how and in what ways these administrations have attempted to reform in the 
police, and the effects of these reforms.  This chapter also explores the effects of scandals and 
political conditions prior to 2014 and explores why these were reforms were largely unsuccessful 
and unsustainable.  Chapter one concludes with a concise history of the changes and reforms begun 
or enacted since 2014 including the drafting and passage of the 2015 Law on National Police, an 
overview of international financial and technical assistance to Ukrainian law enforcement since 
2014. 
  Chapter 2 presents this dissertation’s argument.  I demonstrate that while numerous 
previous attempts to address systemic problems in Ukraine’s policing system have failed, the 
current social, political and institutional change occurring in Ukraine since 2014 produced a 




progress while reform efforts in other areas failed or were later abandoned at different stages in 
the reform cycle.  The factors enabling police reform are: the emergence of a new set of political 
actors and police, increased international support and conditionality, a growing and active civil 
society which creates and maintains pressure on elites and lawmakers for police reform, 
independence from Russian influence, and, perhaps most importantly, institutional mechanisms 
which allow for external participation in reforms and facilitate oversight of the reform process.   
At the same time, the upheaval and the uncertainty created by Ukraine’s political and social system 
elevate the effects of insecurity and public panic from increasing crime and the armed conflict in 
Donbas which elevates the importance and autonomy of law enforcement.  More importantly, in 
the wake of the collapse of the Yanukovych administration in 2014, the breakdown of the 
Yatsenyuk government in April 2016, and an increasingly tenuous political coalition ahead of 2019 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections, political infighting has increased substantially.  As the 
political situation remains unstable in Ukraine, political competition over control of law 
enforcement institutions through appointment, legislation, and budgets has intensified.  Corruption 
in Ukraine which was becoming increasingly centralized under Yanukovych was subsequently 
decentralized as competing political forces and entrepreneurs seek to renegotiate the existing and 
emerging opportunities for illicit rents17.  In short, the perennial instability of Ukraine’s political 
system is paradoxically both an enabling and constraining factor in driving reforms of Ukraine’s 
police. 
  This dissertation takes an inductive approach to studying the politics of police reform by 
providing a process-tracing narrative of previous and contemporary efforts to address ongoing 
                                                            
17 Police and political corruption undoubtedly existed in Ukraine before the current transition, however the instability caused by 





issues of policing in Ukraine and demonstrates how reforms have been shaped by various political 
and social conditions over time.  The narrative of this dissertation is that while the problems 
plaguing Ukraine’s police are systemic and long standing, partial police reform become possible 
under certain conditions where police scandals, international pressure, civil society and other 
factors converged in ways to generate temporary political will to address an issue.  Once the stimuli 
have provoked an institutional and political response in the second stage there are decisions made 
about the policy to be enacted or modified or the institution to be designed.  This dissertation 
argues that the policies most likely to be enacted are those which are drafted in response to a 
scandal, with large coalitions, and in conjunction with civil society.  Similarly, in the design of 
institutions the reforms most likely to be sustainable are those with a high degree of western 
support, and most importantly institutional designs which allow for political insulation and 
mechanisms that allow for civil society and public oversight.  In the absence of these mechanisms, 
reforms that lack these central components will likely fail or be abandoned following the passage 
of a police scandal. 
The following five chapters detail each of the five reform areas in chapters 3 through 7.  
Each of these chapters begin by explaining the background of the relevant issue and its 
corresponding reform, arguments for and against these particular reforms, attempts to pass or 
implement these reforms since 2014, and observations about the likely future paths of these 
reforms.  Throughout each chapter I consider the enabling and inhibiting factors for each reform, 
the actors and interests involved, and, where possible, the indicators by which the reforms are 
being measured and cases of similar reforms from other countries.  The final chapter will briefly 
review each of the reforms from the five chapters and provide a comparison of the progress of 
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these reforms, reflecting on the question of why certain reforms have proceeded while others have 
not, and under what conditions we may expect a future change in the path of certain reforms.   
Studying change in police is important because the persistence of human rights abuses by 
police and other state actors, corruption, and insecurity present major obstacles to state-building, 
democratization, and economic development in many countries around the world (Shelley 1998; 
Nield 2001, Bayley 2005; Levitsky and Way 2006; Ungar 2010; Taylor 2011; Light, Prado and 
Wang 2015).   It is my hope that through this study greater understanding about police in hybrid 
regimes and unstable political systems can be produced that will prove useful to scholars, 
practitioners and others who are concerned with police, human rights, and citizen security issues 
in post-authoritarian countries.  Identifying and implementing sustainable police reforms is a 
crucial task crucial not only in Ukraine or the Former Soviet Union, but in many developing 
countries that face similar issues affecting citizen security, democratization, and the rule of law. 
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Chapter 1:  Historical Roots of Ukrainian 
Policing 
This chapter begins by providing a brief introduction to the defining features of Ukrainian 
politics post-Independence and then introduces the cast of players in Ukrainian politics, law 
enforcement structures, and civil society for those who are unfamiliar with Ukraine’s particular 
history and politics. In examining actors this chapter borrows the classification from Linz and 
Stepan’s “arenas for democracy”, includes political society, bureaucratic society, and civil 
society18 (Linz & Stepan 1996).  Then the chapter gives a brief overview of the criminal justice 
system in Ukraine and the various actors involved in the process.  The chapter then turns to a 
discussion the long-standing problems of Ukrainian policing which current and previous reforms 
have attempted to address.  Finally, this chapter will consider the previous approaches of prior 
Ukrainian governments to police reform and explain why and how reform became a political 
reality only in 2014 Ukraine following the Euromaidan and what changes have been made to date. 
Politics in Ukraine 
For those unfamiliar with Ukrainian politics, the defining features of Ukrainian politics in 
the post-Independence period are regional polarization19, political instability (resulting in unstable 
democratization), and endemic corruption. This section provides a brief primer in these three fields 
which are explored in greater detail throughout the dissertation.  Region has been a very salient 
issue in Ukrainian politics, largely due to different historical, economic, linguistic and political 
factors.  Roughly speaking the territories of Western and Central Ukraine have shown consistent 
18 I exclude economic society because it is outside of the scope of this study and rule of law because it is a phenomenon or 
practice included in the other categories rather than a distinct classification of actors. 
19 Regional divisions are discussed in greater detail throughout this dissertation, and particularly in Chapter 7: Community 
Relations. 
24 
electoral support for promotion of Ukrainian language, history, and culture as well as European 
integration and democratization, whereas the territories East of the Dnieper river and in Southern 
Ukraine have supported political objectives supporting Russian language “rights”, greater state 
paternalism and subsidies, and closer ties with Russia have done better in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine (D’Anieri 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010; Kuzio 2012).   Although Leonid Kuchma (1994-
2004) was able to build electoral support on both sides of the Dnipro by combining Ukrainian 
nationalism with economic protectionism, political polarization remains salient in Ukraine 
(Yekelchyk 2015).  Victor Yushchenko won a plurality of the vote in central and western Ukraine 
in 2004, whereas Victor Yanukovych won the presidency in 2010 with a majority of support in the 
East and south through his Party of Regions.  Taras Kuzio argues that since many in Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine boycotted the 2014 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Ukraine elected its 
first “pro-European” majority Parliament (Kuzio 2016; 115).   
Political upheaval and instability has been another prominent feature of Ukrainian politics, 
and has resulted in extensive competition over state resources, especially law enforcement in every 
administration since Ukraine’s independence in 1991.  Lucan Way describes the political system 
in Ukraine as “pluralism by default” because he understands Ukraine’s political competition as the 
failure of would-be authoritarians to consolidate power rather than any genuine commitment to 
democratic competition (Way 2005; D’Anieri 2011; Way 2015).  The weakness of the state and 
particularly the disloyalty of the police plays a key role in this weakness and Way explains: 
Electoral turnover is widely seen as evidence of democratic institutional strength or elite 
acceptance of democratic norms—and thus an important step toward democratic consolidation 
However, Ukraine’s first electoral turnover was caused less by strong institutions or 
democratically minded leaders and much more by the fact that the police and security services 
were weak and unwilling to follow orders. (Way 2015; 2). 
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   Political instability and weakness is one of the primary factors that enabled the success 
of massive social movements such as the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the Euromaidan 
movement in 2014 or which resulted in mass protests and elite defections that replaced a seated 
(or favored) President.  The Orange Revolution was sparked by public outrage at blatant electoral 
fraud following the stolen election in 2004 by Victor Yanukovych and weeks of massive street 
protests including protest camps and non-violent resistance in Kyiv and other large cities resulted 
in a runoff election with Victor Yushchenko winning the Presidency.  Unfortunately, the 
presidency of Yushchenko (2005-2010) was mired by political infighting, allegations of high level 
corruption, and little progress on essential reforms.  Nevertheless, Levitsky and Way (2010) and 
others (Hale 2015) have argued that the term of Yushchenko, however tumultuous, qualified 
Ukraine as a competitive democracy between 2005 and 2010.  Following the election of Victor 
Yanukovych in 2010, the reinstatement of the previous constitution and the imprisonment of 
political rivals such as Yuliya Timoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko experts concurred that Ukraine was 
facing significant democratic backsliding and headed for a reversal towards authoritarianism 
(Kuzio 2012; Motyl 2013).  In November 2013, small anti-government protests began in Kyiv’s 
Independence Square, known in Ukrainian as the “Maidan Nezalezhnosti” after President 
Yanukovych abruptly reneged on an association agreement with the European Union.  Following 
repression of small groups of protesters by Ukraine’s infamous riot police, the “Berkut”, thousands 
more Ukrainians mobilized to join the protests which escalated into bloody street battles between 
protesters and state security forces throughout the winter of 2013-2014.  The worst violence 
occurred during February 18th-20th, 2014 and resulted in the death of over 80 protesters by law 
enforcement. On February 20th President Yanukovych fled Ukraine20 and his government 
20 Yanukovych fled first Kharkov, then Crimea, and finally Russia with the help of Russian security forces 
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collapsed after a no confidence vote by Parliament.  In addition to the mobilization caused by 
repression of protesters, Ukrainian scholars agree that a primary cause of both the Orange 
Revolution and the Euromaidan Revolution was political defection from the president due to the 
resentment of allies who felt that the two Presidents had become too greedy and overreached.  For 
example, Henry Hale argues that one of the key reasons that Yanukovych’s political vertical or 
pyramid collapsed is that many oligarchs and political leaders resented his overt efforts at 
concentration of all political and economic power in the country at their expense (Hale 2014).  
Therefore, the intense political infighting seen both during the Yushchenko government (2005-
2010) and in the current Poroshenko government (particularly after 2016) are more representative 
of a return to the chaotic natural stasis of Ukrainian pluralism, rather than a temporary phase of 
political instability or gridlock. 
 Following the ouster of Yanukovych, the newly formed interim administration appointed 
an interim President, Oleksandr Turchynov and an interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 
both from the Fatherland (Batkivshina) Party.  In Spring 2014 Ukraine was quickly confronted 
with several existential security crises including the successful armed invasion and annexation of 
Crimea by Russia in March of 2014 and the beginning of a Russian backed armed separatist 
insurrection in its eastern provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk, known together as the “Donbas” 
region.  Long standing practices of distrust, corruption, and patrimonialism among political elites 
and more recent crises have produced a hybrid political system that is fundamentally unstable, and 
which creates short political horizons for incumbents, and uncertainty for voters, vested interests, 
and international lenders. 
Finally, Ukrainian politics are characterized by extensive corruption in nearly every sector 
of life including the political sphere, bureaucracy, the economic sphere, and social interactions. 
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Transparency international gives Ukraine the low ranking of 29 on its Corruption Perception 
Index, making it the most corrupt country in Europe21.  The roots of Ukraine’s extensive corruption 
are legacies of corruption from the Soviet era, arbitrary privatization of state resources in the 
independence period resulting in a new class of oligarchs, low wages throughout the state sector, 
and informality22 (Hale 2016; Polese 2016).  Like in many other post-Communist countries, the 
privatization in Ukraine has produced what Joel Hellman (1998) calls a “partial reform 
equilibrium” in which those on the winning side of privatization stall and oppose reforms at 
precisely the moment most advantageous to them, and in doing so imposing high costs on the rest 
of society (Hellman 1998).  This “partial reform equilibrium” explains Ukraine’s moratorium on 
the sale of agricultural lands, the privatization of key state industries, and the opposition to a host 
of other non-economic reforms, including reform of law enforcement and the court system, which 
are essential tools to control political and economic resources.   
Indeed, a passive and inactive legislature is the norm for Ukraine and in many other post-
Soviet republics and is thought to be the result of weak political parties, few incentives for parties 
to cooperate, and executive heavy political systems (D’Anieri 2007; Hale 2014).  This legislative 
inaction is not the result of ideological differences, rather there is often broad consensus among 
nearly all political parties on the need for many fundamental reforms including reform of law 
enforcement.  Rather, generating enough “political will” or motivating political elites to cooperate 
on a measure is an endemic problem in Ukrainian politics because of weak parties, low 
accountability of elected officials to voters, and executive and cabinet domination of many key 
decision-making powers.  Paul D’Anieri writes, “At least on the surface, the problem with reform 
in Ukraine is not disagreement about goals. While political infighting in Ukraine is endemic, there 
21* Ukraine is tied with Russia, which also has a score of 29 
22 Abel defines informality as “the space between two formal rules” (Polese 2016; p19) 
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is a great deal of consensus on many of the country’s problems and objectives…Consensus on 
these goals makes the inability to accomplish them even more puzzling” (D’Anieri 2016 4-5).   
Thus, the status quo of Ukrainian politics is generally inaction on most problems.  This 
dissertation will be studying legislative and institutional change as the exception, rather than the 
rule, in Ukrainian politics, and the rare conditions and circumstances on which this political action 
becomes possible, successful, and sustainable. 
Accusations of corruption are common place in the highest reaches of Ukrainian power23, 
but unlike other countries with more centralized corruption such as Russia, Ukraine has various 
competing oligarchic “clans” based in different regions which can (and often do) shift their 
political and financial support to opposition politicians who favor their interests (Kuzio 2016; 
Levitsky and Way 2010; Minakov 2015).  These competing corrupt spheres of interest has caused 
defections in every government since independence and further political instability. 
Ukrainian political clans often include combinations of formal political power, media 
holdings, economic power, and more recently battalions.  Clans are typically regionally based or 
centered around an economic commodity such as coal, natural gas, or heavy industry that is 
concentrated in particular parts of the country.  These clans and centers of power have realigned 
considerably following the Euromaidan, but the most established clans have been the so-called 
“gas lobby” based in Dnipropetrovsk which includes Oligarchs such as Yulia Timoshenko, Victor 
Kolomoiisky, and the Donetsk based “Family”, the power base of former President Yanukovych 
and home to coal and industrial magnates such as Rinat Akhmetov.  Recently, new clans have 
emerged or reconfigured such as the power base built around President Petro Poroshenko and his 
allies from Vinnitsa and a Kharkov-based clan that is centered around Interior Minister Arsen 
23 Luke Harding. "Ukraine’s leader set up secret offshore firm as battle raged with Russia" The Guardian. April 4th, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/04/panama-papers-ukraine-petro-poroshenko-secret-offshore-firm-russia 
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Avakov and includes many current and former veterans of the War in Donbas.  These clans will 
be referenced further later after political parties are introduced in the following section. 
Ukraine’s regional divisions and fractured politics also have important implications for the 
political process and reform prospects in the country.  Although some have argued Ukraine’s 
ongoing oligarchic and regional competition an important obstacle to autocratic consolidation 
(D’Anieri 2011), however Lucan Way argues, citing evidence from other political countries with 
deep regional divisions, shows that it is also a primary barrier to reform.  
“The experience of these other cases suggests that Ukraine may face a dilemma: national divisions 
may simultaneously promote dynamic and (semi) democratic political competition while at the 
same time undermining both reform and the development of stable, well-functioning democratic 
institutions” (Way 2016; 41). 
At the state level, low salaries, a weak rule of law, and a culture of corruption allow many 
public officials and bureaucrats to abuse their position for private gain, either through soliciting 
bribes for services, selling public resources, or by a host of other means.  Informalism which see 
public positions, like police, as their personal property, political spoils and opportunities for 
providing rents is also deeply rooted in Ukrainian culture (Polese 2016).  Nearly a quarter of 
Ukrainians admit to having paid a bribe to a state official in the past two years24 and many essential 
services such as healthcare or education are nearly impossible to obtain without a material 
exchange (Polese 2016).  The combination of high-level and low-level corruption throughout 
Ukraine means that corruption is not simply an illicit practice of the few, but an institutionalized 
means of survival and a way of life for many in Ukraine.  Regional divisions, political instability 
and corruption are thus the starting point for understanding Ukrainian politics, our attention now 
turns to an introduction of the specific actors of Ukrainian politics.   
24 IRI Municipal Survey 2017; p44. 
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Actors 
This section will introduce and briefly sketch the cast of actors in Ukrainian politics.  In 
this section I have borrowed from Linz and Stepan’s 1996 “Arena’s of Consolidated Democracy” 
and used their groupings of political society, bureaucratic society, and civil society.  In this section 
I not only define and detail actors but also outline their powers, interests, and constituencies.  
Detailing constituencies is a complicated but valuable way to evaluate elite decision making. 
Understanding the powers, interests, and constituencies of various actors allows for a better 
analysis of their decisions and behavior under different circumstances and enables us to trace the 
evolution of various reforms throughout this dissertation. 
Political Society 
Linz and Stepan define political society as “the arena in which polity arranges itself to 
contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus” and this 
can include political systems, parties, leadership, legislatures, presidents and coalition 
governments (Linz and Stepan 1996; 8).   Ukraine is a heavy presidentialist parliamentary republic, 
with a directly elected President and a multi-party legislature known as the “Verkhovna Rada”.  
Ukraine’s President is directly elected for a five-year term and nominates the Prime Minister which 
must be approved by the Parliament.  In addition to the President, there is the Cabinet of Ministers, 
a Central Executive authority consisting of 20 Ministers which are distributed to the parties of the 
coalition government and nominated by the President and confirmed by Parliamentary majority.  
Ukraine’s legislature has 450 people’s deputies (MPs) which are elected via a combination of 
proportional representation single-mandate districts and party lists (although 28 seats are currently 
vacant due to Russian occupation in Crimea and the Donbas).  Ukraine’s population of 44 million 
is divided among 24 regional entities called “Oblasts”, the (occupied) Autonomous Republic of 
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Crimea, and two cities with special status, Kyiv and Sevastopol25.  Each Oblast is headed by a 
Governor which is appointed by the President, although recent decentralization reforms have 
mayors, city councils, and regional governments (Oblast Rada or OblRada) are all directly elected 
by local voters in separate elections. 
Ukraine ratified its first constitution in 1996, over four years after declaring independence 
from the Soviet Union, and the 1996 Constitution featured strong presidential appointment powers.  
As mentioned in the previous section, Paul D’Anieri and other Ukraine experts credit Ukraine’s 
powerful executive with the weakness and inactivity of its legislature.  There is a fair degree of 
irony in this explanation however, because President Kuchma (and western allies such as the 
United States) was able to argue for and ultimately win strong executive powers over the 
legislature precisely because of the weakness and inaction of the legislature to enact necessary 
economic reforms during the 1990’s (D’Anieri 2007).  Many argue that the excessive 
accumulation and subsequent abuse of executive authorities by Kuchma resulted in the Orange 
Revolution in 2004, after which Ukraine’s constitution was amended in a manner that transferred 
much of the President’s powers to Parliament, including control over police.  Henry Hale and 
others (Levitsky and Way 2010) have argued that rather than stemming from democratic impulses, 
the 2004 decision by outgoing President to weaken the office of the Presidency came out of fear 
of possible prosecution by his successor (Hale 2015; 314).   Upon winning the Presidency in 2010 
Victor Yanukovych packed the Supreme Court with judges loyal to him and overturned the 2004 
Constitution, returning Ukraine to the 1996 heavy Presidentialist Constitution which he used to 
consolidate his power and attack his opponents.  In 2014, following the ouster of Victor 
25 This includes territory currently under Russian occupation including Crimea, and occupied territories in the Donbas, Donetsk 
and Lugansk Oblasts.   
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Yanukovych, the 2004 Constitution was again returned and remains the constitution of Ukraine 
today, albeit with a dominant executive and cabinet.   
Parties 
Ukraine’s political parties have long been criticized for being weak and having little to no 
ideology but instead institutions serving as mere aggregators of oligarchic interests and 
paternalistic political machines (Hale 2016; Kudelia 2016; Kuzio 2015; Levitsky and Way 2010).  
Taras Kuzio (2016) notes that many parties have been created by oligarchs as disposable projects 
for the sole purpose of winning a single election, commonly referred to as one-use or disposables 
(“odnorazove”) (Kuzio 2016C; 137).  Following independence, Ukraine’s Communist Party was 
one of the major opposition forces but ceased to be electorally viable in the millennium and was 
not elected in the 2014 parliamentary elections for the first time (Kuzio 2015).  Below I introduce 
Ukraine’s most important political parties (in order from greatest to least share of seats in the 
legislature) and briefly detail their leadership, ideology, base of support, ministries controlled (if 
any), number of MPs, and current public approval rating.  
The Block of Petro Poroshenko ‘BPP Solidarity’ (Solidarnost) is the party hastily created 
by current President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko to compete in the 2015 Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections following the abrupt departure of Victor Yanukovych.  The party describes 
itself as democratic and pro-European in ideology and its base of electoral support is strongest in 
Central and Western Ukraine, particularly in Poroshenko’s home region of Vinnitsa.  Petro 
Poroshenko is a Ukrainian oligarch from Central Ukraine who made his fortune in manufacturing, 
telecommunications, and banking. He previously held a Cabinet Positions under the presidency of 
Victor Yushchenko but left after feuding with previous Prime Minister and Presidential Candidate 
Yulia Timoshenko (Yekelchyk 2015).  After being elected President of Ukraine in May 2014, BPP 
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Candidates took 132 of the 42326 seats in Parliament and thus became the largest faction.  The BPP 
increased its seat share by to 143 after the merger of 11 MPs from Vitally Klitschko’s Ukrainian 
Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) party in summer of 2015 but is now back down to 138 
MPs after losing several members.  A recent public opinion poll from July 2017 by the National 
Democratic Institute found that BPP had an 8% approval rating and a 53% disapproval rating.  The 
constituency of Petro Poroshenko is currently all Ukrainians as he is the President, however the 
party is particularly interested in winning over pro-European and moderate Ukrainians in the next 
election cycle. 
“People’s Front” (Narodni Front) is the second biggest party in Parliament with 81 MPs 
and control of 7 Cabinet positions including the Minister of Interior and Ministry of Justice (the 
other 13 are controlled by persons nominated by the BPP parliamentary faction or President 
Poroshenko.) The People’s Front Party split from Yulia Timoshenko’s “Fatherland” (Batkivshina) 
party and peeled off many of the most high-profile party leaders including former President 
Turchynov, former PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and current Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov. 
Because of its leadership by former acting President Turchynov and the appointment of many 
powerful battalion commanders, the party was initially associated with a bellicose strategy towards 
the separatist regions of the Donbas and which initially saw it outperform all other parties in the 
2014 Parliamentary elections, particularly in Western and Central Ukraine.  Many of the central 
figures in People’s Front are from the Eastern City of Kharkov and the party has also incorporated 
certain extreme rightwing forces including those under the command of the ultra-nationalist Andrii 
Biletsky, leader of the National Corps and founder of the Azov Battalion.  Despite its initial 
success, People’s Front is currently the least popular political party with just 5% approval and 56% 




approval according to the same NDI post.  The viability of People’s Front will undoubtedly be in 
jeopardy for the next election as Yuliya Timoshenko will reclaim many of her original 
constituency and the frustration with the current coalition and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has 
eroded their popularity.  In response to this, Avakov recently proposed a tentative plan to regain 
control of occupied territories through “de-occupation”, yet the plan has few details.27   
  Together BPP and People’s Front form the coalition government with 219 seats while the 
opposition parties hold 152 seats with a further 51 MPs nonaffiliated and 28 seats vacant. The 
coalition government originally included other parties but following political infighting and mutual 
allegations of corruption the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko, Samopomich, and Fatherland all left 
by April 2016.28 
Ukraine’s Opposition Block was also created to compete in the 2014 Parliamentary 
Elections out of the remnants of Party of Regions, the party of former President Victor 
Yanukovych.  The Party of Regions held a strong base in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, 
particularly the Donbas, and according to Taras Kuzio it amalgamated the Communist Party of 
Ukraine, various pro-Russian parties, and various oligarchic and organized crime groups into a 
highly efficient and disciplined political machine (Kuzio 2012; 2015; Kudelia 2014).  After the 
fall of the Yanukovych government, the Party of Regions collapsed and instead former MPs 
created and campaigned as the “Opposition Block” and performed well in the traditional 
strongholds of Southern and Eastern Ukraine.  The Opposition Block currently has 43 seats in 
Parliament and has a 12 percent approval rating and a 47% disapproval rating according to the 
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2017 NDI poll.  In addition to the Opposition Block there is the smaller “Rennaissance Party” 
funded by Victor Kolomoiski which includes Kharkiv’s Mayor Gennady Kernes and picks up 
much of the eastern vote. 
The current Parliamentary opposition consists of largely pro-European parties including 
Samopomich, Fatherland, Renaissance, People’s Will, and the Radical Party.  Samopomich (Self-
reliance) is a party created by the incumbent Mayor of L’viv Andrii Sadoviy that is described as 
Christian Democratic and pro-European.  The party performed well in the 2014 Parliamentary 
elections gaining 33 seats (but currently holding 25 seats).  The party initially joined in a coalition 
with BPP and Peoples Front but left in spring 2016, causing the collapse of the second Yatsenyuk 
coalition government in Parliament and the election of a new PM, Volodymyr Groysman of BPP.  
The party controls no Ministries but is one of the more popular parties with 18% approval and 
28% disapproval throughout Ukraine according to the NDI poll.    
 ‘Fatherland’ (Batkivshina), the party of former PM Yuliya Timoshenko, was one of the 
most popular parties in Ukraine at one point however following the split of the People’s Front to 
compete independently in the 2014 elections it only gained 20 out of 450 seats in the Rada.  
Timoshenko is originally from the Eastern city of Dnipropetrovsk but her pro-Ukrainian rhetoric 
has always seen her perform better electorally in Central and Western Ukraine than in the South 
and East of the country.  Despite performing poorly in the 2014 elections, being in the opposition 
may have its advantages as Fatherland may have avoided some of the blame for the current 
governments failings.  The party currently has a 15% approval rating (NDI 2017) nationwide and 
is much times more popular than both BPP and the People’s Front and is largely favored to be a 
major force in the coming Ukrainian elections and the most viable threat to BPP. 
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   In addition to formal political parties, high profile activists have emerged as a driving 
force in Ukrainian politics, often able to promote reforms from within or without the government. 
Examples of these activists include former journalists Mustafa Nayyem and Serhii Leshchenko, 
both of who were elected on BPP party lists after the 2014 election.  Nadiya Savchenko, a former 
helicopter pilot made famous after her two years as a prisoner of war in Russia was also appointed 
on a Batkivshina list in November 2014 while still imprisoned in Russia.  Finally, although not 
currently holding electoral power, former President of Georgia and former Poroshenko ally and 
Governor of Odesa Oblast Mikhail Saakashvili had emerged as a political force in the Ukrainian 
opposition.  Saakashvili had relatively low popularity levels but had nevertheless become a thorn 
in the side of Poroshenko as the government was unable to prevent his entry into the country 
following the dubious revocation of his citizenship29 and has been unsuccessful in previous 
attempts to deport Saakashvili to Georgia, thus neutralizing him as a threat.  Eventually Saakashvili 
was detained and deported to the Netherlands in February 2018. 
Like in any political system the primary goals of political actors are to gain and maintain 
elected office.  Rather than ideology, the primary factors in voter behavior in Ukraine appear to be 
regional affinities and voter fatigue at the political establishment and frustration towards reform. 
As previously mentioned, political polling in Ukraine collects both questions on candidate 
popularity as well as their “anti-rating” or the level at which voter’s dislike given candidates or 
parties.  This second metric is often more important in Ukrainian politics as few political parties 
or candidates have approval ratings above 20% nation-wide.   Thus, the constituency of political 
parties are private interests such as business or oligarch groups, important bureaucracies such as 





police and security services whose support they need to maintain power, and only then the 
unenthusiastic voting public (discussed after the next section as Civil Society).  Their powers to 
attain the goal of maintaining political power are first and foremost in representing the interests 
and delivering results for political allies and interest groups, either in the form of favorable 
legislation or control of key assets, or in preventing and defeating unfavorable legislation or 
redistribution.  Bureaucracies, such as the police, for their part, want organizational resources, 
powers, and autonomy. The Executive has wider powers in certain areas such as staffing and 
appointments as well as veto power, the cabinet has the advantage in creating internal 
organizational rules and procedures, and Parliament controls the flow of legislation.  Each uses 
their powers to attempt to deliver for their private interests and bureaucratic allies.  A distant third 
in political decision making is delivering public goods such as reform for the public at large.  
Barbara Geddes in her 1994 study of bureaucratic reform in 20th century Latin America argues that 
although elected officials owe their continued tenure and electoral success to delivering public 
goods to the electorate, the need to gain the control of public and private interests in order to 
maintain political stability and loyalty in the short term means that they often have to bargain away 
the same tools needed to deliver reform to the public.  Furthermore, as much previous research 
demonstrates (Nield 1999; Ungar 2002; 2011; Gonzalez 2014) and as this dissertation will argue, 
public opinion on policing and security issues is far from monolithic, making determining voter 
policy preferences very challenging for political elites.  The publics simultaneous fear of crime 
and insecurity along with their deep distrust of law enforcement sends confusing messages to 
political elites about what should be the proper course for reforms.  There is no doubt, however, 




Yevhen Krapyvin provides a poignant example of this unhealthy relationship between police and 
policies regarding the maintenance of ‘proper’ criminal statistics. 
“At the joint collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine he [Prime-Minister 
V.Groysman] threatened to fire three heads of regional police departments who had the worst 
indicator of solved cases. What these chiefs had to do in order not to be fired — is very easy to 
understand” (Krapyvin 2018; 13). 
 A final very salient factor in political decision making and law enforcement reform in 
Ukraine is political elites fears of voter outrage over police powers.  One lawmaker said in an 
interview that although political leaders are conscious of the need to deliver anti-corruption reform 
and improve policing and criminal justice services to their constituencies, they are equally if not 
more concerned about being accused of creating a “police state” by the media, civil society or 
opponents.30  Ukrainian society had long been distrustful and suspicious of its law enforcement, 
but following the Euromaidan law enforcement became nearly totally delegitimized and the public 
has been very sensitive to any attempts to increase police scope or powers.  As chapter 4 will argue, 
this public skepticism has made the reform of criminal investigation and police procedure very 
complicated.  For example, lawmakers from the L’viv based “Samopomich” (self help) party, often 
considered to be one of the more progressive and less corrupt political parties, opposed legislation 
that would have introduced a points penalty system on drivers for drunk driving and other 
infractions claiming it violated human rights.  As this and many other examples throughout this 
dissertation will show, the level of public distrust of law enforcement is so extreme that it often 
disincentivizes law makers to take any action, even in the face of rising crime and a consensus of 
the need for reform. 
                                                            





 Bureaucratic society is essential to democratic government in that it provides services, 
protects citizens, and enforces the rule of law in a society.  In Ukraine the agencies responsible for 
this are law enforcement agencies such as the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the National Police 
of Ukraine (since 2015), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Procuracy (Prosecutor General) 
the State Bureau of Investigation, and the courts.  Ukraine’s Ministry of the Interior is in turn 
responsible for the National Police of Ukraine, the State Border Service, the State Emergency 
Service (DSNS), the State Migration Service and the National Guard.  The MoI is charged with 
“defending the rights and freedoms of citizens and the interests of society, the struggle against 
crime, safeguarding public order, assuring the safety of citizens, of road traffic and firefighting, 
and of guarding and defending especially important state installations” (Harasymiw 2003; 328).  
The MoI has a critical role in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict in the Donbas as it controls the National 
Guard of Ukraine, the Border Guard Service and several other armed battalions involved in the 
fighting.  
 Control of the national guard, like other security forces, has long been a point of contention 
between competing political forces in Ukrainian politics.  The original Ukrainian National Guard, 
created in the 1990’s and subordinate to Parliament was disbanded by President Kuchma who saw 
it as a threat and the current National Guard is composed of the former Interior Ministry “Internal 
Troops” (vnutrishnoi voiska) and volunteers.  Ukraine’s Nation Guard, under command of the 
Interior Ministry, currently stands at approximately 35,000 and cannot exceed 60,000 by law.  In 
addition to territorial defense Ukraine’s National Guard is involved in many areas of civilian law 
enforcement including guarding government buildings and policing protests.  Many have argued 




of the Interior, Arsen Avakov, is one of the most powerful figures in Ukraine and the most 
powerful Minister of Interior in Ukraine’s history.  From the late 1990’s till approximately 2015 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior had well over 300,000 employees 386,600 employees 
(Harasymiw 2003; Das 2005; 973; Kuzio 2015), but that number has recently decreased to under 
200,000 by 2017.    
 The 2015 Law on National Police created the National Police of Ukraine as an entity 
formally independent of the Ministry of the Interior but still dependent on the Ministry’s approval 
for its budget, legislative proposals, structural organization, and personnel decisions regarding 
police management (Law on National Police Articles 14-17).  The National Police is highly 
centralized and currently has 100,000 police officers based in six different departments including: 
Patrol Police, The Criminal Block, Pre-Trial Investigation Bodies, Protection Police and Special 
Police, and Police for Extraordinary Situations31. Ukraine’s Patrol Police have been the 
centerpiece of law enforcement reforms since 2015 and have recruited nearly 18,000 new police 
officers to date.  The Patrol Police was established with substantial help from western donors and 
technocrats, (especially Georgians who conducted a similar reform in 2004), but observers of the 
reform process and the Ukrainian public concur that little reform has occurred outside of the Patrol 
Police (Friesendorf 2017; Krapyvin 2017).  
 The powers of Ukrainian law enforcement are substantial and have important 
considerations for political leaders.  For example, law enforcement can exercise its discretion in 
which protests to permit, or which figures to target for prosecution.  Way and Levitsky (2006) note 
that one of the key elements of authoritarian stability in post-Soviet regimes is coercive state 
capacity, such as when police forcefully disperse protesters or interfere in elections or infiltrate 
                                                            




and monitor opposition.  They argue that coercive capacity, which is the key to regime stability, is 
largely a function of scope- the ability of the regime to penetrate society, and cohesion- non-
material bonds (such as ethnic, kinship, or veteran bonds) that create links between the coercive 
apparatus and the political regime (Way and Levitsky 2006).  There is emerging evidence of a 
certain level of cohesion and loyalty being built between ATO veterans in the staffing of key posts 
throughout the National Police such as Azov veteran and Deputy Interior Minister Vadim Troyan 
Chief of, Chief of Patrol Police Aleksandr Fatsevich, and many regional police chiefs who were 
connected to MoI volunteer battalions.  While there is currently no evidence to think that these 
groups will engage in the type of high intensity coercion that were seen during the Euromaidan, 
the prominence of military veterans in police leadership is noteworthy.  
Other staffing has seen regional components with police officials from Avakov’s home 
town of Kharkov seeing prominent posts throughout Ukraine such as Andri Kryschenko (of 
Kharkiv) becoming Chief of Kyiv Police.  In addition to regional bonds and bonds formed by war, 
I argue that a major institutional factor in determining the support of police and other law 
enforcement is the provision of institutional resources and budgets, powers, and autonomy.  
Yanilda Gonzalez (2014) and others have noted that police often determine their loyalty and 
support for the regime based on the provision of these and other services through what she calls 
“patterns of accommodations”.  Thus, in exchange for police loyalty and the potential use of their 
coercive powers police demand resources, power and institutional autonomy.  These same three 
demands are renegotiated during police reform and thus the political calculus to deliver police 
reform often becomes a balancing act between maintaining the loyalty and support of law 
enforcement and reacting to strong public pressure for police reform, often in the wake of a 




including patrol officers, criminal investigators and even staff and personnel from the National 
Universities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NAVS).  This last group has proved to be a 
particular challenge for reforming police education as the powerful staff of the NAVS and its 
rectors have extensive support and connections throughout the National Police. 
The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office “PGO” or Procuracy (Prokuror) investigates 
and prosecutes crimes, and until recently, exercised the power of “general oversight” (nadzor) over 
all other state bodies.  The power of the Procuracy to oversee all areas of state activity and conduct 
pre-trial investigations made the Procuracy a powerful ‘administrative resource’32 against political 
and financial rivals and the Procuracy has been at the center of internal political power struggles 
since Ukrainian independence (Hedenskog 2010).  For example, Prosecutors closed a four-year 
criminal investigation into torturing Euromaidan activists, inciting separatism and corruption 
charges against Kharkov Mayor Gennady Kernes from the Renaissance party in September 2018.  
The decision to close the case is thought to be in response to Kernes’ agreement to support 
President Poroshenko’s bid for reelection by providing support in Kharkov and other eastern 
oblasts during next years election33.  Reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), began 
before the Euromaidan with the introduction of a new Criminal Procedure Code in 2012, the 
removal of “general oversight” (nadzor), and increased judicial review of prosecutorial powers 
(Solomon 2015).  The public had long resented the corruption, inefficiency, and unfair 
prosecutions by the Procuracy, but following the role of the PGO in prosecuting activists for 
“terrorism” during the Euromaidan the Procuracy became a target for reform immediately after the 
fall of Yanukovych.  Because of the tremendous power of the Procuracy in the Ukrainian judicial 
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and political system reform of the PGO has been particularly slow and few observers consider it 
successful.  The appointment in 2016 of Yuri Lutsenko, a connected career politician in Ukraine, 
yet one who lacks the legally required education degree or any prosecutorial experience, is a 
testament to the political importance of the PGO.  Lutsekno’s appointment required the Parliament 
to pass a special bill granting him a waiver from the educational requirements and it was roundly 
criticized by many within and outside of Ukraine.  Over 84%34 of Prosecutors were reappointed 
after vetting, interference in the work of prosecutors by “area supervisors” in the PGO remains 
common place in Ukraine, and the Prosecutor General’s Office remains one of the least trusted 
institutions in the country (Beluosov 2017; Razumkov 2016).  The PGO has also been criticized 
by both Ukrainians and foreign observers for its failure to prosecute former and current security 
forces for their role in the violence on Euromaidan and high-ranking officials of the Yanukovych 
regime.35  The Prosecutors office36 has largely failed to hold law enforcement accountable for legal 
and human rights violations outside of the ATO, and the former Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze 
has cited consistent interference and obstruction by the PGO in investigations of both criminals 
and state officials (including police) from the Prosecutor General’s Office during her tenure37.  The 
efforts to remove pre-trial investigation from the Prosecutor General’s Office, in line with global 
legal norms of the division between prosecution and pre-trial investigation, have also proceeded 
grudgingly.  The 2012 Criminal Procedure Code requires the PGO to transfer pre-trial 
investigation (already done by the police) to another agency, the recently created State Bureau of 
                                                            
34Reanimation Package of Reforms: Reform of Law Enforcement http://rpr.org.ua/en/groups-rpr/06reform-of-law-enforcement-
bodies/ 
35 Neil Buckley and Roman Olearchyk. "No justice one year on for those killed in Kiev’s Maidan Square: Questions remain over 
Ukraine massacre on first anniversary". Financial Times. February 20th, 2015.  Available at:  
https://www.ft.com/content/fbc442ec-b844-11e4-86bb-00144feab7de 
36 The Procuracy is described in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6. 
37  Former Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze stated that although Ukraine’s internal affairs police initiated 1,000 cases against 
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Investigation, which will have authority over major crimes and crimes committed by state officials, 
including police.  The reluctance of the PGO to give up its investigative authorities and personnel, 
and overt attempts at competing political forces from BPP and People’s Front to pack the newly 
created SBI with their political patrons has greatly complicated the establishment of this new 
oversight institution.  Even with the loss of pre-trial investigation of state employees to the SBI 
the PGO will still handle the majority of criminal investigations and thus their cooperation in 
criminal prosecution is needed for police to provide to ensure justice and public order.   
Several other law enforcement agencies exist in Ukraine will be occasionally referenced 
throughout this dissertation but are largely outside of the scope of this study.  For example, the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) is an autonomous anti-corruption police force which 
deals with high level corruption where the amount in question is in excess of $200,000 USD.  Like 
the Patrol Police, it was a central component of US and European reform strategy for Ukraine.  
Extensive western support gave the US and the EU leverage to demand that NABU be established 
through an independent recruitment and staffing policies in order to ensure its political 
independence and insulation of the nascent institution.  Like the Patrol Police, NABU is one of the 
few law enforcement agencies which has substantial trust among the public and it has been 
successful in pursuing several high-level investigations, however, much like reformed units in the 
police NABU faces significant opposition and obstruction from largely unreformed courts and 
prosecutors.   
The Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeka Ukraina) or “SBU” is Ukraine’s 
successor to the KGB and handles both foreign and domestic security and intelligence operations.  
In comparative contrast to police and courts, this agency has become substantially more effective 




penetration and because of their central role in the ongoing armed conflict.  The SBU cooperates 
with NABU and certain departments within the police, particularly internal affairs (DVB) which 
rely on the cooperation of SBU for criminal investigations.  SBU is thought to be closely under 
the political control of President Petro Poroshenko, and several high-profile security failures 
resulting in assassinations on Ukraine’s territory have resulted in renewed calls for reform and the 
removal of law enforcement functions from SBU38.  Ukraine’s courts have also largely been 
unreformed, although a second attempt at reform of the Supreme Court began in late 2017.  
Although the PGO, NABU, SBU, the courts, and soon the SBI are integral components of the 
Ukrainian justice system, they are not the central focus of this dissertation. Instead they are 
referenced only in conjunction with their relation to the National Police of Ukraine. 
Civil Society  
Linz and Stepan define civil society as the “arena of the polity where self-organizing 
groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate 
values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (Linz & Stepan 1996; 7).  
Ukraine was long considered to have a weak civil society and comparatively few autonomous 
organizations, although the role of these groups during and after the Euromaidan has expanded 
substantially in large part due to their central role in sustaining and supporting national defense 
(Puglisi 2014; 2015; Minakov 2015).  In Ukraine, civil society includes experts and academics, 
social movements, individual activists and journalists, and domestic and international NGOs and 
international technical assistance programs.   
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This dissertation will categorize civil society into three different groups: mass civil society 
as a force for protest or (‘the public’), professional civil society and the “expert community”, and 
violent civil society and vigilante groups.  The first group is the most amorphous and is generally 
dormant but is activated around issues and can turn out in force, as evidenced during the 
Euromaidan, but may also be activated during police scandals or in response to rising crime. 
Certain fulltime protest groups exist within this first category such as “Automaidan”, an all 
Ukrainian network of automobile owners who participated in the Euromaidan and other ongoing 
protest campaigns throughout the country, often in automobile convoys.   
  A major argument of this dissertation is that the Ukrainian public, like most other 
societies, has a diverse and sometimes contradictory set of hopes and expectations for police 
reform.  This dissertation will extensively cite current public opinion data that shows that the public 
is increasingly concerned about crime and public order, a phenomenon that I will refer to as 
“insecurity”.  This is both in response to a rise in actual street crime (which can often be difficult 
to quantify and measure in Ukraine) and simply the fear and perception of increased disorder which 
may not actually threaten individual citizens.  Insecurity in Ukraine leads to public support for 
certain measures such as tough and long sentencing for criminals and even extrajudicial violence 
against criminal suspects, societal marginals and inmates, however support for authoritarian 
policing is mitigated by extreme public distrust of the police.  The fear of rising insecurity also 
sometimes manifests itself in resentment of police reform and new police, such as the Patrol Police, 
and at times a certain level of nostalgia for previous policing systems in Ukraine.  While rising 
insecurity in many cases leads to public support for an increase in political powers, the deep-seated 
distrust of Ukrainian police by the public means that the public is simultaneously reticent to 




dissertation will show, the tension between public fears about rising crime and the police’s inability 
or unwillingness to deal with the problem, and the lack of public trust and legitimacy in policing 
often collide to prevent the emersion of policy that has general support amongst both the political 
elite and the general public.   
The second group includes full time professionals who are engaged in issues of law 
enforcement reform and are often referred to as the “expert community” and are often involved in 
drafting and supporting legislative reforms as well as in monitoring and analyzing new and existing 
institutions.  In Ukraine the exert community which specializes in law enforcement includes the 
Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR), the Ukrainian Association for Monitoring Pre-Trial 
Detention and Law Enforcement (UMDPL), the Center for Policy and Legal Reforms (CPLR) the 
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KhPG).  This professional civil society works as a kind 
of “policy community” which does much of the analytical legwork for conceptualizing, drafting, 
and refining various legislative and procedural reforms for police.  They are a crucial link in 
feeding the “policy stream” in creating proposals to be adapted during the “policy window”, but it 
is important to note that they cannot create the policy window themselves (Kingdon 1995; 2001).  
Rather, the policy window or opportunity in this story comes typically from unanticipated events 
such as scandals and external pressure. 
The third group, sometimes called “uncivil society” exists of violent non-state actors who 
are capable of both competing with and cooperating with law enforcement.  The third sector of 
civil society is generally considered harmful for police reform because it undermines the role of 
the police as the sole legitimate arbiters of force and because they can, and often do, clash with 
law enforcement.  In Ukraine this third sector includes armed non-state actors and vigilante groups 




Recently in Ukraine, these vigilante groups have claimed to be upholding order and safety on the 
street in response to what they see as police incompetence.  In addition to violent attacks on 
minority groups such as Roma and unlicensed alcohol or gambling establishments they have 
clashed with police and other law enforcement in several cities throughout Ukraine.  The first two 
sectors of civil society- the protest community and the professional or “expert community” are 
generally considered to be necessary in prompting and conducting police reform.  Erica Marat 
(2018) argues that the strength of civil society is in fact one of the key factors in the success of 
failure of police reform in Eurasia.  The third component, “uncivil society” or vigilantes are 
generally considered to be harmful to reform because they both undermine the states capacity and 
authority and often serve the interests of pernicious private actors such as oligarchs. 
  Civil society has been crucial in the reform process both for creating and sustaining the 
pressure on political society to enact change, but also for monitoring and oftentimes directly 
implementing reform.  Ukraine has a large and thriving human rights community and includes the 
Kharkov Human Rights Protection Group (KHPG)39, The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights 
Union40, and the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement 
(UMDPL)41, Amnesty International42, and many others organizations working on issues of police 
torture, detention conditions, and other human rights issues throughout the country.  Ukraine also 
has many grassroots initiatives that monitor the progress of political, legal, and economic reforms 
in Ukraine including CEPR, iMore, and the Reanimation Package of Reforms.  Many of these 
expert groups have been active in proposing and reviewing policies, legislations and internal 
regulation, and are often invited to draft or comment on policies related to policing.  These expert 
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organizations, as well as journalists, play an important role in overseeing reforms and have blown 
the whistle in several cases of dubious laws, cases of corruption, patronistic appointments, or 
exclusion of civil society from the reform process. 
Many have lamented the weakness of civil society in Ukraine and attributed it to societal 
divisions, anomie, and feelings of betrayal (zrada43 in Ukrainian) (Gatskova and Gatskov 2012; 
Kudelia 2012) but the Euromaidan resulted in the formation of many new self-organized groups 
which are active in Ukraine’s defense efforts, humanitarian relief, and overseeing reform (Puglisi 
2015).   Many of these civil society groups Ukraine and have been actively participating in police 
reform through serving on public commissions overseeing police personnel decisions or 
cooperating with police on security projects.  One example is AutoMaidan, a collective of 
automobile owners who first came together to provide transportation and security for protesters, 
but who now participate in police vetting and hiring commissions and independent anti-corruption 
investigations.  Some civil society groups have maintained close relations with the police and 
remain engaged in the reform process, while others have resigned in protest or distanced 
themselves from the police citing insufficient progress in reform.44  In addition to the benefits of 
oversight, the civil society ‘boom’ in Ukraine also carries several risks to reform in Ukraine in that 
civil society groups  and vigilantes are becoming increasingly confrontational with the state in 
areas of security provision.45 Furthermore, in a country with low western linkage and only medium 
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leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010), civil society group have limited resources and many have been 
susceptible to capture by oligarchic groups.  
  Serhiy Kudelia notes that post-Soviet civil society is particularly vulnerable to state capture 
because of many organizations preference for short term benefits, historical or cultural cleavages, 
disjointed values, biased state or oligarch run media, and lack of intellectual leadership (Kudelia 
2012; 150)  Mikhail Minakov argues that the capture of both civil society groups and armed 
battalions has become a deliberate strategy in the evolution of oligarchic clans, what he calls 
‘Financial Political Groups’ (Mikanov 2015; 2016).  This is particularly dangerous for autonomous 
groups involved in security provision, and members of the civil society group were accused of 
interfering in local and Parliamentary elections in Cherkassy, Donetsk and Dnipro in 2014 
(Minakov 2016; 16-17).  The recent emergence of the National “Druzhiniki”46 ahead of the 2019 
election season is further evidence of the risk of these groups to Ukraine’s fragile political system.  
The Druzhiniki have insisted that the state and the police are failing to uphold order and security 
on the streets, yet many see the group with close ties to right wing battalions and political leaders 
as a blatant attempt to influence the upcoming elections. 
  International organizations47, both state sponsored and independent have also had a 
crucial role in police reform in financing, equipping, training, proposing legislation, pressuring 
Ukrainian political elites for reform.  The United States has provided over $25 million of support 
for Patrol Police Projects and other projects, mostly through the State Department’s International 
Narcotics and Law-Enforcement office (INL) and the US Department of Justice’s International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).  The European Union, has also 
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provided substantial economic assistance (€52 Million), technical, and educational support 
through the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM).  Canada has three police programs in 
Ukraine including Agriteam Canada, the Canadian Policing Mission of Ukraine, and the RCMP 
Mission in Ukraine.  The OSCE has provided trainings on community policing, domestic violence 
and sex trafficking and Japan donated 1,500 Toyota Priuses for the newly created Patrol Police in 
2015.  A central argument of this dissertation is that in addition to the financial assistance, one of 
the most important effects of western assistance to Ukraine’s law enforcement reform has been the 
insistence on a meritocratic system of recruitment, selection and promotion and the insulation of 
new institutions from political influence.  Political insulation and meritocratic personnel reform 
were conditions of many of the aid programs, particularly extensive support for Patrol Police.  
Some scholars have noted that the multitude of foreign donor states operating distinctive programs 
in Ukraine sometimes results in duplication of efforts, confusion, or other inefficiencies 
(Friesendorf 2017).  Financial and technical assistance from foreign countries and organizations, 
while critical to the realization of certain reforms reform, has not proven to have sufficient leverage 
to compel systemic overhaul of Ukraine’s justice system as these institutions remain highly 
autonomous.   Having a greater understanding of the actors and institutions in Ukrainian police 
reform, we now turn our attention to the endemic problems of Ukrainian policing that previous 
and current reform campaigns have attempted to address.  The following section looks at issues of 
police ineptitude, extortion, corruption, involvement with organized crime, human rights abuses 
and repression.   
Problems of Ukrainian Policing 
Ukraine’s police have long been accused of major human rights violations, corruption, 




and their proposed solutions are explored in-depth in their appropriate chapters, but they are briefly 
introduced here to establish the basis for and urgency of reform.   
Low Protection 
 Ukrainian police have been historically very inept at providing an adequate degree of 
protection for several reasons.  The first reason is low trust in the police and high insecurity which 
results in many crimes not being reported to the police and low public cooperation in 
investigations.  Following independence and the economic collapse of the Ukrainian economy in 
the 1990’s criminality was at its highest throughout Ukraine, although violent crime rates are lower 
today than in many developing countries.  The first International Criminal Victimology Survey 
(ICVS) conducted in Ukraine found that between 1992 and 1994, over two thirds of Kyiv residents 
surveyed reported that they had been victims of a crime in the previous five years but that less than 
34% of robbery victims 21% of assault victims and only 12% of sexual assault victims reported 
the crime to the police (Kostenko 1999; 18, 26-27).  Many Ukrainians opt not to report crimes 
because they believe that the police will be unable to help, rude or indifferent, or at worst will 
victimize them.   A second reason for low protection is that police are often engaged in predation 
and rent seeking rather than their formal duties of investigating crimes or maintaining order.  The 
third reason is that even when police attempt to do their jobs, they are crippled in their capacity by 
lack of resources, personnel, outdates investigation techniques and technology, poor cooperation 
with or often times sabotage from prosecutors and courts among other issues.  The Ukrainian 
Interior Ministry has historically operated on less than one third of its budget, with consistent 
personnel shortages and lack of basic goods such as forms, ammunition, fuel and shoes 
(Friesendorf 2017; Akulov 2013).  The budget and personnel deficit, coupled with legal and 




exceptionally high and investigators are unable to investigate many serious crimes in the legally 
prescribed timeframe.  This results in the concealment of crimes by downgrading many serious 
crimes to lesser offenses, or the outright refusal to record certain crimes.   
Extortion and Predation 
 Prior to the reform of the traffic police (the State Automobile Inspectorate or DAI/GAI) in 
2015, paying bribes to Ukrainian police was a common occurrence for many Ukrainians.  DAI 
officers were ubiquitous on Ukrainian roads and highways and would constantly stop motorists 
for traffic violations (both real and contrived) and demand bribes to “solve” (poreshat) their 
problems.  This practice was common throughout the Former Soviet Union in countries such as 
Russia and Georgia and is part of a larger corruption pyramid where traffic officers pay bribes to 
their superiors who in turn share them with their superiors (Peacock 2016; Light 2014; Slade 2012; 
Taylor 2010).  In Ukraine, as in many countries, it was not uncommon for traffic police officers to 
compete for or purchase certain checkpoints and posts which provided higher opportunities for 
extortion and bribes, such as roads leading to the airport in Georgia (Stefes 2006).  McCarthy 
argues that in Moscow communities with high levels of Caucasian immigrants are highly sought 
after as they provide extensive opportunities for extortion through immigration and document 
checks (McCarthy 2014; 6).  Ukraine’s reform of the traffic police and the creation of the Patrol 
Police has greatly reduced the practice of police extorting bribes from motorists as many Patrol 
Police officers wear body cameras and are closely monitored48, but extortion and bribery remains 
common in other parts of the police that have not been reformed.  In addition to individual targets, 
businesses are often subject to arbitrary police actions including extortion of bribes, selective 
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persecution, or at the extreme end corporate raiding “Raiderski zakhvat” or “zakazene dele” where 
police officers forcibly seize control of a business and illegally transfer ownership to another party 
(Taylor 2010; Kupatadze 2012; 109).  Corporate raiding is a major issue in Ukraine facilitated by 
the weak rule of law which severely damages domestic and foreign business investment (Rojansky 
2014; Shelley 1998).  One of the most common forms of police extortion is known as a ‘Mask-y 
show’ in which masked security forces raid businesses on the grounds of tax evasion.  During these 
raids they often seize crucial documents or computer servers of the business demand repayment 
for the return of the equipment.   For example, in summer of 2017 in Kyiv49 security forces carried 
out a ‘mask-y show’ style raid on the offices of “Vesti”, an opposition media company, and seized 
servers, documents and records. 
 Police in Ukraine are also involved in protection rackets.  Foglesong and Solomon write, 
“The best-known examples of this entrepreneurial policing include guaranteeing businesses safety 
from gangs, criminal groups, or fire, health, and tax inspectors. In return for these services, police 
officers receive free meals and hospitality from local restaurants or scarce goods and services from 
stores. This activity is difficult to distinguish from racketeering” (Foglesong and Solomon 2001; 
70).  Brian Taylor defines these types of police corruption as “predation” including behavior such 
as corruption, violence and arbitrary despotism (proizvol) against individual citizens which is 
primarily in the interest of the individual officer rather than the state (regime) or society (Taylor 
2010; 180; 198).  Taylor argues that predation is connected with low pay and uncertainty about 
future career conditions and undermines state capacity and state quality (p33; p198), whereas 
repression is typically ordered by the state, who is the primary beneficiary of the act.   
                                                            






Involvement in organized Crime 
 Ukrainian police have also been involved with organized crime figures through 
involvement in the trade of narcotics, stolen cars, human trafficking, smuggling, illegal gambling, 
and many other criminal activities.  Cooperation with organized crime affords police officers who 
typically earn wages of less than $150-2000 USD per month (Friesendorf 2017) immense financial 
incentives while posing few risks in a society where corruption is endemic, there is little oversight 
of policing, there is an extremely weak rule of law.   This process may occur with police directly 
involved in operating the criminal enterprise, or passively involved in “roofing” (kryschovanie).  
Alexander Kupatadze in his 2012 study of organize crime in post-Soviet states finds strong 
evidence of police specialization in cooperating with organized crime in Ukraine. 
Organized crime groups seek alliances with different government officials according to the type 
and scale of their criminal activity. Crime groups engaged in human trafficking will ally with the 
police, while money launderers will target the special services and tax department. If fighting a 
particular criminal activity is split between law enforcement structures, such as cigarette 
smuggling which is addressed by the customs, police and tax departments, the organized 
criminals’ strategy will be to seek contacts in all these institutions or a krysha [roof] influencing 
several of them.  (Kupatadze 2012; 92). 
 
 Some of this most overt corruption has been reined in by reform, but as Lawrence Sherman 
notes “A decline in one source of [police] corruption may lead to an increased reliance on another 
source” (1978; 40) and as certain areas of police corruption such as traffic bribes have come under 
greater scrutiny in recent years, new illicit opportunities in arms smuggling, illegal amber 
mining,50 and even enforcement of the military draft51 have emerged in recent years.  Police 
involvement in organized crime both undermines their ability to provide protection, the amount of 
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public trust in police, and make police subordinate to criminal figures rather than state or the 
public. 
Human Rights Abuses in Police Custody 
 Related to the issue of poor quality criminal investigations, Ukrainian police are notorious 
for torturing suspects and detainees and due process violations (Beck 2005; Chistyakova 2012; 
Krapyvin 2015; Zakharov 2016).  This is, in part, because Ukrainian criminal procedure, internal 
police regulations, and organizational traditions require that police investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges maintain high rates of conviction and low rates of acquittal (Amnesty; Solomon; Paneyakh).  
One of the key drivers of this “prosecutorial bias” (Solomon 2015) is the use of quantitative 
indicators, a major issue in Ukraine, Russia, and other post-Soviet countries acquittal rates are 
virtually zero and where virtually all crimes are solved by confession.  The extensive use of 
quantitative indicators is known as the “stick system” (polochnaya systema) and include the 
number of crimes registered, cases “closed” (roskritiya), and other quantitative measures of police 
performance.  These quantitative measures have a strong impact on police behavior as the ability 
to have good numbers can determine career opportunities for police, prosecutors, and judges but 
including withholding of pay by supervisors. The effect of quantitative measures is felt not only 
within the bureaucracy of law enforcement but is reinforced by political figures who demand 
improved statistics in order to show progress in their promised to provide public safety.  Therefore, 
police have a strong institutional incentive to close cases through coercing confessions by physical 
abuse or torture.  Another method used by police and prosecutors is the extensive use of motions 
requesting pretrial detention (remand52) in order to coerce confessions.  These methods have led 
                                                            




to the torture of thousands of Ukrainians and the death of dozens of suspects in in police custody53.  
In addition to pressure to close real criminal investigations (cases), local police are also under 
pressure to solve a certain number of cases in their district and will often fabricate cases, a common 
practice in Ukraine and Russia where a low status person such as a drunk or a teenager is arrested 
and coerced into confessing to a more serious crime.  Human rights abuses, such as these also 
persist because there is little oversight and accountability over police, few resources for victims of 
police torture, and a disturbing amount of public support for police abuse of suspects (Chistyakova 
2011; KHPG 2017).  Quantitative indicators and attempts to reform this system are discussed in 
Chapter 4, but the consequences including human rights abuses and the wasting of police resources 
on fabricated cases further undermine public trust and confidence in the police as well as their 
effectiveness. 
Repression of Opposition 
 Finally, another consistent problem of Ukrainian policing is that it has been used as an 
“administrative resource” against political opponents, protesters, and others.  Under communism, 
police and other security services were responsible for detecting, and stopping (often through 
violence) any opposition to the regime and maintaining stability on the street (Kadar 2001; Uildriks 
and Van Reenen 2003).  Political repression by police and other law enforcement takes two forms 
in Ukraine, targeted repression and street repression.  Targeted repression is typically against 
specific political opponents or critics who are often high profile and often has a legal, albeit 
questionable, foundation.  Targeted repression often involves selective enforcement of the law to 
prosecute regime opponents for crimes like corruption while allowing impunity for the same 
behavior from allies and is a common feature in Ukraine, Georgia and Russia.  For example, Yuliya 
                                                            




Timoshenko was subject to political prosecutions both in 2001 and 2010 (Harasymiw 2003; 332).  
Former Minister of Interior and acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine Yuri Lutsenko was also 
imprisoned under Yanukovych from 2010-2013 (Kuzio 2015).  More recently, Mikhail Saakashvili 
has been subject to prosecution and a campaign to remove his Ukrainian citizenship, and the Kyiv 
district judge who initially denied the motion stated that she was subject to personal threats.  
Targeted repression can also include using police to shut down critical media or civil society 
organizations or, in the case of Saakashvili and many other Georgians in Ukraine, deporting regime 
opponents.   
In contrast to targeted repression, street repression is much less discriminate than targeted 
repression, its victims are typically ordinary citizens or activists rather than elites, and the goal of 
street repression is to regain control over physical space, deny the opposition a place to control, 
and to maintain public order.  Way and Levitsky use the term “high intensity coercion” to describe 
repression such as firing on crowds because it runs a high risk of backfiring and requires a high 
degree of “cohesion” or unity and a very loyal security force (Way and Levitsky 2006).  Street 
repression does not typically involve the use of lethal force (with the notable and major exception 
of the Euromaidan), but nevertheless uses tactics such as beating and dispersing protesters or 
denying physical entry to protest areas.  For example, riot police were used to quell protest against 
striking coal miners in the 1990’s, and against anti-government protesters in 2002, 2004, 2012, 
and 2013-2014 (Kuzio 2016).  This large-scale street repression is costly however and often results 
in increased protest mobilization that can threaten and eventually spur regime collapse (Beissinger 
2002; Davenport 2006).  As this dissertation will show, the Ukrainian political authorities and 




have invested substantial efforts in professionalizing their crowd control efforts in order to respond 
to political protest without provoking public ire. 
With a greater understanding some of the major problems of Ukrainian policing, this 
chapter now turns to a discussion of the evolution of policing under different administrations in 
the post-Soviet period, their reaction to police scandals and reform attempts, and how these 
conditions led to incomplete and unsustainable reforms in Ukraine. 
Ukrainian Policing through 5 Administrations and Scandals 
This section provides a brief history of policing under the five administrations following 
independence in order to show the challenges faced by each administration and their attempts and 
failures to address these enduring challenges.  A major focus of this section is the theme of 
consistent political competition over control of law enforcement, rooted in Ukraine’s political 
instability, which allows various centers of power to control law enforcement and their efforts to 
use law enforcement against their rivals in furthering financial and political goals.  This section 
also covers major police scandals, are recognized as a major factor in nearly all police reforms 
(Sherman 1978; Gonzalez 2015), although most scandals did not result in sustainable police reform 
because of a lack of proper institutional design and oversight by civil society.  Administration 
policies and scandals are covered in chronological order.   
Under the Soviet Union Ukraine’s police underwent many large structural changes 
including mass purges in the Lenin Era, subordination and merger with the Ministry of Defense, 
and increase in powers during the Stalin Era, a liberalization and decentralization to the republic 
(Ukraine) level during Khrushchev, and a gradual decay in personnel, morale, conditions, and 
prestige during the late Soviet period (Shelley 1996; Foglesong and Solomon 2001).  This 




corruption which coincided with a 1980’s crime wave which brought crime to a rate previously 
unknown in the USSR.  This gradual deterioration of the Ukrainian Militsiya was punctuated by 
several ill-fated reform campaigns, and by independence in 1991, the Ukrainian Militsiya was 
largely considered as a corrupt and delegitimized institution.  The hasty disintegration of the USSR 
which allowed most of the elite to retain power prevented the kind of transitional justice seen in 
other countries of Eastern Europe and transitions in which the former power was cleansed through 
purges and lustration (De Grief 2012).  For example, in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and 
Poland, the police were subject to lustration and Poland reduced its police force by 90% (Kadar 
2001; 3).  Unlike in these countries in Ukraine, most of the Soviet political elite (Nomenklatura) 
remained in their positions, particularly in the security apparatus and MoI.  Martynenko (2005) 
argues that rather than continuing on the course of law enforcement reforms begun through 
Perestroika during the late Soviet period, that the strategic goal of the MoI changed during the 
mid-1990’s from reform to survival or crisis mode.  This refocus on common in other former 
communist countries and in Ukraine was in response to the precipitous rise of crime and organized 
crime as various armed groups competed over the privatization and stripping of massive state 
assets, particularly in the banking, finance, and energy sectors in Ukraine (Kadar 2001; Kuzio 
2015).  This rise in elite crime coincided with a major economic depression in the early to mid-
1990’s during which standards of living plummeted and violent crime increased, affecting most 
Ukrainians (Solomon and Foglesong 2000; Kostenko 1998).  Simultaneously, a deep fiscal and 
economic crisis during the 1990’s saw both the breakdown of police wages and social benefits 
system which made police dependent on cooperating with criminals or extorting resources from 
citizens.  Under the Soviet system policing had never been the most prestigious career but police 




Militsiya perks like housing and MoI run resorts by the sea (Shelley 1996).  The financial 
degradation and the near collapse of the state meant following independence, the police were on 
their own and police corruption became a widely acknowledged, if not official policy of police 
funding in lieu of wages.  Even honest police officers would often ask citizens to pay for their 
gasoline or transportation to respond to a call for assistance, particularly in rural areas. 
Ukraine’s first President, Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) faced several crises from security 
organs including the post-independence crime wave.  Due to rising criminality amongst Ukrainian 
law enforcement, the Cabinet of Ministers created “Department for Combatting Corruption” in the 
central apparatus of the Criminal Police, later renamed the “Department for Internal Security” 
(DVB) in July 1992 (Martynenko 2005; 6).   Kravchuk was ultimately ousted from power after the 
defection of his previous ally, Leonid Kuchma, with the help of the MoI.  Lucan Way writes that 
in the January of 1994, Ukraine’s first President Kravchuk backed down from a plan to break up 
parliament at the intervention of the Interior Minister Andriy Vasylyshyn, who was subsequently 
dismissed a few months later (Way, 2005: 249).  This case demonstrates that the centrality of law 
enforcement in the political balance of power dating back to the very independence of Ukraine. 
Kuchma 
Leonid Kuchma’s decade as Ukraine’s President from 1994 till 2004 was mired with many 
controversies and political scandals involving the Militsiya, yet Kuchma was in many ways 
responsible for bringing about increased stability following the chaos of the post-independence 
period.  The growth of organized crime and state graft, which began in the late 80’s and reached 
its apex in the mid 1990’s, continued under Kuchma although by the late 1990’s economic and 
political power became more institutionalized in regional clans, thus dampening earlier violence 




torture, major internal discipline, declining public trust, and rising criminality the MoI outlined a 
reform package in 1996, including an ill-fated proposition for municipal police with pilot programs 
in Kyiv and Kharkov54 (Martynenko 2005; 3).  In April of 1996, The Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine approved the “Concept of Development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs № 456”.  The 
reform stated the need to increase Militia efficiency, interagency coordination, reject duplication 
of functions, and reform and standardize the personnel policy while granting greater powers to 
local police (MVS 1996; Kalasznik 2013).  Marina Kalasznik (2013) argues that if these measures 
from 1996 had been adopted, they would have been adequate to raise Ukraine’s MoI to 
international standards, but a lack of funding, coordination, political momentum, and the political 
use of law enforcement prevented the reform from materializing.  In the 1990’s the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Interior was funded at only one-third of its operating budget (Foglesong and Solomon 
2001).  Kuchma and his administration were much more interested in directing law enforcement 
and other state resources against their political and business opponents rather than reforming or 
shrinking the Ministry of Interior.  Taras Kuzio writes that by 2000 the number of personnel under 
the command of the MoI outnumbered those of the Ministry of Defense which had been 
systematically hollowed out during the 1990’s (Kuzio 2015; Colby and Pukhov 2015). 
Several rounds of purges (attestation) of the Militsiya occurred during the 1990’s and 
although the number of total MoI personnel increased throughout the 1990’s, Bogdan Harasymiw 
found that in 2000, while nearly 400,000 people worked for the Ukrainian Interior Ministry, the 
actual ration of officers patrolling the street to citizens was 1: 4,500 (Harasymiw 2003; 323).  
Martynenko writes that during the 1990s and early 2000’s the main instrument for personnel 
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reform was “extraordinary attestation” (vetting), which dismissed approximately 2,000 people in 
2005 (Martynenko 2005; 5).  Attestation was meant to purge employees who had violated laws, 
and abused police powers or their official position and would be resurrected in 2015 as a reform 
strategy to improve the cadre of Ukrainian police.  As this dissertation will demonstrate, attestation 
or purging has a popular and recurring theme of police reform in Ukraine. While firing problematic 
police officers is an important part of police reform, in Ukraine vetting has often been used to 
purge political opponents in the police and other law enforcement, rather than to reward merit 
(Akulov 2014; Solomon 2015).   
  Anti-corruption efforts within the police were also launched and in 1996 the Department 
of Internal Affairs or DVB conducted a large-scale operation code-named, “Clean hands” (chistyi 
ruki) where they found 1,400 police officers criminally responsible leading to the dismissal of over 
500 officers (Martynenko 2005; 6). A series of reforms were also begun or attempted during 
Kuchma’s tenure including a new Criminal Code in 2001, (Harasymiw 2003; 327), a 2001 
Decentralization Decree55 and in 2001 the establishment of a “Commission for Reforming Law 
Enforcement Agencies in Ukraine” but the latter two were never implemented (Kalaznick 2013; 
240).56  In 2003 “DVB” (The Department for Internal Security or Internal Affairs) and the MIA 
Inspectorate for Human Resources were merged and the new DVB was organized into a separate 
department under the direct command of the Minister of Internal Affairs (Martynenko 2005; 7). 
Prior to the violence on the Euromaidan, likely the largest scandal involving police in 
Ukraine’s history was the “Kuchmagate” or Gongadze scandal.  In 2000, Interior Ministry 
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Officials (MoI) were accused of assassinating an independent journalist, Georgii Gongadze, on 
orders of former President Leonid Kuchma by opposition speaker Oleksandr Moroz (Levitsky and 
Way 2010).  Gongadze was the founder of an online newspaper Ukrainian Truth (Ukrainskaya 
Pravda) and his headless torso was found in a forest outside of Kyiv several days after his 
disappearance.  A former security guard of President Leonid Kuchma leaked audiotapes where 
Kuchma asked his former Interior Minister Kravchenko to “take care of” Gongadze, as well as 
other cases of illegal orders to his security services (SBU) MoI and tax police against his opponents 
(Harasymiw 2003; 326).  The resulting political fallout forced Kuchma to fire Kravchenko and 
replace him with Yuri Smirnov (Harasymiw 2003).  Smirnov promised to increase public oversight 
of police, abandon the use of quantitative measures, focus on the most important crimes, and 
decrease the workload of investigators, however none of these reforms materialized (Harasymiw 
2003; 325).  The revelation also produced public mobilization against President Kuchma from 
2000-2002 which was known as the Ukraine without Kuchma (UBK) movement.  This movement 
failed to remove Kuchma before his term but saw his base of popular and political support erode 
as many of his top political allies resigned or defected to the opposition, thus laying the foundation 
for the 2004 Orange Revolution.   
Yushchenko  
Victor Yushchenko came to power following the Orange Revolution of 2004, a mass 
protest movement against electoral fraud when Ukrainians mobilized in Kiev against what they 
saw as the dubious electoral victory of Victor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s favored successor and the 
Donetsk Governor, over the western backed candidate Victor Yushchenko.  As had been the case 
in previous anti-government demonstrations, the Militsiya and other security forces (including 




However, the Orange Revolution was also the result of a security forces “split” where the 
Interior Ministry sided with Kuchma while the SBU (Security Services) and the Military sided 
with the protesters, thus protecting them from a brutal crackdown.  Many Ukraine scholars argue 
that this “split” was one of the reasons that the revolution was successful (D’Anieri 2006; McFaul 
2005; Way 2005; 257; Kuzio 2012).  This defection by the SBU, the armed forced, and certain 
elements within the MoI show the critical role that law enforcement plays in determining the 
balance of political power in Ukraine.  Just like President Kravchuk who he had usurped a decade 
before, Leonid Kuchma was ultimately done in by his inability to gain the unquestioned support 
and loyalty of law enforcement and other power ministries. 
 Although Yushchenko was elected on a mandate to combat corruption, Russian influence, 
and put the country on a path towards reforms and western integration, Yushchenko’s term was 
marred by intense political infighting between his former ally, Yuliya Timoshenko and opposition 
from Victor Yanukovych.  This political situation had several consequences for policing.  First, it 
derailed and stunted plans for reform of law enforcement by the newly appointed Interior Minister 
Yuri Lutsenko (now Prosecutor General after June 2016).  Kuzio (2015) quotes Lutsenko on why 
reforms didn’t succeed under Yushchenko:  
The reason for Ukraine not following Georgian police reforms, Lutsenko pointed out, was that 
the Ukrainian and Georgian presidents had very different working styles: In Georgia, the 
President personally met on a weekly basis with his team, government and parliament. They 
jointly planned reforms, executed them, prepared legislation and as a consequence these people 
felt fulfilled. I acted without the support of the President and without any possibility of changing 
legislation in parliament. In such a situation, it was impossible to cut or reform the police force. 
One could instead only watch over the police, providing it with one's own personal example.  





Yushchenko’s original plan57 for the reform of the traffic police after 2004 was designed 
to replicate Georgia’s 2004 police reform, which dismissed the entire traffic police and recruited 
new officers, but this plan to reform them never materialized (Light 2014; Slade 2012).  Peacock 
and Codner (2016) argue that another reason that Lutsenko’s plan failed was due to the 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to allow changes to the 1990 Law on the Militia, and because 
Yushchenko was unable form and sustain a political coalition for police reform.  Other proposals 
at the time called for creating the “institute of detective” and an independent standalone structure 
into the “National Bureau of Investigations”, both of which were proposed a decade later following 
the Euromaidan (Martynenko 2005; 4; EUAM 2015).   
Jakob Hedenskog argues that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU during the 
Yushchenko years remained resistant to any reforms to bring it under civilian leadership or limit 
its power and autonomy, which had increased substantially since independence (Hedenskog 2010; 
6).  Another serious problem faced during the Yushchenko administration was that the 2004 
Constitution reduced the President’s control of appointment powers over the heads of Cabinet 
Ministries, and therefore various law enforcement agencies developed connections with other 
centers of power and resources outside of the executive. The 2004 amendments to the Ukrainian 
Constitution weakened Presidential powers, removing his power of appointment of the PM and 
certain key Ministers positions, including the Minister of Interior.  Political competition over the 
control of law enforcement continued and deepened during Yushchenko’s presidency and there 
was consistent use of security forces for “exceptional”58 purposes including standoffs between 
                                                            
57  Mite, Valentinas. “Ukraine: Yuschenko Orders Law-Enforcement Overhaul”. RFERL. July 19 2005 
http://www.rferl.org/a/1060025.html 
58 Brian Taylor uses the term Exceptional use of bureaucracy to describe situations where bureaucrats obey an order from an 
authorized state superiors that comes in response to specific circumstances that may be discretionary, or even potentially 




security forces loyal to Yushchenko and forces loyal to Yanukovych in 2007 and Timoshenko in 
2008 (D’Anieri 2010; 37).  For example, in May 2007 when Yushchenko tried to fire Prosecutor 
General Svyatoslav Piskun, who was loyal to then PM Victor Yanukovych, the decision was met 
with violence 
When policemen from the SBU, loyal to Yushchenko, came to the Prosecutor-General’s Office 
to ask Piskun to go, he called Interior Minister Vasyl Tsushko, another Yanukovych ally, for 
help. Tsushko overreacted and instructed riot police from the MVS (the Interior Troops’ special 
force Berkut) to storm the Prosecutor-General’s Office, where they clashed physically with the 
Presidential Guard (Directorate on State Protection, Upravlinnya Derzhavnoyi Okhorony, UDO), 
which guard senior officials, and announced that “a coup is taking place.” 
 (Hedenskog 2010; 9-10). 
 
A similar showdown occurred in 2008 between Yushchenko and Timoshenko over the 
leadership of the state property fund of Ukraine, also leading to clashes between law enforcement 
loyal to different patrons (Hedenskog 2010).  Some of the reasons that reform of law enforcement 
failed during these years is because of patronage in appointments, political infighting, or simply 
ineptitude of those responsible for designing and implementing reforms.  The routine uses of law 
enforcement by competing political factions must have also weighed on the calculus of would be 
reformers who, rather than risk the ire of the Militsiya and other security forces, could have made 
the calculation to defer painful reforms in exchange for (partial) loyalty. 
Yanukovych 
Despite being associated with mass electoral fraud and violence in the 2004 Presidential 
Elections, Victor Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine in 2010 in an election recognized 
as free and fair by international observers.  Yanukovych reinstated the pre-Orange revolution 1996 
Constitution, reassuming many of the powers that had been ceded to the Parliament back to the 
Presidency, including appointment of key security Ministers.  Whereas Yushchenko’s five years 




administration was characterized by heavy personalization, centralization, and “sultanization”, an 
extreme form of patrimonialism where all state resources become the personal instruments of a 
leader (Motyl 2010; Linz and Stepan 1996; 51).  Scholars argue that Yanukovych’s attempts to 
consolidate an increasing number of economic and political resources under his and his associates 
control was another reason for the Euromaidan, as other oligarchs and elites were wary of 
Yanukovych’s Donetsk-based clan, “the Family” encroaching into their privileged spheres (Hale 
2015).  Yanukovych introduced personalist staffing policies all throughout the political and state 
apparatus, including many former or current Russian citizens, and some argue that he was 
particularly attentive to finding loyal patrons in the security apparatuses after having learned the 
cost of security defections during the Orange Revolution (Kuzio 2014).   
Not only did Yanukovych seek to create a personalistic regime with a highly loyal security 
apparatus, he also sought to implement a Russian-inspired model of best practices by creating 
greater cooperation between FSB (Russia’s security service) and SBU, and by employing agency 
heads and bureaucrats who had served in similar positions in Russia (Motyl, 2010).  Kuzio argues 
that many of Yanukovych’s appointments of head in the security sector had personal ties to him, 
his business interests, or Russian security officials (Kuzio, 2012).  Yanukovych’s first appointment 
for Interior Minister was Anatoli Mohyliov, who left the post in November of 2011 to become the 
Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.  He was replaced as Interior Minister by 
Vitali Zakharchenko, who fled the country to Russia on the same day as Yanukovych and is wanted 
in Ukraine on charges connected to the Euromaidan massacre. Serhiy Akulov contends that the 
effects of Yanukovych’s campaign of massive personalization in the security sector had 




“Grave consequences stem from inconsiderate changes in the career arrangements of men and 
officers. In particular, tens of thousands of professionals of the lower and middle level resigned 
within 2 or 3 months at the end of 2010.  The unhealthy trend persists, where appointments of 
new heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ukraine's Security Service, Internal Troops give 
rise to mass reshuffling of personnel, from the deputy head of the central staff, heads of main 
departments, heads of regional divisions, departments and sections down to city and district level 
executives. Lack of proper planning of the human resources policy and fair competitive selection 
to fill the vacancies create favorable conditions for flamboyant protectionism, place-hunting, and 
opportunism.” (Akulov, 2013:116). 
Yanukovych’s term also saw a host of legal59 and organizational reforms announced, 
including a new Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) in 2012 that was actually praised for advancing 
human rights in Ukraine and its potential to increase the amount of acquittals in court (Kuzio 2015; 
Amnesty 2012; Akulov 2013; Solomon 2015).  The United State Embassy and the European Union 
were instrumental in pushing for the adoption of the 2012 CPC, but this reform produced many 
unanticipated problems that will be discussed throughout this dissertation.  Another component of 
Yanukovych’s legal reform was the establishment of a judicial high qualification commission that 
Solomon argues was used to purge judges that Yanukovych disliked (Solomon 2015; 171). 
   A reform concept published in 2012 called for structural reforms and demilitarization of 
the police, and observers of Ukraine’s police admit that the police in Kyiv and other host cities 
performed exceptionally well during Ukraine’s hosting of the Euro Cup in 2012 (Akulov 2013; 
118).   
There were also several disturbing reforms during this period, including a Presidential 
decree “On steps towards intensifying the struggle against terrorism in Ukraine,” which included 
extremism, (a term long used in Ukraine to describe political opponents and nationalists), 
alongside terrorism (Kuzio 2012; 576).  Laws such as these as well as extensive personalization 
                                                            




and Russian influence in the security services set the stage for the crackdown which occurred 
during the Euromaidan. Serhiy Akulov also argues that a positive development from the 
Yushchenko years, a reduction in police interference in the electoral process and repression of 
opponents, was reversed under Yanukovych.  Whereas the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections 
and the 2010 presidential elections were free of police interference or repression, the 2012 
elections saw heavy interference by law enforcement and increased repression of regime 
opponents by police (Akulov 2013; 117; Kuzio 2015).  Leading up to the Euromaidan there were 
several police scandals under Yanukovych Other including the death of 20-year-old student Igor 
Indilo in police custody in Kyiv in 2010 (Amnesty 2011) and the brutal gang rape of a woman by 
police6061 in Vradiyivka (Mykolaiv Oblast) in 2013 which resulted in furious villagers storming 
the local Militsiya precinct, although neither of these scandals resulted in sustainable reforms.  
Each of these cases of scandal generated sufficient public outrage to raise the issue of policing on 
the political agenda, but they were insufficient to incentivize lawmakers to enact meaningful 
reform. 
Euromaidan 2013-2014 
The Euromaidan movement began in November 2013 after Victor Yanukovych abruptly 
backed out of Ukraine’s long anticipated accession to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
and Association Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union in favor of closer ties to Russia, 
infuriating those who saw Ukraine’s future in Europe. According to those involved in 
demonstrations and other experts, opponents of Yanukovych had little reason to think that the call 
for protest on Kiev’s independence square “Maidan Nezalezhnosti” (from here on; Maidan or 
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Euromaidan) would result in much action, as the initial turnout was less than 100 protesters and 
social movements in Ukraine had been anemic for most of Yanukovych’s tenure.  The situation 
changed when the Berkut, a riot division of the Public Order Militsiya under the MoI attacked 
protesters on November 30th, 2013.  This led to a dramatically increase in support for the protesters 
and the size of the demonstrations swelled. State repression often backfires and causes ordinary 
citizens to sympathize with the protesters (Davenport 2005; Francisco 2005). Puglisi argues that 
rejection of closer ties with Russia and corruption were the original impetus for the protest, “Yet, 
it was the police brutality and the consistent abuse of authority exercised against the demonstrators 
that prompted a more militant attitude and engendered the feeling that the people had to protect 
themselves against the state” (Puglisi 2015).  In January 2016 as the protests grew and Maidan 
became a permanent encampment, at the urging of the President Parliament passed a series of anti-
protest laws which allowed for trial of protesters in absentia, criminalized “extremist activity” and 
imposed stiff penalties for protest activities such as wearing a mask, participating in protest 
motorcades62, or publishing defamatory materials about police.  These dictatorial laws had the 
effect of increasing public support for the demonstrators and turning the public against the 
Yanukovych regime, the police and prosecutors.  As violence increased and nationalist and radical 
protest groups gained increased control over the protests throughout the winter, traditional 
Ukrainian opposition politician such as Vitali Klitschko and other moderates were shunned and 
booed off stage at Maidan and deadly clashes with law enforcement increased (Onuch 2014).  After 
escalating violence through early 2014, the precarious situation on the Maidan came to a head on 
February 20th, 2014, when snipers opened fire from rooftops facing the Maidan, killing over eighty 
protesters.  This proved to be the final straw for President Viktor Yanukovych and within hours he 
                                                            




had been removed from his position by vote of Parliament. Following the hasty departure of 
Yanukovych to Russia, many of his political supporters and security elites including his Interior 
Minister and many security elites fled to Russia in the following days, including Interior Minister 
Vitali Zakharchenko 
The massacre of protesters, had a profound impact on the character of Ukrainian politics 
and on the new governments approach to law enforcement. These killings completely 
delegitimized the already disliked Ukrainian police and law enforcement system, and in addition 
to those killed, hundreds of protesters were beaten, tortured, kidnapped, or otherwise abused during 
the Euromaidan. The failed wager of the “dictator’s dilemma” (Francisco 2005) caused many 
police, particularly units that were involved in the repression or from Eastern parts of the country 
(including 30% of Donetsk Militsiya), to either flee the country or go into temporary hiding.  Many 
local police were either complacent or involved in Russia’s Crimean Coup in March 2014, and 
some police in the Donbas defected to the separatists during the so called “Russian Spring” the 
same year (Puglisi 2015).  In contrast, there was also a breakdown in policing order in other parts 
of the country as many police from Western and Central Ukraine refused to follow orders to repress 
local demonstrations or deploy to Kiev, (this was also the case during the Orange Revolution) 
(Kuzio 2015; 2009).  This exacerbated the security gap in the weeks and months after the fall of 
the Yanukovych regime in spring 2014 as many towns lacked law enforcement officers who had 
either fled to the Crimea or Russia or were simply hiding in fear of protesters fury (Puglisi 2015).   
In the east of the country this shortage of law enforcement, pro-Russian sympathies, and 
professional agents from the FSB were instrumental in allowing pro-Russian demonstrators to 
occupy government buildings and declare their allegiance to Yanukovych during the so called 




country, in the vacuum left by the absence of police, citizens began to organize themselves into 
volunteer patrol brigades known as “people’s control” (Narodnyi control).  These groups reached 
their peak of activity in spring 2014, but many still exist and have a strong presence in certain 
cities, such as Odesa (Shukan 2016).  The second effect was that the new interim government led 
by acting president Turchynov and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk undertook several measures 
in the aftermath of Euromaidan.  These include attempting to pacify the public by disbanding the 
Berkut63 (special public order riot police) and GUBOZ (Directorate for Combatting Organized 
Crime) and reorganizing the Interior Troops into the newly recreated Ukrainian National Guard.  
Talks began almost immediately on how to overhaul law enforcement which had plummeted to its 
lowest ever approval ratings and level of public trust under 1% (MVS 2014). 
Poroshenko 2014-present 
 Petro Poroshenko was elected President of Ukraine in spring 2014 with 54.7% of the vote64 
for a five-year term and tasked with undergoing deep structural reforms to the political and 
economic system of Ukraine.  His tenure has coincided with an economic crisis, a war, a crime 
wave, and intransigent corruption in nearly all of Ukraine’s state bodies, particularly in the courts 
and law enforcement. From the beginning, Poroshenko was heavily dependent on accepting 
western financial support and advice in exchange for implementing a series of comprehensive 
reforms, and many foreign technocrat advisors came from the European Union, Baltic States, the 
Republic of Georgia and the wider Ukrainian diaspora to serve in the new government or provide 
technical assistance.  The Poroshenko administration’s policy towards law enforcement seems to 
have two ultimate goals, engaging in some minimal level of cosmetic reform and maintaining as 
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much stability as possible.  The President and leaders in the Cabinet and Parliament were eager to 
distance themselves from the Yanukovych regime and its law enforcement regime and made 
several large symbolic gestures towards reforming the police, most notably the reform of the State 
Automobile Inspectorate (DAI/GAI) into the Patrol Police of Ukraine.  This has come from a 
combination of domestic and western pressure as well as from the desire of the current 
administration to gain reform credentials, particularly in 2014 and 2015.  The force mitigating this 
however has been the ongoing security crisis in the Donbas and the political instability or 
competition in national and local politics which preclude drastic change in the police.  Political 
elites face risks when reforming law enforcement, first the risk that the reform will fail and 
backfire, then the risk that the reform may be successful but will cost them the loyalty of the police, 
and finally the risk that new or existing institutions will come under the control of influence of 
their rivals and can be used against them.  Nevertheless, the political conditions during 2014 and 
2015 were sufficient to incentivize the Poroshenko Administration and the Yatsenyuk Parliament 
(before April 2016) to name several high profile Georgians to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
begin reform of the Patrol Police, eliminate special militarized units like the Berkut and Guboz, 
start the process of attestation, and pass the 2015 Law on National Police which gave the police 
formal independence from the MoI for the first time ever.   
Much of this political will evaporated as the coalition government broke down and public 
attention turned from policing and law enforcement to the dragging war in Donbas, the economic 
crisis, and the price of heating. By late 2016 nearly all of the international technocrats including 
former Georgian President and Governor of Odesa Oblast Mikhail Saakashvili, first Chief of the 




resigned citing lack of support, failure to fight corruption, and political interference in their work.65  
President Poroshenko has also been accused of rewarding and protecting his allies and punishing 
dissidents through influential advisors such as Igor Kononenko, known as the “black cardinal” of 
Poroshenko. The Ukrainian President’s approval ratings have declined since 201466 and many 
Ukrainians cite the continuation of the conflict, the economy, and continued corruption as evidence 
of the government’s ineptness.   
Reforms under Poroshenko 
In late 2014, the government announced plans to develop a new and separate structure 
called the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) (MVS 2014).  Various draft plans were created by 
the Interior Ministry through consultation with various expert groups and civil society 
organizations.  In 2014 the Cabinet of Ministers Approved the “Strategy for Reform of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs”67 , which was created in conjunction with the executive director of the Kharkov 
Human Rights Protection Group, Evgen Zakharov.  Many civil society organizations note that 
while they were invited to consult and comment on drafting the new police law, the Interior 
Minister had a clear preference for proposals from Zakharov, who was often put forward as an 
unelected representative of all of civil society.  The Law on National Police provided for major 
overhauls in the selection, recruitment, organization, measurement, and internal discipline of the 
National Police as well as support for the principles of decentralization, demilitarization, 
depoliticization, accountability, and community policing68.  The new structure of the NPU was to 
be independent of the Interior Ministry, staffed by new recruits and domestic and foreign 
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technocrats, and the MoI declared its intention to move towards a model of policing guided by the 
principles of accountability to citizens, a high level of public trust, transparency, and respect for 
human rights (MVS 2014).   The Cabinet of Ministers also supported major overhauls of Ukraine’s 
policing system in their 2015 and 2016 action plans including calling for additional police hiring, 
vetting, and a series of legislative and institutional changes that addressed criminal investigation, 
police discipline, and police oversight (Cabinet of Ministers 2016.) 
In late 2015, Georgian reformers were invited to Ukraine on to provide technical advice 
including Eka Zguladze as the Deputy Interior Minister in 2014, in summer 2015 Khatia 
Dekanoidze as the first Chief of the National Police of Ukraine (Peacock and Cordner 2016). The 
first project and the centerpiece of the police reform was the establishment of a new Patrol Police 
service which were to replace the corrupt and reviled69 Soviet institution of the State Automobile 
Inspectorate (GAI/ DAI) with a new Patrol Police which merged the previous GAI and Patrol 
Militsiya (PPS).  This reform follows a similar pattern to the Georgian police reform in 2004 which 
saw its traffic police entirely disbanded and recruited from scratch (Light 2014; Slade 2008).  
Reform began with new recruitment of Patrol Police in late 2014, conducted with extensive 
technical assistance from the United States and the European Union in conjunction with Ukrainian 
civil society.  In an attempt to break the entrenched institutions of corruption which existed 
throughout the recruitment and educational structures of the Militsiya, Georgian reformers and 
their foreign supporters insisted on competitive testing of all candidates with strict physical, 
medical, ethical and MMPI evaluations which included interviews with commissions including 
members of civil society and the public (Peacock and Cordner 2016).  The police training system 
                                                            





was also overhauled, and the new police received training from American, Georgian, European 
and Canadian instructors.  Between July 2015 and May 2016, the National Police established 
entirely new Patrol Police departments in 26 cities throughout Ukraine and hired approximately 
12,000 new Patrol Police officers (Peacock, 2016).  These newly recruited officers were mostly 
recruited from non-law enforcement back grounds, most had higher education, and over a quarter 
were female.  These new Patrol Police immediately became popular among the Ukrainian public, 
registering upwards of 60% of public trust in many cities (KIIS 2016), as they were the first 
tangible reform after the Euromaidan.  In addition to massive recruitment, the National Police 
established vetting commissions known as “re-attestation commissions” (pereattestatsiya) which 
reviewed approximately seventy thousand former Militia officers and fired over to five thousand, 
or nine percent of police in 2016.   Patrol police have increased public trust in the cities where they 
are operating, but they remain extremely limited in institutional and procedural powers, and other 
divisions of the National Police such as Investigative and Criminal Police divisions have 
experienced little change since 2014.  Reforms were begun with the Patrol Police because of 
limited resources and personnel and because Patrol was meant to be an example and to diffuse 
reforms to the rest of the police, but many fear that the insulated Patrol police will take on the 
negative habits of the former Militia if reform doesn’t expand to other divisions of the National 
Police.  International cooperation and technical assistance to Ukraine’s police has increased 
substantially, and several community policing initiatives have been begun by foreign donors.  
Ukraine’s police have also become involved in the ongoing conflict through the formation and use 
of Special Purpose Police Battalions (PSMOP) and some are critical that much of the attention has 
gone to developing militarized special force units such as “KORD”70.   
                                                            




There have also been several police scandals that have occurred in the post-Maidan era.  
Shortly after the start of reform in January 2016, Patrol Police officers in Kyiv were involved in a 
car chase which resulted in the shooting death of 1 teenager after police tried to fire at the vehicles 
tires in an attempt to make it stop.  This led to the swift indictment of the young officer, but also 
resulted in the first known rally in favor of police by public supporters that thought the officer had 
been judged too swiftly.  Several other scandals are thought to have resulted in policy changes.  
Several public scandals of separatism have plagued the police, in spring of 2016 the regional police 
chief of Vinnitsa71 was forced to resign after it was revealed that he was celebrating the “liberation 
of Crimea” (by Russia) in March 2014.  In April 2017 it was alleged that the current head of the 
Donetsk GUNP was involved in commanding separatists after video emerged on the internet 
appearing to show him with separatist groups in 201472. One source argued that the assassination 
of Belarussian journalist Pavlo Sheremet73 by car bomb in Kyiv, and the subsequent botched 
investigation, convinced former Chief of Police Dekanoidze to prioritize investigative merger 
reform.  The killing of two Patrol Officer in Dnipropetrovsk74 in September of 2016 was also 
briefly used in an ill-fated attempt to pass an unpopular bill expanding police procedural powers 
during traffic stops.  In early 2017 shortly after the new Chief Serhiy Knyazev was named to 
replace Dekanoidze, five police officers were killed, in an apparent case of ‘friendly fire’ likely 
caused by police burglarizing a house75 according to Prosecutor Yuri Lutsenko76, further 
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embarrassing the National Police in its attempts to rebrand itself as an effective and reformed 
police organization.  A series of fatal traffic accidents in 2017 and 2018 have also raised the issue 
of road safety in Ukraine and pulled the conversation in new directions.  This dissertation argues 
that scandals, while providing important opportunities for concentrating elite and public energy on 
policing issues can often distract from other long-term goals and cause previous projects to be 
abandoned for short term political gain.  Furthermore, scandals alone are insufficient to provide 
for sustainable police reform which requires motivated policy coalitions, domestic and external 
support, and institutions deliberately designed to provide independence and oversight 
Law on National Police 
 Arguably one of the most important reforms to date has been the enactment of the “Law 
on National Police”, which was drafted over five months in early 2015 through international 
advisors, legal experts from civil society and representatives of the Interior Ministry.  As I will 
show, this important reform had all of the elements including the impetus of the Euromaidan as a 
catalyzing scandal, the support of domestic and external actors, a political opportunity or 
“window”, some level of coordination and cooperation with civil society which was able to require 
a sufficient institutional response from political elites.  Furthermore, the codification of a law is 
itself an oversight procedure which allows the public and civil society to detect any violations of 
law and provides recourse for addressing them.  These factors made the 2015 Law on National 
Police a sustainable reform and opened the political possibilities for deeper reform. 
The Law on National Police, introduced by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, was passed 
on July 2nd, 2015 with 274 deputies casting a vote.  The Petro Poroshenko Block and People’s 
Front, Fatherland, Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko largely supported the bill in unity whereas the 




and the Non-factional group largely abstained or voted against the bill.77  The Samopomich party 
withheld their support until later rounds of voting.  One of the debates during the passage of the 
law were over an amendment the new Chief of Police would be over the creation of a central 
governing body of the national police to be controlled by the appointed Chief of Police.  The 
amendment had been put forward by Anton Gerashenko from the People’s Front but was opposed 
by Yuri Lutsenko who thought that it would give the new Chief of National Police too much 
independence from political powers and the Interior Minister.78  Great detail was also given to 
appointment powers of top police officials.  For example, according to the Article 21 of the law, 
the Chief of Police is appointed and removed from office by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister of Ukraine based on the proposals of the Minister 
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.  This balance between the Cabinet, the PM, and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs represents a political compromise and a balance in control over policing.  Chiefs 
of territorial [local] police forces are appointed and removed from office by Chief of Police upon 
consultation with the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine but are subject to a vote of no 
confidence from local communities under Article 87 of the Law.   
The final law adopted was drafted by MoI officials and international experts from the USA 
and Georgia and was chosen over a competing draft introduced by experts from the Ukrainian 
NGO and expert group CEPR.   The Council of Europe provided lukewarm support for the law 
and was particularly critical towards the law’s relative vagueness of an overall reform concept, 
undefined police powers, and police relation to other state bodies.  Also, the report raised concern 
about the law’s failure to provide for accountability, oversight, and a public complaint 
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mechanism.79  The law was motivated by pressure to update the antiquated “Law on Militia” from 
1990 into the National Police of Ukraine, a semi-autonomous agency based on the principles of 
observance of human rights and freedom, rule of law, political neutrality, openness and 
transparency, and public cooperation (Chapter 2).  For the first time in Ukraine a list of exhaustive 
grounds for police measures has been established that restricts police measures to preventative and 
coercive measures, a fundamental step in limiting abuse.  A major achievement is that Article 11 
of the Law on National Police stipulates that “The level of public trust and confidence in the Police 
will be the main criterion for the assessment of performance of its forces and units.” Experts of 
policing in the former Soviet Union argue that the use of performance quotas and measures of 
crime clearance rates, by police contributes to the use of torture, false arrest, violation of due 
process, and coerced confessions (UMDPL 2016; O’Shea 2015).   One of the most important 
reforms has been the establishment of “Police Commissions” (Article 51) which allow for public 
oversight and participation in the personnel processes of hiring and promotion.  This provision in 
the text allows for public participation in and oversight of a crucial part of policing, which has the 
ability to seriously increase police accountability to the public and the rule of law. 
The Law on National Police also redefined the relationship between the Interior Ministry 
and the Police, granting the National Police much more autonomy from the Ministry than before.  
The NPU now has the legal status of Central Executive Body, which means that the NPU can now 
control most internal decisions including hiring, promotion, dismissal, allocation of budget and 
operational activities with a higher degree of autonomy from the Interior Ministry.  But the MOI 
must still grant final approval for the budget and approval over central and regional Chiefs. Former 
Chief of National Police, Khatia Dekanoidze, complained of constant interference in staffing 
                                                            





decisions by the MOI and the inability to get rid of Interior Ministry Avakov’s loyalists in the 
National Police who were blocking her reform program.  The NPU is also limited in its legal status, 
as it is not a Subject of Legislative Initiative it cannot introduce laws in the Parliament and relies 
on the Interior Ministry to approve and then introduce necessary legal changes before Parliament.  
This give the Interior Ministry substantial veto power over the NPU and the MoI often removes 
crucial provisions in legislative initiatives needed to accomplish reform goals.   
Human rights groups have been critical of the law for an increase in the grounds that can 
be used to stop, search, and detain citizens, as well as the collection and indefinite storage of 
personal data by the National Police (UMDPL; Banchuk;  CEPR)  Another major limitation of the 
Law on National Police is that it does not give the NPU the authority to establish its own 
educational institutions, which leaves it heavily dependent on the Interior Ministry for use of its 
existing National Universities, financing, and approval of training curriculum.  Because of 
resistance by the Interior Ministry to allow the National Police to use their training facilities, 
training has been financed and conducted ad hoc by international donors which precludes the 
consistency and institutionalization needed for sustainable training reform.  Without changing 
articles of the existing Law on National Police and Law on Higher Education, training reforms 
(covered further under professionalization reforms) will be unsustainable as the NPU lacks the 
funds and facilities as well as the autonomy to approve their own curriculum.  The Interior Ministry 
for its part is reluctant to relinquish control of a crucial lever of influence over the National Police 
and a source of corruption and sinecures for its patrons.  This situation began to slowly change in 
2017 as the first Patrol Police Academy was established in Kyiv after the US and European states 




29 amendments80 to the Law on National Police that would address issues such as the absence of 
competitions for all positions, maintaining military ranks, and no clear regulation on timelines for 
maintaining personal information in databases.  In July of 2016, MPs from Samopomich and 
Batkivshina registered Bill №4753 to amend the Law on National Police to include these 
recommendations but no action has been taken as of 2018.81   
Conclusion  
 This chapter has demonstrated how law enforcement in Ukraine has been influenced by 
various political regimes acting under similar structural pressures but different political conditions 
over the past quarter century.  Law enforcement has been at the center of most of Ukraine’s post-
independence political crises from the National Guard blocking Kravchuk’s attempts to dissolve 
parliament, through the use of law enforcement as administrative resources during the Yushchenko 
years by Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Timoshenko, and most prominently in both the Orange 
Revolution and the Euromaidan revolution.  Post Euromaidan Ukraine has also seen intense battles 
over control of law enforcement with different political patrons82.  The tenure of Dekanoidze as 
the First Chief of Police was a bold effort to assert the independence of the newly created National 
Police of Ukraine, however her resignation in November 2017, as well as the departure of many 
other reformers is testament to the difficulties of implementing reforms in an environment where 
the MoI, the Prosecutor’s Office and the courts remain thoroughly politicized and resistant to 
reform.  At the time of writing it is premature to tell what kind of leadership Chief Knyazev will 
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provide, although it is clear that he, like all other leaders before him, will face an institutional 
environment that is antagonistic to reform. 
 The current leadership of Ukraine including President Poroshenko and Interior Minister 
Avakov argue that advocates for radical reform should temper their expectations as Ukraine is 
currently experiencing multiple crises.  While on the surface this appears to be a reasonable 
argument, an examination of Ukraine’s history shows that each administration has faced several 
crises including the scandals of corruption and nationalist mobilization in the late Soviet period, 
the crime wave of the 1990’s, the Kuchmagate revelation of 2000, and the instability following 
the Orange Revolution.  The changes since the Euromaidan are that western donors and Ukrainian 
civil society have committed much more attention and resources to the problem than was 
previously the case.    This Ukrainian government’s willingness to accept western assistance and 
conditionality and a greater role for Ukrainian civil society in its law enforcement reform program 
are undoubtedly the furnishing of resources, the need for political legitimacy (both within Ukraine 
and without), and the need to reestablish the discipline and abilities of its internal security forces.  
These forces have allowed for progress in the perennial areas of policing that were acknowledged 
but neglected for decades.  At the same time, the prospects for reform have been limited when they 
threaten interrupting political or patronage networks or upsetting the balance of control over 
security forces.  Pressure from society to simultaneously address rising crime while limiting the 
procedural powers of police creates a ‘fractured’ reform coalition that is unable to give the political 
leadership a clear mandate of what the public wants (Gonzalez 2014).  This allows for political 
elites to simultaneously acknowledge the need for deep reforms in many areas while arguing that 





Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and 
Institutional Change through Police Reform 
Introduction 
 This Chapter will attempt to answer the question, what contributes to the success and 
sustainability of police reform and which factors can change the political will of political leaders 
in order to implement the difficulties of police reform in unfavorable conditions?  The core 
argument of this dissertation is that the conditions for a successful police reform are rarely met 
because of the mitigating factors of corruption, insecurity, and political competition.  It is only 
when reform stimuli generate sufficient political will, and this political will is then harnessed to 
either pass legislation or to create independent “insulated” institutions with oversight mechanisms 
that reforms become successful and sustainable.  The goal of this chapter will be to show how 
reforms have been proposed to address specific issues of policing in Ukraine, why they are so often 
unsuccessful, and under what conditions this can change.  The goal of addressing these questions 
is to generate greater understanding about the political challenge of an institutional change and 
public policy change process in Ukraine and in other countries attempting to reform their police 
under similar conditions of corruption, high insecurity, and political competition.   
Police Reform 
 Before proceeding to the causes of police reform, a conceptual understanding of police 
reform is needed.  Reform of any sort is an attempt to address an issue, (real or perceived) in 
response to pressure outside of the institution, and reform will inevitably include several different 
and competing approaches to addressing the problem at hand.  Because of the diversity in police 
organizations and the specific issues faced in different communities, police reform is a very 




the same community, publics may favor vastly different policing strategies, disagreeing about the 
problems in a community, whether they be the inability to protect the public, rampant corruption, 
or human rights abuses, and how to best address these issues (Loader 2005; Gonzalez 2014).  
Policing is a highly-specialized task and publics generally have very low levels of information 
about police and unclear preferences towards crime control, and police reform strategies, and 
activists often fixate on the emotional appeal of single cases and individual officers (Grabowski 
2013; Walker 2013).  In contrast to democracy or economic growth, which have certain objective 
criteria83 and measurements that most can agree upon, even among policing experts there is no 
consensus on the primary problems of policing, what constitutes proper or good policing, and 
whether measures such as crime rates, public approval, or other criteria represent the quality of 
character of policing (Walker 2013).  The research presented in this dissertation also makes a case 
that the goals and objectives of police reform are constantly evolving, often in response to scandal 
and public insecurity, and therefore reform goals and the political agenda around policing is fluid. 
This dissertation considers a reform as an explicit proposal that has a reform coalition 
advocating for change, addresses a recognized issue in policing, and has a specific plan to address 
the problem.  Most of the issues that this dissertation examines come from official government 
plans such as the Ministry of Interior’s 2014 Development Strategy of 2014, the 2018 plan“MoI 
2020”, or the Cabinet of Minister’s Action Plans, but others are proposals put forward by expert 
civil society groups or western governments such as the Reanimations Package of Reforms 
“Roadmap to Reform” from 2014.  These include efforts to address the issues from the “Problems 
of Ukrainian Policing” in the previous chapter such as low protection, corruption, involvement 
with organized crime, human rights abuses, and repression, but also include efforts to stabilize the 
                                                            




funding, control, human resources, and political independence of police. A foundational 
assumption is that key actors in the control over policing and police policy such as the National 
Police, Interior Ministry, other law enforcement, and political elites most often favor the status 
quo and rarely enacts reforms, except when compelled to do so under external pressure from the 
public, political opposition, or international actors and organizations.   
  Before proceeding to the next section which explains the stimuli of reform, it is important 
to define and explain several terms that will be used throughout this dissertation.  A critical goal 
of police reform in Ukraine is depoliticization which means that political elites agree not the police 
in a manner responsive to their personal whims of political leaders, rather than policing in the 
public interest.  Politicized police can be used by political leaders to arrest, monitor or physically 
repress their political opponents, put pressure on business rivals through opening political 
motivated cases, or any other activity that police perform on behalf of political elites which is 
outside of their routine84.  Politicized use of police can be much more difficult to measure than 
arrest rates or response time, but I will argue that the police have become depoliticized when they 
no longer receive or refuse to carry out illegal orders from political elites.  This may mean that the 
police permit a peaceful opposition protest or provide equal protection to rival political groups and 
refrain from any interfere in elections. 
Politicization is enabled by patrimonialism, a practice in which jobs are distributed as 
political spoils and where personnel policy is determined through use of informal and personalist 
criteria rather than through merit or rational legal standards (Weber 1965; Taylor 2011, 5).  
Western donors and civil society have been at the center of the campaign to introduce meritocratic 
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(merit based) reform in Ukraine’s political and bureaucratic system, although they face substantial 
challenges as these institutions have been historically dominated by patrimonialism and informal 
networks.  Another major goal of police reform is to reduce corruption in police departments.  
While a generic definition of corruption is “private use of public office”, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic 
defines police corruption as “police officer’s actions, omissions, or attempts to do so that result in 
abuse of their official duties and are motivated in significant part by gain.” (Kutnjak Ivkovic 2005; 
17). 
Another key argument of this dissertation is that for institutional reforms to become 
sustainable in a highly corrupt and politicized environment like Ukraine, law enforcement 
institutions require a level of “bureaucratic insulation”.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
insulation should not be confused with impunity, but rather means that police and law enforcement 
are insulated from receiving illegal political orders (politicization) or from being captured and 
incorporated into patrimonial pyramids.  This concept of bureaucratic insulation borrows heavily 
from both Barbara Geddes “The Politician’s Dilemma” and from Elton Skendaj’s work on reform 
of public administration and police in Kosovo.  The methods for providing insulation vary and 
may include the establishment of transparent civil service, creation of new laws and regulations, 
the posting of job competition results, or having public input and publishing data on personnel 
decisions.  In order for police reforms to become sustainable, they need a “reform coalition”, 
meaning a group of consistent political support among vested actors and the public that will put 
pressure on political elites to enact reform (Peacock and Cordner 2016).  However, the issue of 
reform coalitions (detailed in the next section of this chapter) is that they are contentious, 




Finally, a major goal of this dissertation research is not simply to study reforms, but to 
study reforms that become sustainable.  Research on police reforms show that although reform is 
a constant part of many police organizations, police reforms fail more often than they succeed and 
rarely do police reforms become sustainable (Bayley 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski 2005; Skogan 
2008; Ungar 2011). Sustainable reforms are reforms which are adopted and institutionalized into 
the internal routines and practices of police organizations and continue even after the political 
pressure has subsided and reform coalitions have disbanded.  The marker or reform success and 
sustainability will vary greatly depending on the reform areas covered in different chapters, but 
overall reforms of the police organization should increase trust, legitimacy and efficiency of the 
police while maintaining their political independence.  If police institutions become less trusted, 
less effective at controlling crime, politically dependent, or more patrimonial and politicized over 
an extended period than reform can be said to have failed.  This definition of reform includes both 
realized, sustainable reforms as well as attempts at reforms or reforms which are later reversed or 
abandoned because of political resistance, lack of resources, policy change, or because the reform 
created unanticipated negative consequences (policy backfire).  The next section shows how the 
reform cycle has unfolded in Ukraine and how political will for police reform is affected by various 
factors including international pressure, government state building programs, political upheaval, 
police scandal, and civil society.   
Reform Cycles 
 To provide some analytical clarity to the messy and confusing process of police reform in 
Ukraine, this dissertation uses a frame of “reform cycles” which include three different stages in 
the life cycle of a particular reform: stimulus, response and constraining factors, and outcomes and 




with its problem stream, policy stream, and political stream.  Kingdon argues that these three 
streams proceed independently, but when there is an “focusing event” following an event such as 
an electoral turnover or a crisis than and public policy window appears which allows for the policy 
to be enacted (Kingdon 1995; 2001).  Kingdon’s work is helpful in showing the independence of 
the streams and the hurdles in enacting public policy change, but the focus of my reform cycles is 
on the second and third stages, response and outcomes where there is political resistance to the 
reform and how and why institutional choices are finally made. 
In the first stage, the reform stimulus creates public and elite pressure to address a particular 
issue.  In the next stage, there is a response by political elites or police leadership on whether or 
not to address the problem which may or may not result in political will to address the issue.  If 
there is not sufficient political pressure from the stimulus than they may disregard or ignore the 
problem deciding that the potential reputational, political and electoral costs are not a threat or will 
be reduced with time. However, if the stimuli are sufficient and elites are pressured into taking 
political action there are still mitigating factors which affect their level of political will for reform.  
These three mitigating factors in Ukraine are corruption, insecurity, and political competition 
which counter the effects of the stimulus and are often sufficient to kill the reform or severely 
dampen its effects.  Finally, if there is still sufficient political will there is the outcome phase where 
the effects of the first two stages are reconciled into either a bill, a policy, or an institution.  All 
public policy is the result of competition and compromise, but this dissertation pays particular 
attention to the creation and reform of institutions and the choices made about the powers and 
procedures given to them.  Specifically, this dissertation argues that when institutions are reformed 
or created, in addition to new personnel and resources the critical factor in their success and 





While scholars recognize the need for comprehensive reform of police because of the 
important effect on democratization, corruption, economic development and citizen security, they 
emphasize different factors to explain the emergence of political will for police reform.  The range 
of possible explanations is extensive and includes responding to public outrage over scandal, crises 
such as crime waves or terror attacks, the rendering of international support, norm diffusion and 
policy learning, political change, civil society, and currents within the police themselves that blow 
the whistle or push for professionalization.  This section considers what factors might produce 
political will, and why it is often so difficult to persuade the political elite to act. 
Police reform, like other forms of administrative reform, can be conceived of as a 
“collective good” in that a majority would receive diffuse benefit from reform, while a powerful 
minority would suffer the immediate costs, and thus strongly oppose any reform (Geddes 1994).  
The costs of police reform would be paid by police who would lose impunity and autonomy, while 
there are opportunity costs for political elites in relinquishing control over law enforcement as an 
“administrative resource” to be used against their opponents.  In the event that they lose the loyalty 
or control of the police there is a very real potential that their opponents could use the police against 
them.  In countries like Ukraine where law enforcement is heavily politicized, but controlled by 
competing political factions, enacting meaningful police reform is tantamount to unilateral 
disarmament and presents a serious collective action problem for lawmakers.  As the previous 
chapter showed with the many failed and abandoned reform efforts, when faced with pressure from 
the public, Ukrainian political elite’s strategy has been historically been to announce vague police 
reform with little plans for change.  Under conditions of political competition and uncertainty over 




high incentives for declaring reform campaigns, while pursuing the same patterns of 
accommodation or “business as usual” with police (Gonzalez 2014). 
Another reason it is so difficult to generate sufficient political will for police reform is that 
police are unlike other bureaucratic organs in that they are highly autarkic have high degrees of 
autonomy in budgets, control, low supervision making it exceedingly difficult for even sincere 
political forces to enact change (Gonzalez 2014).  Furthermore, police as the regulators of 
legitimate use of force (Weber 1965) and the “state on the street”, are tasked with upholding the 
social and legal order and therefore have a very high degree of leverage over politicians (Gonzalez 
2014).  While police are legally forbidden from striking in nearly all countries, the implicit threat 
to simply stop working raises the stakes significantly for civilian political administrations, and this 
tactic has been used by police agencies from New York85 to Sao Paolo (Gonzales 2014; 64). 
Because of the high amount of leverage of police, it is difficult to generate and sustain political 
will for reform.  Instead, this produces pressures for politicians to maintain the status quo towards 
police in what Yanilda Gonzalez calls “patterns of accommodation”, with police which allow 
police to preserve high levels of resources and organizational autonomy, as well as insulation from 
public accountability (Gonzales 2014; 64).  The specifics of these patterns of accommodation may 
vary from agency to agency but at their core are resources, powers, privileges, and immunities that 
the police see as central to their interests.  There is also sound logic for assuming that police in 
hybrid authoritarian regimes which routinely use police for “exceptional” tasks such as 
suppressing opposition or spying on opponents (rather than “routine” tasks of criminal justice and 
public order provision) are highly reluctant to make foes of these important “administrative 
                                                            





resources” which help them maintain control over their political and often times financial rivals 
(Way and Levitsky 2006; Taylor 2011; Kuzio 2016; Minakov 2016).   
 The central question then becomes: what causes politicians to eventually overcome these 
default “patterns of accommodation” with police in order to enact meaningful police reform that 
both increases the quality of citizen protection and police services while making police more 
accountable?  What causes politicians to attempt this costly reform by providing these public 
goods rather than pursuing individual benefits? (Geddes 1996).  Below I consider five explanations 
of factors which can generate the requisite political will from elites to pursue costly police reforms 
with uncertain benefits.  All of the reforms examined in this dissertation have arisen from some 
combination of these sources.  Endogenous, or internal police led reform, has not been considered 
here because there is little historical or contemporary evidence of police acting as a reform agent 
in Ukraine; however, diffusion of Patrol Police may contribute to future endogenous change in 
other areas of the National Police of Ukraine. 
International Pressures 
One of the most common sources of pressure on political elites to enact police reform 
comes from outside, particularly from powerful international actors such as the United States and 
Europe and the United Nations.  As human security and the concept of the “security development 
nexus” (Chandler 2007) began to dominate policy circles in the 1990’s and 2000’s, police reform 
has been described by some as a “cottage industry” (Bayley 1994; Stenning and Shearing 2005).  
David Bayley argues that international police assistance can (and should) have an important role 
in transforming authoritarian political systems in into democratic systems around the world.  
Others, such as Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) and Pino and Ellison (2011), are skeptical of 




divorce of police from other reform areas (such as the economy, labor, health and justice) and 
suspicious of the ulterior motives of donor countries. A common criticism of western police reform 
programs abroad is that the countries receiving assistance and the international practitioners 
implementing these projects fail or refuse to incorporate their domestic population in the reform 
process, and the outcomes often end up benefiting the donor country rather than the local citizens 
(Pino & Wiatrowski; Marat 2013).  But what are the interests and goals of international actors in 
Ukraine?  While the stated goals of US and European Assistance to Ukraine are promoting a rule 
of law, public safety, and the protection of human rights in Ukraine, there are other more 
immediate reasons for their assistance as well.  Both the United States and the European Union 
are vested in preventing the collapse of the Ukrainian state and further annexation by Russia, 
particularly in a time of increased territorial aggression by Ukraine’s neighbor and former 
colonizer.  Furthermore, maintaining public order and stability in Ukraine is a major goal of the 
European Union which has four countries that share a border with the state of 44 million people.  
Ukrainian migration has increased substantially in the last four years but were the state to erode 
any further the prospect of a massive flow of people and potentially weapons across the borders 
with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or Romania poses a real threat to European security.  Finally, in 
addition to preventing further Russian aggression or humanitarian crisis, both the US and the EU 
are working to prevent Ukraine from becoming an international hub for organized crime and a 
failed state.  Ukraine has previously had a very large presence of organized crime networks that 
have operated in other countries and are responsible for much of the human trafficking, narcotics, 
and smuggled goods that reach Europe as well as the United States.  Preventing the further 
deterioration of the rule of law in Ukraine by improving policing may help to deny these criminals 




Scholars often criticize international police assistance for being short-cited, western-
centric, and lacking an understanding of local conditions (Marat 2013; Pino & Wiatrowski 2006; 
Brogden 2005).  These and other critics argue that western assistance often commits substantial 
economic resources to train and reequip police to address issues that are important to the west such 
as drugs or terrorism but do little to improve conditions for local citizens including citizen security 
or human rights abuses by police.  In certain cases, such as Colombia, Kosovo and Georgia, 
western assistance has been critical in reforming law enforcement agencies by insisting on 
meritocratic procedures and leveraging financial and technical assistance to provide political 
insulation for new bureaucracies that are subject to competition and political influence (Bayley 
2005; Goldsmith 2000; Skendaj 2014).  A similar argument can be made for policy diffusion of 
successful policing, or norm cascade in human rights realms, arguing that police can learn from 
the success of other countries sharing similar characteristics and issues in their policing system 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Peacock 2016; Sheptycki 2002).  This could also come from police 
exposure to other police from more liberal societies, through training programs or police 
exchanges. 
There is strong evidence of international pressures and policy diffusion in Ukraine’s police 
reform campaign.  The need to maintain the political support from the west and the security and 
economic crises facing the country have made the authorities increasingly dependent on western 
countries for financial and diplomatic support as well as domestic legitimacy with Ukrainians.  
One of the many conditions has been police reform, and to achieve this goal the State Department 
assistance for law enforcement reform to Ukraine doubled between 2014 and 2015, and tripled the 
next year to $25 million dollars.  The European Union Assistance (EUAM) mission, which works 




Ukrainian police since 2014 have received training from American, Canadian, European, 
Georgian, and even Turkish police.  Substantial aid and technical assistance affords international 
actors and organizations substantial leverage in setting the conditions of reform.  Many state 
building theorists argue that international actors are bad at designing institutions in places where 
they hold little knowledge of local customs and practices, others have argued that international 
pressure has been essential to creating insulated bureaucracies which can promote meritocratic 
personnel policies, transparency, and accountability.  While the Ukrainians have been eager to 
accept any resources or support that they can get, the multitude of actors can create duplication of 
programs, policy disagreements, and contradictory policies.  For example, Cornelius Friesendorf 
writes that the Germans became critical of the EUAM’s public order trainings of Ukrainian police 
by the European Gendarme, arguing that they were too militaristic and inappropriate for a country 
like Ukraine that had recently experienced severe repression in its public order policing 
(Friesendorf 2017; 20).    
Another crucial factor is the policy diffusion and learning from the Georgian police reform 
example, which has been solidified by the role of Georgians in Ukraine’s reform, including several 
high-profile reforms including Khatia Dekanoidze, Eka Zguladze and Grigori “Goga” 
Grigalashvili who all held high national posts in Georgia’s Interior Ministry and subsequently in 
the National Police of Ukraine.  Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly argued that Georgia is a 
model of reform for them and have mimicked certain policy steps taken by the Georgians including 
dismissing traffic police and focusing on foot patrols (Peacock 2016).  International assistance is 
a facilitating, but not sufficient factor in police reform, and the amount of leverage will depend on 
the domestic political conditions of the host country, their reliance on the donors, the infrastructure 




and intelligence, are at the heart of state power and are going to be one of the areas in which 
political and security elites are least open to sharing power (Zetocha 2014).  Foreign assistance 
facilitates many projects in Ukraine’s police reform through financing, training, and providing 
oversight of police, but the effects are mitigated by ongoing bureaucratic resistance and political 
interference.  It is also important to remember that international influence in Ukraine is not always 
benign and in the case of Russia is often malignant and inimical to reforms.  Paul D’Anieri (2016; 
14) writes that Russia is highly vested in opposing reforms in Ukraine. “Russia, concerned both 
about geopolitics and the domestic challenge that a democratic Ukraine would set for itself, 
apparently perceives an interest in seeing reform in Ukraine fail.”  Russia’s role in perpetuating 
armed conflict, terrorism, and acts of sabotage against Ukraine have been well documented in 
recent years, and Russian media actively works to discredit or diminish attempts at 
democratization or reform in Ukraine.  Furthermore, the Russian threat to Ukrainian reforms also 
gives Ukrainian political interests who oppose reform (because they benefit from the partial reform 
equilibrium (Hellman 1998), a convenient excuse for their own failures to deliver reform and other 
public goods in domestic policy.   
In addition to financing, training and technical assistance, international actors also play a 
critical role in leveraging their continued assistance on reform concessions from the host 
government.  In Ukraine, the United States in particular has pushed very hard for transparent and 
fair competitions for all new hiring, transparency mechanisms, and public oversight.  It has also 
been one of the major forces pushing for the political independence and “insulation” of new law 
enforcement institutions such as the Patrol Police and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(NABU).  In situations where the Ukrainian government has been unwilling to agree to these terms 




about leverage becomes very crucial in the third stage of the reform cycle, outcome and 
articulation, when decisions about the design of institutions and legislation are being made.  
Despite the strong and positive impact that international actors can play in police reform by using 
their leverage forcing reluctant actors to the table, they are often a necessary but insufficient 
component in the success of police reform.  It is equally important that the reform has a local 
policy coalition, is matched to local issues, and has buy in from civil society in order for it to 
succeed. 
State-Building   
 Another reason that states may seek to reform their police is simply to increase their control 
over and effectiveness of a security organizations, a crucial source of power, as part of a broader 
state building process.  These reforms may not necessarily be “liberal” reforms, but they still imply 
the state enforcing its will on and extracting concessions from police or improving the police’s 
ability to maintain order or solve crimes.  Another distinguishing feature of state-building theories 
of police reform is that they are deliberate and conscious efforts begun on the initiative of the 
political elite, rather than in direct reaction to a scandal (which I will discuss next).  Nearly all the 
states of the former Soviet Union experienced institutional collapse affecting their law 
enforcement structures during the 1990’s (Volkov 2002). This vacuum of state power meant the 
inability of the state to pay wages, address security, or oversee police malfeasance, and thus saw 
police cooperating closely with organized crime, and at times even armed separatists in the case 
of Georgia (Light 2014; Slade 2012; Volkov 2002; Harasymiw 2003).  Brian Taylor writes that 
regaining control over law enforcement through personalization became one of Putin’s primary 
strategies in recentralizing power from Russia’s errant regions (Taylor 2011).  Mathew Light and 




2004 was motivated by the state’s conscious realization of the need to regain control over its 
Interior Ministry in response to real threats to state sovereignty from criminal groups, smugglers, 
separatist regions, and Russian intelligence and security services (Light 2014; O’Shea 2015). 
While links between organized crime and the state are not new in Ukraine, there are limits to the 
degree which the state can allow organized crime to operate before the state runs the risk of losing 
its monopoly on power and violence. The breakdown and reorganization of organized crime 
networks and the growth of armed non-state actors moving into lucrative illegal sectors of the 
economy such as smuggling, the exploitation of natural resources, and the drug trade has also poses 
a threat to the states power.  One of the ways that they seek to address this challenge to their power 
is through strengthening their coercive capacity to confront these groups by reforming police. 
States may also seek to professionalize and improve their police forces in order to limit 
their liability for police malfeasance or preempt the type of behavior that could spark a scandal, 
damaging the regime.  Yuhua Wang demonstrates how China has grown increasingly concerned 
with professionalizing its police in order to limit police abuses which provoke citizen outrage and 
opposition to the regime (Light, Prado and Wang 2015).  In another article, Wang demonstrates 
how the Chinese Communist Party has proactively sought to coopt police by recruiting local and 
regional police into the once exclusive Chinese Communist Party (Wang 2014).  
  There is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that the contemporary police reform in 
Ukraine is at least in part motivated by a state building process.  The first reason is that the fall of 
the Yanukovych regime, the “Russian Spring” mobilizations in the Donbas and other regions of 
eastern Ukraine, and the fear of transitional justice caused many former Militia to either flee 
Ukraine, join the separatists, or abandon their post out of fear of mob violence or transitional justice 




(2014, 2015) write that many police simply stopped working abruptly in Spring 2014 and civil 
society was forced to fill the vacuum in certain areas such as maintain safety on the roads and 
streets of Ukraine’s cities for several weeks.  There is also substantial evidence of thorough 
Russian penetration of Ukraine’s Security Services (SBU)86 Ministry of Defense, and other 
security infrastructure (Kuzio 2012).  While there is less documented evidence of Russian 
penetration of policing (because “high policing” of the State Security Services (SBU) represents a 
more strategic resource for foreign intelligence than “low policing” (Brodeur, 1983), reports of 
“separatists” and their sympathizers in the NPU abounded resulting in dozens of officers and 
commanders fired87 for tacit or explicit support of Russia or Russian separatists, often times 
through social media.  Thus, regaining the control and loyalty of its law enforcement can be seen 
as a key component of a broader Ukrainian state building reform, which includes substantial 
military reform and modernization (Colby and Pukhov 2015).  Furthermore, the current political 
authorities must be at least somewhat conscious of the public disdain of police and the risks to the 
regime in repressive public order policing during protests which led to the downfall of the 
Yanukovych administration. Much of the focus on reform has been improving public order 
policing in ways that can deescalate crowds and mitigate the possibilities for violence through 
training and education, much of it offered by international organizations.  Some of the fastest 
growing areas of police hiring and training have been in public order policing and police anticipate 
large protests ahead of the 2019 elections.  Police experts and steadfast critics alike have noted 
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that police have become noticeably more restrained in their policing of protests since Euromaidan, 
even if only to avoid provocations that could threaten stability, however, Volodymyr Ishchenko 
argues that police have simply become better at preempting protests (Ishchenko 2015).  
Increased defense and regime stability are not the only causes of state building reforms.  
Barbara Geddes writes that in Latin America, state building reforms such as economic 
development through administrative reform became possible only after the political conditions 
were such to incentivize politicians to action (Geddes 1994).  She argues that administrative reform 
was very difficult in Latin America because politicians need to reward their political machines 
through patronage jobs, a custom also heavily practiced in Ukraine.  While reform of the 
administration would have provided diffuse benefits to all citizens in the country, and potential 
electoral benefits to the candidate, the immediate political costs of administrative reform would 
limit the incumbent or party’s base, and therefore their hold on power.  Geddes argues that high 
party competition and incumbent vulnerability makes reform unlikely, but that reform of 
“insulated” areas is possible under these conditions (Geddes 1994).  Geddes argument is highly 
relevant for the post Euromaidan police reform process in Ukraine.  The political conditions have 
not aligned to such a degree where broad administrative reform of police as a public good is 
possible, and reforms have instead followed a strategy of making insulated ‘islands of success’ in 
the Patrol Police and other units in the National Police of Ukraine.  The forces of state building as 
a reform stimulus are typically long-term pressures to rebuild the states coercive capacity in order 
to maintain stability and address potential challengers either from political rivals or non-state 
actors.  The political dividends for state building efforts however are often not apparent for years 
and political leaders in unstable regimes often have short political horizons due to political 




Political Upheaval  
Another explanation for why politicians take the costly decision of reforming police is 
because of political upheaval and change.  In many cases of transition or regime turnover the new 
political power will seek to purge the state apparatus, including police, of personnel loyal to the 
old regime and replace them with loyalists (Schmitter and O’Donnell; 1986).  This was the case in 
the transitions and lustration of power in many of the former CEE countries such as Poland and 
Eastern Germany, that attempted “de-communization” of their state administrations (Kadar 2001; 
Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003; De Greiff 2007).  In transitions from authoritarian rule it is logical 
that societies seeking to democratize their government would seek the removal, and often 
punishment, of individuals involved in repression, human rights abuses, and wide scale 
surveillance under the previous regime, as was the case of the police in many former socialist states 
(Caparini and Marenin 2004; Uildriks and Van Reenen 2004; Zetocha 2014).  But in countries 
with a highly patrimonial bureaucratic structure even an electoral change of power can cause a 
massive shift in police.  Stephen Hennsell writes that in the 1990s and 2000s in Albania, each 
subsequent electoral political power between the PS and PD party would result in a near total purge 
of police personnel, who were appointed by party bosses (Hennsell 2012; 819).  The cessation of 
conflicts also provides an important impetus for police reform because police are often heavily 
involved in fighting wars and through peace agreements as control of police can become a key 
provision in negotiating confidence and security guarantees for demobilized militants, as was the 
case in El Salvador and Kosovo (Bayley 2005; Nield 2000; Call and Stanley 2001). 
 Political upheaval also creates the possibility for change through transitional justice.  
Bachmann and Lyubashenko write that transitional justice can follow two patterns, the “politics of 




the present” where justice is tempered by political circumstances and crises of the present moment 
(Bachmann and Lyubashenko 2017).  They argue the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in 
Donbas have significantly mitigated the possibilities for transitional justice in Ukraine.  
“Both events decreased the possibilities of holding direct perpetrators of human rights abuses 
under Yanukovych accountable, for two reasons: first, because the new government needed the 
skills of those policemen and secret service agents to fight separatism in the east and to prepare 
the country for a possible Russian invasion; and second, those targeted by transitional justice 
measures suddenly had an exit option to avoid accountability [defection to Crimea, the Donbas 
or Russia]….. Because of the warlike situation in the east, the focus of transitional justice was 
directed against groups that were not indispensable to the war effort – judges and officials in the 
state and municipal administration.  
(Bachmann and Lyubashenko 2017; 312-313.) 
 
As they demonstrate, while the public reaction to Euromaidan was a powerful impetus to 
purge police and security service officers, the political realities of the unexpected conflict made 
their services indispensable and proscribed transitional justice. Above all political upheaval and 
turnover see concerns over control of police come to the forefront, much like in state building.  
However, since periods of political upheaval and turmoil are by definition contentious, uncertain, 
and the rules of the game are unclear (Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986), they create both the 
opportunities or ‘windows’ for change, and simultaneously increase costs to all players by raising 
the stakes.  Therefore, during political change police who themselves are vulnerable to public and 
elite ire because of their role in the old regime are more likely to withhold their support from a 
new regime until they are confident that it has established itself, taking a wait and see approach 
and “leaving the back door open” should the old regime return to power (Uildriks and Van Reenen 
2003; 18).  Uildriks and Van Reenen refer to this period immediately post transition as “crisis 
policing” which occurs at precisely the same time as new regimes are most dependent on police, 
as they face the unavoidable consequences of ‘triple transitions’ which increases crime, while 




That political upheaval can produce higher crime by renegotiating political, economic, and 
social rules is not surprising, however former communist or socialist systems are particularly 
vulnerable to this because socialist systems guaranteed a high degree of public order in exchange 
for limitations on freedom and democracy and therefore their citizens have higher expectations for 
public order (Kadar 2001; Caparini and Marenin 2004; Shelley 1996).  Political upheaval can also 
affect the crime rate by increasing competition among criminals (and often state actors) when pre-
existing corruption networks collapse following political change.  Much of the gangland violence 
experienced in Ukraine during the 1990’s was a result of competition by organized crime over 
newly liberalized state assets (Kuzio 2014).  This crime wave largely decreased after corruption 
networks solidified control and boundaries over state and private assets by the early 2000’s in 
Kuchma’s second presidential term.  One can also argue that in addition to the ongoing security 
and economic crisis the collapse of the Yanukovych regime with its tight control over lucrative 
corruption schemes and criminal enterprises has led to a renegotiation of criminal control such as 
smuggling routes and the extraction of illegal resources throughout the country.  Increased crime 
can result in additional pressure for strengthening the police through a state building effort to 
fortify the police, or if left unaddressed rising crime can itself become a scandal and the primary 
political issue. 
Writing on the lackluster progress of police reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Richard 
Mawby notes “It seems, then, that the socio-political context has changed dramatically in many 
post-Communist societies; increased crime rates and fear of crime have resulted in order 
maintenance replacing freedom and democracy at the top of political agendas” (Mawby 2001).  
The perceptions of crime and insecurity have risen consistently throughout Eastern Europe and 




East Germany after reunification (Mawby 2001). Although public pressure and expectations about 
change in police are highest immediately after a political turnover from authoritarian rule, because 
of rising crime and insecurity comprehensive police reform is often the least likely at this time. 
Furthermore, the coalitions that overthrow authoritarian regimes rarely stay together for long and 
usually begin to compete with one another for power (Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986).  Kupatadze, 
raises this point when he states; “quick and radical change is highly unlikely without a monopoly 
of power that eliminates contestation, resistance and differing views on reform. In other words, 
reform like the Georgian one is highly unlikely to be carried out in a pluralistic setting” (Kupatadze 
2013; 20).   
Kingdon notes that for a policy for a policy “window” or opportunity to result in legislative 
change the problem, policy, and political streams must all align (Kingdon 1995; 2001).  Often 
during a political change there is a political possibility, but if the problem and policy streams do 
not align the opportunity can easily be missed.  This argument about timing is also critical for the 
pace of reforms in Ukraine, as the pace of all reforms in Ukraine has slowed following the collapse 
of the 2016 Yatsenyuk coalition government and the reshuffle of a new coalition which only 
includes BPP and People’s Front (Carnegie 2017).  Political competition is thus both an enabling 
and constraining factor in the advancement of reforms.  Plurality and political competition can 
force complacent governments to enact reforms for the public good in order to maintain credibility 
and electoral support among voters, but an excess of political competition means that political 
leaders are weary of cooperation and concessions to minority parties, particularly over control of 
law enforcement. Furthermore, with low approval ratings and slim electoral margins many 
Ukrainian law makers fear a policy backfire and are more concerned with political survival than 




political consolidation for the regime to stabilize itself, but the great irony is that once regimes 
have solidified themselves they lack the threat of insecurity or political opposition to motivate 
them to take drastic measures in reforming police.  Several sources note that the pace of reforms 
significantly decreased following the consolidation of BPP power after Groysmann was named as 
Prime Minister in April 2016.88 The “Catch-22” of police reform during political tumult is that 
support and pressure for police reform are highest at precisely the time that states are most 
dependent on police, as well as politically and institutionally weak, making reform exceedingly 
difficult. However, when the regime finally gains the institutional power over political opponents 
and the police needed to enact meaningful reform, they no longer face a credible threat from the 
public or political opponents that would force them to enact reforms.   
 The initial evidence in Ukraine would also suggest that political pressure for reform was 
highest immediately after the political upheaval in February 2014, which marked a flurry of 
announcements and ambitious plans for reforming police in cooperation with civil society.  A 
counterfactual history could reasonably conclude that in the absence of territorial aggression by 
Russia and the ensuing conflict, political mass pressure may have pushed for deeper and more 
comprehensive reforms if the war had not started.   However, the fact remains that the conflict and 
increasingly crime have diverted resources and political attention away from democratic reforms 
of police and towards the armed conflict and rising crime.  Also, the political changes occurring 
in both parliament and throughout the state apparatus have undoubtedly affected reform.  For 
example, of the dozens of reformers who came from abroad to Ukraine upon invitation of the 
President in 2014-2015, 14 of the highest-level reforms had resigned by spring 201689.  The exodus 
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began in early 2016, but the resignations accelerated and coincided with the exit of the 
Samopomich, Batkivshina and other coalitions parties and collapse of the original parliamentary 
coalition, with Vladimir Groysmann (from BPP) replaced Arseniy Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister 
in April 2016.  In other words, once the Petro Poroshenko Block (BPP) consolidated power nearly 
all of the remaining reformers left.  This included the head of Internal Affairs (DVB) in April 2017, 
and the chief of National Police upon completion of her one-year contract in November 2016.  
These reformers from outside of the system complained of consistent political interference in their 
work, often from the highest levels90, and many were replaced by loyal clients of the old system 
or current political regime.  Thus, the argument that power consolidation allowed the current 
government to abandon their commitment to reform (or illusion, thereof), is a powerful one.  
Interestingly, the same administration had claimed that its lack of power in the past (before the 
collapse of the Parliamentary commission in April 2016) had delayed or prevented it from passing 
needed legislation including provisions on the Law on National Police, decentralization, increased 
funding for police, and amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code. The solidification of the 
Petro Poroshenko Block means that political elites face a weak and divided opposition, and 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections will not be held in 2019.  The Ukrainian public has 
become increasingly dissatisfied with the Poroshenko administration, however, it remains to be 
seen whether this will result in political deactivation or increased mobilization and agitation by the 
public for police reform.   
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Police Scandal  
 Perhaps the most common impetus of police reform anywhere is the emergence of an 
unanticipated scandal involving the police which generates sufficient public outrage to pressure 
political administrations into reform.  Unlike state building which is essentially a conscious, 
deliberate and pro-active political decision taken by the governments over a long period of 
planning, scandals catch administrations off guard and force them to engage in emergency damage 
control to “relieve pressure” through offering immediate concessions and reforms (Gonzalez 2014; 
Sherman 1978).  Scandals take a variety of forms and may be in response to revelations of 
corruption, abuse of force, or the inability to provide protection or bring criminals to justice.  Use 
of force and human rights abuse has been at the center of many of Ukraine’s biggest police scandals 
including Kuchmagate in 2000, Vradievka in 2013, and the Euromaidan in 2014. 
 Scandals can also be caused by the failure of the police to fulfill their primary mandate of 
providing protection and justice.  Scandals arising from the police’s failures can either arise from 
specific cases, such as the murder or kidnapping of a high-profile person or may simply represent 
a noticeable surge in violent crime and public fear of criminals that is part of a longer trend.  Ungar, 
writes that citizen insecurity led to the collapse of six democratic governments across Latin 
America over a decade, and rising perceptions of insecurity are at the top of the list of citizen 
concerns in developing countries (Ungar 2010; 69).  
A crucial fact to keep in mind is that not all scandals are equal, in other words scandals 
which result from police malfeasance (corruption or abuse) often result in calls for oversight and 
limitation of police powers, whereas police scandals resulting from police failures to provide 




resources, and tougher criminal justice reforms, known in Latin America as “mano dura” (Ungar 
2010; Balko 2013).   
 Regardless of the origins of the scandal, the political pressure on decision makers generated 
by a scandal is always temporary and public attention inevitably shifts to other areas and policy 
problems as time passes.  This means that while scandals are an important cause of police reform, 
they can often result in short-sighted reforms that are unsustainable or fail to comprehensively 
address the issue.  Political elites who are able to delay reform or initiate only mild superficial 
reforms will, without fail, face a decrease in pressure to enact reforms as more time elapses from 
the onset of the scandal, (however this effect is likely more pronounced with malfeasance scandals 
than citizen security or protection scandals which tend to be cumulative and build over longer 
periods of time).  In the absence of a crisis or scandal, public opinion is usually divided in their 
views and attitudes towards the police, elites have incentives to favor accommodation with police 
and face few consequences for doing so (Gonzalez 2015).  Even after the outbreak of a scandals, 
the temporary convergence of the usually “schizophrenic” public attitudes towards police will 
decrease as more time elapses and citizens either give up on change or become preoccupied with 
other issues (Gonzalez 2014).  Scandals are often a necessary, but not sufficient cause of police 
reform, and require a specific set of conditions, timing, and sequencing to produce lasting change 
in police organizations (Gonzalez 2014).  Using cross case methodology in her 2014 dissertation, 
Yanilda Gonzalez shows how meaningful police reform becomes possible only when viable 
political oppositions are able to use “mobilized scandals”, producing a temporary convergence of 
public opinion on policing to raise the political costs of inaction and political rewards for action to 




The frame of scandal is certainly a powerful explanatory factor in explaining the emergence 
of police reform on the Ukrainian political agenda in 2014-2015.  It can be said, without any 
hyperbole, that through the unanticipated events of the Euromaidan the Yanukovych regime 
collapsed in part because of a police scandal.  The unprecedented and overwhelming use of force 
against protesters led not only to a complete public rejection of police (as evidenced in public 
opinion polls post-Euromaidan showing police approval at less than 1%91), but also a defection of 
allies from Yanukovych’s highly personalized and (until then) disciplined Party of Regions 
machine in Parliament and elsewhere throughout the country (Kuzio 2015).  Among the first acts 
of the government, before the emergence of territorial threats, was the disbanding of Berkut and 
Interior Troops and the announcement of plans to begin police reform92.  In addition to the events 
of the Euromaidan and previous public distrust of policing, violent and other crime has risen 
substantially in Ukraine since 2014, thus producing another source of pressure (or one could argue 
counter pressure) for change in Ukraine’s law enforcement system.  Thus, the receptiveness of 
political elites to public pressure for reform was highest in 2014 and 2015 but may be decreasing 
as more time elapses and other concerns take precedence over policing.   
Civil Society Organizations 
If the new regime in an administration quickly reaches a pattern of accommodation with 
police, then where does pressure to reform come from in a transition?  Under these circumstances, 
pressure comes from civil society organizations, but the strength and effect of civil society 
organizations varies greatly within and across countries and depending on the areas in which civil 
society focuses their efforts.  Civil society organizations are distinguished here from mass civil 
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society that is mobilized early in the transition, and is rather the loose network of human rights 
community, political activists, community groups, scholars, and independent media that focus 
much of their attention on issues of policing and criminal justice.  The tools by which civil society 
can pressure political elites to implement reforms are not unique to a period of crisis, scandal, or 
transition and include the tools of investigating, exposing, and mobilizing allies around issues 
(Stone and Ward 2000).  During transitions these civil society groups have heightened agency in 
the initial period where new political regimes are trying to gain allies and legitimacy in their battle 
with contending factions, yet their effectiveness in gaining policy concessions and influence 
decreases as the regime becomes more stable and less dependent on civil society allies.  Also, 
transitions in much the same way as scandals, produce a temporary convergence of public opinion 
about the urgency and need for police reform, but this convergence and the ‘reform coalition’ 
eventually fractures and whither as some groups are coopted, other reform and political priorities 
take precedence over policing, and crime increases.  The political agency of these groups will 
likely increase closer to elections, especially if scandals of police malfeasance or police failure 
plague the administration and tie unpopular police to an embattled incumbent.  
Though it is very popular for scholars to argue for the participation of civil society in police 
reform and criticize programs which don’t include civil society that are “top down” (Marat 2013; 
2014); policing by its very nature is a highly specialized, dangerous, and by nature secretive 
function of the state (Grabowski 2009).  Scholars are less clear on the form, role, and degree to 
which civil society should be involved in police reform projects, and some have raised concerns 
that publics have undemocratic attitudes that may undermine human rights and democratic 
principles of police reform (Grabowski 2009).  Perhaps the area where civil society participation 




but even these vary extensively in their function, authorities and duties allocated to the public, and 
level of imposition on police (Gonzalez 2014; Skolnick and Bayley 1988).  Bayley also warns that 
community policing in authoritarian regimes can be used for co-optation or “top-down 
regimentation” or can be dangerous in countries with strong ethnic, linguistic, or political 
cleavages (Bayley 2001; 36-37).  Some have suggested that community-oriented policing is so 
popular precisely because it is so vague and means “all things, to all people”, without 
fundamentally altering the powers of police.   
These concerns aside, the effectiveness of civil society in security reform is affected by 
several factors.  First, the timing of scandals and elections which can activate the same political 
mechanism by which Gonzalez’ “mobilized scandals” refer, which allows political opponents to 
capitalize on the regimes and the police’s unpopularity.  Civil society undoubtedly becomes more 
powerful in these cases as they often times break the scandal and provide the policy experts and 
reform plans proposed by these opposition “policy entrepreneurs.” Second, civil society can more 
effectively influence the reform process when they have the requisite political skills and capital 
(Marat 2018).    For example, long term research initiatives such as the Institute for the Rule of 
Law at the University of St. Petersburg, the Georgia Young Lawyers Association (GYLA), and 
the Kharkiv Human Rights Group all are established research organizations which publish rigorous 
reports regularly on the activities of police and are in a key position to provide policy prescriptions.  
During periods of reform, organizations such as these can provide the legitimacy and policy 
expertise that is needed to reform police.  Ukraine’s human rights groups have historically been 
very inept at holding police accountable (Chistyakova 2012; 149-150) but following the 
Euromaidan a host of new and old groups improved their ability to detect and broadcast human 




society groups mentioned in the first chapter such as the RPR, UMDPL, CEPL and Automaidan 
have become much more active in police reform through exposing corruption and abuse, drafting 
legislation, participating in commissions and providing informal oversight. 
  Another very important way that civil society can become a key player in reform projects 
is through institutional design which requires participation and oversight by the public. For 
example, Civilian Complaint review boards and community policing boards in the United States 
(while varying in their effect) are almost all uniformly the result of police scandals in which the 
police ceded to the community a series of powers over the review of citizen complaints and 
disciplinary action (Reiner 2010; Walker 2012).  These new institutional forums often become the 
bases by which civil society and others (including state organizations) can use in future battles 
over policing, long after the precipitating scandal.  Eduardo Moncada argues that the decision by 
Mayors in Bogota to regularly release crime statistics to the public and extensive public campaigns 
to involve city residents in a host of community policing forums and workshops empowered 
citizens and effectively “tied the hands” of future administrations that would have likely 
abandoned or reversed police reform under pressure from police (Moncada 2009).  Moncada, using 
O’Donnell’s (1992) framework of vertical and horizontal accountability argues that these reforms 
created both expectations and the means by which the public and other state agencies could exert 
increased pressure on police for progressive reforms and accountability.  He argues that this 
resulted in a tremendous increase in public approval and trust of police that was unknown in 
Colombia in previous years and is a regional anomaly in South America. 
In Ukraine, the drafting of the new Law on National Police created several possibilities for 
the involvement of civil society in reform.  First, the law was drafted in consultation with outside 




release of crime statistics and regular reports on department activity from each region, thus 
democratizing information that was previously held exclusively by the state.  Also, the law creates 
institutional mechanisms for public participation, particularly with commissions involved the 
hiring and vetting process which build in public oversight93.  Several of the commissions which 
allow public participation have been the “Police Commissions” which select new police recruits, 
“Attestation Commissions” which reviewed former Militsiya personnel between 2015-2016, and 
selection commissions for the directors of major law enforcement institutions including the Chief 
of Police, Director the Patrol Police Academy, and the Director of the newly created State Bureau 
of Investigations in 2017.  The commissions for the director positions have included foreign 
experts from the US, the European Union and Georgia, as well as leading human rights activists 
and academics.  While public commissions offer opportunities for oversight and transparency, 
there are several cases of these commissions being manipulated by political interests, often leading 
to stalemate and drawn out selection processes as competing factions try to ensure that they have 
representation in new and existing law enforcement institutions.  In the cases where committees 
have been staffed by independent civil society they have been successful at hiring qualified and 
independent candidates, however in cases where the selection committees have been heavily 
politicized there are serious risks of a deeper politicization of law enforcement agencies.9495 
 Although there is no specific mention of community policing in the law on national police, 
article 11 of the law states that “Police will carry out its activities in close partnership-based 
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cooperation with the general public, territorial communities and civic associations with a view to 
meet their needs” (Law on National Police 2015), and several community policing initiatives are 
currently being implemented.  The broader social changes in Ukraine since the Euromaidan, 
namely the spike in civil society and organizational activity has spawned a variety of self-
organized groups, many of which are focused on issues of policing and public safety.  There is 
currently a dearth of research on these groups in post-Euromaidan Ukraine however initial 
evidence suggests that these ‘self-defense’ groups can have both cooperative relationships with 
police as in Kyiv, or more adversarial or competitive relationships as with the police as is the case 
in Odessa (Minakov 2016; Shukan 2016).96  Certain vigilante groups have become increasingly 
hostile towards police97, provoking clashes in several cities, and fear abound that right wing 
vigilante groups may provoke violence ahead of the upcoming elections. 
  This section has demonstrated how all five factors, international support, state building 
campaigns, political upheaval, scandal, and civil society have facilitated the beginning of police 
reform and shaped its course. In the next section, I turn to constraining factors which also condition 
and limit which police reforms become realized and which become sustainable. 
Response and Constraining Factors   
 After the initial reform stimulus, political elites respond to the pressure to provide a 
particular police reform.  The consequences for ignoring these reform stimuli could mean a 
decrease in financing or poor relations with important foreign allies, the loss of popularity or 
political support, large scale protests and mobilizations, and potentially even a loss of control of 
the police.  These pressures should be sufficient to generate the political will to incentivize elite 
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action, but they are mitigated by three constraining factors of corruption, insecurity and political 
competition which provide robust, and in many cases, overwhelming resistance to reform.  The 
previous section of this chapter examined the factors and conditions which often cause police 
reform to emerge on the political agenda, and shape reform along the way.  This section will look 
at the obstacles that more often than not prevent the emergence of meaningful police reform and 
hinder the implementation of reforms and condition the response of political decision makers. 
Corruption  
Corruption, typically defined as the private use of public office, is endemic throughout 
Ukraine, and Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perception Index found that Ukraine 
is the most corrupt country in Europe (Transparency International 2016).  Pervasive corruption 
throughout Ukraine has incorporated its law enforcement into political-business-criminal networks 
(Kupadatze; 2012; 4).  The historical roots of police corruption in the region were institutional 
collapse of the Soviet policing system, low wages, low state capacity, and insufficient resources 
and the 1990s crime wave (Volkov 2002; O’Shea 2015, Taylor 2010).  Police predation on citizens 
through extortion is a salient issue with the public in Ukraine, and a survey from spring 2016 found 
that Ukrainians ranked an end to bribery and corruption as the first priority in police reform, higher 
than compliance with human rights or the effective prevention and investigation of crime (KIIS 
2016; 12). Henry Hale (2015) argues that corruption and patron client networks, and the 
expectations about a patron’s ability to deliver rewards and punishment are what determine regime 
dynamics throughout the former Soviet Union.  In Ukraine, police and other law enforcement have 
been used extensively to punish defectors, political dissidents, as well as business and political 
rivals through repression, surveillance, and the opening of politically charged investigations 




of maintaining, or tacitly condoning, corruption in police and other bureaucratic organizations, 
politicians are particularly reticent to end corruption.  Geddes says that politicians in a corrupt 
political system are unlikely deliver public goods, such as police reform because of the 
“politician’s dilemma” means that reforms entail high political risk for uncertain political benefit 
(Geddes 1994).  “Power ministries” (Taylor 2010) such as police and prosecutors, are also 
important sources of regime stability in hybrid regimes that are full of patrons loyal to political 
elites.  Taras Kuzio (2016) notes that despite being approximately two-thirds the size of the United 
Kingdom, Ukraine has nearly triple the number of prosecutors and Interior Ministry employees 
than Great Britain.  Political regimes that are under threat or face instability are highly unlikely to 
engage in meritocratic reform of state agencies which are important sources of patronage (Geddes 
1994).  Because of the use of police in generating rents and punishing defectors, political elites are 
reticent to deliver reforms that would unilaterally disarm them of this crucial power lever.    
Even when political will exists to address police corruption, the reliance of police on illegal 
rents from corruption also complicates the state’s capacity to implement its decisions because it 
reduces the infrastructural power of the state to incentivize and discipline officers to implement 
changes. Corruption creates loyalty to other figures such as economic actors and criminal 
organizations who can offer much more than the state.  Furthermore, Kristof Stefes argues that 
systemic decentralized corruption leads to more human rights abuses than centralized corruption 
systems.  
“This is so because under conditions of decentralized systemic corruption the size of the 
state apparatus is likely to swell due to the uncontrolled sale of public offices.  This will attract 
individuals with dubious motives to the state apparatus who compete with each other in the 
extortion of bribes.  Moreover, they are able to abuse their position with impunity, having little 
to fear from higher authorities.  Human rights abuses such as the extortion of bribes by torture 





  Finally, police corruption seriously undermines citizen trust and cooperation with the 
police, as citizens fear police encounters that will end in extorting money.  Public trust in Patrol 
Police has significantly improved largely due to their refusal to take bribes, but other departments 
within the NPU such as Pretrial Investigation and Criminal Police are still not trusted by the public 
(KIIS 2016).  This lack of public trust and the unwillingness to cooperate with police makes it 
difficult to address the most serious crimes affecting the public, which would increase their trust 
and legitimacy (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006).    
Insecurity 
One can define “insecurity” as pervasive fear among citizens about violence and crime and 
a lack of faith in the state to provide adequate security and protection.  Insecurity varies throughout 
Ukraine geographically, with the south and east of Ukraine reporting more insecurity than western 
Ukraine (KIIS 2016).  In fall 2016, the Interior Minister announced that the crime rate had risen 
by 30%-40% in Ukraine, which he attributed to the war in the country’s east, shortages of police, 
and an increase in the reporting of crime due to an improved emergency response system.  Since 
the start of the conflict in spring 2014, Ukraine has millions of internally displaced persons and 
Patrol Police in Kyiv and other cities are reporting that grenades and Kalashnikov rifles from the 
front line are increasingly used in street crime.  Attacks on police98 have also increased 
substantially and deaths of law enforcement are at their highest in years, (with the exception of 
Euromaidan where 20 law enforcement were killed in clashes with protesters). Ukraine also faces 
a potentially serious demobilization problem due to the conflict in Donbas and bleak economic 
prospects for demobilized soldiers.  Insecurity has been shown to undermine social capital (Pino 
                                                            





1999), confidence in the state (Nield 1999), and even economic development (Nield 1999; Pino 
2001; Shelley 1998).  Conflicts, such as the current war in Ukraine’s Donbas, are known to 
exacerbate crime because of the dangerous potential of recently demobilized combatants, a 
proliferation of small arms, and increased societal divisions (Nield, 1999; Bayley 2001; 2005).  
Reform priorities such as demilitarization, decentralization, transparency, and respect for human 
rights are all undermined by high crime and armed conflict, which often produce militarized 
policing and demands for more police powers.  Insecurity incentivizes states to pursue militarized 
responses to crime as has occurred in Latin America and the United States (Ungar 2010; Balko 
2013).  Many countries experiencing internal conflicts or armed secessionist movements have also 
used police for military operations such as Serbia, Turkey and Russia during both Chechen Wars 
(Hinton and Newburn 2009; 14; Galleotti 2003; Taylor 2010).  High levels of insecurity in society 
also undermine public support and pressure for reform goals such as respecting human rights, 
transparency, and community policing as well as other broader criminal justice goals like 
alternative sentencing and diversionary programs that keep first-time offenders out of jail (Ungar 
2010; Moncada 2009). High crime and insecurity also affect the democratization process because 
they can elevate the issue of crime to a level of moral panic (Hinton and Newburn 2007), which 
can cause increased public support for authoritarian excesses by the police such as crackdowns, 
the suspension of due process, and extrajudicial killings (Gonzalez 2014; Grabowsky 2009, 23 
Nield, 1999; 2002; Ungar 2010).  
Some literature argues that sometimes conflict and security crises can present an 
opportunity for radical reform through state building. The “Tillyian” argument is based on the 
logic that states professionalize by improving taxation, building their army, and solidifying the 




threats (Tilly 1985).  In Ukraine there is some evidence of professionalization in the armed forces 
and intelligence services to address the threat from Russia, but the increase in crime has largely 
undermined police reforms by empowering anti-reform “spoilers”, who protest that police reform 
is responsible for the increase in crime.  These critics argue that the rise in crime is partly caused 
by personnel shortages from the vetting process (re-attestation), and have also criticized new 
officers for being inexperienced and “too soft” on criminals, thus giving political leverage to the 
old guard and spoilers.  For example, forces within the police and Parliament fought against the 
dismissal of Vasyl Paskal, the former head of Criminal Police in Kyiv during the Euromaidan, 
with the argument that he was an effective crime fighter (Friesendorf 2017).  While public opinion 
showed a marked increase in public trust and approval of police in 2015 and 2016, this number 
has begun to decline as perceptions of crime have increased across the country.99  The conflict has 
also limited the possibility of decentralization of state institutions, as the current government sees 
decentralization as capitulation to Russia’s demand for federalization.  The ongoing conflict in the 
Donbas also has effects in increasing IDPs, access to weapons100, and political violence. Therefore, 
any major escalation or even decrease in the intensity of the conflict will also factor into insecurity.   
Political Competition  
Political competition is the process of contestation by actors seeking to advance their 
political interests, patrimonial control over state institutions and bureaucracy, of influence in the 
reform process.  Political competition includes relations among and across a wide range of actors 
within the National Police of Ukraine, prosecutors, the MoI, parliament and the presidential 
administration, oligarchs, international donors, and civil society.  Exploring the political interests 
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of stakeholders allows analysts to transcend a simplistic narrative of reform as a battle between 
reformers and spoilers.  Instead, it captures relationships and interactions among these actors that 
can range from cooperation and compromise to obstruction and sabotage.  Following Geddes 
(1994) I argue that the political interests of stakeholders, namely politicians but also international 
actors, police, and civil society, are often crucial in determining what kinds of reforms become 
possible.  Gryzmalla Busse (2006) argues that political competition has been central to the 
establishment of competent bureaucracies and the creation of independent oversight mechanisms 
in post-Socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe because party competition forced parties to 
deliver democratic reform at the risk of reversion to autocracy or electoral defeat.  While political 
pluralism is important in any economic system, I argue that due to Ukraine’s history of political 
instability, Russian interference, the absence of representative political parties and extensive 
patrimonialism; political competition in Ukraine presents more obstacles than opportunities for 
administrative reform. 
Both insecurity and corruption increase political competition amongst actors as they fight 
over rents, influence, and political credit.  Political competition includes sabotage from spoilers 
who stand to lose power, rents, and influence from reform.  Political competition can often cause 
rivalry and discord between actors that intend to work together towards a common goal but do not 
cooperate because of incomplete information, policy disagreements, mistrust or bureaucratic 
rivalry.  Kupatadze writes that the seeming political chaos of the Yushchenko administration was 
the result of increased political competition.  
“The Orange Revolution clearly resulted in increased political competition. The 
centralized system with a single arbiter, Leonid Kuchma, was no longer in place and power was 
partitioned among different political factions. Oligarchs therefore faced more competition in 
influencing the state, though both their strategy of capturing state institutions and the 




(Kupatadze 2012; 108). 
While Ukraine is still a hybrid regime, the post-Euromaidan political climate is much more 
competitive than the authoritarian regime of Victor Yanukovych as new actors, pressures, and 
interests enter the political cycle (Kuzio 2012; Puglisi 2015). Three factors have forced the 
authorities to involve other actors in its policy-making process to a greater extent.  First, following 
the collapse of the Yanukovych regime and the beginning of the conflict in Donbas, Ukrainian 
civil society took on a greater role in providing state services, such as defense, internal security, 
and counter-propaganda (Minakov 2015; Puglisi 2015).  Second, substantial funding from 
international donors and further concessions from the European Union depend upon Ukraine 
demonstrating concrete progress towards reforms such as limiting corruption and respecting 
human rights that require changes in the police.  Third, perhaps in an effort to increase its 
legitimacy after Euromaidan, many political parties have recruited new political figures to their 
ranks.  These include activist types such as former journalist Mustafa Nayyem, war veterans like 
Aleksander Biletsky101 and Nadiya Savchenko, and even the former President of Georgia Mikhail 
Saakashvili.  A similar process of recruiting veterans, technocrats, and outsiders has occurred 
within the police, and this has led to increased rivalries between the “old guard” police and newer 
Patrol Police.  The focus on political competition over specific reforms helps to better understand 
when a pluralistic bargaining can be an asset that brings consensus, transparency, and legitimacy 
to the reform process, and when political competition produces gridlock, stagnation, and sabotage.  
 Unlike in Georgia, where former President Mikhail Saakashvili’s party had a majority of 
the parliament and a broad public mandate, the political balance of power in Ukraine is much more 
fractured and contentious.  Alexander Kupatadze (2013; 20) argues that in pluralistic political 
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environments with competing political clans (like Ukraine) will be unable to gain the political 
capital and consensus needed to enact deep reforms.  Ukrainian politics is dominated by several 
competing regional clans or “financial political groups” that have their own business networks, 
media, political parties, and, recently, and, since 2014, paramilitary and NGO groups (Minakov, 
2015).  Paul D’Anieri (2011) argues that structural constraints such as regional divisions, weakness 
of ideology, and economic weakness have historically prevented the consolidation of political 
power in Ukraine.  The current coalition government is comprised of the Petro Poroshenko Block 
(BPP) with 143 seats and the People’s Front” (Narodni Front) with 81 of 425 seats.  The coalition 
faces major challenges as it has anemic public approval and very nearly avoided a coalition 
collapse in April 2016 after the exit of the “Self-Reliance” (Samopomich) party from the coalition.  
Infighting abounds as Interior Minister Arsen Avakov from “People’s Front” was accused by 
Mikhail Saakashvili from BPP in early 2016 of blocking reform and protecting figures engaged in 
corruption.  The Interior Ministry has frequently clashed with the NPU over powers, and Avakov 
was later accused by the first Chief of the National Police of Ukraine, Khatia Dekanoidze, of 
political interference, lack of support, and blocking reform during her resignation speech in 
November 2016.   
Political competition and reform also divides law enforcement between old and new police 
units, and particularly between police and prosecutors.  Many police officers complain that they 
arrest a suspect only to have that person later released by other police, prosecutors, or courts after 
paying a bribe or using political connections.  Officers from the National Police and investigators 
from the NABU have also arrested judges on corruption charges, and in August of 2016 the 
Prosecutor raided the office of the NABU and detained several of its personnel on charges of using 




corruption.  Another area of political competition is within and among foreign donors, state elites, 
and the police.  The US State Department assistance for law enforcement reform to Ukraine 
doubled between 2014 and 2015 and tripled in 2016 to $25 million dollars and the EUAM has a 
budget of €54,250,000 from 2014 to 2017.  The Euromaidan was heavily influenced by the desire 
to integrate with Europe, and the EU has leveraged the promise of European integration and free 
trade for Ukraine in exchange for reforms (including reform of police). In Ukraine, political 
competition amongst donors and between donors and the NPU and MOI in some cases complicates 
reform by creating short horizons, duplication of efforts, and contradicting objectives.  
Many authors argue that the participation of civil society is the key to police reform as it 
brings legitimacy and transparency to the reform process, provides important oversight and can 
help with the implementation of reform programs (Nield 2002; Bayley 2001; Stone and Ward 
2000; Marat 2013).  Through public cooperation in a police reform, the police are thought to gain 
legitimacy and to be more accountable and effective, but literature on community policing also 
raises some concerns about public control over police agencies through “majority tyranny” and 
authoritarian excesses of the public against minorities (Kadar 2001; Grabowski 2008; Kadar 2001; 
Sklansky 2008).  Ukrainian civil society has so far been heavily involved in the reform process in 
areas such as commenting on draft laws, recruitment, participation in vetting commissions (re-
attestation), and training of the new Patrol Police; but many activists and journalists have also been 
critical of political interference, continued corruption, and the slow pace of reforms outside of the 
Patrol Police.  Lucan Way argues that Ukrainian civil society in a country as regionally divided as 
Ukraine can increase societal division undermine democratization, and that civil society in Ukraine 
has historically been poor at holding governments accountable (Way 2014).  Much of the 




and civil society often clashes over various reform proposals.  The cooptation of civil society by 
Ukrainian oligarchs is also of concern and Mikhail Minakov argues that, “[if left unchecked] the 
nexus between civil society, business, and politics will introduce a new shade of systemic 
corruption and reduce the resources for the further democratic development of Ukraine” (Minakov 
2015).  Finally, the introduction of new mechanisms such as selection and attestation commissions 
allows for new arenas of political competition over appointment of all levels of law enforcement.  
Whereas Ukraine lacks a tradition of independent civil service and nearly positions were always 
filled as patronage jobs, the involvement of commissions in law enforcement and other state 
sectors allows for new arenas of contestation over who receives these positions.  Therefore, 
political competition among this broad case of actors in Ukraine at various levels has the possibility 
to affect the course of reforms in both positive and negative ways that have serious implications 
for the sustainability of reforms.  With a better understanding of the enabling and constraining 
factors involved in police reform, the next section will explain institutional and legislative 
outcomes and their success and sustainability. 
III Outcome and Institutional Articulation   
Because of the tempering effects of corruption, insecurity and political competition, what 
starts as grand plans for the total overhaul of policing typically results in isolated experiments or 
‘pilot programs’, or more ambitious parallel insulated structures in low policing which have little 
authority over grand corruption or major criminal investigations.  At this third phase of articulation 
and outcomes, political elites and decision makers within law enforcement calculate whether the 
pressures from the stimulus are more of a concern than the mitigating factors of corruption, 
insecurity and political competition.  The costs of ignoring the first set of factors may be a loss of 




of pressures may mean the loss of lucrative corruption schemes for a political actor or their allies, 
the possibility of public backlash at a policy which increases insecurity, and the most concerning, 
the potential loss of the loyalty of law enforcement.  If the pressure from the first stage of reform 
stimuli is sufficient to provoke action, the political elite will either enact a new law or policy, or 
create or modify an institution.   
 Most of the laws and policies explored in this dissertation will be covered in chapter four 
whereas chapters five and six will focus more on institutional design.  The politics of enacting 
legislation and creating institutions are different, but the same factors apply in generating pressure 
and resistance for these reforms.  If the reform is a law or policy, typically enacted through the 
parliament or by internal ministry order the outcome can be said to be sustainable if it resolves the 
particular issue, is adopted by the bureaucracy, and is not reversed or abandoned.   
If the reform is a creation or reform of a new institution, two components are necessary to 
make the reform sustainable.  First, reforms which are created following a meritocratic, rather than 
a patrimonial, personnel policy and those which are insulated by international actors and overseen 
by domestic independent civil society.  Second, reforms that allow for public oversight and 
participation in decision making and which provide information to the public have a greater chance 
of becoming sustainable because they create permanent mechanisms by which outsiders can shape 
decisions, influence policy, and detect ‘cheating’.  In short, for reforms to become sustainable, 
they need to have insulation from political interference and mechanisms for public oversight and 
accountability.     
This argument suggests that the real and extensive reforms begun in Ukraine after the 




separatists), and diplomatic imperatives102, however as the political and security situation 
stabilized, pressure for reform has decreased as the current administration faces no immediate 
threats from political challengers, and increasingly relies on the Ministry of Interior for national 
defense, public order, and crime control.  Lackluster results in many areas of police reform three 
years after the Euromaidan has produced broad public skepticism about the possibilities and 
prospects for police reform, and thus has decreased public attention and political reward for 
pursuing further reform of the police.  Despite decreasing political pressure and the effects of 
constraining factors some reforms have had much more success than others.  I argue that the key 
to the success of certain reforms is that they have increased accountability by incorporating civil 
society and international actors in the process, thus creating oversight, a level playing field, and 
tying the hands of would be spoilers.   Below, I examine how this institutional design affects the 
sustainability of reforms.   
Which reforms are most likely to sustainable?  Reforms are most likely to be sustainable 
when they have a built-in constituency through lateral and vertical accountability where the 
authorities “tied their hands”, preventing themselves and their successors from abandoning 
reforms (Moncada 2009).  This can be done through public campaigns which seek to inform the 
public and engage them in the changes taking place, as was the case with Patrol Police’s aggressive 
public relations campaign which included information campaigns and workshops, new television 
shows about police, and the release of data including personnel hiring lists, annually mandated 
police reports, and crime data. While providing more information to the public increases their 
political agency and stakes in successful reforms, under these conditions the public still remain a 
passive rather than active participant in reform.  Institutional design can create more durable 
                                                            




reform constituencies when it creates active participatory and oversight roles for civil society or 
international partners, as is the case in public oversight of police hiring and vetting, and civil 
society and international donor’s roles in retraining the police.  International support is crucial in 
insulating new and reformed institutions from patronistic staffing and from being used by political 
incumbents as an administrative resource.  Although international actors cannot be the primary 
constituency and international support is necessarily temporally limited, if properly conducted 
international insulation can create institutions that are independent of politicians and accountable 
to the public.  These processes provide the public and donors with stakes in the reform by 
empowering actors outside of the state and police to meaningfully participate in these intimate 
areas of a police organization.  Finally, community police programs, when they integrate 
community input in a meaningful way, can create long standing links between police and 
communities that improve both relations between police and the public and increase oversight by 
exposing more of police work to citizens. 
Which reforms are least likely to be sustainable?  The reforms that are least likely to be sustainable 
in the long term are those that rely on top-down decision making from elites, do not allow for 
public participation and transparency in their passage or implementation processes, require 
extensive legal, administrative, and at times constitutional changes, and reforms which are not well 
understood, have no constituency or unclear political currency among the public.  Reforms are 
also unlikely to succeed in areas where they affect the current distribution of political powers, such 
as powerful new organizations which have the ability to investigate corruption and crimes among 
high level officials and.  For example, meaningful decentralization of policing is complicated by 
resistance to decentralization from some of the public and political opposition by nationalist 




of decentralization.  As Yanilda Gonzalez argues in her dissertation, divided public opinion 
represents a constant barrier to reform which is only overcome in the rare case of scandals which 
are exploited by a robust political opposition in the run-up to elections (Gonzalez 2014).  Similarly, 
changing the inefficient and archaic criminal investigation process would require broad changes 
in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on Operational Search 
Activity, and other changes in Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, and within the Ministry of 
Interior.  Demilitarization of policing is risky in times of war, has no immediate reform coalition, 
and may solicit serious opposition from demobilized police and others who benefit from the status 
quo.  Police accountability, through reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office or the creation of 
the State Bureau of Investigation are also unlikely to significantly advance as the public is unaware 
of or ambivalent towards these agencies, and police impunity is favored by both political and police 
elites (when it does not result in uncomfortable scandals).  Though personnel policies such as new 
hiring and training have allowed for public oversight, the process of vetting or attestation, which 
formally had public oversight, was resisted and undermined by the MoI and others in a way to 
make its results less sustainable.  Furthermore, reforms that seriously threaten the political status 
quo by increasing the independence of police to engage in legitimate anti-corruption and criminal 
investigations are likely to be opposed as entrenched powers fear “overzealous” (Sherman 1978) 
independent police investigating political elites, or capture of these forces by their opponents as 
an ‘administrative resource’.  
Prospects for change and future scenarios  
 The insights provided in this chapter and throughout the dissertation are in no means an 
attempt to be determinative about the prospects for future police reform in Ukraine but are rather 




conditions and factors considered in this dissertation (and others not explored here) are subject to 
change in abrupt and unpredictable ways which could have serious implications for police reform. 
The first and most obvious way in which these conditions could change would be the emergence 
of another police scandal.  While the police and political authorities have been noticeably 
restrained in their handling of protests and bribery has decreased, several high-profile cases of 
police violence and police brutality have plagued the police in recent years103104.  These cases have 
not been politically salient enough to produce change beyond symbolic dismissals105 or to energize 
reform coalitions, but future scandals could certainly reinvigorate public and elite pressure for 
reform.  Another scenario under which reforms may be reenergized is if reforms in other state 
bodies are able to increase lateral accountability on police to control corruption and abuse of force.  
Several anti-corruption initiatives have been launched in Ukraine since 2014, including the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau, special anti-corruption courts, and the long-anticipated State 
Bureau of Investigations (SIB), as well as the revived Ombudsman office within the police.  These 
newly created (or recreated) institutions have so far complained of a lack of resources and 
authority, independence, and cooperation from other agencies.  Similarly, reform in Patrol Police, 
and reform of the internal affairs bureau of police “DVB”, has proceeded, and may eventually have 
a strong impact on the actions and behaviors of the overall police organization police.  If these 
agencies are given the independence (insulation), resources, authority to operate as they are 
designed, they may meaningfully change the way police functions in Ukraine by increasing 
accountability to the public and reducing impunity for police corruption and human rights abuses. 
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  An escalation in insecurity, through the conflict or a continued escalation of crime will 
likely have a negative effect on police reforms, by prioritizing police force and authority over 
human rights, civil rights, and accountability.  Conversely a stabilization a of either the criminal 
or security situation could produce the political opportunity to focus on other areas of reform such 
as demilitarization, police accountability, anti-corruption reform and human rights reform.  Any 
major change in the geopolitical situation and the rendering of support, including an increase or 
decrease in aid and political pressure to Ukraine by outside states can also cause reforms to change.  
While foreign aid alone is no guarantee of a political commitment to meaningful police reform, an 
abrupt decrease in aid, technical assistance, or diplomatic support to Ukraine from the west (either 
because of donor fatigue, austerity, or domestic politics) could seriously jeopardize the 
implementation and advance of reforms including hiring and community policing.  Amid attacks 
on anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine in late 2017, IMF and EU sources warned that Ukraine 
could not rely on continued aid unless it ensures the independence of these agencies (Ash et al, 
2017).   
Finally, a major change in the political landscape of Ukraine could change the dynamics 
and trajectories of police reform in the immediate future.  This may result in another coalition 
reshuffling, which could either increase or decrease the power of the dominant party (currently 
BPP), thus solidifying or endangering the reform coalition.  Also, scheduled elections in 2019 may 
see reform of law enforcement become a political issue in the next election, prompting incumbents 
to react or challengers to adopt police reform policies.  The effects of police reform as a campaign 
issue would be even more effective if another scandal was to break near the time of the next 




next section, we explore how the causes of police reform and the constraining factors have shaped 
the paths of structural police reforms in Ukraine since 2014. 
Argument 
 Reform stimuli can create windows of opportunity to enact meaningful police reform 
briefly open due to a political realignment, a convergence of elite and mass opinion in rejection of 
the policing status quo, the formation of a reform coalition, increased agency by civil society, and 
the rendering of international aid.  These forces often coalesce to convince political elites that there 
are substantial political benefits in engaging in police reform as a public good.  This is because 
police are often delegitimized and unpopular with the public, and more are filled with personnel 
that have loyalties to the previous regime.  This creates incentives for political elites to engage in 
short-sighted reform in order to strengthen their control over law enforcement, as well as to gain 
political support and currency amongst the electorate and international partners.  However, 
corruption, insecurity, and particularly political competition limit the possibilities for sustained 
reform by creating increased uncertainty among political actors and law enforcement about the 
future political order, specifically in the control over law enforcement institutions.  In most cases 
reform coalitions do not stay together for long amid increased political competition and 
renegotiation of boundaries as new players enter the realm of politics and security.  Similarly, 
structural changes such as rapid change in the political, economic, and social system typically 
causes an increase in crime or non-state violence and thus increases the new leadership’s 
dependence on security organizations such as police, and thus increase the leverage of law 
enforcement organizations to resist unwanted reforms and change.  This also changes public 
attitudes and preferences about policing.  Writing about the level of societal support for reform in 




1998) often focus on elite actors, the Ukrainian public also has mixed feelings about reform.  “Even 
at the bottom of society, supporting reform requires some confidence that change will lead to the 
benefits promised by reformers. The experience of the past two decades does not inspire trust in 
the promises made by reformers” (D’Anieri 2016; 13). 
Soon, incumbents and their police feel the pressure of these crises and with low support 
and uncertain electoral benefits of deep democratic policing reform, they double down on 
traditional strategies of crime fighting and accommodating police demands of autonomy and 
impunity.  Furthermore, the effect of corruption, insecurity, and political competition is that mass 
and elite political pressure for reform is almost impossible to sustain for any long period of time 
and will inevitable encounter resistance from entrenched elite who benefit from the status quo 
(through patterns of accommodation) politicians reluctant to cede their own control over police 
forces, and public’s inchoate demands for simultaneous limitations on police power and increased 
order and safety in response to rising citizen insecurity.  As coalitions break apart, the control over 
law enforcement and the justice system becomes an increasingly central part of political survival 
which political elites are unlikely to disabuse themselves of through enacting meritocratic reforms 
and decreasing the power and autonomy of these organizations.  These reforms would at best cause 
unilateral disarmament of administrative resources, and at worse become a future tool by which 
incumbents and their political networks are attacked.  Thus, as the following chapters of this 
dissertation will demonstrate in detail, they key to sustaining police reform after the initial stimulus 
and the resistance from the mitigating factors is political insulation often at the behest of 
international donors, public oversight and involvement by civil society.  These components allow 
certain reforms to become institutionalized by creating broad constituencies, preventing 




Chapter 3:  Structural Reforms  
Background 
This chapter focuses on two types of structural reforms for policing in Ukraine, 
decentralization and demilitarization, which are both stated reform goals of the government, 
Ukrainian civil society groups, and international donors.  I begin this chapter by introducing the 
structure of the policing system in Ukraine and the changes that have occurred since 2014.  Then 
this chapter will focus on the issues of demilitarization and decentralization, previous and current 
reform proposals, and progress towards stated reform goals since 2014.   
Structure of Ukrainian Policing 
Before examining specific reforms, it is first necessary to provide some background 
information on the structure of the National Police of Ukraine.  The NPU has a unique centralized 
structure with three levels of subordinations and six separate subdivisions of police:  1) Criminal 
Police; 2) Patrol Police; 3) Pre-Trial Investigation Authorities; 4) Security Police; 5) Special 
Police; 6) Special Operations Police (KORD) (article 13 of the Law on National Police).  The NPU 
has a complex leadership structure, with a Chief of Police is nominated by the Minister of Interior 
and confirmed by the Council of Ministers (article 21 of the Law on National Police).  The first 
Chief of the National Police of Ukraine was Khatia Dekanoidze from November 2015 through 
November 2016.  As January 2017, the Chief of NPU is Serhiy Knyazev, a twenty-year veteran of 
the Criminal Police division from Kyiv Oblast who previously served in as Chief of Police in 
Donetsk Oblast.  Directly below the Chief of the NPU is one Deputy Chief and five more Deputies 
of various departments in the Central Apparatus who are appointed by the Minister of Internal 




21 section II). Below the central leadership are 24 heads of Territorial Units of NPU in the regions 
(GUNP) who are nominated by the Chief of NPU and approved by the Minister of Interior.  
  The NPU establishes departments at three levels including the Central Apparatus 
(Apparat), Interregional Territorial Organs (Mizhregioanal’i Teritorialni Organi) and Territorial 
Organs of the NPU, known as Main Directorate of the NPU in the oblast or “GUNP” (Golovnikh 
Upravlin’ Natsionalnoyi Politsiy) in each of Ukraine’s 24 Oblasts, plus Kyiv. In addition to 
departments there are nine institutions of the NPU including training centers in various oblasts 
(separate from the much larger university system controlled by the MoI), and a NPU National 
Service Center in Kyiv.  The Apparatus level is centralized in Kyiv and contains 32 departments 
alone, some of which are highly specialized such as analytical departments, explosives, department 
for international cooperation, pensions departments, as well as other more general departments 
which are mirrored at the oblast GUNP level such as criminal intelligence and preventative 
functions, and communications.   
Territorial Units or GUNP represents the National Police of Ukraine in the countries 24 
Oblasts and the City of Kyiv, (and the occupied territories of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol), 
and these departments each have their own structure and number of officers depending on the 
particular size and needs of the Oblast.  The typical setup of a GUNP in an Oblast often includes 
a Department of Pre-Trial Investigators, a Department of Criminal Investigations, Criminal 
Intelligence, Department of Operative106 services, Department of Preventative Activities, 
communications sector, legal division, and other small support departments.  The GUNP may 
duplicate many of the functions of the Apparatus in the region, and there are police divisions, such 
                                                            
106 Operatives or “Operativniki” are tantamount to detective’s assistants, they carry out the field work of detectives, such as 
collecting evidence, conducting searches, and surveillance or following suspects.  They are typically dressed in plain clothes and 
may have little training in criminal procedure, as the legal and procedural aspects of investigations are handled by investigators 




as Criminal Police Division that have police in the GUNP, Interregional and Central Apparatus 
levels.  The Apparatus and Territorial divisions of GUNP have always existed, however the 2015 
Law on National Police created a third level called “interregional departments” which have the 
right to set up police departments at the local level, but are subordinate to the Central Apparatus 
chiefs rather than the GUNP chief.  There are six of these interregional departments including the 
Interregional Department of Patrol Police (not to be confused with the GUNP and Apparat 
departments of Patrol police107), the Department Against Narco-addiction (under the Criminal 
Police Division) Internal Security Department (Internal Affairs) “DVB”  (under the Criminal 
Police Division)108, the Department for the Protection of the Economy (under the Criminal Police 
Division), the Department of Security Police (under the Security Police Division), and the newly 
created Cyber Police (also in the Criminal Police Division).  These six interregional departments 
are controlled directly by central department chiefs which answer to the Chief of the NPU, meaning 
that decisions on funding, hiring, promotion, transfer and operations are all made in Kyiv, rather 
than in the regions.  Sources familiar with the drafting of the Law on National Police claim that 
the interregional status departments arose from concerns of reformers and Dekanoidze’s team 
about the perverse influence by MoI, police, and local and national political elites on staffing in 
the new police and the potential for corruption and disloyalty of police under GUNP regional 
management during transition.  
 The following figures provide a before and after comparison of the structure of the Militia 
under the MoI, six months before reform, and the National Police of Ukraine one year after reform, 
as well as organizational charts.  In the following lists, Criminal Police are written in red text and 
                                                            
107 The remnants of the Public Order Militia (MOB) of the MoI which included the former Traffic Police DAI, Patrol Militia 
(PPS) neighborhood police, and Berkut.  These Patrol Police from the old MoI system operate outside of the 32 cities where the 
new Interregional Patrol Police which is almost entirely new hires is not operating.   
108 DVB is technically under the Criminal Police Division, because they are empowered to use the law on Operational Search 




Public Security Police are in blue, investigators in brown text.  Also, the charts demonstrate which 
police departments and units within the Militia were eliminated during the 2015 reform which 
created the NPU such as the Veterinary Police, the office of the Transport Police, and the State 
Automobile Directorate (GAI/DAI) and the Department of Public Security (MOB) which were 
replaced by Patrol Police.  The changes in structure show both a continuity of many police 
departments, as well as a change in subordination and organization.  Further organizational 
diagrams of both the Ukrainian Militsiya and the National Police of Ukraine can be found in the 




















Figure 3.1Structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (As of March 30, 2015) 
Office of the Ministry 
1. Management 
2. Department for Operations of the Minister  
3. Department of Internal Security* (DVB-Internal Affairs) 
4. Criminal police 
Main Department for Combating Organized Crime (GUBOZ) (*eliminated in 2014)  
Department of Criminal Investigation 
Department for Counteracting Crime in the Sphere of Economics (*renamed Dept. for Defense of the 
Economy)  
Department of Operational Services 
Department of Operational and Technical Measures 
Department for Combating Crimes Related to Trafficking in Human Beings 
Department for Combating Illegal Drug Trafficking 
Office of the fight against cybercrime 
Office of the Criminal Police for Children 
Department of the organization of canine activity 
5. Working apparatus of the Ukrainian Bureau of Interpol 
6. Public Security Police MOB 
Department of Public Security (*eliminated- but continues to exists in GUNP in some regions) 
Department of State Automobile Inspectorate (liquidated July 2015-replaced by intereg. Patrol Dept.) 
Department of the organization of special police units (*former Berkut- riot control) 
Department of Veterinary Police (*eliminated in 2015) 
7. Main Investigation Department (GSU) (this is where investigators are located) 
8. The Office of the Transport Police (eliminated in 2015 reform) 
9. The General Staff 
10. Department of Information and Analytical Support 
11. Department of Legal Support 
12. Human Resources Department 
13. Department of Financial Support and Accounting 
14. Department of material security 
15. Department of Internal Audit 
16. Department of regime-secret and documentary support  
17. Communication Department 
18. Office of International Relations 
19. Department of Medical Support and Rehabilitation 
20. Office of Lustration Support 
21. Department for the Coordination of Reforms 
Department of the State Security Service  
The State Research and Expert-Forensic Center 
State Research Institute 
The Main Directorate of Internal Troops of Ukraine (military administrative body)  
(*now National Guard of Ukraine) 
Central Executive Authorities, coordinated by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine 
1. Administration of the State Border Service of Ukraine 
2. State Migration Service of Ukraine 




Figure 3.2 Structure of the National Police of Ukraine (As of June 22, 2016) 
Apparatus 
1. Management 
2. Head Operations Support Department 
3. Department of Criminal Investigation (as part of the Criminal Police) 
4. Department of Criminal Intelligence (as part of the Criminal Police) 
5. Department for Combating Crimes Related to Trafficking in Human Beings (as part of Criminal 
Police) 
6. Department of Operational Services (as part of the Criminal Police) 
7. Department of operational and technical measures (as part of Criminal Police) 
8. Department for the identification of hazardous materials and environmental crimes (as part of the 
Criminal Police) 
9. Department of Preventive Activities (formerly under Public Security Police MOB) 
10. Department of Special Purpose Police (formerly under Public Security Police MOB) 
11. Department of the organization of activities "KORD" *(as part of the Special Police) 
12. Working staff of the Interpol Ukrbureau (as a department) 
13. The Main Investigation Department (Pre-Trial Investigation Bodies PTIB) 
14. Department of Organizational and Analytical Support and Rapid Response 
15. *Department of Information Support and Coordination of Police "102" (911 call system) 
16. The Legal Department 
17. Human Resources Department 
18. Communication Department 
19. Department of Financial Support and Accounting 
20. Department of Internal Audit 
21. Department of Property Management 
22. Department of Communications and Telecommunications 
23. Documentation Support Department 
24. Department of Explosives Engineering Service 
25. Management of the regime and technical protection of information 
26. Office of International Cooperation 
27. Office for the Ensuring of Human Rights 
28. Special Police Division  
29. Department of the organization of Canine Activity (*no longer under criminal police) 
30. Special Communications Division 
31. Department of Lustration 
32. Pensions Sector 
Interregional territorial bodies 
1. Department of Patrol Police (formerly under department of Public Security ‘MOB’) 
2. Department for Combating Drug Trafficking (as part of the Criminal Police) 
3. Department of Internal Security (as part of the Criminal Police) 
4. Department of Cyber Police (as part of the Criminal Police) *newly created in 2015 
5. The Department of Economic Protection (as part of the Criminal Police) 
6. Department of Security Police 
 
Territorial authorities (GUNP) 
Main departments of the National Police in Kiev, the regions (oblasts), the Autonomous Republic of 





Changes in departments since 2014 
According to figures provided by Taras Kuzio, before the Euromaidan the size of the 
Ministry of Interior, with the inclusion of Internal Troops (Vnutrenniye Voiska), Border Service 
and other divisions, stood at over 330,000, “[of which] nearly 50,000 belong to the traditional 
criminal militsiya of the Soviet era, 90,000 are involved in public security, 50,000 belong to the 
State Protection Service (DOS), 12,000 belong to the investigative department, and 5,000 are 
instructors in MVS academies and research centers” (Kuzio, 2015; 480).  Once the National Police 
became formally independent of the MoI in Fall of 2015, the National Guard (formerly Interior 
Troops) and other divisions such as state migration service and Department of Emergency Services 
(DSNS) were removed.   
 An information request to the National Police of Ukraine in January 2017 revealed a 
dramatic decrease in total numbers of police since 2015.  Below I provide a graph of the exact 
number of police in each department, followed by a brief explanation of the function fulfilled by 
each department.  These are organized from largest to smallest and include a description of the 
function of these police.   
Table 3.3 Descriptions and Job Functions of Ukrainian Police 
  Name of Department Description and Function  
  
 




Civil Service  
Police seconded to other state 
administrations or 
international organizations 
A variety of bureaucrats including administrators, plann  
faculty and researchers at the MoI university system, and 
others who are not directly involved in providing law 









The largest block of police which includes departments   
at both the central (Apparat), interregional level and at th  
regional (GUNP) level.  These divisions are typically 
specialized on different types of crimes and include oper  





-Economic Crimes Division 
-Human Rights Division 
-Internal Affairs (*DVB) 
 
work under orders from investigators and conduct search  
surveillance and arrest criminals.  They are often in plain 
clothes and are similar to detectives, but highly depende   
investigators for orders and authorization. 
*DVB is technically under Criminal Police because they  
the law on Operational Search Activities- but, in reality,  
subordinate to Chief of National Police. 
3.   Department of Patrol Police 
(Interregional Organ) 
Департаменту 
патрульної  поліції 
(міждурегіоналний орган)  
Newly created department of Patrol Police which replac  
(DAI/GAI in 2015).  This new department has interregio  
department status which with its own chief and deputies    
the 14,578 current Patrol Police only 2,682 (18.3%) prev  
worked in either Patrol Militia (PPS) or DAI/GAI.  This   
fastest growing department and has hired aggressively si  
2015.  In late 2017 the Patrol Police hired and began trai  
an additional 4,000 Patrol Police officers which should b  








4.   Organs of Pre-trail 
Investigation  (PTIB) 
Органів досудового 
рослідовання 
These are the investigators tasked with investigating crim  
known in Ukrainian as “Slidchi”.  Investigators must hav   
degrees and they prepare criminal cases similar to a pros   
These investigators do not conduct field work and instea   
orders to “operatives” (operativniki) from the Criminal B  







 Protection Police 
Поліції охорони 
An armed private security guard service for hire, which 
protects both state and private businesses. These police r  
to alarms and emergency calls from clients and are a sou   
revenue for the National Police of Ukraine. 
 
6.   Special Purpose Police 
Battalions 
Особливого призначення109 
Formations of former police and volunteers which guard  
2nd and 3rd lines in the “ATO” conflict zone.  Their dutie  
include: manning checkpoints, preventing removal of we  
and searches for terrorists and criminals in addition to ro  
law enforcement functions in Donetsk and Lugansk Obl  
 
7.   Department of Patrol Police- 
(separate from interregional 
department) 
Департаменту 
патрульної  поліції   
The remnants of the previous Patrol Militia ‘PPS’ Patru
postova sluzhba under the Public Security Militia which  
with basic patrol and public order functions.  These poli   
still operating small citiesin rural in areas where new 
Interregional Patrol Department has not been set up.  Th  
includes former PPS and DAI which EUAM attempted t  
reorganize into the Sambir model “quick reaction” (Shvi   
order to improve responsiveness.110 This department also 
includes Neighborhood Officers (sometimes called 
neighborhood inspectors) “Dilnichi” which typically dea   
the lowest criminal infractions, lack powers, and deal wi  
registered offenders.    In rural areas they are often the o  
 
                                                            
109 "'Special Purpose Units will form the basis of the new police’ - Alexander Fatsevich”. National Police of Ukraine.  March 
31st, 2016.  https://www.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/1870243 






police and can fulfill the role of sheriff 111  This departm   
supposed to be closed and all police moved into Interreg  
Patrol.   
8.   KORD“Corpus of Rapid 




A newly created department which includes divisions A   
are specialized like a SWAT team to handle high profile 
situations such as terrorism and apprehension of armed 
suspects. KORD-C is division within KORD that deals w  
public order and is meant to replace Berkut  
 
 
9.   Special police 
Спеціальної поліції 
 Tasked with keeping order in areas with special status a  
affected by natural or ecological disaster (including 
Chernobyl). 
 




Small division in the central Apparatus which conducts 
research and outreach including on road safety, domestic 
violence, and human rights, and youth.  Youth officers a  
included under this department at GUNP level. 
*This department formerly contains youth officers.  In 2   
was liquidated and and youth officers to move into  the 
interregional Patrol Department 
 
11.    Overall police 
Police + bureaucrats  
  
 
12.    Total including GUNP after reform  
These figures above help to explain the structural divisions of police within the National 
Police of Ukraine, however these figures remain largely fluid as the GUNP Patrol should 
eventually be assumed into the Interregional Patrol Department, Special Purpose Territorial 
Battalions will eventually demobilize with the end of conflict (with some being absorbed into 
KORD). Also, the Department of Public Security Militia (MOB) which was eliminated in 2015 
and which housed the Patrol Militia (PPS), State Auto Inspectorate (DAI/ GAI), Neighborhood 
Officers (Dilnichi) and Berkut.  With the elimination of this department of Public Security, and 
the Interregional Patrol Department created in 2015 subsumed the functions of the Patrol Militia 
and DAI, although less than 20% of former militia officers were hired into this department.  The 
remaining 5,000 police left in the GUNP Department of Patrol Police includes mostly 
                                                            
111 Lucy Sohryu "Spell our Name with a 'MI': Ukrainian Law Enforcement." The Ukraine Today.  June 14, 2015 
https://theukrainetoday.wordpress.com/2015/06/14/spell-our-name-with-a-mi-ukrainian-law-enforcement/ 
112 Interior Minister Arsen Avakov’s Facebook Page revealed that 2,100 members of KORD had passed the vetting and training 




neighborhood officers, and some former Berkut; although most of these have been moved to either 
Special Operation Police Battalions or been fired.  The department of Preventative Police which 
formerly housed the neighborhood officers was due to be phased out in 2017 and potentially 
incorporated into the Patrol Police Community Policing Unit.  District Police are supposed to be 
given expanded procedural powers to tackle more crimes once criminal misdemeanors are enacted, 
(a topic covered in Chapter 4).  Many district police were repurposed for the quick-reaction groups 
(“Shvidko Reogirovani” or “Shvi-Reg”) proposed by EUAM in their ‘Sambir Model’ reform 
which sought to increase police response times in smaller cities and rural communities where 
Patrol Police were not established, but this program was discontinued in 2017.  Chief of Police 
Knyazev has proposed the idea of merging District Officers with the Patrol Police, but a firm plan 
is yet to emerge as of early 2018.  Finally, there are ongoing proposals for unification of the 
Criminal Police and Pre-Trial Investigation Organs (operatives and investigators), which will be 
discussed in the next Chapter.   
Demilitarization 
Ukrainian law enforcement has a long history of militarization which began in the Soviet 
period and expanded substantially after independence.  The first militarized special purpose or 
“spetsnaz” (spetsialnogo naznacheniya) police formations were known as OMON and were 
created in the late Soviet period to address rising crime and in particular crowd control of 
nationalist mobilization in the republics (Shelley 1996; Beisinger 2002).  Unlike the former Soviet 
Militsiya these spetsnaz forces had military uniforms and weapons, used military tactics, and were 
deployed in extreme cases of riots or armed confrontations.   After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
independent Ukraine facing a violent crime wave in the 1990’s, the President and Parliament 




State Department for Preventing Organized Crime “GUBOZ”.  The former OMON was now 
renamed Berkut and specialized in crowd control.  These and other militarized police units 
proliferated throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s in part because of a real need for stronger policing 
but also largely due to the desire of particular political and bureaucratic leaders to accumulate 
security forces that could be used in a power struggle against their rivals.  As mentioned in Chapter 
1, during the political infighting and instability of the Yushchenko years (2005-2010) the use of 
these special forces against allies became a major part of the political struggle between 
Timoshenko, Yushchenko and Yanukovych. 
These units were also unpopular with the public and were responsible for several high 
profile cases of repression or protesters, a more militarized approach to crime fighting and in many 
cases actual involvement in criminal enterprise.  After the Euromaidan the first target of the interim 
government was Berkut and Guboz who were both disbanded but continued to operate.  The 
outbreak of armed conflict in 2014 presented a dilemma and contradiction for demilitarization of 
police that is emblematic of many of the other reforms in this study.   
While the public ire was focused on these militarized policing units and there was massive 
support for demilitarization, the outbreak of the conflict led to de facto amnesty for many of these 
officers and a further proliferation of “police battalions” created under the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to address the outbreak of violence in Donbas.  These police battalions later became a 
major part of the new National Police and many of the top leadership and officials have come from 
their ranks.  The problems of a militarized police force are that they are often violent against 
civilians and protesters, unaccountable to civilian leadership, and used against political rivals.  The 
reform impetus that created the biggest pressure to provide demilitarization was obviously the 




biggest mitigating factors are the ongoing conflict in Donbas and the rising crime rate which cause 
public insecurity and the change in the political balance of control over special forces that is caused 
by any elimination or reorganization of existing forces or the creation of new forces.  As this 
section will show, several reform stimuli were present in the goal of demilitarization including 
western support, the scandal of the Euromaidan, a conscious state building effort to rebuild the 
states coercive capacity after the Euromaidan, and political upheaval which created the 
opportunities for change.  At the same time, the forces of political competition over the control of 
existing forces and the creation of new forces and the fear of insecurity stalled both efforts for 
demilitarization of police and decentralization.  The result has been the partial elimination of 
certain militarized units and the creation of new special force units and a partial decentralization 
of police forces at the local level through municipal guards. 
Goals of Demilitarization 
The goal of demilitarization is to transform police from a military or paramilitary 
organization into a civilian agency, focused on public service and accountable to civilian 
authorities.  Demilitarization typically involves ensuring civilian leadership, the transferring of 
militarized units out of the police and into the Ministry of Defense, eliminating military uniforms 
and insignia and heavy weapons among patrol and public order police, reforming the rank 
structure, and downsizing personnel (Caparini and Marenin 2004; 14).  Demilitarization is also an 
effort to prevent police from using military tactics, equipment, and from deploying militarized 
police into encounters with civilians, particularly during public protests. A 2014 Strategy 





• The structure of the MIA shall not have any military units; all MIA departments 
shall be civilian services, whose personnel, although partly performing their duty 
in uniform, shall not have special ranks similar to the military ranks, and shall not 
use military attributes or symbols. The National Guard and the Border Guard 
Service, as the most militarized units within the MIA, may only have a status of 
paramilitary formations. 
 
• The MIA shall have a developed system of professional standards of conduct 
aimed for development of the personnel’s initiative, independent decision making, 
and readiness to take responsibility for their actions. All rudiments of military 
discipline and training shall be eliminated.   (MVS 2014). 
The same document proscribes metrics of “creating a civil model of operations and 
relations within personnel, reducing or eliminating military ranks within the police, and both 
civilian and police personnel downsizing” (MVS 2014).  These statements are reflective of public 
and elite demands over militarized policing during Euromaidan and certain steps have been taken 
towards demilitarizing Ukraine’s police.  For example, the first Chief of the NPU, Khatia 
Dekanoidze, was a civilian with no background in law enforcement (although she was the head of 
the MoI Educational system of the MoI in Georgia, responsible for training police).  The choice 
of Dekanoidze as a foreigner and a political outsider is also an interesting decision made by leaders 
and could reflect what they assumed would be a neutral arbiter in the political balance of power 
and control over Ukrainian law enforcement. 
The law on National Police also rationalized and simplified the rank structure of police 
through removing several ranks113 (article 80).  The new uniforms administered to Patrol Police 
and perceived as less militaristic than the uniforms of the Militia (with its epaulettes), although 
financing shortages have delayed the provision of these new uniforms throughout Ukraine.  
Despite some movement towards demilitarization, the realities of three years of armed conflict and 
                                                            




a dramatic increase in crime and public insecurity114 have dampened expectations for 
demilitarization.  Below I explore contemporary reform proposals for police demilitarization by 
examining downsizing, the removal of military units, and improvements in public order policing 
to better understand how plans to demilitarize Ukraine’s police have evolved since 2014. 
Downsizing and Optimization 
Post-Soviet states inherited the institutional legacies of very large police forces that were 
needed to maintain an authoritarian political system and a regime of repression (Shelley 1996; 
Beissinger 2002).  While the Armed Forces of Ukraine (which were the second largest standing 
army in Europe in 1991) were shrinking during the post-independence years, during the same 
period, the Ministry of Interior was swelling in size (Colby and Pukhov 2015; Derdzinski 2014)  
Taras Kuzio estimates that at the time of the Euromaidan, the size of the Ministry of Interior stood 
at 330,000 employees and he argues that, “Large size [of security agencies] is important in a post-
Soviet country such as Ukraine as it translates into resources and influence; quantity therefore 
trumps quality” (Kuzio 2015; 478).  The figure of 330,000 is double the actual amount of police 
as it included the Internal Troops (Vnutrini Voiska), DSNEP (State Fire and Emergency Service), 
the State Border Guard Service, and many other non-police services.  Before the reform there were 
approximately 170,000 people working in the Militia either as officers or commanders, support 
staff, or in the educational institutions.  A report from 2010 found that Ukraine, while having 
higher levels of police to civilian ratio, was relatively close to average for the Former Soviet Union, 
                                                            





although it spent much less per capita on police, security services and its military than other 
countries.115  
   Downsizing is a reform advocated by international donors and local human rights groups 
and others which argue that decreasing the size of bloated police ministries can allow police 
organizations to more effectively allocate limited resources by eliminating duplicate jobs, “paper 
pushers”, and sinecures.  While downsizing as a principle of demilitarization is often accepted in 
theory, the form and speed of downsizing can present several challenges (Caparini and Marenin 
2004).  Cutting the size of a large police agency raises several dilemmas including how to best 
manage a mass dismissal of civil servants within a rule of law framework (De Grief 2007), how to 
respond to assertions that police downsizing is causing, or will cause a crime wave, and how to 
manage a “demobilization dilemma” where dismissed security actors may turn to crime or other 
threats to state stability (Bayley 2001; Cawthra & Luckham 2003).  Also, downsizing almost 
always politically contentious with opponents arguing that it is often focused on selective purging 
of political opponents and politicization of forces.  Serhiy Akulov has maintained that purges in 
the MoI conducted early in the Yanukovych administration in the name of downsizing, 
optimization, and fighting corruption were in fact simply a process of personalization of the 
security services which led to an exodus of many good police officers and a decrease in 
professionalism and the ability to solve crimes (Akulov 2013).   
The Ukrainian Interior Ministry announced in 2014 that reforms would decrease the 
number of police from 172,000 to 110,000 and the attestation of 69,000 police during 2016 resulted 
in the dismissal of over 6,000 police the voluntary resignation of thousands more police.  Many 
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legal experts were highly critical of the legal basis of attestation and have argued that officers fired 
in the vetting process are being reinstated through the courts on legal technicalities, or by transfer 
to other units such as Protection Police or Transport Police which were not subject to attestation.  
According to sources from the UMDPL the actual decrease of police has been from 156,300 police 
before the start of reform in 2015 to 130,000, of which 119,000 were police officers by January 1st 
2016116.  An information request to the National Police of Ukraine found that after nearly two 
years of reform the number of police in Ukraine stood at 106,300 in January 2017.  For these 
reasons, downsizing in and of itself does not constitute a true commitment to civilian policing and 
citizen security, which is instead a function of staffing levels in different agencies and police 
prioritization of citizen security.  For example, if the overall number of police officers decreased, 
but the number of police officers in special forces increased, this could hardly be considered 
demilitarization.  Similarly, a major complaint of police and politicians is that the deficit of police 
personnel, estimated at over 20%, is contributing to the rise of crime and the inability to begin or 
complete criminal investigations. 
In general, police downsizing consists of two sorts of personnel policies.  The first is the 
optimization of bureaucratic structures and the reduction of bureaucratic personnel and functions 
which are not central to policing such as the provision of certain licenses, passports, and other non-
law enforcement functions, which are inefficient or better handled by other agencies.  For example, 
Georgia eliminated several of their police’s responsibilities during reform including administering 
passports and registering cars and animals and transferred them to other agencies (Slade 2012).  
While police in Ukraine still perform a large amount of non-law enforcement functions due to their 
continental and Soviet policing legacies, there has been an attempt to reduce certain non-police 





functions such as passport administration and address registration in order to allow police to focus 
on central law enforcement tasks.  Removing non- police functions from police is also thought to 
have the effect of reducing opportunities corruption by limiting citizen exposure to bureaucrats.   
The second component of a demilitarization policy seeks to increase the number of police 
officers providing primary policing functions such as public order provision and the investigation 
of serious crimes which have the greatest effect on citizens such as violent crimes, robbery and 
property crimes (Bayley 2005).  David Bayley, the preeminent theorist of democratic policing 
argues that the one of the most important aspects of democratic policing is to shift from a focus on 
regime stability to a focus on crime prevention and to transform the mantra of police from focusing 
on “national security” to “serve and protect” (Bayley 2005; 58).  Interviews with the public and 
police officers in Ukraine confirm that there has been a large increase in the amount of Patrol 
police and neighborhood officers since reform began, and both departmental (NPU) and 
independent survey data show that police response times are improving (KIIS 2015, 2016).  Patrol 
Police are the officers which most regularly interact with civilians, and police report that there has 
been a push throughout all divisions of the NPU towards spending less time behind desks 
generating paperwork, and more time in patrol or investigation.  Patrol police have dramatically 
increased the public’s exposure to police and have been received well registering increased public 
trust in all the cities in which they are operating (KIIS 2016).  In the cities where the interregional 
Patrol Police are not operating, a pilot project by NPU in cooperation with the EUAM in Sambir, 
L’viv region, had attempted to increase the reaction time and availability of rural police officers, 
improving the emergency telephone system, and dedicated 70% of all police staff to patrol 
functions117.  Rather than using newly hired Patrol, this program sought to deploy former Militsiya 





officers in more useful ways by eliminating office jobs and increasing patrols and mobile units.  
Proponents argue for expanding this “Sambir model” throughout the rest of Ukraine, but argue 
that a lack of financing for basics necessities such as fuel and vehicles has prevented the expansion 
of this strategy beyond a few cities.118 119  This program was abandoned in summer 2017 after the 
new Chief of Police Serhii Knyazev decided that the program was not functional. 
The Chart Below (Table 3.3) is a visualization of the above data on NPU Personnel, minus 
the 20,674 non-police state officials working in NPU, the purpose of this graph is to better 
demonstrate where the NPU places its policing priorities.  A shift from regime policing towards a 
focus on citizen security should see the bulk of police dedicated to either public order functions 
such as foot or auto patrol, or the investigation of serious crimes. 
Table 3.3 
 
As shown in the chart, 30% of all police are dedicated to patrolling or public functions, 
and 44% are involved in some level of criminal investigations.  This means that almost three 
                                                            










































quarters of Ukraine’s police are directly involved in the essentials of law enforcement including 
investigating crimes and providing for public order.  While there are undoubtedly figures within 
the Criminal Block and Pre-trial Investigation Division which have little interaction with the 
public and may be less efficient, even protection police are highly visible in Ukraine and are 
duly-sworn law enforcement officers who are authorized to prevent crime and detain criminals.  
Special Purpose Police Battalions, despite their involvement in combat operations, provide a 
range of essential policing functions in the ATO including apprehension of criminals and 
maintaining public order.  The downsizing and optimization of personnel within the NPU is far 
from complete, but the dramatic increases in Patrol show that the department is moving towards 
a more civilian model that prioritizes citizen service over regime protection (Bayley 2005).   
According to MoI data as of January 2015 (six months before the start of the new 
Interregional Patrol) the former State Automobile Inspectorate (DAI/GAI) had 10,928 officers in 
Ukraine’s 24 oblasts, of which only 5,285 were road patrol.120  Within two years the newly created 
Interregional Patrol Department stood at 14,578 officers of which nearly all are actively 
responding to calls, plus 5,295 Patrol Police in the GUNP (mostly Neighborhood Officers) for a 
total of 19,873 Patrol Police.  Patrol Police hired an additional 4,000 officers in 2017 out of 
recruitment centers in Kyiv and Odesa, and the NPU is in the process of recruiting and training 
another 1,500 highway police in 2017 to patrol Ukraine’s 23 highways which have a combined 
length of over 5,000 miles of road.  Attestation, political purges, defections and transfer to combat 
units has decimated the cadre of police, and while it remains to be seen how much police behavior 
has changed, there are undoubtedly fewer people working in the police than ever before in post-
independence Ukraine.  This situation will eventually change as recruitment (covered in Chapter 
                                                            




5) continues, and recruitment priorities have focused on Patrol, including hiring over 12,000 new 
officers between summer 2015 through Spring 2016.  I now turn my attention to another 
component of demilitarization, the removal and separation of military units from the police. 
Elimination and Separation of Military Units 
The reforms begun in 2014 have simultaneously eliminated and separated many of the 
former Soviet militarized policing units such as the Berkut, Guboz, and the Internal Troops, while 
creating and proliferating other militarized units, namely the Special Purpose Patrol Battalions 
(PSMOP) which have been critical in fighting the war in Donbas.  This section will demonstrate 
how this seemingly contradictory policy of reduction and proliferation is a result of public pressure 
and outrage at these units, the necessity of increasing the states capacity in the war in Donbas, 
increasing public disorder, and the political competition over control of special force units. 
  The importance of a demilitarization was highlighted by the fact that one of the first 
actions of the interim government was the abolishment of Berkut and the Internal Troops in the 
days after the fall of the Yanukovych regime (Kuzio 2016).  In addition to these units, formal 
independence of the NPU from the MoI meant that they were no longer housed in the same 
organization along with the Administration of the State Border Guard Service (which is being 
reformed), the State Immigration Service of Ukraine, the Department of Medical Services and 
Rehabilitation (which operated detox facilities) and the Department of State Guard Service (UGO).  
Also, two divisions of police, Transit police and Veterinary police were liquidated during reforms. 
The Main Directorate of Internal Troops (Vnutrenniye Voiska) were a militarized force for 
internal order under the command of the Interior Ministry.  This Soviet institution was transformed 
into the National Guard in 2014, although unlike the National Guard of the 1990’s (which was 




is under the command of Interior Minister.  Many argue that the involvement of the National Guard 
and other MoI forces in the ATO has contributed to the power of Interior Minister Avakov since 
2014.  Other militarized units of the MoI were also eliminated or reorganized as many of their 
members are sought by prosecutors in conjunction with the attacks on Euromaidan protesters.   The 
Law on National Police of Ukraine established the de jure independence of the National Police of 
Ukraine from the MoI removed policing from other units other militarized units which are mostly 
included under the Interior Ministry or the national guard.  These militarized units are known as 
“spetsnaz” units (similar to American SWAT teams), and in 2014 the MoI spetsnaz divisions 
included Berkut, Falcon, Griffin, Titan, Scorpion, Omega, Bars, Jaguar, Cheetah and Tiger (Kuzio 
2015).  Proliferation of police units, particularly special forces units, are in many cases a biproduct 
of previous reform campaigns.  These forces are typically created to address an issue such as 
organized crime or narcotics, but often proliferate gaining greater autonomy from the main police, 
more resources and personnel, and greater allegiance to political patrons.  The murder of Gongadze 
was likely relegated to once such unit, and the leaked “Kuchmagate” audio tapes (referenced in 
Chapter 1), when Kuchma raised the issue of the journalist (later killed) Georgii Gongadze.  Taras 
Kuzio writes: “In one of the tapes recordings illicitly made by Melnychenko in Kuchma's office, 
MVS Minister Kravchenko is heard telling Kuchma in June 2000, "I have such a unit, their 
methods; they have no morals, no nothing. So, God forbid that something happens." (Kuzio 2015; 
487).  Gongadze’s headless corpse was found in a forest outside of Kyiv several days later. 
Ukrainian special police forces had been involved in significant repression during the 
Euromaidan and politicized attacks on opponents during President Kuchma, Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych’s administrations (Hedenskog 2010; Kuzio 2012) Of these spetsnaz units Berkut was 




Jaguar Omega were under the Internal Troops (VV) and therefore were transferred to the National 
Guard with that unit.  The State Guard Directorate (UGO/DSO) had Titan (estimated at 2,900) 
which protected VIPs and Griffin (1000) which was charged with protecting officials of the 
Courts.121   
Fate of Berkut 
 Berkut was the most infamous of the security forces used to repress protesters on the 
Euromaidan so they merit a few lines here.  Berkut is the successor of OMON public order special 
operation divisions created by order under Gorbachev in the late 1980’sto maintain public order 
during nationalist uprisings during the end of the Soviet Union (Shelley 1996; Besieger 2002).  In 
Ukraine, Berkut, which means “golden eagle”, was initially under the Directorate for Combatting 
Organized Crime (GUBOZ), but since this directorate already had a special operations team 
“Sokil” (just ‘eagle’) they were reassigned to the Department of Public Safety of the MoI (UGB 
MVS Управлінням Громадської безпеки УМВС України).  Because of their location in the 
Department of Public Safety (UGB MVS), they became the first battalion to deal with “mass 
events” and public order functions including the protest of policing, riots, and sporting events.  
Despite the mandate to deal with unarmed crowds rather than armed criminals, Berkut had armored 
personnel carriers (BTR), automatic weapons, sniper rifles, night vision goggles and a host of other 
military equipment unnecessary for civilian policing and crowd control. During the 1990’s Berkut 
was used to repress Crimean Tatar and other riots in Crimea, rioting coal miners in the Donbas, 
and also to suppress opposition during the UbK and Orange Revolution Movements122.   Mark 
Galeotti estimates that in late 2013 at the beginning of Euromaidan there were 4,250 total Berkut 
officers around Ukraine including over 900 in Kyiv city.123  Berkut were the first unit to be 







deployed against protesters at the Euromaidan starting on November 30th 2013 and over the course 
of the three months, thousands were injured, hundreds were tortured, and upwards of 100 civilians 
were killed by Berkut and other security forces on the Euromaidan (Kuzio 2015).   
After the fall of the Yanukovych regime on February 21st, 2014 many Berkut fled to 
Crimea, the Donbas (to participate in the so called “Russian Spring” uprising) or Moscow.   
According to Taras Kuzio, “Berkut on the Euromaidan were primarily drawn from Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine and Crimea, and their traumatic experiences coupled with being disbanded by 
the revolutionary authorities made many of them passive or separatist supporters” (Kuzio 2015; 
487).  Today there is a private security company named Berkut in Crimea with approximately 400 
previous Berkut officers.  Many police from Berkut are wanted on suspicion of violence against 
Euromaidan protesters, however members of Berkut divisions from other Oblasts that were not 
involved have been reincorporated into other divisions of the police.  Although the MoI and NPU 
did not release data on the amount of Berkut officers still in the police, many began to suspect that 
many Berkut remained in early 2016.124  Critics of reform claim that the Special Operation Police 
Battalions in many Oblasts are mostly comprised of KORD and while some occasionally rotate 
through the ATO (to receive veteran status), many have remained in their regions GUNP Patrol 
Division and still perform crowd control functions.  As evidence they also point out the fact that 
as of 2017 less than 20 members had been convicted for their role in the Euromaidan, another 30 
were under suspicion but not under arrest, and that overall only 5% were fired overall, despite the 
deployment of thousands of police to the Euromaidan during 2013-2014.125  In April 2017 four 
former Berkut officers on bail for charges including murder during an investigation into violence 
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on the Euromaidan fled to Russia.126  On May 9th 2017, former Berkut and current riot patrol were 
involved in the brutal beating of pro-Ukrainian activists and veterans in Dnipro protesting what 
they understood as a pro Russian rally commemorating the Soviet Union’s Victory over Nazi 
Germany.127  Videos emerged of riot police using excessive force resulting in the injury of dozens 
of protesters and with many calling for the resignation of Minister Avakov.  The Kyiv Post 
conducted an information request to the National Police following the incident and found that 
nearly 41% (1,641) of Berkut officer remained in police and that few officers have been fired by 
the NPU, virtually none were fired during attestation, and many officers have been able to gain 
‘veteran’ status, particularly in Kyiv (city and Oblast), L’viv, and Dnipro128.   
One source inside the police speculated that the reason that more former Berkut have not 
been fired is that the administration of Poroshenko is concerned about increased civil unrest and 
political activity.  The source further explained that he believes the administration is particularly 
concerned a showdown between BPP and People’s Front, which has extensive control over other 
units of the police, National Guard, volunteer battalions, and veterans.  Indeed, in late 2017 amid 
growing tensions between BPP and People’s Front Oksana Syroyid, a lawmaker from 
Samopomich was quoted warning that:  
“Avakov is not accountable, and has established the National Guard as “an alternative army 
already. It’s even better equipped and better paid than the army. It’s a point of jealousy for the 
armed forces. Now he is calling for an increase in its policing functions. So, it will be double 
policing — we have the police and we’ll have the alternative police.” Giving the National Guard 
law enforcement and military duties “is very dangerous,” Syroyid said, threatening to turn 
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Ukraine into a police state. “If you have two alternative armies, there is a big risk they could start 
fighting with each other.”129 
 This quote and the continued tenure of most of Berkut, despite the public outrage at their 
actions during the Euromaidan, are a testament to the importance of law enforcement, particularly 
special forces and militarized units in maintaining political stability and balance between 
competing factions.  Political elites understand well that the loyalty and action of these groups can 
mean the difference between political survival and ouster in an unstable environment like Ukraine.  
This has led to the survival of even the most unpopular units like Berkut and the proliferation of 
even more units due to the conflict and as the next section of this chapter will show, 
decentralization. 
«KORD» 
After the elimination of Berkut, Sokil the former spetsnaz detachment for GUBOZ (the 
Organized Crime Directorate) and Griffin (another special detachment under UGB MVS) were 
reorganized into a single all national unit, the “rapid action response unit” “KORD” (Korpus 
Operativno Raptovoi Diyi).  This project was received substantial technical and financial support 
from foreign advisers, particularly the United States Department of State’s INL program in 
Ukraine.  The idea behind this reorganization was to bring all of the previously disparate and 
competing spetsnaz units under one central entity, the Patrol Police.  This would provide a renewed 
sense of legitimacy to some of the most unpopular units that had been involved in repression and 
other crimes and it would help to consolidate and coordinate the activities of these units.  Prior to 
the creation of KORD each of these groups previously had their own training, standard operating 
                                                            





procedures, and were communicating poorly with other units.130 The development of KORD was 
a major priority for the NPU, MOI and international donors and KORD has received equipment 
from the US and the EU as well as training by the FBI.  Despite the consensus on the importance 
of KORD, disagreements have arisen between the MOI, NPU, and various international donors on 
the future of police special forces including delineation of powers and the rollover of personnel 
from Berkut.  An important part of KORDs mandate is in the handling of public order during 
demonstrations and political protests.  This is particularly important given the intense repression 
during Euromaidan and the role of repression in causing the regimes downfall.  The designers or 
KORD hoped that through better training police units could become more adept at preventing 
violence and defusing volatile situations during protests. 
By many accounts, the creation of KORD as well as special crowd control groups within 
the Patrol Police known as TOR has greatly reduced the level of violence at protests.  In its 2017 
report, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: “noted an 
improvement in the policing and security provided for various anniversary and commemorative 
events throughout Ukraine. The Maidan commemorations, at the end of February, were held 
peacefully, with isolated disturbances. OHCHR also observed improved law enforcement 
measures at the 2 May commemoration in Odesa, which prevented clashes” (OHCHR 2017; 
110).131  Indeed, there is evidence to believe that poor training, as well as officer threat perception, 
is an important factor in many cases of police repression during protests (Earl and Soule 2006).  
Nicholas Kozloff wrote that the creation of KORD and their training by FBI, DEA and Texas 
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Rangers poses the question of whether American police departments, notorious for their 
militarized protest policing, should be involved teaching Ukrainians riot control.132  Erica Marat 
commenting on Ukraine’s police reform has written “Activists worry that adopting the U.S. model 
for a militarized police force will allow Ukraine’s leaders to use brutal force against anti-
government demonstrations in the future.” (Marat 2015).  Ukrainian police have also received 
training from Turkey which provided week long training sessions to hundreds of Patrol Police in 
crowd control tactics including use of tear gas which these officers were unable to conduct in 
Ukraine.  A final question in the reformation of Ukraine’s special forces is the staffing of these 
units.  The Head of the Patrol Department Oleksandr Fatsevich has said that volunteer battalions 
should be the foundation of KORD133, however it remains to be seen who will staff them, and 
sources within the police claim that former spetsnaz members are given priority over volunteer 
fighters.  One positive note in the development of KORD is that local human rights expert has 
credit the creation of KORD-C which handles public order, with a significantly more professional 
and less repressive policing of protests.134  On the topic specialized police units, David Bayley 
cautions that “It is especially dangerous to “roll over” whole units into the new police, even if they 
possess unusual skills, such as intelligence gathering or criminal investigation.  They bring with 
them a cohesiveness that hampers change” (Bayley 2001; 56).  Despite some Berkut remaining in 
the police, rotations of these officers through the ATO, personnel turnover, transfers. and new 
hiring should eventually break the institutional cohesiveness of these units. 
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Special Purpose Police Battalions 
 The ongoing conflict in the ATO has a major effect on the operations of the NPU.  
According to a report on the “Activities of the National Police of Ukraine” for 2016, approximately 
13,000 police were involved in the ATO that year alone.135 Despite these attempts to remove 
militarized divisions under the police, two years of war has seen the NPU establish and incorporate 
its own ‘Police Volunteer Battalions’ (Battalion Politsii Osoblivoho Priznachennya) These 
battalions were created by Interior Minister Avakov’s decree №352 in April 2014 in response to 
the escalating crisis in Ukraine’s eastern regions. 136  Because of the very poor conditions and lack 
of preparedness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Colby and Pukhov 2015) and the government’s 
insistence that the three-year conflict in Donbas is not a civil war, but an “anti-terrorist operation” 
(officially referred to in Ukraine as the ATO), these emergency forces were created as police 
battalions under the MoI.  In interviews with police officers and former members of the Dnipro-1 
Battalion from Dnipropetrovsk recalled that in April and May 2015 these groups consisted mostly 
of poorly armed and non-uniformed civilians were engaged in pitched battles with separatists over 
control of local administration buildings, police stations, and setting up checkpoints (block-posts) 
in the early days of the conflict.  They credited the action of these special purpose volunteer 
battalions under the MoI for stopping the spread of separatism into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 
other eastern regions of Ukraine.137 These battalions are on average 200 men strong and originally 
fought on the front lines, but since 2015 are used for auxiliary functions to patrol the second line 
and third line as the National Guard and the reformed Army has taken over fighting at the front. 
Today the duties of Special Operation Police Battalions include guarding checkpoints, 
preventing the removal of heavy arms or munitions from the ATO, investigating separatism in 
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connection with the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU), and routine law enforcement in the ATO 
and containment zone.  Special Operation Police Battalions (PSMOP) originally numbered 30 and 
were created in different cities and regions throughout Ukraine and recruited from both police and 
patriotic volunteers with no law enforcement background.  Some sources have suggested that the 
police sent to some these battalions were either lower ranks who were unable to protest their 
transfer or those who were suspected of criminal activity or disloyalty138.   
While many of these battalions have become among the most awarded and celebrated 
regiments in the conflict to date, others have been mired in controversy, such as the Shakhtar and 
Tornado Battalions.  Allegations also claim that these Battalions include many former Berkut 
officers.  As of early 2016 the number of battalions had decreased from a high of 36 to a total of 
20, and many of them were moved into the National Guard such as Azov, others were consolidated.  
According to the deputy head of National Police Aleksandr Fatsevich (himself a former battalion 
member from the “Svityaz” battalion from Volyn’ Oblast) these special operation police battalions 
should become the “backbone” of the new NPU KORD special operations police teams, and this 
model was followed in Dnipro with the Dnipro-1 battalion.139  Much of the leadership of the NPU 
has been recruited from veterans including acting Chief of Criminal Police Vadim Troyan and the 
First Deputy of Patrol Police Oleksandr Fatsevich, and many regional Oblast Police Chiefs.  While 
the literature on policing warns against over reliance on recruiting soldiers into the police, this 
trend of preferential hiring of veterans doesn’t seem to apply to the Patrol Police (Bayley 2005; 
Pino and Wiatroski 2006).  Among employed patrol officers only 11.2% participated in the war in 
                                                            






Donbass (1,200 of 10,662 officers) by 2016, and of the second wave of recruits which were hired 
in Fall 2016 only 6% have participated in the war.   
The Special Operations Police Battalions were a measure created by Ministry decree to 
deal with the insecurity and politically unstable situation in the spring of 2014 before the Ukrainian 
authorities realized that they would be involved in a protracted multi-year engagement.  While 
some of these battalions have been transferred to the National Guard, others remain under the NPU 
and some have suggested that Minister of Interior Avakov is reluctant to give up these Militias as 
they are a crucial bargaining chip in political negotiations.  Mikhail Minakov has also warned of 
the possibility of the capture of these volunteer battalions (including police battalions) by 
oligarchic forces and warns of the troubling dependence of the 5,0000 strong Dnipro-1 Battalion 
on Dnipropetrovsk based oligarch Igor Kolomoisky (Minakov 2016).   In the short term, the NPU 
will be unlikely to demobilize these battalions as long as there is active conflict in Ukraine, and as 
long as these battalions receive resources from independent oligarchs.  In the short to medium term 
the most important measure of demilitarization will be whether or not these Special Purpose Police 
Battalions are used outside of the ATO for civilian policing functions. 
As this section has demonstrated, the forces of scandal and public outrage produced public 
and international pressure for reform and elimination of militarized policing units. However, this 
was tempered by the acute need for security forces conflict in Donbas as well as political 
competition over the control of existing and new special police units.  This resulted in an odd 
hybrid where units like Guboz was eliminated, Berkut was partially eliminated, and new security 
forces such as KORD, TOR, and the militarized police battalions were created.  The following 





 After the Euromaidan it was clear that to the Ukrainian public, political elites, and 
internationals that the approach to public order and protest policing needed to be reformed.  In 
addition to overt and deliberate repression on the part of the state, there was also an issue of failure 
to provide sufficient protection to groups of protesters from violent counter protesters.  For 
example, Marina Tsapok notes that the police failed to provide protection for protesters, 
particularly those sympathetic to Russia during an Anny Lorak concert in Kharkiv and in Odesa 
in 2014 (Tsapok 2014).  Furthermore, Ukraine still lacks a consistent  and coordinated strategy for 
policing of mass protests which often draw on National Guard, regional police, Patrol Police, and 
other units.  With the exception of Patrol Police, few of these officers have been retrained in crowd 
control methods and National Guard personnel are governed by completely different legislation, 
command structure, and standard operating procedures.  This lack of coordination poses a serious 
risk for protest violence in Ukraine. 
 
  German representatives of the EUAM distanced themselves from trainings being conducted by 
the European Gendarme Force in 2015 that they saw as overly militaristic for public order policing 
in Ukraine140 (Friesendorf; 2017).  An American policing scholar and practitioner familiar with 
US police training programs in Ukraine has also questioned the wisdom of focusing on riot control 
so soon after a revolution that was largely in response to heavy handed protest tactics.  Critics are 
concerned about several areas of riot policing, particularly the continued use of National Guard 
during protests.  Both National Guards and Police officers have been criticized for failing to ensure 
                                                            




that they wear personal identifiers when dressed in riot gear.141  Observers note that the lack of 
personal identifiers such as a number on helmets or a badge leads to anonymity and impunity, and 
has been one of the primary challenges in obtaining convictions for perpetrators of violence on the 
Euromaidan, even when there is video evidence (Tsapok in UMDMPL 2014).   National Guard 
are thought to be unsuitable for protests because of their lack of training, lack of flexibility, and 
the absence of personal identifiers for service members142 This lack of training and flexibility was 
one of the contributing factors to the tragic death of 4 national guards members in  grenade attack 
during protests over decentralization on August 31st  2015.143  In response to this, rather than 
removing National Guard from the policing of Protests, deputies of the People’s Front and BPP 
proposed a bill №6566 in 2017 which would dramatically increase the powers of the National 
Guard during peacetime including the possibility to stop, detain, and question civilians and to use 
force.144  The authors argued that the bill was needed to protect National Guard service members 
from protesters, but it immediately drew consternation from both Parliamentary Human Rights 
Commissioner Valeriy Lutskova145 and civil society groups who organized protests outside of 
Parliament.  The bill has remained in committee since September.146  In December of 2017 several 
MP’s from the Human Rights Coalition147 expressed their disapproval of a separate move to amend 
                                                            
141 MP Mustafa Nayyem, supported by experts from UMDPL Yevhen Krapyvin and Mikhailo Kamaniev introduced legislation to 
provide better identification for police officers Zakonoproekt №5700 and 5701  
“Effective identification of law enforcers will reduce the level of impunity - the authors of the drafts 5700, 5701”.  Ukraine Crisis 
Media Center.  February 8th, 2018.  www.uacrisis.org/ua/64347-identyfikatsiya-pravoohorontsiv 
142 Sergei Baglay "You can not think of acting forcefully. Police tactics during protests" Dzerkalo Tyzhnia.  August 14, 2017  
https://dt.ua/LAW/diyati-siloyu-ne-mozhna-dumati-250981_.html 
143 "Ukrainian National Guardsman Killed At Protest Outside Parliament." RFERL.  August 31st 2015. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-decentralization-bill-protests/27218087.html 
144 Tulup, Margarita "State of the Police" LB.UA October 10, 2017 
https://lb.ua/society/2017/10/10/378828_6556_gosudarstvo_politseyskoe.html 
145 ibid 
146 "Under the Rada was held an all-Ukrainian action against the expansion of the National Guard" LB.ua September 21st 2017.  
Available at: https://lb.ua/society/2017/09/21/377161_pod_radoy_proshla_vseukrainskaya_aktsiya.html 
“Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving the Legal Basis of the Activities of the 
National Guard of Ukraine”.  http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=61978 
147 "Statement of Inter-faction deputy association "Human Rights Coalition" on decisions of the Government on the use of special 




procedure allowing National Guard to use ‘special means’ which include non-lethal weapons 
during protests.  While the National Guard still remains more popular than police148, the continued 
use of National Guard during protest policing represents a serious obstacle to demilitarization of 
policing in Ukraine.  Speaking of the bill №6556 Dennis Dobzin, an expert from the Kharkiv 
Human Rights Group warn that the criticism of this bill is being drowned out and that, “Populist 
slogans about security and war, manipulation of facts and reference to European experience” are 
gradually changing the uninitiated viewer’s image of reality and ensuring support for this latest 
step towards setting up a police state”149 
 The National Police have made several important improvements in the handling of protests 
including the establishment of dialogue police,and the Patrol Police’s ‘quick response’ unit.  In 
2016 the Patrol Police set out to establish their own crowd control unit, known as the ‘quick 
reaction’ team, later renamed the “Tactical Operative Response Group” TOR.  This team handles 
mass events and is meant as a mobile containment unit that can be quickly deployed to protest 
hotspots.  The group received training in crowd control from representatives of the Houston Police 
Departments ‘Strategic Response Group’, and was provided instruction in de-escalation, crowd 
control, and formations.  The group has had notable success, and is credited with diffusing several 
tense protests, including the Pride parades in Kyiv in 2016 and 2017, which were previously 
cancelled because of security concerns in 2012 and 2014150.  Reestablishing the coercive capacity 
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of the police is no doubt a conscious state building effort, evidenced by the fact that the TOR group 
grew three times in 2018 from 600 to 1800 personnel.151 
 In addition to the Patrol Police TOR group, the creation of  a “dialogue police”152 have 
been a crucial new tool in protest policing.  The program was sponsored by the European Union 
Advisory Mission and included a study trip to Sweden where police use protest mediators to 
diffuse standoffs between police and protesters.  Sergei Bahlai has noted that the Dnipro scandal 
of May 9th, 2017 led to a public commitment from both Chief Knyazev and First Deputy Interior 
Minister Serhiy Yarovoy, who is in charge of the Public Security Department, publicly committed 
to reforming protest policing and increasing dialogue with protesters.  He writes that, “This is the 
so-called "police dialogue", which is tasked with: to promote mass events, to protect the right of 
citizens to freedom of peaceful assembly, to maintain a regular dialogue with the participants, to 
prevent possible confrontation and to promote their de-socialization” (Bahlai 2017).  The program 
so far has trained 120 dialogue police throughout Ukraine, with plans to expand.153  An 
improvement in protest policing is more relevant now than ever, as confrontations between police 
and protesters have become increasingly violent.154 There are other positive developments in terms 
of protest activity at the legislative level.  On December 15th 2017 there were changes enacted in 
the procedural code make it more difficult to deny a permit for a political rally or a protest, 
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previously the rules were stipulated from a 2005 rule that had not been updated for ten years155.  
This is important because historically protesters were often denied permits despite the 
constitutional right of assembly (Tsapok 2014).  The improvement of public order policing to be 
less violent and confrontational is both a response to public and international demands for allowing 
peaceful political protest and a conscious state building effort to prevent another destabilizing mass 
movement which could topple the government.  Still, the continued use old units such as Berkut, 
and the National Guard complicate efforts to professionalize protest policing.  This hybrid 
compromise reflects both political concerns over the control of mass protests and a lack of 
institutional coordination between police, national guard, international donors and political elites.   
Decentralization 
Ukrainian police are highly centralized, meaning that decisions about funding, staffing, and 
enforcement priorities are mostly made in Kyiv.  Following the Euromaidan, there have been 
increased calls for decentralization and the government has adopted efforts to devolve local power, 
funds and decision making to local communities, known in Ukraine as “hromadas”.  While there 
has been some support from international actors, certain political elites, and elements of civil 
society for decentralizing state functions, including policing, there has also been serious 
opposition.  Opposition to decentralization of power and policing to communities is based on 
several criticisms.  First, many sectors of Ukrainian society feel that due to the real threat of 
Russian influence and separatism in Ukraine, the time is not right for decentralization of police 
force.  These voices point to powerful and popular local leaders such as Gennady Kernes, the 
Mayor of Kharkov, or Gennady Trukhanov the Mayor of Odesa as figures that have questionable 
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loyalty to Ukraine and need to be checked by strong central control.  In addition to the fear of 
separatism, others such as MP Mustafa Nayyem have raised concern that granting local leaders 
control of security forces will allow them to turn these forces into their own “private armies” which 
may be used to attack political or business rivals or even to influence local elections.156  This 
section will show how fears of Russian influence and concern over politicization of local police 
forces has largely curtailed efforts to decentralize policing in Ukraine with the notable exception 
of police commissions. 
What is decentralization? 
Decentralization of policing involves granting greater powers to local communities in 
determining the staffing, priorities, financing, and operations of their police.  Globally, most police 
are centralized and organized under a national level Interior Ministry, and decentralized policing 
systems controlled at the municipal level like those of the United States and Great Britain are the 
minority.  Many scholars also refer to centralized police as “continental police” (Harasymiw 2003; 
Reiner 2010).  David Bayley notes that since much of the foreign police assistance comes from 
the United States and Great Britain, their biases for decentralized police tend to be reflected, 
although he argues that neither a central or decentralized policing system is necessarily more 
conducive to democratic policing (Bayley 2001; 2005).  While it is unlikely that centralized 
systems of policing will move completely to decentralized systems, the process of transferring 
funds, power and decision making to local authorities and communities is known as 
decentralization and can take on many different forms.   





The logic for decentralization is two-fold; first, like other types of government 
administration, it is argued that local administrators are better informed and equipped to handle 
local challenges than central planners. Decentralization can be understood to advance the 
principles of accountability and transparency, as well as vertical accountability to the public and 
elected officials (Moncada 2009).  In Ukraine, the Interior Ministry and the NPU have both 
expressed interest in reform plans incorporating both forms of decentralization including allowing 
for local territories to control operational decisions, staffing, and both contributing to and deciding 
the budget of police (MVS 2015).   
With regards to policing many argue that local police often have better relations with the 
community, better criminal intelligence and are less of a threat to democracy than centralized 
police (Caparini and Marenin 2004; Fichtelberg 2013; 14).  Another argument for police internal 
decentralization is that it could disrupt vertical patronage and corruption networks that are well 
established and documented in Ukrainian police (Chistyakova 2011; Harasymiw 2003).  In 
Ukraine, like in many other FSU countries systemic corruption in the police begins with a bribe 
before entering the academy, is pervasive and constant throughout an officer’s career, and includes 
paying for desired assignments and posts, but sometimes even basic provisions such as pay, 
vacation and uniforms.  This creates a vertical chain of dependence with police expected to produce 
a certain amount of revenue each month to their superiors who in turn must “kick up” to their 
bosses (Peacock 2016; Caparini and Marenin 2004).  Financial dependence on their superiors 
creates an institutional engine of corruption as even honest police are often compelled to participate 
in corruption simply in order to keep their jobs (O’Shea 2015).  Decreasing the dependence of 
local police on the national levels for funding, and rank and file officers on their superiors could 




While many arguments are made for the benefits of decentralization, states with endemic 
corruption, low capacity, divided societies and serious external threats may have good reasons for 
resisting decentralization (Bayley 2001; 2005; O’Shea 2015).  Endemic corruption in its 
decentralized form has been shown to lead to greater predation of citizens, and more systemic 
human rights abuses, as unrestrained bureaucrats have more opportunities to prey on citizens and 
businesses and less oversight and discipline by central authorities (Stefes 2005; 32).  Some have 
argued that while the election of Victor Yushchenko following the Orange Revolution in 2004 
appeared to bring in an era of democratization, by breaking the centralized system of corruption 
which Kuchma had built political shifts allowed for a decentralization of corruption that increased 
opportunities for predation of state resources and citizens (Kupatadze 2012; 174). 
Another potential risk of decentralization of policing is that it can allow for capture of 
police organizations by local political, economic or criminal powers, and can result in increased 
corruption or collusion between local police and prosecutors through the formation of informal 
networks.  India has attempted to address this issue by not allowing police to be posted in their 
home states and by rotating police officers every three years in order to prevent the formation of 
corruption networks or allegiance to local political bosses (Hinton and Newburn 2009; 15).  While 
this may reduce the possibilities formation of corruption networks, the downside of constant 
rotation is that police do not form lasting relationships with the communities in which they serve, 
and it can allow for extortion of low ranking officers by their superiors with the threat of being 
sent to a less desirable state.  The Kharkiv Group for Human Rights has also called for this reform-
in their response to the 2014 “Law Enforcement Agencies Development Strategy” which they 




“The rotation of personnel at the highest levels is an important element in maintaining the 
unity of the police corps and a good way to promote the exchange of best practice across regions. 
Regional commanders and their deputies shall also rotate across the regions in order to avoid 
excessive ties with local structures.” (Kharkiv Human Rights 2014; 4). 
 
The fear of local capture is a legitimate concern in Ukraine as low wages and poor financing 
have allowed oligarchs and local businessmen to have a large role in forming and deploying 
volunteer battalions in Ukraine’s current conflict.   
 Weak control over policing also poses a real threat to a nation’s sovereignty, particularly 
those facing an aggressive neighbor (Light, 2014).  The diversity of Ukraine’s regions is infamous 
and is often simplified as “east vs. west” or south-east versus central regions (D’Aneiri 2011; 
Himka 2015; Katchinovski 2014; Kuzio 2015).  Some argue that these divisions are artificial and 
are promoted by ambitious and unscrupulous local politicians and outside actors who would like 
to see Ukraine weaker (i.e. Russia)157 However, the very real political differences between eastern 
and southern oblasts and central and western oblasts are well documented by years of public 
opinion data and are at least part of the basis of the ongoing territorial conflict in the Donbass and 
behind the annexation of Crimea.  Control over police forces by local mayors is also a major 
concern.  For example, Kharkov’s Mayor Gennady Kernes is relatively popular158 despite initially 
coming out in favor of pro-Russian separatists in spring 2014 (he soon changed his position).  One 
observer noted that decentralization of police in Kharkov would be tantamount to giving Kernes a 
private army.159 In societies emerging from armed conflict control over policing becomes a 
contentious issue and states need to balance demands for local representation with central 
prerogatives of maintaining order (Nield 2003). 
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The Politics of Decentralization in Ukraine   
Decentralization was a central demand of the Euromaidan protesters and in a poll from 
September 2016, 73% of Ukrainians160 favor decentralization and the transfer of more rights from 
central authorities to local authorities and communities (IRI Sept 2016).  Previous attempts to 
decentralize the police following the Kuchmagate Scandal in 2001 were unsuccessful (Harasymiw 
2003; 327).  Partial decentralization began as early as 2014 with the amalgamation of Ukraine’s 
11,500 local communities into a proposed 1,500 new amalgamated territorial communities 
(Hromadas) which would be ruled by Presidential Prefect, rather than local government161 (Jarabik 
2017).  To date, approximately 366 (20%) of communities have voluntarily self-amalgamated and 
held local elections in 2016 and 2017 (Reanimation Package of Reforms 2017).  This 
decentralization has allowed for the newly amalgamated territorial communities to keep a larger 
part of their income taxes and impose their own sales taxes.  With new funds these communities 
have been able to make investments in local schools, hospitals, road repair, and even the repair of 
police stations.162  
  While decentralization as a principle enjoys vast support among society, foreign donors, 
Ukrainian academics, NGO’s, and even the Presidential Administration and the Prime Minister; 
the strongest opposition to general decentralization of state administration has come from 
Ukrainian nationalist parties and certain civil society organizations.  This includes factions within 
People’s Front, elements of Samopomich, Svoboda, and other parties based in central and western 
Ukraine.  Their primary fear of decentralization is that local control in Eastern and Southern parts 
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of the country will be a springboard for separatism.  Other liberal reforms such as Mustafa Nayyem 
and much of the civil society expert community fear that decentralization can be a trojan horse not 
only for Russian influence but for local capture of political and economic resources and a further 
politicization of police. 
For right wing and nationalist groups, the opposition to decentralization comes from fear 
of Russian influence in local Ukrainian politics.  Decentralization was a key component of both 
Minsk I and Minsk II peace agreements for ending the war in Ukraine’s Donbass by allowing for 
greater local rule in these territories.  However, critics say that decentralization and allowing of 
“special status” for the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk is a capitulation to Russia which is 
tantamount to de-facto federalization and would invite further dismemberment of the country by 
Russia.  This nationalist opposition to decentralization of “federalization” had tragic consequences 
in the summer of 2015 during the attempt to pass Constitutional Amendments (“Concerning 
Decentralization of Power” [№2217а].  Opposition to these amendments resulted in nationalists 
holding massive protests outside of parliament which culminated in a grenade attack that killed 
four National Guardsmen and injured 100 others.163 (Jarábik 2017).  This incident effectively 
ended the short-term political prospects for constitutional amendments in 2015 which would have 
allowed for greater decentralization in Ukraine.  Nevertheless, Ukraine has made plodding 
progress with other forms of decentralization reform including allowing local communities more 
control over housing, education, borrowing and raising taxes, however without the subsequent 
constitutional amendments these reforms remain stalled.  Efforts to enact decentralization have 
stalled, but the next section will look at several concrete proposals which have resulted in more 
local control including the creation of police commission, local funding, and municipal police. 
                                                            






 Decentralization is such a broad concept that it encompasses many aspects of policing and 
different actors including the MoI, civil society and experts, and foreign donors all have various 
concepts and proposals for decentralization.  The document, “Development Strategy for Police 
Reform” from 2014 was drafted by representatives of the MoI and domestic and international 
experts including from the Kharkiv international association for human rights164  delineates 
decentralization as a high priority and proscribes [that]: 
• “The territorial units of the MIA [GUNP] shall have the right to independently 
address the issue of current activity planning, staffing policy, and distribution of 
the budget received, with full liability for the decisions made to the local 
community and the MIA management. 
• The state policy in the area of MIA budgeting shall be regulated in such was as to 
allow the territorial units to use the resources provided by the local self-
governance bodies. The procedure of receiving additional revenue to the budget 
of the territorial units shall involve an anti-corruption supervision mechanism, and 
the information about additional revenue shall be open to the public. 
• A part of the public order protection functions shall be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the local police to be established by the resolutions of local self-
governance bodies and funded at their expense. The activity of the local police 
shall be supervised by the MIA Police Department and the local self-governance 
bodies.  The creation of local police will be carried out gradually, taking into 
account the characteristics of each region, which will also provide the opportunity 
to introduce several alternative models.” (MVS 2014). 
In the same document their proposed measures of decentralization will be “expanding 
autonomy of regional and local (“territorial”) units” and “expansion of the role of local authorities 
in the activities of MIA units”, including both internal and external decentralization.  
Unfortunately, this and other reform documents from the Interior Ministry, as well as from other 
sources are extremely vague on the specifics of how decentralization would be implemented, 
                                                            





measured, and evaluated.  Below, I explore some of the possible avenues of decentralization of 
policing including Police Commissions, funding, and Municipal Policing.  Community policing is 
often considered to be related to the principles of police decentralization, but will be discussed 
separately, in chapter 7.   
 Police Commissions 
 
Chapter VIII of the LNPU covers civilian oversight of the police and has several notable 
provisions that increase local control of police staffing.  The most important provision is “Police 
Commissions” which are commissions established which include appointees from the public, the 
MoI and the National Police to oversee the hiring and promotion of police officers.  Hiring and 
promotion are covered in Chapter 5 “Professionalization Reforms”, but the local influence on these 
commissions is a critical step in increasing local control.  In addition to allowing local community 
representatives a voice on hiring of new police, the process of attestation (covered extensively in 
Chapter 5) requires that commissions which also include local representatives of civil society 
review any promotion or demotion or change in department of police.  Most significant of the 
staffing powers, Article 87 of the law allows for local governments such as Oblast councils or 
Kyiv city council to remove a local chief of police by vote of no confidence with a vote of 2/3rd.  
Article 65 also states that this removal by vote of no confidence from local authorities also applies 
to other police officers.  
In addition to staffing the law includes certain provisions about the sharing of data and 
cooperation of territorial police with local communities.  Article 86 requires both the Chief of NPU 
and the chiefs of territorial divisions to publish annual reports on the state of police activities 
including crime statistics, surveys and reports of police response (Звіт про поліцейську 




months to with members of local government and the public “dedicated to discussing policing 
activities, identifying current challenges and finding the most effective solutions.”  Experts from 
the Centre for Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR) as well as the Ukrainian Monitor for Human 
Rights (UMDPL) have argued that the police commission could serve as a vehicle for greater 
decentralization and local control of police by communities, although it is currently not living up 
its potential.  Oleksandr Banchuk of CEPR notes that police commissions could play a role in 
developing local community priorities and developing strategies that emphasize local priorities.  
Evgeni Krapyvin from UMDPL has argued that the current measures for analysing police 
effectiveness, quantitative measures (outlawed but still in use de facto) and the level of public 
approval (stipulated by Article 51 of the Law on National Police) both result in abuses.  His 
proposal would see the Police Commission developing into an expert commission that can evaluate 
the police on a number of scientific criteria that would improve public safety and police 
performance and eliminate the institutional drives towards human rights abuses and falsification 
of data caused by reliance on quantitative measures. 
Police commissions only began to be formed in late 2016 but are now functioning 
throughout most of Ukraine.  While these commissions represent an unprecedented degree of 
public oversight into the hiring of police, and potentially the eventual setting of police priorities in 
the future, they are also subject to capture, manipulation and political competition.  A report from 
2018 on the Police Commissions found a mixed record of success.165  While they applauded the 
success of the commissions in improving civil society oversight, ensuring transparency, and 
eliminating on average 30% of applicants, the report authors noted that over 60% of the appointed 
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seats that were designated for “representatives of the public” were actually going to elected 
officials or persons with affiliations to the Interior Ministry rather than independent members of 
civil society.  They also expressed concern that while the commissions are legally entitled to 
review promotions as well as hiring, they were not exercising oversight over promotions in 
practice. 
  In Kyiv Oblast, the two public members of the commission are in fact members of the 
Oblast government, rather than civil society166. In Lutsk167, (Rivne Oblast), anti-corruption 
activists criticized the appointment of two former military veterans (one with a criminal 
background) over two local human rights activists.168 They also were concerned that the two 
appointees, both with connections to the Radical Party, would be used as a political tool in order 
to obstruct the local head of the police who is affiliated with the People’s Front Party169.   
Police commission will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, but they do represent 
one partially institutionalized reform.  This reform is only partially institutionalized because while 
it does include public participation and oversight, a critical step in ensuring sustainable reforms, it 
failed to include political insulation.  This has resulted in a mixed array of police commissions 
where some are truly representative of civil society, whereas others have been “captured” by local 
political interests.  
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The law on National Police states in article 16 section 6 that “ [the MoI] makes decisions 
on the allocation of budget funds where the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is a primary 
spending unit;”  Although the National Police of Ukraine have received substantial funds from the 
US and European countries as well as in-kind donations by other countries, (notably Japan’s 
donation of 2,000 Toyota Prius), the MoI is the sole domestic funder and therefore has an enormous 
amount of leverage over the NPU.  All NPU departments are still financed through MoI, they have 
been historically underfinanced (Kalasznik 2013, Chistyakova 2011, Beck 2006) but now compete 
with military units within the MoI for funds.  Police in Ukraine were previously paid approximately 
$250 dollars per month, but Patrol Police received a raise to approximately $400 USD per month.  
All sides recognized that it would be necessary to increase the wages of other divisions of police 
to the new higher rate, but this was delayed in part because the Ministry had been working to 
supplement the wages of volunteer battalions the National Guard and move all of these irregular 
forces into full time contracts under control of MoI.   
While the NPU still remains dependent on the MoI for its budget, Chapter X section 6 of 
the Law on National Police also states that “Municipal and private enterprises may allocate funds, 
transportation and other facilities, equipment and resources required for policing to police forces 
and units.”  Municipalities in Ukraine rarely have the funds to do this, with the notable exception 
of Kyiv whose famous mayor, world class boxer Vitali Klitschko has donated uniforms and 
bicycles to Kyiv patrol police, these are typically categorized as “charity”.  Communities that have 
made progress in voluntary amalgamation and thus control more of there budgets will have higher 




Ternopil Oblast.170  Still, as only 20-25% of communities have amalgamated (and thus gained 
access to revenue sharing) alternate sources of law enforcement funding will likely depend on 
precarious international grants and funding from regional oligarchs, both of which are 
unsustainable in the long term.  The political stimulus for funding decentralization has come in 
part from civil society but lacks enough traction with the public to produce a sustainable reform 
coalition.  This has resulted in insufficient pressure to produce the political will needed to 
decentralize substantial funding to local communities.  The state’s ongoing fiscal crisis and the 
need to pay and professionalize the National Guard and Armed forces has largely reduced the pot 
of local money for policing.  Furthermore, concerns about local control of security forces and 
political competition have also incentivized national leaders to maintain control over funding for 
local police forces.  The next section will look at another facet of local policing, municipal police. 
Municipal Police 
The creation of a Municipal Guard (municipalna varta) a form of policing set up by 
municipalities is another proposal for police decentralization.  While there is currently no law that 
legalizes the establishment of municipal police throughout Ukraine, many cities have recently 
opted to create municipal guards as a “communal enterprise” a type of public corporation that is 
owned and operated by the local city to provide public services.  The first municipal police in 
Ukraine started in L’viv in 2002 and municipal police are subordinate to the city and paid by city 
revenues, have the legal ability to enforce administrative but not criminal laws These guards are 
full time city employees, they are equipped with a baton but not firearms and they have powers of 
citizen arrest (gromadski formuvanniya) a relic of the soviet “druzhina” community policing 
                                                            
170 Ivan Lukerya and Olena Halushka "Decentralization as a remedy for bad governance in Ukraine | #UAreforms" Euromaidan 




programs that were prominent during the Khrushchev era and often consisted of neighborhood 
watch, auxiliary police, and joint police-community patrols. (Shelley 1996).  This Municipal 
Guard was established by L’viv city council law №19 of 2002 and are entrusted with ensuring the 
rule of law, protection of citizen’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests, protecting public and 
private property, share information and cooperate with law enforcement and enforcing a series of 
administrative offenses and city ordinances.  These are typically low level administrative offenses 
such as parking, regulation of food vendors, preventing the sale of alcohol and tobacco to teenagers 
and ensuring that people clean after their dogs in parks.   Recently in L’viv the Municipal Police 
has become increasingly involved in public order functions and recently given the power by the 
city to administer tickets to demonstrators during protests.171  
Other cities have expanded the use of Municipal Police under different legal schemes.  For 
example, in Dnipropetrovsk, an eastern which is home to several influential political leaders such 
as Yulia Timoshenko and billionaire oligarch Victor Kolomoiski has had municipal police since 
2011.  The ‘Dnipro Municipal Guard’ is a private security firm largely employing Donbas War 
veterans which is registered as a communal enterprise.  Dnipro is also the unofficial war capitol of 
Ukraine, as it is the city closest to the front in the ATO.  In late 2016 the Dnipro Municipal Guard 
renamed itself the Dnipro Municipal Police which has raised concerns that private security officers 
are impersonating National Police Personnel.  Indeed, many police and reformers argue that 
indiscretions and misconduct carried out by these private security firms and communal enterprises 
reflects poorly on the public image of police who are unable to distinguish between National Police 
and these private actors.  Since Maidan, the idea of expanding the Municipal Guard to other cities 
                                                            





has grown in appeal and can be achieved through the establishment of municipal police as a 
‘municipal enterprise’.  Kyiv has begun implementing plans to initiate a Municipal Guard and has 
hired approximately 200 officers to date with plans to expand to 500 in 2018172.  These officers 
are largely recruited from ATO war veterans and participate providing for public places such as 
parks and museums, event security for protests, concerts or games, and have enforcement power 
over administrative offenses such as parking, public intoxication and unauthorized street trade.173 
Many argue that these new municipal police could take control of some basic functions 
such as giving administrative protocols and parking tickets, thus freeing up Patrol police and other 
law enforcement to handle more serious crimes.   
Some see Municipal Guards as a way to formalize what these groups are already doing in 
many cities throughout Ukraine.  To this effect, a draft law “On Municipal Guards” supported by 
the Reanimation Package of Reforms174 would have empowered municipalities to set up and fund 
their own forces charged with the following powers.   
1. Functions of municipal guard include maintenance of public order in the territory of the 
jurisdiction of the local council, in cooperation with units of the Ministry of Interior; 
(police)  
2. prevention of offenses; 
3. informing and units of the Interior committed or are preparing, crime, gangs place of 
concentration; 
4. perform certain administrative penalties; 
5. protection of property in communal ownership; 
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The bill, “On Municipal Guards”, (№2890 of 2015) was advancing through parliament in 
the summer of 2015 and a roll call vote on May 7th saw 288 votes in favor of the bill.175  However, 
the final version of the bill failed to pass as support dropped to 184 votes after withdrawal of 
support from independents, Self-reliance and the Renaissance party.176  The opposition to this bill 
largely came from political forces that are concerned about perverse effects of local control on 
policing.  The main sponsors of the law are the sitting PM Volodymyr Groysman and the acting 
General Prosecutor Yuri Lutsenko and the bill was again included on the legislative agenda in 
February 2017.  Still, factions within Narodnyi Front, the party of Interior Minister Avakov and 
the second biggest party in the coalition government argue that the creation of municipal police 
could lead to private armies of local political elites that could empower criminals or separatists. 
There is emerging evidence that the recent proliferation of municipal police is being used 
to resolve business disputes through selective enforcement of local administrative laws and codes. 
Interviews with police and civil society in Dnipropetrovsk revealed that much of the enforcement 
activity of the municipal guard concerned combatting unlicensed street vending, much of it with 
connections to business rivals of local political elites. In late 2017, Yuri Sirotyuk, a Kyiv City 
council member from Svoboda warned that new municipal police were being used to protect illegal 
construction sites, a major issue in Ukraine.177  
Mustafa Nayyem, a lawmaker from the BPP has raised even more serious concerns about 
the potential for these groups to interfere in local elections in 2019.  In July 2018 he wrote, “There 
is a big risk that during the election campaign and directly at the elections, all these formations 
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will become weapons of local feudal lords and current administrations.”178  He recommended that 
the Ministry of Interior should ask swiftly to revoke the security licenses of these groups until it 
can figure out a better way to control and standardize their practices. 
Conclusion  
 The cases of demilitarization and decentralization in Ukraine’s police since 2014 presented 
in this chapter demonstrate the difficulty of implementing major structural reforms of institutions 
during transition and crises.  While political turmoil, scandal, and state building efforts create the 
stimulus for major structural changes of intransigent institutions like police, structural reforms also 
inevitably shake up power relations and corruption networks, which fosters untense political 
competition between policy entrepreneurs who desire a new system and entrenched forces who 
benefit from the status quo.  Similarly, the public insecurity caused by the continuation of the 
armed conflict and rising crime have affecting demilitarization and decentralization in complex 
and unintended ways, producing support both for and against decentralization and demilitarization, 
and preventing the formation of a cohesive and coherent reform coalition.  Greater decentralization 
could either decrease corruption by breaking centralized patronage networks (Minakov 2016), or 
could allow for more opportunities for local capture of police by local political, business or 
criminal forces, and more opportunities for police to prey on citizens (Stefes 2005; Ungar 2013)   
In the near future the prospects for demilitarization and decentralization reforms are low because 
they contain few provisions for increased vertical accountability through public participation and 
oversight (with the exception of police councils) and because these reforms have powerful political 
opponents, including the war lobby and powerful  political and economic interests, and have 
                                                            





uncertain benefits and weak reform coalitions.  With the exception of territorial (local) police 
commissions, none of these reforms contain public oversight mechanisms.  Police commissions 
have oversight mechanisms but are not politically insulated meaning that they are potentially 
subject to capture and the efforts of local political figures to be appointed to these boards is 
evidence of that risk.  The greatest mitigating factors against the structural reforms of 
decentralization and demilitarization have been insecurity caused by the ongoing conflict and 
competition and uncertainty about control of new and existing forces.  The next chapter which 
covers criminal justice reforms, the greatest barrier is insecurity, institutional inertia, and 
legislative inaction in the face of weak reform coalitions and an unclear public mandate on the 



















Chapter 4: Legal and Procedural Reforms 
Introduction 
 This chapter will introduce the criminal justice system in Ukraine and detail the efforts to 
reform criminal justice legislation and criminal investigation policy in Ukraine.  Most of the 
reforms examined in this chapter are legislative or procedural reforms passed by either the 
legislature or by MoI decree and therefore do not involve institutional design.  The laws and 
procedures here deal mostly with the criminal justice process in Ukraine and cover changes from 
the initial contact and investigation process, through pre-trial detention and the way in which police 
are evaluated.  These legal and procedural reforms are critical because they change the way in 
which criminal investigations are conducted and the constraints under which police behave.  The 
stimulus for these reforms has been international pressure to adopt best practices in criminal 
investigation, a state building effort to addressing rising crime rates and increasing caseloads and 
the work of the expert community in pushing and advocating for change.   
At the same time, pressure from scandals has been weaker and has been insufficient to 
produce lasting reform coalitions that demand changes of complex criminal procedure.  One reason 
for this may be that the police which conduct criminal investigations are less visible and the law 
and procedure is too complex for most citizens to follow.  Like many other countries, Ukrainian 
public sentiment on the proper goals of a criminal justice system is fractured between those who 
would support more liberal reforms, those who support a more punitive system, and those who are 
ambivalent or cynical.  This fractured public sentiment creates incomplete and weak public 
pressure on political elites who are reticent to make policy mistakes.  In addition to facing 
institutional resistance from prosecutors and law enforcement and the difficulties of enacting 




criminal justice legislation that backfires either by increasing crime and insecurity or by being 
perceived to increase the powers of the police in front of a wary public.  The mitigating factors of 
political concern over being blamed for increasing public insecurity and police powers and weak 
reform coalitions are the primary obstacles to enacting criminal investigative reforms through 
policy.  As this chapter will show, this has resulted in many cases of legislative inaction or policy 
backfire and subsequent reversal.  The following figure provides a brief chart of the reforms 
covered in this chapter and details their stimuli and proponents, sources of resistance, and political 
outcomes.  Because of the failure to build robust reform coalitions, most of these reforms are either 
stalled, result in symbolic pilot programs that will be abandoned, or are reversed.  Rather than 
political competition being the primary obstacle to these reforms, it is weak coalitions, institutional  
inertia, and political elites fears of increasing crime and insecurity. 
Reform Problem Reform Proposal Stimuli/ Proponents Opponents Outcome 
Division of 
investigators 
Unified Detective European Support 
Civil society support 
(expert community) 
Old guard in 
Police and MoI 
Pilot project, not 
sustainable 
Case overload Criminal 
Misdemeanor 
Civil Society (expert 
community) 




Use Public Trust Civil Society Old Guard MoI,  
instl intertia, 
 political elites 
Incorporated in law, 
not implemented 
Pre-Trial Detention “Savchenko’s Law” Ambitous lawmakers 
(political upheaval) 
Insecurity and 







Before delving into the issues of criminal justice and the politics of their reforms, it is first 
necessary to introduce the criminal justice system in Ukraine in order to understand the 
investigative process. 
Landscape of Criminal Justice and the Criminal Investigative Process in Ukraine  
Ukraine’s criminal justice system has its roots in Tsarist and Soviet legal tradition and 
differs in several important ways from western and continental traditions of criminal justice.  First, 
Ukraine has what has been described as a “neo-inquisitorial” judicial system (Foglesong and 
Solomon 2001; Solomon 2015), rather than an adversarial system.  Unlike the impartial role of a 
judge in an adversarial system, Ukraine has an inquisitorial judicial system rather in which the 
judge plays an active role in determining the truth and may interview witnesses, and gathering 
exculpatory as well as incriminating evidence to compile a criminal case file or dossier (Dyel).  
Peter Solomon argues that while democratic countries can have inquisitorial systems, inquisitorial 
judicial systems with their roots in the Soviet tradition often fail to provide fair outcomes because 
of judicial and prosecutorial dependence on high conviction rates, and because of the police 
investigator’s (sledovatel/slidchi) extensive involvement in the pre-trial investigation portion of 
the proceedings (Solomon 2015; 61).  Solomon notes that unlike other adversarial systems, the 
police investigator is the principal actor because, “The creation of the case file was the 
responsibility not of a judge but a law enforcement official (the investigator), whose construction 
of the case was presumed to be correct” (Solomon 2015; 162).   Since the role of judges in a neo-
inquisitorial system is to discover truth rather than to maintain fairness in the proceedings, and 
because judges and prosecutors are dependent on high conviction rates, they cede a large amount 




Judges in Ukraine lack tenure and can be fired based on poor conviction rates, and regional 
prosecutors face similar pressures for quota.  Yuri Beluosov writes: 
“As a possible sanction for inadequate, in the management’s opinion, performance [re low 
conviction rate], a procedural supervisor (public prosecutor) can be deprived of bonus payments, 
or case files can be transferred to another prosecutor virtually without any grounds, or the 
prosecutor will face disciplinary sanctions (disciplinary punishment imposed).” 
Beluosov 2017 (p74-75). 
 
Much of prosecutor’s salaries are paid as performance based ‘bonuses’, therefore the 
failure to meet institutional goals of high conviction rates can result in serious economic losses for 
the prosecutor, this dynamic is also prevalent in the police.  This results in a heavy prosecutorial 
bias, which can also occur in adversarial systems.  For example, many have argued that judges and 
prosecutors that are directly elected rather than appointed are influenced by electoral concerns and 
pursue longer and harsher sentences and uphold less appeals than do appointed judges.179  The 
importance of the case file and the lack of independence of judges, prosecutors and police, who 
are expected to secure high conviction rates, seriously limit due process and legal rights of the 
individual in the criminal justice system as the criminal dossier compiled by the police investigator 
is presumed to be correct (Foglesong and Solomon, 2001).  In recent years Ukraine has introduced 
numerous judicial reforms meant to make trials more adversarial, including jury trials, habeus 
corpus, bail, and improved access to counsel, although these resulted in less than 0.4% of cases 
end in acquittals, and judges remain highly dependent on the Chairs of their Court which evaluate 
them on their acquittal and conviction rate (Foglesong and Solomon 2001; 60:  Solomon 2015; 
172).  Compare this to the rate of felony conviction in the United States at 68%180. 
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Another unique component of the Ukrainian criminal justice system is the Procuracy181, 
an institution created in 18th century Tsarist Russia with the mandate to “supervise” government 
functions and to ensure the interests of the Czar, and later the state (Foglesong and Solomon 2001).  
By the end of the Soviet period the Procuracy’s powers included representing the state in criminal 
and civil cases, overseeing government through the power of “general oversight”182, and proposing 
legislation. During the Soviet period, the Procuracy investigated most criminal cases, but after a 
series of reforms in the 1960’s the USSR MoI became responsible for conducting the preliminary 
investigations in all but the most serious or “grave” crimes, which were still handled by the 
Procuracy (Shelley, 1995; 70).  Shelley notes that during the Soviet period the Procuracy had the 
upper hand in criminal investigations because it authorizes searches, pretrial detention, and verifies 
the legality of police work and has the ability to initiate or drop criminal charges against 
individuals.   During the Soviet period, the Procuracy was among the most well-regarded 
institutions of the state because of its independence and its willingness to defend the interests of 
citizen’s, much like an ombudsman, however according to Foglesong and Solomon (2001; 60) 
they rarely exercised this oversight role in the critical pre-trial investigation phase where the 
Procuracy would sanction nearly all searches, arrests, seizures and wiretaps by police investigators. 
  The Ukrainian Procuracy is headed by the Prosecutor General who is appointed by the 
President and confirmed by Parliament (Verkhovnaya Rada) (Pomeranz and Nesterenko 2016).  
Today in Ukraine the Procuracy is tasked with:  
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“supporting the prosecution in court on behalf of the state; representation of interests of an 
individual or the state in court in the cases stipulated by this Law; supervision over observance of 
laws by the authorities carrying out detective operations, inquiries and pre-trial investigation; 
supervision over observance of laws in the enforcement of court judgments delivered in criminal 
cases, as well as in application of other coercive measures related to restraint of individual personal 
liberty.183”  
The “supervision” function of the Procuracy and its vast powers also introduce a strong 
accusatorial bias, and experts in Russia, (which also has a Procuracy) note that judges face 
tremendous pressure from the Procuracy to secure a conviction, because they have the power to 
appeal an acquittal (Paneyakh 2013).184  In 2014 attempts were  made to law limiting the 
Procuracy’s powers the organ lost the power of representing individuals in court and supervising 
the execution of court decisions, including returning cases to the courts in cases where they 
disagreed with the outcome.185  This law was adopted with a wave of other pro-reform legislation 
in 2014 following the post-Maidan reform wave from the public to address corruption and political 
abuse of the Procuracy.  Nevertheless, this reform has not been implemented in practice and the 
Procuracy remains heavily involved in both trying cases in court and overseeing and directing 
many aspects of pre-trial investigation.  According to the 2012 Criminal Procedure Code, the 
Procuracy is not supposed to be involved in pre-trial investigation and these powers are supposed 
to go to the State Bureau of Investigation (discussed in Chapter 6), a national pre-trial investigation 
body which was only formed in late 2017 after years of delays. 
  The Procuracy, which is one of the only cabinet positions appointed by the President, has 
long been accused of serving the current political power rather than the Ukrainian public 
(Pomeranz & Nesterenko 2016).  Prosecutorial reform from 2014 attempted to turn the Procuracy 
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into a more European traditional Prosecution service, allowed for a new selection process for 
Prosecutors and for Prosecutors to refuse their superiors orders if they believed the order to be 
illegal.186  It also required a form of re-certification for Prosecutors in which 25% or approximately 
2,000 Prosecutors left across Ukraine.187  Some critics of this reform have said alleged that the 
personnel purges were used to solidify power verticals, and that the change in personnel has had a 
negative effect in estranging local police and prosecutors.188  In May 2016, Yuri Lutsenko, a 
former Interior Minister under Yushchenko (2005-2007) and a supporter of President Poroshenko 
was named Prosecutor General, despite not possessing the required legal higher education.  While 
reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office has encountered substantial resistance from many 
sources, the State Bureau of Investigation (which is meant to replace the general supervision over 
other state organs) has still not been created nearly three years after the reform.189  In 2016 and 
2017, the Procuracy was involved in several legal and physical confrontations with the newly 
created National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, testament to the endurance of political 
influence in the institution. 
Criminal Police and Organs of Pre-Trial Investigation 
Ukraine’s criminal investigative police are divided into Criminal Police, (often called 
“Operative” or “operational” police because of their powers and tactics), and Organs of Pre-Trial 
Investigation, which are usually referred to as “police investigators”190.   Within the National 
Police of Ukraine operatives and investigators are located in different departments with a separate 
command structure, varying job qualifications, different powers and scope, and a different role in 
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the investigative process leading to poor communication, cooperation and a duplication of 
functions.  The division of operative and investigative units was a common division in socialist 
political systems but most former socialist countries in Eastern Europe have reformed this 
including the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania and Romania.191 Interestingly, one source for the 
division of operative and investigative units was the decision of a previous reform effort of the 
1988 USSR Communist Party Conference “On Legal Reform” which was intended to increase the 
objectivity of investigators.  The logic was that the investigator could not independently and 
objectively both supervise undercover work and investigate individual criminal work because of 
institutional incentives to approve any police operational action such as searches, recordings, and 
the collection of evidence.  Rather than cede investigative or operational power or authority to 
another agency, such as the Procuracy or KGB, the Soviet Ministry of Interior proposed creating 
separate divisions for the operational and investigative branches of the Militia to address the 
conflict of interest in the investigatory process (Shelley 1995; 73).  This decision laid the roots of 
a policing system that has endured for decades and which has created a host of problems which 
hamper investigations, complicate coordination, and diffuse responsibility for failures and human 
rights violations.  
Pre-Trial Investigation Process in Ukraine 
In Ukraine criminal complaints are reported via emergency telephone dispatchers, or in 
person at a police precinct or district station.  If the crime is a lesser administrative offense it may 
be able to be investigated by “police inquiry” (diznanie) by Patrol Police or neighbourhood 
inspectors, or if it is a more serious crime that falls under the criminal code it will be referred to 






the field detectives (operatives) and the police investigator for a “preliminary investigations” 
(predvaritelnoe sledstvie).  If a crime proceeds via preliminary investigation it cannot be 
investigated by Patrol Police and will be assigned a police investigator who will coordinate 
(through a separate and parallel chain of command) any operational actors that he may need, such 
as surveillance, searches, or ordering the arrest of a suspect to the operative officer in the criminal 
block (field detective).  The police investigator will also laisse with the Prosecutor who supervises 
the procedural aspects and legality of the investigation and make decisions regarding bail, search 
and arrest warrants along with police management (PTIB) 
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The Criminal Justice Process in Ukraine 
 In Ukraine the Criminal Justice Process is unique in that it combines many Soviet legacies 
with more recent innovations.  The first part of the criminal justice pipeline in Ukraine is police, 
who are in turn divided into six different departments within the National Police of Ukraine.  There 
is a fair amount of fluidity as the former structure of the Militsiya is reorganized into the National 
Police of Ukraine but for an introduction it is safe to start with Patrol Police and District Officers 
(dilnichi) who Patrol roads and neighborhoods and respond to emergency calls.  Other large 
departments within the Ukrainian National Police such as the Protection Police (which provides 
private security services by contract) and the Special Patrol Battalions (which provide order and 
checkpoint security in the conflict area) are generally not involved in criminal investigation.  Patrol 
Police or District Officers are often the first law enforcement officials to arrive on scene and 
register a complaint.  At this point if the crime or event is an administrative offense they can 
register and investigate the crime through a simplified procedure.  This may involve taking a victim 
statement, arresting a suspect, or completing an auto accident report.  If the crime is classified 
under the criminal and not the administrative code, then police investigators (sledovatel) from the 
Pre-Trial Investigative Bodies Department (PTIB) and “operatives” criminal investigators from 
the “Criminal Block” will take over the investigation.  Patrol police and neighborhood officers are 
not empowered to investigate offenses under the criminal code according to the Ukrainian 
Criminal Procedure Code of 2012 and once it is determined by police investigators then they will, 
in conjunction make the determination of whether to file criminal charges (razbudit ugolovnoye 
dyelo).  Section 208 of the Ukrainian CPC stipulates the conditions under which police can detain 
and arrest an individual without a judicial warrant such as being caught in the act, the testimony 




then draw up a protocol which specifies the place, time, date, evidence found and grounds of 
apprehension and any pleas and must notify the prosecutor to obtain procedural approval for the 
arrest (Ukrainian CPC Article 208; Belousov 2017; 88).   
After the initial contact or arrest, the primary actors in criminal investigations are police 
operatives (operativniki ) and police investigators (sledovatel).  Ukraine inherited the socialist 
tradition of a division of pre-trial investigation from the Soviet Union and has a divided system of 
criminal investigation where police “operatives” from the Criminal Block Department of the NPU 
carry out “operative” field work such as searches, monitoring and interrogations while police 
investigators from the PTIB Department fulfill legal and procedural tasks of constructing a legal 
case against a suspect, mostly from the office.  Under this divided system of criminal investigation, 
a police investigator working from their office will request “operative” actions from police 
operatives in the criminal block through separate command structures to compile evidence and 
testimony for a case.  These operative actions include surveillance and tracking of criminal 
suspects, monitoring electronic communications, recording suspects, developing informant and 
criminal intelligence networks, and conducting searches and raids.  Recent efforts to overhaul this 
system and to implement a “universal detective merger” are covered later in this chapter.  
Another peculiar characteristic of the Ukrainian criminal justice system is the relationship 
between police investigators (PTIB) and the Prosecutor General’s Office, known in Ukraine as the 
Procuracy.  Police Investigators in their largely legal and procedural role mimic many of the duties 
of a prosecutor in other criminal justice systems such as writing indictments and forming case 
documents and arguing cases before a court.  Many consider police prosecutors to be an extra of 
superfluous step in the criminal justice system.  The actions of police investors are subject to 




oversight is often lacking and may in many cases work as a rubber stamp and the Prosecutor 
General’s Office may approve nearly all police actions.   
The final step in the Criminal Justice system is the relationship between the prosecution, 
both the police investigator (sledovatel) and the Prosecutor General and the Judge.  In adversarial 
justice systems the judge is the neutral arbiter and referee between a presumably equal prosecution 
and defense, however the Ukrainian system is an inquisitorial system where the judge plays an 
active role in the determination of facts and truth.  Peter Solomon classifies the Ukrainian court 
system as a “neo-inquisitorial” system because of the relative weakness of judges, the dominance 
of investigators, and a very strong accusatorial bias (Solomon 2015).  Criminal cases in Ukraine 
are dominated by verifying the facts based off the case file, which is constructed by the police 
investigator (sledovatel) and typically receives little scrutiny from either prosecutors or judges.  
Authoritarian legacies from the Soviet Union made judges dependent and relatively weak, and like 
police and prosecutors, dependent on retaining high rates of criminal conviction for their tenure 
and career advancement (Solomon 2015).  Below is a brief and rudimentary diagram of the 
criminal justice pipeline in Ukraine.  The figures in the left column show criminal justice procedure 
and what actions state actors such as police, prosecutors and the judge are taking and the column 
on the right shows consequences for the criminal defendant. 
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   ↓  ↓ 
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The Politics of Legislative Reform 
 Reforms of police investigation are particularly difficult because many proposals are 
dependent on legislative changes enacted in the legislature or cabinet of ministers.  Unlike other 
police reforms such as reorganization of units and personnel, changing hiring standards, and 
conducting community policing, legal and procedural reforms involve gaining enough support to 
pass the parliamentary vote threshold, which can be a herculean task in post-Maidan Ukraine.  As 
this dissertation has shown to date, there is substantial difficulty in mobilizing and sustaining the 
political will and consensus on many reform issues in Ukraine, and procedural reforms often lack 
the broad reform coalitions that other reforms enjoy.  For these reasons, reforms that require 
legislative solutions have more veto players and are typically only possible when the party in 
power has a strong majority or when political forces are pushed to action by a scandal or other 




following a scandal involving the rape and murder of a 9-year-old girl in a police station in Bogota 
in 1993 (Moncada 2009; Gonzalez 2014).  While there existed political will to create the Patrol 
Police and to pass the Law on National Police in 2015, as societal pressure has decreased amid 
cynicism at the progress of reforms and low living standards (IRI 2017; NDI 2017), the remaining 
necessary reforms have become lower priorities for both the administration and the public.  Several 
high profile scandals have provoked minor political responses including efforts to improve road 
safety and traffic enforcement and introduce road cameras “automatic fixation” after a series of 
tragedies in 2017 and 2018, but other scandals have not been potent enough to provoke meaningful 
political action on issues of criminal law, investigation, and internal police operations.   
 Rather, the two most salient concerns for the public in Ukraine are public insecurity and a 
skeptical approach towards any increase in police powers or authorities.  While the rising level of 
crime and insecurity might lead one to believe that law makers would prioritize legal and 
procedural reforms that would improve and enhance police investigations, the uncertainty of 
whether these reforms will work or will exacerbate the problem disincentivizes political action by 
lawmakers.  As this chapter will show, in the case of Savvchenko’s law the policy backfire created 
by reforming the system of pre-trial detention and releasing thousands of violent criminals actually 
resulted in an abrupt policy reversal.  The fear of similar policy backfire incentivizes lawmakers 
to avoid reform experiments with real risks and uncertain rewards. 
A second very obstacle to enacting serious reforms is that after the Euromaidan the 
Ukrainian public became increasingly sensitive and distrustful of any laws that would increase 
police powers or authorities.  One the side, police and their supporters, particularly those from 




increased procedural powers to effectively address crime in Ukraine.  On the other, opponents 
from civil society and political parties such as Samopomich192 (self-reliance) argue that given the 
police’s history of abuse of the public and little impunity, granting more procedural authorities to 
the police would result increased abuse and a “police state”. 
  This chapter focuses on issues regarding legal and procedural reform initiatives, mostly 
involving Ukraine’s criminal investigative police, the Criminal Block (CID) and Organs of Pre-
Trial Investigation.  This chapter looks at issues of interagency cooperation, inefficient 
investigations, procedural powers of police to investigate crimes, and human rights abuses 
committed by police in the investigative process.  The reforms examined are the creation of the 
‘institute of detectives’, the introduction of criminal misdemeanors and changes in procedural 
powers, reforming the system of police evaluation, and reducing the use of torture and pre-trial 
detention (remand) in investigations.  The underlying issues of criminal investigation are 
introduced in the first section and the proposals and outcomes are introduced in the final section.  
Issues of Criminal Investigation 
Interagency cooperation-competition 
 Because of the divisions between the different agencies involved in administering criminal 
justice, there are often institutional competition which results in inefficient investigations and 
human rights violations.  First, operative police under the current system are not proactive, as they 
require written orders that must be approved by their management, police investigators (and their 
management) and prosecutors for many routine actions that would not generally require court or 
prosecutorial supervision in an outside context.  This means that criminal police are idle much of 
the time or are free to pursue other activities such as extortion and running criminal rackets when 
                                                            





they are not called upon to carry out operative orders.    Because of the antiquated criminal code 
and administrative code in Ukraine, only Criminal Police and Police Investigators are allowed to 
address criminal codes, which are the majority of offenses.  In these systems, a major issue with 
the division is that each branch is only responsible for their own clearance rate and have little 
interest in creating quality cases. (Paneyakh, 2014; 125).  Operative police from the Criminal 
Block are dependent on the work they do being overseen by Police Investigators, but investigators 
often refuse to approve the work because they fear that it will be challenged in court.  Ella 
Paneyakh writes that in Russia (as in Ukraine), field detective work is organizationally separated 
from the formal investigation; the police precinct as an organizational body and the individual field 
detective who works on the case only receive credit for it after the case is accepted for formal 
investigation by the investigative body.” (Paneyakh 2014; 122).   Similarly, police investigators 
complain that many times when they detain a suspect they fail to receive the requisite summons 
(notice of suspicion) from Prosecutors in a timely manner, which can lead to criminal charges for 
them.  This delay in response between prosecutors and investigators causes many investigators to 
not record detainment as such, but rather as an informal ‘conversation’.   
“If I sign 208, I have to provide a notice of suspicion within one day. And they [prosecutors – 
ed.] do not notify. What should I do? Release. And it is the prosecutor who orders the release. 
And then they ask me at the investigation department why I detained him. It means I deprived 
him of liberty illegally. And they charge me with article 146, illegal confinement. We have not 
notified the person of suspicion, therefore, you had no reasons to apprehend this person.” 
     (Beluosov 2017; p90)  
 
This delay in registration creates a period where the person ‘doesn’t exist on paper’ (Chistyakova 
2012; 145) and where torture is most likely to occur, particularly because investigators face time 
constraints for obtaining evidence or a confession. This results in inefficient investigations and 





 Experts agree that an important step towards effective police reform in is the unification of 
operative and pretrial investigation units within the National Police of Ukraine through the creation 
of the “institute of detectives” (EUAM 2015; Krapyvin 2018).  Like other Post-Soviet states, 
Ukraine inherited the Soviet system of policing, which had an arbitrary division between 
‘operators’ (operativnik), who carry out the operational activities of an investigations such as 
collect evidence, interrogating and surveilling suspects; and investigators (slidchi), who launches 
formal legal preceding and prepare the legal cases against a suspect.  Critics argue that the division 
between inquiry and investigative functions seriously complicates criminal investigations by 
preventing cooperation between the two units, which are housed in separate departments of the 
National Police (EUAM, 2014; UMDPL 2015; Center for Rule of Law 2013).  This in turn results 
in poor communication, discoordination, and at times competition between the two departments 
within the police.   
Operative police are subordinate to the Department of Criminal Police and are specialized 
by crime area in units that deal with human trafficking, economic crimes, narcotics, organized 
crime, and now cyber police. In Ukraine, as in many other countries, these specialized units have 
been abused and units dealing with organized crime, economic security, and narcotics have either 
been disbanded or reorganized due to extensive corruption and use of force incidents.   For 
example, the former head of Ukraine’s Narcotics Police (and current head of the Communist Party) 
Ilya Kiva, in addition to other controversial statements, has publicly expressed support for 
extrajudicial punishment of criminal suspects193.  In contrast to operative police, investigators 
                                                            





working in the Pre-Trial Investigation Department are required to have a legal education, rarely 
leave the office for field investigations, and spend most of their time preparing the criminal dossier.  
Investigators task operators with conducting operational and investigative actions on their behalf 
including searches, surveillance, interrogations, wiretaps and other action.  Police “operatives” are 
police officers who carry out auxiliary functions of an investigation such as conducting 
surveillance, searches, controlled buys, background checks, and interviewing suspects and 
witnesses in order to establish the necessary grounds to open an official criminal investigation into 
a suspect (Semukhina 2013; 136).  Police investigators (slidchi) are primarily concerned with the 
formal legal aspects of a case including whether to initiate criminal charges, collecting evidence 
and testimony, directing and overseeing operational and search activities through tasking operative 
police, communicating with the prosecutor, and compiling the criminal dossier to conduct a 
prosecution.  The powers of the police investigator and operator are detailed in the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 2012, the Law on Operational and Search Activity, and the Law on National 
Police.  Investigators are required to have a legal higher education and typically graduate from an 
MoI academy, whereas Operatives typically have a much shorter length of study often several 
months, are often recruited from the armed forces or sports, and have often served in other parts 
of the police force. 
 The separation between these units can create a confusing division of powers, because 
police operative’s units have no right to perform procedural actions in criminal proceedings 
without a directive from investigators and must through a process which is bureaucratic, requires 
unnecessary time and the approval of several parties (EUAM 2015).  For example, Operators 
cannot collect evidence without an order from investigators, and investigators are prohibited from 




Activity (EUAM 2015).  Another consequence of this division is that police investigators are not 
responsible for the actions of their operatives, which can often include abusing suspects or 
detainees in order to extract coerced confessions (Semukhina 2015; Chistyakova 2015; CPT 2014; 
UMDPL).  Yulia Chistyakova explains that in Ukraine,  
“The 'operative' officers view the [pre-trial] detention of a suspect as an effective start in the 
process of solving crime. They try to obtain evidence of guilt 'at any price'.  Methods of 
pressuring the suspects during the so-called 'preliminary investigation', including beatings and 
torture, are reportedly widespread, and the victims of ill-treatment face great difficulties when 
seeking justice (Amnesty International 2005). Even if judges later dismiss such evidence, it 
would not have any impact upon the operative officers: they have achieved the desired result 
(Rushchenko 2005a: 60; Kobzin ct al. 2010).” (Chistyakova 2012; 145). 
While in theory police investigators, who are required to have a legal education and training 
in legal process, should be ensuring the integrity of the case, including the means used and the 
evidence collected, “Instead of providing a fresh assessment and thorough screening of the 
detectives’ [operatives] work, police investigators often did little more than give legal form to the 
detective’s hunches and reports.” (Foglesong and Solomon 2001; 60).  A report from the Russian 
Institute for the Rule of Law of the European University of St. Petersburg, contends that in addition 
to causing delays, bureaucracy, and discoordination; the division between these operative and 
investigative units perpetuates human rights abuses because investigators are not responsible for 
the actions and methods used by operational police.  The report further argues that in Russia, where 
71% of investigators are female and all are required to have a law degree, that these police are 
much less likely to rely on the use of force against suspects and detainees (Committee for Civic 
Initiative 2013; 69).  Furthermore, the current division between operatives and investigators 
creates excessive bureaucracy, delays, and institutional competition among separate departments 
that should be working towards a common goal.  For example, because operational detectives rely 




of command and departments, valuable time and information can be lost in serious criminal cases 
that would otherwise not occur if the two were working together as a team.   
Some experts have raised suspicion at increasing the legal and procedural powers of 
operative units, many of which are notorious for human rights abuses (including specialized 
departments within the Criminal Police that handle narcotics or organized crime, such as 
GUBOZ)194 (Krapivin 2017a).195  Some have raised concerns that while combining operative and 
investigative police may provide increased efficiency, it would eliminate the legal screening 
function (of operative police actions) that investigators currently perform.  This function is carried 
out by a prosecutor in other systems, but one expert argues that prosecutors lack the time, ability, 
or independence to screen police functions, and therefore the police would be supervising the 
legality of their own actions196.  A counter argument is that the merger of Criminal Police 
Operatives with Pre-Trial Investigators, rather than empowering operatives, has the potential 
brings them under closer supervision by investigators who will be responsible for the legality of 
the methods used by the operatives.  In Ukraine, currently the only law enforcement institution 
with a unified operative and investigative function is the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(NABU)197, and observers have acknowledged that the unified detective in NABU has yielded 
positive results in their effectiveness and the legality of their actions (Krapivin 2017b; EUAM 
2015).  The Chief of National Police, civil society, local experts and international donors all agree 
that these functions should be combined into the institute of a detective, but the major barrier is 
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that establishing detectives would require substantial legal changes to the law on National Police, 
the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Law on Operational Search Activities198.  In the absence of 
a scandal that can motivate and sustain a reform coalition, the only source of consistent pressure 
for this reform has come from expert community civil society groups and foreign partners who 
have provided assistance with few conditions. 
EUAM Initiative 
 The European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM), which began working in 
Ukraine in 2014, lists reform of the criminal investigative system one of its primary areas of focus 
and support.  In 2015 the EUAM published a “Concept Paper on Criminal Investigation” which 
called for merging the Criminal Police and Pre-Trial Investigation Police into one single 
department known as the “Criminal Police and Investigations Department” (EUAM 2015).  
Kęstutis Lančinskas, the head of the Mission of the EUAM, said in an April 2017 editorial, “It is 
unacceptable that in a small police station you can find officers working on the same cases, 
along the same corridor, not communicating properly. It is amazing to think that criminal 
investigations can break down over something as simple as communication, but that is the 
reality.”199  A 2015 concept paper by the EUAM provided for two possible scenarios through 
which the unification could be enacted.  The first, was through changes in existing legislation, 
namely the Law on National Police, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on Operational Search 
Activity, and other laws.  This approach has subsequently not been adopted considering the legal 
barriers to enacting these changes and in particular the opposition to amending the Law on 
Operational Search Activity200.   Opposition to amending the law on Operational Search Activity 
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comes from the police, corrupt political elites who are concerned about being investigated, and 
several civil society groups that are concerned about expanding police powers, including UMDPL. 
 The second approach to enacting detective reform provided for organizational changes 
within the existing legal framework and entailed created common SOPs for the new department, 
developing new trainings, creating a unified chain of command and joint teams combining 
investigative and operational police, optimizing resources, new recruitment, and new evaluation 
and review standards, and the development of an electronic case management system which would 
allow better coordination and communication between police, the Procuracy, and judges (EUAM 
2015).  This plan did not materialize until early 2017, likely because of the unwillingness of the 
NPU to begin personnel experiments and transfers while vetting (attestation) was still being 
conducted, which ended in summer 2016.  Sources close to the reform note that although the 
detective merger had been a lower priority for former National Police Chief Dekanoidze in her 
first year, the assassination of journalist Pavlo Sheremet201 by car bomb in Kyiv in July of 2016, 
and the inability of the police to locate a suspect, convinced her to prioritize investigative 
reform.202  Serhiy Knyazev, a 20 year veteran of the Criminal Police, was appointed the new Chief 
of National Police of Ukraine in January 2017 emphasized the importance of increasing 
cooperation among the police.203 
 In January, 2017 the EUAM and NPU began their first project to unify investigators and 
operators under one chain of command at the Boryspil police department in Kyiv Oblast.204  In 
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March the NPU stated that the  experiment was extended to police departments in another eight 
regions of Ukraine in Kyiv, Kharkov, Khmelnitsky, Odesa, L’viv, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporozhe 
Oblasts where 90% of operational police would be assigned to new merger units under a unified 
command205.  The EUAM provided technical assistance, new forensic equipment, and trainings to 
these new “detective” units, in addition to providing new technology and resources to improve 
their investigative and forensic capacities.  According to sources within the EUAM and the NPU 
the division between operational and investigative units creates more bureaucracy and less 
effective investigations because operative and investigators are not sharing information and are 
not working as a team and are overloaded and lack supervisionю  The EUAM and NPU anticipate 
that the benefits of the merger project will be a decrease in bureaucracy, a more balanced workload 
between police, a reduction in the use of force and corruption, an increase in the number of cases 
solved and a decrease in the amount of time required to conduct criminal investigations.206  The 
results of these pilot programs throughout Ukraine were expected to be published by September 
2017, but sources outside the EUAM say that the project never expanded beyond Boryspil, due to 
a lack of police engagement and rotation of international advisors.  The reform was further cast 
into doubt during a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Providing Support to Law 
Enforcement Bodies in July 2018.  Representatives of the EUAM and police officials from several 
of the pilot program sites were invited to provide testimony to the committee which includes 
several senior MoI and SBU generals who were hostile to the reform.  According to members of 
civil society present at the hearings, the source of hostility was generally institutional inertia and 
the belief by senior committee members with a law enforcement that the existing (divided) system 
of investigation was more effective and that attempts to change the system would result in less 
                                                            
205 https://censor.net.ua/v444245 




criminal convictions.  Furthermore, the committee members were unconvinced that the EUAM 
and representatives from the pilot sites had provided sufficient evidence of its superiority 
(Ukrainian Law Enforcement Reform Digest No. 7 May 2018; p2).  The case of detective merger 
reform shows that despite broad consensus on the failings of the current investigation process, 
institutionalized practices, the lack of a broad based reform coalition and little buy in among the 
police that will need to administer the reform have prevented the emergence of this practice. 
Case Overload 
Another legal issue limiting the effectiveness of police in investigations in Ukraine is that 
Investigators are currently overloaded with cases as the Criminal Procedure Code under Chapter 
25 stipulates that only bodies of Pre-Trial Investigation can investigate criminal acts under the 
Criminal Codex (EUAM 2015).  Since the introduction of the new Criminal Procedure Code in 
2012, all criminal complaints must be recorded in the Universal Pre-Trial Registry and must be 
investigated by police investigators.  Since the introduction of the 2012 CPC, police and 
prosecutors complain that they have seen a surge in the amount of cases from several dozen cases 
per prosecutor, to several hundred cases.  This case overload means that police investigators and 
other officers have insufficient time to investigate personnel and time to investigate crimes, and 
therefore have institutional pressure to either downgrade or simply not record crimes, or to apply 
extensive pressure, including through torture, to quickly close cases without conducting thorough 
investigations.  In addition to the constraints placed on police investigators, district officers 
(Dilnichi) complain that a majority of their time is spent writing formal responses to close minor 
cases to complainants for cases that will not be investigated.  The time spent writing these refusals 
greatly limits the amount of time neighborhood officers must perform other functions such as 




 The Criminal Procedure Code of 2012 created the basis for a category of ‘Criminal 
Misdemeanors’, which previously did not exist in Ukraine, and empowers other law enforcement 
bodies besides Police Investigators to initiate misdemeanor investigations through a simplified 
procedure ‘police inquiry’ (Krapivin 2017b).  The issue is that while the Criminal Procedure Code 
allows for other police units to investigate Criminal Misdemeanors, the Criminal Code does not 
have a classification for Criminal Misdemeanors, therefore all infractions in Ukraine are under 
either the Criminal Code (last updated in 2010) or the Administrative Code KUPAP (last updated 
in 1964).  According to one source, investigators in Ukraine have on average criminal 400 cases 
at any given time (Krapivin 2017b).  Other police units such as Patrol Police and Neighborhood 
inspectors (Dilnichi) only have the legal authority to address administrative offenses, and this 
leaves investigators with the burden of having to investigate misdemeanors in addition to criminal 
offenses.  Since Patrol and other police units represent over 60% of the nearly 70,000 total sworn 
officers in the NPU, allowing Patrol, Neighborhood Police and other police that are not covered 
under the Law on Operational Search Activity to investigate misdemeanors would greatly decrease 
the burden of time and personnel on criminal police.  Furthermore, deputizing other police to 
investigate misdemeanors would improve police service provision throughout Ukraine, because 
many rural areas lack a strong police presence, particularly for criminal investigation, and are often 
served by a sole district officer.  Various draft laws and regulations have been proposed by experts 
and the Interior Ministry but so far none has been considered by either the Cabinet of Ministers or 
the Parliament. The CPC of 2012 differentiates between preliminary investigations 
(predvaritelnoe sledstvie) for more serious crimes and police inquiry (diznanie) for minor crimes.  
While the CPC of 2012 introduced the concept of misdemeanors for the first time ever (Article 




changes to the Ukrainian Criminal code and other legislation have not been made, and currently 
only criminal and pre-trial investigative police (and the Procuracy) can investigate any crime, 
regardless of severity.  In a 2016 interview, Interior Minister argued for reform of misdemeanors 
and that the current criminal code was responsible for case overload “As a result the police 
investigator has three hundred cases per one: both murder and theft of a hen ... And for each case 
he must have a folder, to work out operational measures ... So we suggest [that] criminal offenses 
like stealing a chicken should be transferred to a universal policeman of the basic level - a district 
police officer”.207 
Introduction of Criminal Misdemeanors  
 The stimulus sources for the introduction of this bill were Ukrainian civil society, certain 
political parties including the People’s Front and the Petro Poroshenko Block, and international 
partners.  There were several iterations of this bill which failed before the law was finally passed 
in its first reading on June 7th 2018. The first  draft law from 2015, “Draft Law on Amendments 
to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Introduction of Criminal Offenses” (Zakonoproekt 
№2897) was introduced into Parliament in May 19th 2015 by Andriy Kozhemyakin of the 
Batkavschina, Fatherland Party).  In effect this law would have harmonized legislation created a 
separate classification for minor crimes, which exists under the CPC of 2012, with a simplified 
process of investigation that would reduce bureaucracy and workload on other police (Krapivin 
2017b).   Despite gaining over 200 votes of support failed to pass because of heavy MP abstention 
in May 2017208 for a variety of reasons including concerns over the public reaction to increasing 
police powers.  According to a Denis Monastyrski, a legal expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the 
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Future, the bill was fundamentally flawed from the beginning.  While the goal of the bill was to 
decriminalize many existing criminal offenses and bring them under the administrative code (and 
thus the scope of Patrol Police and District Inspectors), draft law №2897 actually moved more 
administrative offenses into the Criminal Code, which would have defeated the purpose and spirit 
of the reform.  Even though the proponents of the bill were able to increase their total number of 
votes from 176 to 212, the two main sponsors of the bill, BPP and People’s Front were unable to 
maintain enough party discipline to pass the bill. While 79 BPP deputies favored the bill and none 
opposed it, 41 MPs abstained and a further 20 were absent out of a total of 140 seats.  In People’s 
Front discipline was slightly higher with 53 out of 81 supporting the bill, 18 not voting and 10 
absent.    
 After bill №2897 failed in May of 2017, The Ministry of Interior and the National Police, 
in particular the Main Investigative (PTIB) Department headed by Maxim Tutskiridze209 authored 
another draft (№7297) of the law that may be introduced into Parliament which fall which will 
hopefully address the shortcomings of the first bill (Krapivin 2017b).  
  In November, two competing bills were introduced including one from deputies within 
People’s Front and Batkivshina (Fatherland) as well as the MoI and the Prosecutors office law, 
project № 7279210  on November 10th, and a competing draft law by members of Samopomich 
(self-reliance) and Mustafa Nayyem (of BPP)  project № 7279-1211 on November 16th.  Both bills 
were named, “Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the 
Simplification of Pre-trial Investigation of Certain Categories of Criminal Offenses.”  The 
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Reanimation Package of Reforms heavily criticized the first bill № 7279 written by MoI and 
Tutskiridze for violating  human rights and freedoms, in particular by expanding the grounds on a 
person can be questioned or detained, of removing protections such as discovery and the right to a 
defense attorney through the simplified investigation process, and  for violating the presumption 
of innocence.212  The group also argued that the time constraints required under the draft law would 
increase police torture:   
“the criminal proceedings must be completed within 48 hours from the date of the notification of 
suspicion or 20 days if the person is not find guilty. These are unrealistic terms, especially if you 
consider the composition of the acts to be criminal offenses. Moreover, it is a clear "signal" to 
law enforcement officials: get confessions at any price”.213 
 The RPR instead put its support behind law project 7279-1, which was created in 
consultation with outside experts and met international standards214.  As of January 2018, both 
bills had been read on the Rada floor and received 234 votes, including from majorities of MPs 
from People’s Front, Samopomich, Batkivshina and BPP, but were sent back to committee for 
reconciliation.215  In April 2018, Kozhemiakin, the chair of the Parliamentary Committee for 
supporting the activities of Law Enforcement, introduced a reconciled bill №7279-Д which 
included compromises to investigate low level and medium level offenses under the simplified 
criminal procedure (diznanie) as stipulated in the 2012 CPC.  This bill came for a vote in June 
2018 and again failed at first reading to gain the support of several progressive members of BPP, 
the Renaissance Party, Samopomich, and the Non-Fractional group, but a second draft with 
compromises was approved by a vote of 229 after these parties agreed to support the bill.  The 
                                                            
212 “THE PUBLIC CALLS ON PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES NOT TO SUPPORT BILL NUMBER 7279, WHICH VIOLATES THE 





215 “Named voting on referral for re-first reading of draft laws on amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the 





compromise dealt with many of the concerns of the holdout lawmakers, but a report by the 
UMDPL states that there are still issues with the law as it prepares for its second reading.  
“ In its current wording, the draft law contains provisions posing a threat for human rights and 
freedoms — understated timelines of inquiry, additional extra-procedural sources of evidence, 
possible conviction of a person found guilty without the participation of a lawyer, etc.”.   
(UMDPL Digest No. 7; p5) 
  While the bill has not yet come into law, the difficulties of negotiating competing concerns 
of the legislature over whether and how to increase police authorities shows the difficulty of 
implementing police reform in a society with low levels of trust in both government and law 
enforcement. 
Human Rights Abuses 
Quantitative measures of police performance have proven problematic and have been 
challenged in the United States (Bronstein 2014; DOJ 2015) and elsewhere, yet the use of 
quantitative performance measures in policing in Ukraine is also a product of the Soviet obsession 
with central planning which extended to all spheres of state administration.  The use of quantitative 
indicators is a powerful force in Ukrainian criminal justice and politics because it allows police 
officials and political elites to claim credit for reductions in crime, even if the figure are dubious 
or fictitious.  This dependence on quantitative indicators of success begins with street level cops 
being held to account by their supervisors and proceeds all the way up to police leadership 
responding to political elites for their progress in fighting crime.  As concerns about crime and 
insecurity become more salient public concerns and political issues, political leaders take note and 
demand demonstrations of progress and success in the war against crime.  Yevhen Krapyvin 
provides a recent example of this phenomenon. 
Such a system of evaluation is traditionally supported by politicians and high-profile 




being achieved. A story worth mentioning is the one that happened with the Prime-Minister 
V.Groysman in 2017. At the joint collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine he 
threatened to fire three heads of regional police departments who had the worst indicator of solved 
cases. What these chiefs had to do in order not to be fired — is very easy to understand. 
 (Krapyvin in UMDPL 2018, 12).  
  This enduring legacy of quantitative performance measures not only exerts pressure on 
police to keep crime down, but also to measure a given amount of arbitrary crimes in their district, 
regardless of whether said crimes have occurred.  For example, in Russia (as in Ukraine), district 
inspectors (Uchastkovvy in Russian Dilnichi in Ukrainian) are required to process a certain number 
of arrests for drunkenness and hooliganism.  According to Lauren McCarthy:  
“Uchastkovyy try to formally fulfil the demands of the system by arresting people for 
minor violations that are not really threats to the public order (e.g., people who have had a few 
drinks but are not disturbing anyone) or in the process of responding to one situation make an 
arrest or hand out a fine for something completely different [e.g., when dealing with a domestic 
dispute, giving one of the residents a fine for registration violations]” (McCarthy 2014; 203). 
 Many scholars of Ukraine and Russia (McCarthy 2014; Chistyakova 2013; Krapivin 2014, 
2017B; Light 2014; Taylor 2012, 2014) argue that these centrally imposed quotas cause perverse 
incentives, manipulation and falsification of statistic, and more opportunities for police to 
shakedown and extort citizens.  The use of quantitative data in determining policing objectives 
was rooted in Soviet faith in ‘scientific planning’ from the central level and is particularly 
engrained among police, prosecutors, and even judges (Shelley 1996; Chistyakova 2013; Solomon 
2015).   In Ukraine and Russia this system is informally known as the “stick” or “tally” system 
(polochnaya Sistema) because police are required to meticulously document their enforcement 
activities and are evaluated based on how many marks they have for various indicators (UMDPL 
2016; McCarthy 2014; Paneyakh 2013).  In Ukraine, the system used by the MoI is formally known 
as AMPR+1, a Ukrainian acronym for ‘The same period as last year’.216  In Ukraine, the figure is 
                                                            




evaluated based on three components: the number of registered crimes and cleared cases, the 
expected growth or decrease in the indicators over a year, and its specific weight in assessing the 
activities of any police unit. (UMDPL 2016, p28).   In Russia, where quantitative measures of 
police performance are also a major issue, the three indicators of the “stick” system are: clearing 
a case (suspect is identified and charged), the case is investigated within the time stipulated by the 
CPC, and the comparison with the previous reporting period (McCarthy 2014; 6).  The heavy use 
of quantitative performance measures results in both the underreporting of crime and the false 
accusation of innocent persons for crimes that they did not commit, or at times crimes that never 
occurred. 
Police evaluate which crimes to address based on the likelihood that they will be accepted 
by an investigator, and often discourage victims from recording cases which they perceive as 
unlikely to hold up in court.  This could take the form of police not recording a crime report, 
misclassifying crime, or aggressively attempting to persuade complainants not to report crime.  
There are several documented cases of police discouraging citizens from registering crimes, and 
then retaliating against victims if they refuse to drop the charges.217  Lauren McCarthy argues that 
in Russia, police face overwhelming pressure to avoid being stuck with unsolvable cases as this 
will have a negative effect on their performance and can result in disciplinary action or being 
passed up for raises or promotion: “This means that what the public experiences as indifference or 
laziness is actually a carefully calculated decision made by the officer taking the complaint about 
its prospects for success and its impact on the performance assessment of the department” 
(McCarthy 2014; 7).   In addition to violating the rights and safety of victims to adequate police 
and justice services the refusal to register crime contributes to an increase in latent (unrecorded) 
                                                            




crime.  This makes the true scope and causes of crime harder to track and study, all while 
contributing to an environment of impunity for criminals (Paneyakh 2013). Fabrication of non-
existing crimes and the false arrest and prosecution of innocent suspects for crimes, either by need 
to produce or suspect or a quota of crimes from central police command.  According to Yulia 
Chistyakova, in the Ukrainian police: 
“Success is evaluated in terms of the increase or decrease in clear-up rates compared with previous 
periods. The main task therefore is to gain information leading to the clearing up of a crime as 
quickly as possible using the most effective methods at the investigating officer's disposal. Scarcity 
of technical means and investigative skills mean that the use of torture is often the easiest and 
fastest way to receive needed information or to obtain a confession. The system of measuring 
performance is often seen as one of the reasons for the systematic use of torture, unlawful detention 
of citizens and abuses of power (Shepeleva 2005; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine 2007; 
Kobzin et al. 2010). A police officer who is able to provide good statistics can count on his bosses 
turning a blind eye to his misdeeds and violations of legislation (Novikova 2005).  
(Chistyakova 2012; 144). 
 
A recent audit218 by the Office of Human Rights Monitoring within the Ukrainian MoI 
noticed a pattern in several regions where police were planting the same evidence (at times 
ammunition or drugs) on several different suspects on the same day, presumably in order to meet 
arbitrary central quotas.  Researchers have found similar methods in many countries, including 
coerced confessions, charging a suspect in one crime with several other unrelated crimes, and a 
tendency towards prosecuting the most vulnerable or marginalized members of society, often 
without any evidence other than (coerced) confessions (McCarthy 2014; 7).  According to the US 
Department of State’s 2016 Human Rights Report for Ukraine, during the first nine months of 
2016 law enforcement opened 133 criminal cases against police for torture, arbitrary arrest, and 
the illegal confiscation of property.  The report states that ten officers were fired and twenty were 
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disciplined as a result of these proceedings, however most police remain undisciplined for these 
and other illegal actions. (U.S. Department of State 2016; 7).  
 McCarthy argues that in Russia the system creates perverse incentives and pressure to 
meet targets for criminal closure and generates a tremendous amount of paperwork with many 
district police reporting that paperwork, particularly reports on refusal to initiate a crimianl 
investigation, take up 80% of their time (McCarthy 2014; 6).  Police in former Soviet states have 
a variety of non-traditional tasks including checking permit and residence requirements, 
registering automobiles firearms and dogs, and keeping tabs on high risk youth and parolees, each 
with its own associated set of paperwork (McCarthy 2014B).  Not only do these superfluous and 
onerous requirements overburden police officers, but they turn police into nearly full-time 
bureaucrats and prevents them from engaging in other activities such as following leads, foot patrol 
or community policing which could improve their relation with the public.  Police themselves are 
preoccupied with satisfying the bureaucratic requirements of the “stick” system, and therefore 
orient all of their attention and efforts towards satisfying these requirements, rather than 
investigating crime.  
Reforms of Quantitative Measures 
Public Opinion  
The sources of reform of quantitative measures have largely come from civil society.  Since 
the reform of quantitative measures are less visible than hiring or re-equipping police, it has been 
difficult to find enthusiastic public support (outside of expert civil society) and subsequently 
political coalitions.  Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to address the use of 
quantitative performance measures, typically after police scandals but these institutional responses 
are often too weak to overcome a system that is firmly entrenched in both the law enforcement and 




cancellation of the 2013 MoI Order №334219 “To further improve the analytical support of the 
departments of the Interior”220, which entrenched performance measures as the methodology for 
determining Militia (police) efficiency.  A major source of change came with the passage of the 
2015 Law on National Police, in which Article 11 on “Partnership-based cooperation with the 
public” stipulates:   
3. The level of public trust and confidence in the Police will be the main criterion for the 
assessment of performance of its forces and units. 
4. The level of public trust and confidence in the Police is assessed by independent sociological 
services in the manner prescribed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
 
Although evaluating police based on public opinion is a step in the right direction, experts 
warn that relying on public opinion data as the basis of police evaluation raises several distinct 
concerns.  The first concern is that public opinion may be at best an imperfect, and at worst a 
problematic measure that supplants, rather than resolves the issues evaluating police based off of 
quantitative crime stats.  For example, Yulia Chistyakova notes that: 
“In addition, perhaps paradoxically, post-Soviet societies combine distrust of the state and law 
enforcement institutions with the approval of coercive methods of control.  On the one hand, the 
level of trust and confidence in the police is low [Beck 2005; Beck and Robertson 2009]; on the 
other hand, when coercion or even torture are applied to ‘real criminals’, such methods are often 
met with public approval [Novikova 2005; Shepeleva 2005]. (Chistyakova 2013; 150) 
Furthermore, the question remains of who will conduct the sociological assessment and in 
what ways the data will be interpreted.  While the article in the Law on National Police provides 
that the survey needs to be done by an “independent sociological service”, experts have raised 
concern that the Ukrainian MoI or National Police could manipulate the selection of the service or 
otherwise influence the results.221  The same concern was raised in Russia following the 2012 
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passage of the ‘Law on Police’ in which Article 9.6 states that: “public opinion is one of the basic 
criteria of official assessment of the activities of the police”, however the law entrusts monitoring 
public opinion to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.  According to one report,  
“Giving priority to public opinion is consistent with the goal of law enforcement 
legitimation, but allowing the Ministry of Internal Affairs—of which the police is a part—to 
conduct unobserved monitoring of the most important metric for evaluating the success of the 
reforms, without specifying their methods in the law, is misguided.”222   
In June of 2017 the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered a working group to develop a methodology 
for evaluating the work of police based on public trust, but many criticized the group for failing to 
include outside experts and civil society and has yet to come up with any substantive proposals.223 
Despite the explicit legal basis for prohibiting the use of quantitative measures and the requirement 
under the Law on National Police that public trust be used to measure the effectiveness of the 
police quantitative measures are still used in the National Police.  This is because of the political 
utility off these statistics and because of the inability to agree on a methodology with the Interior 
Ministry.  Experts in Ukraine and Russia have argued that public opinion data should be only one 
consideration, that police assessment should include additional qualitative measures (including 
police attitudes, public safety concerns, and the recommendations of experts from diverse 
backgrounds including legal experts, current and former law enforcement, and civil society 
organizations.  They provide the example of volunteer led police re-attestation committees as a 
possible model for establishing these expert panels in the future.224 The unwillingness of the MoI 
and the National Police to accept public trust as the primary indicator of their effectiveness is not 
surprising given the relative unpopularity of all police throughout Ukraine.  If the system were to 
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be implemented and enforced, it could spell the end of many careers and important political and 
corruption networks in the police. 
Pre-Trial Detention 
Another enduring human rights issue in Ukraine’s criminal justice system is the overuse of 
pre-trial detention or remand is the involuntary detention of a person suspected of a crime, but who 
has not yet been tried or convicted.  In many countries throughout the world, remand prisoners 
who have not been convicted of a crime- and many of whom will be released without charge- 
represent the bulk of the prison population (Schönteich and Varenik, 2014).  Lawmakers are 
starting to pay increased attention to reforming their use of pre-trial detention because of concerns 
about economic and racial inequality225 as well as the economic, public health, and safety risks 
associated with the overuse of pre-trial detention causes (Schönteich and Varenik, 2014).  The use 
of pre-trial detention has a long history in Ukraine and other post-Soviet systems, and in Ukraine 
the average length of pre-trial detention is six months, but can be as long as two years (Schönteich 
and Varenik 2014; 26).  Ukraine’s heavy reliance on remand prisons causes violations of due 
process as suspects are remanded for long periods in order to extract confessions, human rights 
abuses where suspects are denied basic medical treatment and contact with the outside world and 
often counsel. According to a report by the Open Society Justice Initiative entitled “The Global 
Overuse of Pretrial Detention” police favor pretrial detention for two reasons: 
 “First, pretrial detainees are guaranteed to stand trial, cannot interfere with witnesses and the 
criminal investigation, and do not pose a risk to public security. Second, pretrial detainees—
especially those without legal representation—are at the largely unfettered beck and call of 
detectives and prosecutors for repeated questioning, and are more likely to cooperate with their 
interrogators by making admissions or confessions” (Schönteich and Varenik 2014; 104).   
                                                            





This section focuses on pre-trial detention, but not from a perspective of preventing torture and 
human rights violations (Which is covered in Chapter 6: Accountability) but rather using pre-trial 
detention as an investigatory tool to exert pressure on suspects and secure criminal convictions.  
Individuals are held in either police remand centers ‘ITT’ or “SIZO” “slidchyi izolyator” 
(investigative isolator) as remand prisoners before trial.  Although the Ministry of Justice in in 
charge of administering the Prisons, including pre-trial remand prisons “SIZO”, police play a large 
role in this process either in the initial detention in police stations, or by recommending remand to 
investigating judges and prosecutors226 for suspects.  First, torture and abuse in many cases is 
likely to occur in initial police custody as police exhibit maximum pressure to obtain a confession 
before the suspect is arraigned through physical and psychological abuse.  In a 2014 report for 
UMDPL, Eugene Krapivin notes that the typical police torture including physical abuse and 
beatings and excessive handcuffing that can occur in detention facilities (Krapyvin 2014).  In 2016 
former Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze made the decision to dramatically decrease the number 
of police-detention (ITT) centers in Ukraine from 340 to 144 and to cut police staff by nearly 
40%.227  While this decrease in the amount of police run pre-trial detention centers (ITT) is a 
positive development, police investigators continue to rely on remand for most individuals charged 
with a crime, despite the availability of bail and diversionary options under the 2012 CPC. 
 Another issue with the use of pre-trial detention and torture in detention in Ukraine is the 
delayed registration of detainees.  Under the provisions of the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code, 
Ukrainian authorities can detain a suspect for up to 72 hours in ITT without official charges, after 
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which a court has to approve detention in a Ministry of Justice pre-trial detention facility (SIZO) 
with an official warrant or release the suspect.  During this time Detainees have to be informed of 
the allegations or charges against them and to challenge their detention, however Ukrainian police 
often delay registration of the detainee by not completing the protocol of detention, thus depriving 
them of these rights. (Chistyakova 2012; 145; Amnesty 2016).  According to Yulia Chistyakova,  
“[the purpose of] these procedures is to delay the formal registration of the detainee, sometimes 
for hours or even days. This period, when the detainee has no formal status ('on paper' they do not 
exist), is used to exert psychological and physical pressure in order to 'convince' the person to 
confess. Detainees are held not in temporary detention units but in police units (in contravention 
of the law)…. The very fact of falling into this 'gap of uncertainty' proves for some so 
psychologically disabling that it is often sufficient to make the detainee confess.” (Chistyakova 
2012; 145).   
Pressure to reform pre-trial detention started to build in Ukraine after a series of scandals 
involving suspects dying in police custody, including the case of Igor Indilo, a 20 year old from 
Kyiv who was illegally detained on his birthday and killed in police custody in 2010 (Amnesty 
2011).228  Several similar scandals and European pressure lead the Yanukovych administration to 
pass a new Criminal Procedure Code in 2012 which was supposed to curtail remand detention 
though using diversionary programs such as bail, house arrest, discouraging pre-trial detention for 
minor crimes carrying less than three years, and removing investigator’s appeal to judges for pre-
trial remand  (Solomon 2015; 173).  The 2012 CPC launched in Ukraine did lead to a decrease in 
the number of individuals held in pretrial detention centers, prisons, and it lead to fewer overall 
incarcerated persons in Ukraine (Solomon 2015; Krapivin 2014), however human rights and legal 
observers argue that major procedural violations still occur routinely (Krapivin 2014; p29)  
Solomon notes that the population of remand prisoners dropped 40% in the first 9 months after the 
                                                            






passing of the new CPC, police and prosecutorial requests for remand were down, and the number 
of suspects remanded decreased from 17% to 9% (Solomon 2015; 173).  Although this represents 
an impressive decline in a short period of time, others argue that these figures are still deceptive 
as they include a majority of non-violent offenders who are still remanded. 
 Notwithstanding this decrease in the use of pre-trial detention, a visit by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT) to several Ukrainian police directorates (precincts) and pre-trial detention centers (ITT and  
SIZO)  in Fall of 2013, over a year after the enactment of the new Criminal Procedure Code, found 
major violations still occurring, particularly in the time immediately after apprehension and during 
the initial questioning and interrogation of suspects (CPT 2014).  According to the CPT the 
allegations were mostly against operational officers (operatives or police from the criminal block) 
and involved physical violence, threats to place prisoners in “press-khata”, and other forms of 
torture.  In Kyiv, the delegation noted that the ill treatment was worse, and included in addition to 
physical abuse allegations that detainees were forced to exercise till exhaustion, prolonged periods 
of handcuffing, and being driven at high speeds on bumpy roads. (CPT 2014; 20:38).  According 
to the report:  
“The main purpose of the alleged ill-treatment was said to ensure, prior to formal questioning, 
that the persons concerned would provide self-incriminating statements or information 
incriminating other persons before the investigative judge/court and/or to extort money from the 
detained persons. In a few cases, blows were said to have been inflicted to obtain submissive 
behavior or as a form of “entertainment” for Internal Affairs officials (with some of them 
reportedly filming the alleged ill-treatment with mobile phones equipped with cameras). (CPT 
2014 21).  
 A follow up visit by the CPT in late 2016 found that “the severity of ill-treatment alleged had 
diminished”, yet unrecorded “invisible” detentions in police stations remained common practice, 




access to food, medical treatment and being informally interrogated without counsel.229  CPT also 
noted the practice of prisoners being returned from SIZO back to police facilities for the purpose 
of ‘police investigative work’.  They argue that police facilities are not equipped for long term 
prisoners and that police use this time to exert additional pressure on suspects to self-incriminate 
(CPT 2016).   Despite progress in recent years, pretrial detention including torture has become a 
larger issue due to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, however the majority of the allegations of illegal 
detention and torture on the Ukrainian side are carried out by the Security Services of Ukraine 
(SBU)230 rather than the police (with the possible exception of MoI special police battalions 
involved in combat), and thus falls outside of the scope of this study.  According to the Criminal 
Procedure Code article 197 pre-trial detention cannot exceed six months for minor crimes and up 
to 12 months for major crimes, but a spring 2017 report by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights reports that pre-trial detention is used extensively in Ukraine to 
hold suspects of terrorism or other separatist related charges without formally charging them which 
undermines the presumption of innocence and due process.231  Following the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, on August 12, 2014, parliament introduced special amendments into Ukraine’s law “on 
combatting terrorism” extending the period for which suspects accused of terrorism can be 
detained without charge, to 30 days.”  According to the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Ukrainian Prosecutor General has informed them that the NPU has opened 
2,845 pre-trial investigations since 2014 concerning illegal detention and abductions of persons in 
Donetsk and Lugansk, resulting in 79 indictments. (OHCHR 2017; 87).   
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Savchenko’s Law  
In addition to the above listed legal reforms which directly affect the police as an 
institution, broader criminal justice reforms also have major effects on policing in Ukraine.  A 
prescient legal issue with major implication for policing is the ongoing controversy surrounding 
the ‘Savchenko Law’ (Law of Ukraine № 838 of 2015).  This law was introduced by Nadia 
Savchenko, the political prisoner and MP held by Russia for two years, amended part 5, Art. 72 of 
the Criminal Code of Ukraine.  Police and prosecutors often extend the trial indefinitely so that 
defendants in pre-trial detention will confess.  The law required that each day spent in pre-trial 
detention before sentencing count as two days towards the eventual prison sentence, and applied 
retroactively.  The logic of the bill was to incentivize Prosecutors to rely less on solitary 
confinement, reduce the prison population and to expedite trials, but experts note that it has failed 
to change the calculation of prosecutors.  More disturbing is the effect that the law has had since 
passing in late 2015, as 9,000 prisoners have already been released, and of those 785 have 
reoffended including 22 for murder.232  The release of thousands of prisoners during a crime wave 
has seen the law become extremely unpopular amongst the public and a political target for 
politicians amidst the backdrop of insecurity.   The original bill appears to have been possible only 
because of Savchenko’s popularity during her imprisonment in Russia, and has lost support even 
among its previous proponents.   According to a co-sponsor of the bill Andriy Kozhemyakin, “the 
initiators of the document took the unprecedented decision because at that time Savchenko was on 
hunger strike in a Russian prison.”233  On June 17th, 2017 President Poroshenko enacted law No. 
2046-VII, “On amendments to the criminal code of Ukraine on the rules for cumulative penalties 
                                                            






and the term of preliminary detention”, which reversed Savchenko’s law.  Whereas Savchenko’s 
law stipulated that each day in pre-trial detention should count for two days of the sentence, 
Poroshenko’s bill reverses this to a formula of one for one.234  This abrupt reversal in policy shows 
how liberal impulses of reform are often stunted by public fears of crime and unforeseen 
consequences of policy change. 
Conclusion 
 Reforming police hiring, training, compensation, and oversight and improving community 
relations are all necessary and important goals in any police reform, but in order for new behaviors 
to be institutionalized, the police must also be governed by a legal and procedural framework that 
rewards good behavior, such as successfully investigating serious crimes, and punishes human 
rights and due process violations.  Procedural and legal reforms are critical for changing police 
behavior because they modify the incentive structure and institutional environment in which police 
conduct investigations.  A police force Police can only be as efficient and just as the rules which 
govern it, so it should be no surprise that under institutional incentives to ignore crime reports, 
coerce confessions, and prosecute innocent persons with impunity, that these behaviors have 
continued despite public condemnation and prior reform efforts.  Police, like other state actors, are 
heavily influenced by the rules and institutions governing them, and are unlikely to change their 
behavior save changes in these structures.  By combining operatives and investigators and making 
each invested in and responsible for the work of the other the incentive structures for how to 
conduct criminal investigations are changed.  Similarly, by reducing police pressure to conform to 
arbitrary and artificial statistical performance measures, the police can pursue practices which 
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encourage the recording of all crime and ensure a just and fair investigation process for suspects 
and victims alike.  If the legislative and organizational reforms discussed here are adopted, 
implemented and expanded throughout the police, many of the most serious problems with 
Ukraine’s police could be solved, however substantial hurdles exist. 
 The stimulus factors pushing for these reforms were in certain cases international pressure 
and assistance to adopt best practices, the need for rebuilding a strong state and combatting crime, 
and responding to civil society.  At the same time, there was never a scandal large enough to 
provoke sustained public interest in these largely technical reforms, with the unfortunate exception 
of the backlash to the criminals released after Savchenko’s Law was enacted.  Similarly, the 
political upheaval of 2014 and 2015 that allowed important changes such as the passage of the 
Law on National Police and the creation of the Patrol Police had largely subsided before these 
technical issues could be addressed on the legislative agenda.  Thus, the political window for many 
of these reforms had closed by 2016 and 2017 and there was insufficient public pressure to provoke 
political action on these matters.  This missed political window and lack of a reform coalition 
means that political elites have not been properly incentivized to act on these issues.  
 The political opposition and interest groups are weary of empowering police through 
expanding their authority and mandate because of the long history of police abuse of power and 
authority, yet other political and social forces argue that the rising crime demands urgent action.  
Similarly, the same liberal consensus about pre-trial detention that led to the enactment of 
Savchenko’s law proved unsustainable amidst rising crime and public insecurity as many violent 
offenders were released.  Thus, broad momentum and reform coalitions that push for changes often 
appear to be defeated by rising crime, public distrust of police, and political competition in the 




second reason that these reforms have been so elusive is the endurance of institutional incentive 
structures which encourage gaining quick results through tried and proven methods such as 
coercing confessions, relying on quantitative indicators and pre-trial detention all the while 
discouraging independent investigations and cooperation between different investigative 
authorities within the police and the procuracy.  With the possible exception of criminal 
misdemeanors, which sat in committee for three years and has yet to pass a second reading, none 
of these reforms have been implemented or sustained.  The next Chapter focuses on reforms in the 
realm of professionalization and explores the effects of better selection, recruitment, training, and 















Chapter 5: Professionalization Reforms 
This chapter considers the role of professionalization and personnel reforms which look at 
the recruitment and hiring, education, and management systems of the National Police of Ukraine.  
More than any other chapter, these reforms exemplify the central argument of this dissertation: 
namely that institutions are capable of being reformed when they are the result of major scandals 
and political upheaval which catalyze reform coalitions and international support, and when they 
implement political insulation and public oversight from civil society.  The case of Patrol Police 
and certain other units in the National Police of Ukraine shows that institutions designed with 
extensive input from civil society and international partners can implement mechanisms which 
prevent against political capture and patrimonialism, a major threat for any law enforcement 
institution in Ukraine.  Whereas the greatest mitigating factors in the previous chapter on legal and 
procedural criminal justice reforms was political uncertainty over insecurity and inertia, the 
greatest challenge to overcome in designing new institutions and conducting personnel reform is 
political competition and corruption.  This is because the unhealthy links between political elites 
and law enforcement discussed throughout this dissertation are primarily reinforced through 
political control over hiring, promotion and appointment powers and are sustained through 
corruption networks.  As this chapter will show, the political upheaval of 2014-2015 allowed for 
a brief window where the problem stream of a discredited Militsiya, the policy (solution) stream 
of a western backed plan to reform Patrol Police, and the political stream of the first reform 
government created an opportunity for a partial reform of police.  Most importantly, the advocates 
involved in pushing for that reform fought for and were able to gain policy concessions that 
institutionalized these reforms and made them sustainable: namely public oversight in the hiring 




The chapter is divided into three types of professionalization reforms; recruitment and 
selection, organizational and management reforms, and educational reforms.  These reforms are 
further broken into two categories.  First, ‘insulated’ reforms meaning those which received 
extensive international assistance that required meritocratic personnel procedures and cooperation 
with civil society and protection from politicization.  Then, other attempts at reform where 
international organizations did not have extensive leverage and where civil society had less 
influence .235  The following diagram 5.1 shows a breakdown of the reforms and practices explored 
in this chapter. 
Table 5.1 Insulated versus non-insulated personnel reforms 
 Insulated Not insulated 
Recruitment and Selection  National Recruitment 
Center 
Territorial Police Commissions 





Attestation Phase 1  
 
 
Attestation Phase 2 
Organization and leadership Holosiivsky Model 
Police Pilot Project  
Continued Appointment of regional 
Chiefs and Police Commanders by MoI 
Police Education Creation of Patrol 
Police Academy (PPA) 
Endurance of Interior Ministry  
National University system (NAVS) 
 
 ‘Professionalization’ Reforms improving the standards of police recruitment, education, 
and management have been instrumental in reducing police corruption, public abuse, and political 
influence on the police c since the late 19th century in the UK and the early 20th century in the 
United States (Reiner 2010; Bayley; Walker 2012).  Throughout this chapter, the terms “personnel 
reform” and “professionalization reform” are used interchangeable and include any changes in 
recruitment, selection, education and training, vetting and management policies within the police 
organization.  Reforming personnel policies in police departments is extremely challenging 
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because politicization of police through patronage appointments and corrupt personnel practices 
and is a very common practice throughout post socialist and developing countries and results in 
incompetent, corrupt, and politically dependent police (Gryzmala Busse 2007; Hensel 2010; 
Taylor 2011).  Patronage jobs are the lifeblood of political machines and police that owe their jobs 
and career advancement to politicians or other outside actors cannot be expected to serve in the 
public interest.  Similarly, corrupt practices in police hiring, training, and management means that 
individuals with high skills and integrity will be deterred from police services, and those who do 
join and advance in the police service may have dubious motives, in particular the extensive 
opportunities for predation afforded by careers in law enforcement (Taylor 2011). 
  Ukraine’s personnel policy was historically characterized by perpetual personnel 
shortages and low recruitment standards, a corrupt and overly theoretical educational system, and 
career advancement based on patrimonial practices and the sale of ranks.  The creation of the Patrol 
Police of Ukraine created an institutional rift in the Ukrainian police which resulted in two parallel 
systems of police personnel policy in Ukraine.  The Patrol Police system started from scratch with 
new meritocratic procedures and policies and another with institutional legacies of the Militsiya.  
As this chapter will show, the political and institutional response to reform for the rest of the 
National Police largely mitigated the political will for deeper personnel reforms.  This is because 
political elites and police elites were hesitant to dismantle patrimonial networks and face 
competition from rivals over control of the police.  For many areas of the National Police, such as 
investigators and neighborhood police, the systems of recruitment, training and management have 
retained many of the same legacies that they had under the Militsiya.  Similarly, the police 
education system, comprising both the National University of Internal Affairs (NAVS) put up 




was built with insulated and highly effective system of recruitment, training, and management with 
substantial support from international actors and Ukrainian civil society.  The result of these 
different personnel policies is that three years into reform, Ukraine’s Patrol Police have a level of 
public trust that is above 50-60%, whereas most other parts of the National Police have trust levels 
near 40%236 or below (KIIS 2016; 2017; IRI 2017). This dual system emerged as the traffic police 
(DAI) was liquidated in 2015 and replaced with Patrol Police.  At the time, Western advisors and 
Georgians overseeing reform designed the Patrol Police to be the initial beachhead for reform that 
could eventually be diffused to other departments.  
 There are several reasons that deep personnel reforms emerged in Patrol Police before they 
were attempted in other areas.  Barbara Geddes writes that there is typically less political 
opposition to the creation of new bureaucratic institutions than the redistribution of old ones, and 
that in cases where politicians face major obstacles to reform, creating insulated ‘islands’ of 
reform, (such as the Patrol Police), may be the only feasible option for administrative reform 
(Geddes 1994).  The creation of a new department was enabled by the political upheaval which 
allowed the formation of a consensus and a reform coalition for a new police force, and which did 
not threaten control over other more powerful sectors of the police.  Second, the creation of the 
Patrol Police was a reform priority both because they would replace a highly unpopular service 
with a highly visible service, thus bolstering reform credentials of the new administration and pay 
political dividends.  Finally, reform of the Patrol Police became a possibility following the 
Euromaidan because it was largely funded and supported with technical expertise by western 
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donors who insisted on a competitive and transparent recruitment and promotion processes and 
insulation from political influence.  Substantial funding of the Patrol Police and police training 
initiatives gave international donors a high amount of leverage over the conditions of the new 
service and they used this leverage to insist on transparent civil service, meritocratic policies, and 
civil society oversight.  At the same time, personnel reforms in the rest of the Police proceeded 
much slower.  Some progress towards reform was achieved with the passage the new Law on 
National Police of 2015, which institutionalized new recruitment standards and a new recruitment 
policy via competitive exam and interview with public police commissions.  However, there has 
been significantly more difficulty in staffing other parts of the police outside of Patrol, the MoI 
retains control over a large part of police education, and despite the National Police’s formal legal 
independence from the MoI, the Interior Ministry is still very active in selecting regional and 
central police commanders and is locked in a political competition with political networks over 
control of police staffing.  This has led to a hybrid system where professionalization reforms have 
had varying success in addressing the quality of police officers, their political independence, and 
their competence.  By late 2017 recognizing the disparities in the quality, competency, and level 
of public trust between Patrol Police and other sectors of the National Police of Ukraine, the NPU 
leadership committed to consolidating its two-tiered system of hiring and training and to require 
all future hires to begin their career in the Patrol Police, however it is still unclear how or when 
this reform will take place and what will happen with the Ministry of Interior universities, who 
have so far been able to resist any challenges to their power. 
  This chapter shows how many of these reforms which were insulated from political 
competition and politicization by clear regulation, transparency, with oversight mechanisms and 




efforts in other parts of the police which lacked these attributes.  Reforms such as the Patrol Police 
and the Patrol Police Academy have established sustainable processes involving outside actors 
which can hold police accountable and can continue to push for incremental improvements and 
changes in the rest of National Police of Ukraine by serving as an example and through the 
diffusion of personnel who went through the Patrol Police recruitment and education system.   
Strong civil service reform, proper police training, and the use of public commissions help to 
counter the attempts of political elites to staff the police in ways which will make police 
accountable to the public rather than particular interests.  The next section considers the history of 
professionalization reforms and the previous personnel system in Ukraine, this is followed by 
sections examining the three reform areas, recruitment and selection, training, and management. 
What is Professionalization Reform? 
 Public discontent at police inefficiency, corruption, and misconduct grew throughout the 
late 19th and early 20th century in the United States and police reform became one of the signature 
issues of the progressive era.  Reformers such as Theodore Roosevelt in the NYPD and August 
Vollmer of the Berkeley Police Department pioneered programs to improve police conduct by 
introducing strict recruitment standards, requiring additional officer training, and implementing 
strict management and discipline techniques borrowed from the private sector and the military 
(Walker 2012). 2004).  Professionalization reforms are premised on the logic that a key component 
of police reform is “staffing the police with the right sort of people” (Bayley 2006; 53).  
Professionalization reforms are some of the most common reforms because they do not necessarily 
change the power or authority of individual police, nor do they significantly change the powers 
and rules of the institution, as compared to legislative, procedural or accountability reforms which 




on police found that professionalization reforms are popular response to crises “… when something 
goes wrong in a police department, additional training is usually at the top of the list of remedies 
proposed and undertaken.” (Skogan and Frydl 2004; 142).  Similarly, Stone and Ward argue that 
training persists as a popular strategy of police reform precisely because, “[training programs] are 
attractive both to reformers and to those who wish to resist reform” (Stone and Ward, 2000;7).  
The National Academies report found in 2004 that the existing research on additional police 
training in changing police behavior is ambiguous at best (National Academies 2004; 153).  
Training programs represent the majority of police assistance internationally, but many have 
criticized these programs for being irrelevant to the actual work of police, unconnected from larger 
reforms, or poorly planned (Bayley 2001; 2005; Marat 2013; Pino & Wiatrowski 2006; Brogden 
2005).  
Other scholars have raised the criticism that police professionalization is a western concept 
which may not be appropriate for export to the developing world or post-conflict countries.  Rachel 
Nield (2001) and Pino and Wiatrowski (2006;69) argue that the very concept of police 
professionalization: “reflects a Western approach that underscores [a belief in] non-partisan, high-
tech, information-driven policing.  The implication is that a ‘profession’ is capable of a high degree 
of self-regulation” (Nield 2001; 22). This is a fair critique of western led professionalization 
programs because they often presume that host countries have other prerequisites such as a rule of 
law, functioning courts and oversight mechanisms, non-corrupt political institutions, and a vigilant 
public.  In the absence of these components, simply raising the standard of police recruits and 
education is rarely enough to fundamentally change police behavior in the long term.  
 While these are valid critiques of the police training or equipping programs that occur in 




meaningful progress in attacking the very heart of patrimonial politics, the personnel system of 
hiring, staffing, and promotion.  This has been accomplished through providing political insulation 
of these reforms and implementing transparency and accountability mechanisms such as 
competitive testing and promotion, publishing lists of all hiring and promotional competitions, and 
by establishing police and attestation commissions.  Reform of hiring and appointment is crucial 
in countries like Ukraine with strong traditions of patrimonialism and informalism (Geddes 1996; 
Hensell 2012; Stefes 2006; Taylor 2012; Polese 2016).  Ukrainian police have a long history of 
being under the direct dependence of politicians, and personnel police has traditionally been based 
on a patrimonial logic, where personnel advance due to their informal connections and loyalty to 
patrons, rather than through merit (Friesendorf 2017 3; Taylor 2011).  Apart from an increasing 
trend towards centralization by the Yanukovych administration (Kuzio 2014) Ukrainian Presidents 
had a hard time establishing unified control over all areas of law enforcement.  This resulted in 
many instances where different law enforcement organizations found themselves in standoffs with 
other law enforcement loyal to a different political patron (Hedenskog 2010; D’Anieri). 
Patrimonial politics particularly influenced the composition of senior staff in the Militsiya, where 
many positions were created as patronage jobs and this bloated the amount of officer positions and 
non-essential law enforcement positions in the Militsiya (Friesendorf 2017; 4).   
Indeed, even previous attempts at reform through police vetting or “attestation” have often 
been used to further politicize police by pushing out opposition sources following a political 
turnover.  Serhiy Akulov writes that political changes which resulted in the appointment of a new 
Interior Minister have typically result in massive turnover of Militsiya personnel in as many 
Militsiya officers owed their jobs to a particular political patron.  This created an exodus of 




of proper planning of the human resources policy and fair competitive selection to fill the vacancies 
create favorable conditions for flamboyant protectionism, place-hunting, opportunism. (Akulov in 
DCAF; 2013; 167).   As this chapter will demonstrate, police vetting and recruitment are necessary 
steps towards reforming dysfunctional and delegitimized police organizations, but without 
effective civil society oversight these reforms can serve as trojan horses for further politicization 
and the capture of new institutions by political forces. 
Fortunately, Ukraine’s civil society watchdogs and media have actively worked to expose 
political actors ongoing battles to pack new law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies and 
courts since reform began in 2014, and they remain one of the major forces pushing against a 
patrimonial rebuilding of the police.237  Patrol Police have largely been able to break the previous 
system of political control and corruption because of these accountability mechanisms required by 
civil society and western donors with high leverage to ensure compliance with reform goals.    
Public Commissions and Police commissions  
 Central to the success of the early recruiting efforts has been the use of open commissions 
which involve members of the public in selecting police recruits.  This process was recommended 
by civil society, domestic experts, and international donors to bring a degree of transparency and 
accountability to a process that had long been dominated by patronage and informalism.  In 
conjunction with ongoing lustration and reform of most state institutions in Ukraine, commissions 
involving members of the public have participated in the hiring and vetting of judges, prosecutors, 
police and many other state agencies.  While there are a few cases of public representatives have 
participated in vetting commissions of security services (De Greiff 2007), direct public oversight 
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and involvement in police personnel screening is an extremely rare and bold step towards 
improving police professionalization.  In Ukraine, members of the public have been allocated 
representation in both new police recruitment and in vetting (re-attestation).  The Law on National 
Police, which came into effect in Fall 2015 stipulates under Chapter VI Article 51 that Police 
Commissions shall be created for the purposes of police officer recruitment and promotion. This 
legal mechanism allowed for the members of the public to participate in the decision process of 
selecting candidates for police officer.  Commission members are tasked with “selecting 
candidates to serve in the police force”, and members serve a term of no more than three years and 
commissions reach decision by majority vote. Section 2 of article 51 of the Law on National Police 
(2015) states that:  
Police commission of the Central Police Authority is composed of five members: 
1) two representatives designated by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine from outside the 
Police; 
2) one representative designated by Chief of Police; 
3) two representatives of the pubic recommended by Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for 
Human Rights from among persons with impeccable reputation, high professional and moral 
qualities commanding respect among the public. 
 
A similar formula existed for establishing police commissions which oversee all new hiring 
into the National Police.  Police Commissions at the territorial level include one representative 
from the MoI, one representative appointed by the Chief of the NPU, one representative from the 
respective territorial police force, and two representatives of the public elected by the oblast 
(region) council or Kyiv City Council. (Section 3 article 51 Law on National Police).   Personnel 
procedures was also reformed to introduce competitive tests with integrity and to eliminate 
corruption in the recruitment process.  After candidates passed a competitive skills test, medical 
test, physical test and background check, they proceeded to an interview with the Police 




commissions determine the candidate’s eligibility by interviewing candidates about their 
motivations for seeking work in the NPU, their professional experience and competencies, and by 
reviewing both public and classified documents from the NPU (Section 14 Article 51).  The 
success of Patrol Police and a transparent and effective recruitment process has given a political 
victory to activists seeking police reform, foreign donors, and elites in the political and police 
spheres which are attempting to portray themselves as reformers.   
Yevhen Krapyvyn argues public representation on police commissions is one of the most 
important reforms fought for and gained by civil society.  “Now we have heard about the 
competition for patrols, investigators, polling stations. An individual goes through all stages as 
before. The final one is an interview with the police commission. This is the real impact of civil 
society on certain personnel issues in the police.  Previously, you could only dream about this.”238    
Re-attestation of police which took place from late 2015-2016 also included a mechanism 
for public participation on commissions, however the results varied widely from city to city and 
many observers were critical of the process.  As the later section of this chapter will show, 
attestation faced a very high degree of political opposition and interference by the Interior Ministry 
and local political figures, and the regulatory basis of attestation was found in a problematic 
Interior Ministry decree which created an unstable basis. 
The use of public commissions is not a panacea for all the ills of Ukrainian policing and 
during attestation there were many documented cases of police officers with serious problems 
passing interviews with attestation commissions in 2015 and 2016. Some critics of attestation have 
noted that in certain instances vetting was used to consolidate political networks in the police and 
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that some of the officers who were purged were not the most corrupt, but rather the least connected.  
Territorial Police commissions faced significant delays in being established throughout Ukraine 
leading to personnel shortages throughout the police, and many local political figures have filled 
the seats on the commissions designated for members of the public.  The argument of this chapter 
is rather that these commissions provide a new institutional arena with both benefits and risks for 
meaningful personnel reform.  The benefits offered by public commissions are increased public 
oversight over police personnel and greater accountability to the public as police become 
dependent on the public for the success of their careers, a key component of democratic policing 
(Bayley 2001; 2005).  At the same time, these commissions providing new opportunities and 
arenas for political competition which could be used to block quality candidates or pack loyalists 
into the National Police.  As these commissions have only started to work and are not operational 
in many parts of the country, is far too early to determine the actual effect of these policies on the 
police force overall and there are no known precedents from other countries attempting a similar 
practice.  The effects of public involvement in the personnel policy will likely depend on the ability 
of civil society and reform coalitions to monitor and detect attempts at politicization and 
patrimonial staffing policies.  For example, during attestation, activists participating in the 
attestation commissions and others monitoring the commissions spoke out loudly on many 
occasions about violations in the process and were able to prevent many questionable Militsiya 
officers from re-entering the police .239  While negative press abounded during the attestation 
process, the reason that activists and journalists were able to gain such information is precisely 
because there was public oversight built into the process which allowed them to detect violations 
of the process with open information in real time.  Violations of the process abounded during 
                                                            




attestation, however the fact that civil society and other voices were able to raise these concerns 
should not be used as evidence that the process was futile or a farce, but rather the criticism should 
be understood as functioning as a “fire alarm” oversight mechanism (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984).  These fire alarms that were sounded throughout the process can, and in many cases, did 
cause the police and political leadership to readjust their approach and likely tampered some of the 
worst abuses of the personnel reform process.   
Recruitment and Selection Reforms 
 Barbara Geddes in her 1996 book “The Politician’s Dilemma” writes that while political 
leaders usually have high incentives for distributing public jobs as political spoils to their 
supporters, under certain conditions they can opt for policies that promote meritocratic rather than 
patronistic bureaucracies.  She argues that political leader’s decision on whether to pursue 
patrimonial or meritocratic civil service reform will be determined by the balance of control over 
bureaucratic organizations and whether the potential long term “collective goods” of economic 
growth and efficiency outweigh the short-term goals of political support through patronage 
(Geddes 1996).  The conditions in Ukraine during 2014-2015 including the public rejection of 
police following the Euromaidan repression, a brief period of political balance and cohesion 
following the ouster of Yanukovych and the invasion by Russia, and substantial foreign financial 
support in exchange for reforms, and the presence of foreign advisors and technocrats seem to all 
have favored bold bureaucratic reforms of police over the status quo.  Reform of the State 
Automobile Directorate “DAI”, the traffic police, became a logical starting point for reformers for 
several reasons.  First, the DAI was universally unpopular due to their aggressive solicitation of 
bribes from motorists.  Second, the DAI along with the Patrol-Post Service “PPS” were 




quickly improve the image of police and bolster the new government’s reform credentials.  A third 
reason is that reform of PPS and DAI was among the most politically feasible.  These departments, 
while still engaged in serious corruption, were less politically and economically important than 
other departments or services which had access to high sources of rent or potential use as 
administrative resources.  Certain departments within the police such as the Criminal Block or 
Investigative Police have the ability to engage in “exceptional” police behaviors such as 
surveillance of political opposition or targeting business rivals for corruption investigations 
(Taylor 2010; Levitsky and Way 2010).  Finally, replacing the PPS and DAI was logistically the 
simplest as these officers usually received the least amount of training, which was several months 
in a MoI institute “uchylyshche” rather than criminal investigators who train for four years at an 
MoI academy (Das 2005).   
Foglesong and Solomon wrote that investigators began leaving in mass during the late-
Soviet period. “Many of the more talented and experienced investigators left MVD [MoI], 
especially as the socialist economic system began to collapse and the opportunities for profitable 
employment in the private sector grew. In 1991, independent Ukraine inherited a young, 
undereducated, and relatively inexperienced corps of criminal investigators” (Foglesong and 
Solomon 2001; 60).  After Ukrainian independence, the working conditions and prestige of the 
Militsiya declined even further and salaries were rarely paid on time.  This led to an exodus 
of seasoned personnel at all levels of the police organization and the absence of a labor pool 
to replace them.  A similar phenomenon occurred in Russia during the 1990’ (Taylor 2011; 
p189).  The guiding principle in personnel policies of new recruitment and promotion prior to 
reform was patronage appointments and corruption.  Peacock and Cordner write that under 




the moment they enrolled through each step in their testing, including a negotiated fee to pass the 
entrance physical exam.” (Peacock & Cordner 2016; 81).  The dearth of applicants, poor 
conditions, and a corrupt hiring policy resulted in a labor force that was often lacking the bare 
educational requirements and had criminal backgrounds (including convictions). In addition to 
being understaffed and largely underqualified, the Ukrainian Militsiya was 92% male and had few 
female police officers outside of clerical positions (Beck, Barko and Tatarenko 2003; 549). 
 In 2014 and 2015, in an effort to boost its reform credentials, the new government by 
invited dozens of foreign experts to Ukraine to serve at some of the highest positions in the state, 
including as Minister of the Economy (a Lithuanian) Minister of Health (a Georgian, later an 
American) and Minister of Finance (an American)240.  Due to Georgia’s renowned police reform 
which began in 2004, the Government appointed Ekaterina Zguladze in December 2014 as Deputy 
Interior Minister and charged her with overseeing the reform of the Ukrainian police.  In early 
2015 Eka Zguladze announced the dissolution of the state automobile inspectorate (DAI) and the 
Patrol Militsiya (PPS) and their replacement through the establishment of the Patrol Police.  Soon, 
the Cabinet of Ministers approved a wage increase of approximately 300% for recruiting a new 
Patrol Police Department (Peacock and Cordner 2016).   
During the initial open call in late 2014 and early 2015 over 26,000 applicants were 
received throughout Ukraine to work in the new Patrol Police for the first 2,000 positions in Kyiv. 
Throughout the initial wave of Patrol Police establishment in 2015-2016, reformers from the 
National Recruitment Center boasted that there were hundreds of applicants for a single position 
in the new Patrol Police.  The Patrol Police project was heavily funded by western advisors, namely 
                                                            





the US State Department office of INL and US DOJ’s ICITAP and served the cornerstone of 
American efforts to reform Ukrainian law enforcement.  This gave the Americans and European 
donors high leverage in setting conditions and standards of how the reform should proceed.  
Western donors and Georgian technocrats, in cooperation with Ukrainian civil society, decided 
from the beginning that officer selection would be a crucial component of reform and therefore 
they designed and administered a selection process that began with a general aptitude test, medical, 
psychological (MMPI) and physical testing for all candidates (Peacock and Cordner 2016; 84).  
The recruitment and selection process for Patrol Police is centered in the National Recruitment 
Center (NRC) which facilitates the testing, investigations and interviews of Patrol Police 
applicants.  The NRC was established with substantial financial and technical support from 
ICITAP and, as such only focuses on recruiting Patrol Officers, follows its own procedures, is 
independent of other NPU hiring by NPU Human Resources, (although the NRC is still governed 
by the Law on National Police.)  For the first time ever, the recruitment process required an 
interview with a local public commission, composed of both police and civil society 
representatives.  The use of public commissions was an imperative for civil society experts as well 
as international partners and Georgian advisors and many credit these commissions for breaking 
the cycle of patronage that had long plagued police recruitment and selection.  Insulation by 
international actors also played a crucial role in protecting reforms.  Peacock and Cordner write:  
The stand-up [establishment] of the National Patrol Department was accomplished largely 
outside of the existing MIA [MoI] bureaucracy. Applications were taken online or at independent 
municipal facilities outside MIA control. Interview commissions included activists and civil 
society representatives. The selection process and training curriculum were designed and 
overseen by Georgian advisors, using staff provided with donor support. 
 (Peacock and Cordner 2016; 84) 
 This initial open call resulted in the hiring of 2,000 newly trained patrol police officers in 




due to a successful ad campaign for new recruits, and the introduction of a competitive wage of 
10,000 UAH, (USD $250) that was much higher than other wages in most of the public sector or 
police.  The first wave of new Patrol Police in Kyiv were met with wide public approval on the 
streets of the Capitol, positive international and domestic media coverage241, and a marked 
increase in public approval from 5% to 85% in Kyiv, according to the Interior Ministry’s initial 
estimates.242  Also, during the first few weeks of Patrol in Kyiv, the amount of emergency calls 
quadrupled, potentially indicating a greater willingness of Ukrainian society to rely on police to 
address their issues.243  Figure 5.2 below shows the extremely fast pace at which the major cities 
in Ukraine established Patrol Departments between July 2015 and May 2016.   
Table 5.2 Patrol Police Hiring  
City Total Patrol Officers Date of Launch 
Kyiv Total Patrol Officers: 1,973 4-Jul-15 
L’viv Total Patrol Officers:635 23-Aug-15 
Odessa Total Patrol Officers: 800 25-Aug-15 
Kharkiv Total Patrol Officers: 1,120 26-Sep-15 
Uzhgorod-Mukachevo Total Patrol Officers: 230 29-Nov-15 
Mykolaev Total Patrol Officers: 484 6-Dec-15 
Lyutsk Total Patrol Officers: 160 19-Dec-15 
Khmelnetsky Total Patrol Officers: 250 26-Dec-15 
Dnipro Total Patrol Officers: 1,100  17-Jan-16 
Ivano Frankivsk Total Patrol Officers: 200  31-Jan-16 
Kherson Total Patrol Officers: 300  8-Feb-16 
Chernigov Total Patrol Officers: 200  19-Feb-16 
Vynnytsia Total Patrol Officers: 260  22-Feb-16 
Kremenchuk Total Patrol Officers: 250  27-Feb-16 
Cherkassy Total Patrol Officers: 250  1-Mar-16 
Poltava Total Patrol Officers: 250  5-Mar-16 
Ternopil Total Patrol Officers: 200  12-Mar-16 
Zhyttomyr Total Patrol Officers: 230  22-Mar-16 
Borispol Total Patrol Officers: 180  24-Mar-16 
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Chernivtsi Total Patrol Officers: 340  27-Mar-16 
Zaporozhia Total Patrol Officers: 800  16-Apr-16 
Rivne Total Patrol Officers: 200  19-Apr-16 
Kirovograd Total Patrol Officers: 250  28-Apr-16 
Summy Total Patrol Officers: 300  12-May-16 
Slaviyansk-Kramatorsk Total Patrol Officers: 480 14-May-16 
Kryvii Rig Total Patrol Officers: 800  19-May-16 
Severodonetsk-Lisachansk Total Patrol Officers: 300  22-May-16 
Mariupol Total Patrol Officers: 480  30-May-16 
 
Of these 13,022 Patrol officers hired before June 2016, all of them adhered to the same 
standards and competitive process established by the first wave of Patrol Police in Kyiv and 
administered by the NRC.  Following the success of Patrols in Kyiv, the MoI decided to expand 
the stand up of Patrol Police departments in more cities ahead of schedule under pressure from the 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Peacock and Cordner 2016).  Peacock and Cordner note that: 
“That torrid pace, which essentially has Ukraine standing up from scratch a police department the 
size of Richmond, Virginia every week, suggests that early success brought its own challenges as 
Ukraine’s patrol police became arguably the first real institutional reform success in the country” 
(Peacock and Cordner 2016; 85)    Stop gap police recruitment, if done improperly, can easily 
result in low quality cops which are latter dismissed for corruption or abuse of force as was the 
case during the NYPD’s careless hiring practices in the 1980’s (Kane and White 2012).  
Fortunately, the standards put in place by the new law on National Police as well as the diligence 
of the NRC and oversight commissions made sure that only high-quality recruits entered the police. 
Recruitment Standards 
The 2015 law on National Police also introduced new recruitment standards in the hiring 
of all police officers.  Article 49 of the Law on National Police states that the minimum 




age, completing the physical fitness requirements stipulated by the MoI and possessing a 
“command of the Ukrainian language”.  The same article requires that all applicants must agree to 
the “Police Officer Oath” and must not be subject to “The Law on Lustration” which bans many 
people who were in leadership positions during the Yanukovych administration or during the 
Soviet Union from holding office.  In reality, the law on lustration has not been applied to the 
National Police because police underwent a separate process of attestation in 2015-2016.  Military 
service is not formally listed in the Law on National Police as a recruitment standard, but service 
time is provided for veterans of the armed forces and Article 81 of the Law on National Police 
allows veterans to maintain their special rank in the police. 
Article 61 lists the restrictions on who may not become a police officer including  
“incapacitated persons”, persons convicted of a grievous offense or any person who had criminal 
proceedings against them that were not expunged.  They further prohibit service by anyone who 
had been held administratively liable for a corruption-related offense, anyone who has renounced 
their Ukrainian citizenship or has foreign citizenship (dual citizenship is not allowed in Ukraine), 
or anyone who “misrepresents” themselves during the recruitment process.   
  The formal requirements for Chief of Police are laid out in Chapter XI Transitional 
Provisions and raised the standards for Chief of Police to a completed higher education, ten years 
of work experience and five years of supervisory experience.  In addition to the formal 
requirements laid out in the Law on National Police, many of the recruitment standards were set 
by Georgian and American advisers working on the establishment of Patrol.  These actors 
emphasized the hiring of young, physically active people with higher educations and experience 
in the private sector, particularly during the first wave of Patrol Police hiring.  They also made 




In the initial wave of Patrol Police hiring approximately one-third of hires were female, 
one-third had a legal degree and 60% had a higher education, and less than 10% had previously 
worked in the Militsiya creating the most qualified class of police in Ukraine’s history.  This 
meritocratic system helped to produce the first generation of Patrol Police which were able to gain 
a high amount of trust from the Ukrainian public.  This first wave of 13,000 police officers was 
the first generation of police to have gone through a merit-based recruitment and training process.  
During late 2016 There was supplemental hiring of approximately 1,500 Patrol Police for Kyiv, 
Odesa, Kharkiv and Dnipro to supplement the local forces. 
 In June, 2017 The NPU has declared a second wave of hiring 4,500 new Patrol Police 
officers through the NRC before the end of 2017 and the Chief of NPU, Serhiy Knyazev declared 
that a new highway Patrol Division would start working in fall of 2017 with approximately 800-
900 officers, many of them new recruits to come from the 2017 wave.244  The 2017 Hiring was 
done in regional centers of Ukraine in the cities of Dnipro, Zaporozhe, Kyiv, Krivvi Rih, Odesa, 
Rivne, and Kharkov.  Recruiters noted that the applicant pool for the second major wave of Patrol 
Police hiring was smaller than the first open call because of a decrease in public enthusiasm about 
police reform and because of issues of police pay and extensive working hours that led to a fair 
amount of attrition in the first Patrol wave.  This undoubtedly had some effect on the decrease of 
female Patrol Police candidates hired which decreased to 22% in the 2017 cohort but was still an 
improvement from the former institutions of DAI and PPS which had virtually no female officers.    
Despite a decrease in applicants, the 2017 police recruitment stats reveal that of 4,500 police 
officers hired, 73% had a higher education, approximately 20% had previously worked in the MoI 
(whether Militia, National Guard or State Migration Service), and 8% were veterans of Ukraine’s 
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current conflict (ATO Veterans).  Heavy female recruitment has also been essential to the success 
of Patrol Police.  Women outnumber men in Ukraine but have historically constituted less than 
10% of the police force (Beck Barko Tatarenko 2002).  Female officers are thought to be better at 
dealing with victims than male officers and some evidence suggests that they may be less prone to 
corruption.  A recent police reform in Mexico replaced the Traffic Police with a nearly total female 
workforce in an attempt to reduce the practice of taking bribes from motorists.245  Through a 
widely publicized recruitment campaign and a competitive and transparent hiring process 
Ukraine’s Patrol Police in less than 3 years managed to hire 18,000 new police officers to serve as 
the core of a new police organization.  These officers have proven adept at gaining the trust and 
confidence of the Ukrainian public because of high quality recruitment and selection procedures 
demanded by international funders and supervised and enforced by Ukrainian civil society and 
media.  Plans were announced in late 2017 for the hiring of an additional 3,000 Patrol Police in 
2018, but sources inside the National Police as well as reports from local police commissions note 
that it has become much more difficult to recruit qualified candidates in 2018.  They note that 
while there were often times hundreds of applicants for a single position in Patrol Police in 2015 
and 2016, there are now often fewer than ten and recruiters and local police commissions feel like 
they have a lack of qualified candidates.  This has resulted in a decrease in hiring plans.  The same 
sources argue that low wages and long hours, high attrition, and negative press about Patrol Police 
has made the recruitment much more difficult than before. 
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Other NPU Hiring 
 The hiring of other departments within the NPU such as investigators or neighborhood 
inspectors (Dilnichi) is conducted by the main HR department of the National Police of Ukraine 
and has also hired thousands more police since the end of Attestation in Fall 2016.  The ongoing 
hiring of other police such as neighborhood police and investigators has been less successful in 
attracting new recruits and does not receive funding or oversight from western donors.  Whereas 
the Patrol Police recruitment ant testing is done by the National Recruitment Center, the hiring of 
other police goes through the main Human Resources department of the NPU, though these 
officers are still required to interview in front of Police Commissions.  The training of the police 
hired by the NPU HR is still conducted by the Ministry of Interior at either police institutes or 
Ministry of Interior Four-year Universities.  Recruiting investigators has been particularly difficult 
because the position requires a higher legal education which limits the candidate pool.  Ukraine 
offers a terminal undergraduate legal education of four years, and subsequently has many more 
lawyers than most other countries, however, law graduates are often dissuaded from service in the 
police by low salaries (often less than 8,000 per month) and prestige.  The Ministry of Interior 
even has a difficult time recruiting its alumni who earn their legal degrees at MoI universities for 
service in the police.  District inspectors (Dilnichi) have also been difficult to recruit as they earn 
wages of 6,000-8000 UAH246 per month and limited promotional opportunities.    
 While Patrol Police were hiring thousands of new recruits during 2015 and 2016 the rest 
of the police were undergoing vetting (re-attestation).  All non-patrol hiring was suspended during 
attestation because it was unclear how many vacancies would be created by attestation as officers 
                                                            





from the Militsiya were vetted for admittance into the National Police.  Attestation only concluded 
in Summer of 2016 and had fired nearly 6,000 police and thousands more had resigned, and the 
process took much longer than initially expected.  According to the Interior Minister this created 
shortages of up to 40% of police throughout Ukraine and exacerbated the issue of high caseloads 
for police investigators.    There was much less interest in police careers outside of patrol between 
the end of attestation and March 2017 only 861 neighborhood officers and investigators were hired 
in 13 Oblasts.  In February of 2017 Avakov announced that for 3,500 vacancies there were over 
18,000 applicants, but many of them failed to fill their vacancies.247  The website of the NPU listed 
closed competitions for over 6,300 vacancies for district officers, inspectors, and operatives 
throughout Ukraine during 2017, although however many of these failed to fill their slots248.  For 
example, an open contest for 100 investigators in Kyiv during January 2017 produced only 39 
finalists.249  One way that this deficit has been addressed is by internal transfer by which Patrol 
Police officers are transferred to work in other areas of the police such as neighborhood inspector, 
operative, and police investigator (for those holding a legal degree).   
 Despite the challenges in recruitment, there are several positive reforms in non-Patrol 
hiring.  First, the Law on National Police (requires there to be open calls and published results of 
competitions, such as those cited above, which mean that the positions are awarded on meritocratic 
objective criteria.  This can go a long way towards breaking power verticals within the police.  A 
second area of improvement is the use of police commissions which administer police 
competitions for new hires.  Police commissions are comprised of appointees from the MoI, the 
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National Police (both central and local), and members of the public appointed by either the or the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Council (for the Central Police Commission) or the Oblast Council 
or City Council (for territorial Police Commissions) (Law on National Police Article 51).  Public 
representation on police councils allows for a check on the Interior Ministry and NPU’s influence 
on the selection and recruitment process, and the same law requires that Oblast or City Councils 
to select public representatives from “persons with impeccable reputation, high professional and 
moral qualities commanding respect among the public.” (Law on National Police, Article 51; 
section 2).  While these could be any members of the public, in many cases they are members of 
local politicians.  For example, in Kyiv, two heads of the Kyiv regional council, Viktor Svitovenko 
and Ivan Stupak were appointed to the Kyiv regional police commission as the public 
representatives.  Yuri Sirotiuk, the head of the Svoboda faction in Kyiv city council, wrote in 
January 2017 that the police had attempted to use attestation commissions rather than police 
commissions for personnel transfers and promotions, in violation of the Law on the National Police 
Article 51.250  He further complained that the Kyiv regional police commission had attempted to 
begin its work and name a chairman and secretary before it had actually appointed the two requisite 
members of the public.251  The central police commission which will handle all of the hiring for 
the central apparatus (apparat) has still not been established more than two years after the Law on 
National Police came into effect.  Oleksandr Banchuk, a well-respected human rights expert and 
the head of Center for Economic and Political Reforms was elected by the Parliamentary Human 
Rights Commissioner, Valerina Lustkova.  Banchuk noted that he was expelled from the 
committee without reason and that the National Police and MoI are attempting to find ways of 
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hiring and promoting police by circumventing the police commission.252  At their best, the 
commissions can provide an unprecedented level of public oversight over police which makes 
police officers truly accountable to communities and reduces political influence on police.  
Another possible scenario is that police commissions, like other selection commissions in Ukraine, 
become another arena for political competition.  A study of Police Commissions published by the 
UMDPL in July 2018 found that while police commissions were increasing public oversight of the 
police, nearly 60% of the “public” appointees were political figures including members of regional 
(oblast) and city council (Banchuk and Krapyvin 2018).  The report was unable to find overt 
evidence of political interference in the activities of police commissions but warned that public 
seats should be reserved for independent members of the public so as to prevent the possibility for 
political influence on police hiring.  In cases where local political power is opposed to MoI power 
this can create a balance of powers between the two, by giving police commission members 
nominated by the public veto power over MoI patrons.  In regions in which local political power 
is connected with Interior Ministry power we can expect to see quicker hiring, but much more 
politically dependent police organizations. 
Organization and Management 
 This section focuses on organization and management with a focus on attestation, 
promotion and appointment, and attempts to create a new management corps and the establishment 
of the Holosiivsky district model police project.   Issues of police discipline are covered in the 
following chapter, (Chapter 6: police accountability reforms).  
                                                            






 One of the most important organizational reform in Ukraine was the vetting of 
approximately 70,000 former militia officers through the process of re-attestation or vetting.  The 
process of re-attestation required each former militia officer to pass a competitive subject matter 
exam (typically on police legislation and duties), submit a financial declaration of their assets, and 
interview before a commission composed of representatives from civil society, the National Police, 
and the MOI.253  The use of representatives from civil society, which included activists, academics, 
legal experts, and other private citizens, represents a major effort towards creating a more 
accountable and transparent reform process Many critics argued that the re-attestation process 
suffered from political influence in the commissions, and that many of the officers were reinstated 
by appeals commissions or through paying bribes to judges or that the decisions of the 
commissions were simply ignored.  Nevertheless, the process of attestation saw 6,000 officers 
dismissed including 27% of top-level management, despite various institutional design problems, 
corruption, and attempts at political sabotage.  The number of officers reinstated is unclear as the 
information has not been published by either the NPU or MoI.  
Vetting of personnel is always complicated and is highly contingent on political events 
including regime change and upheaval.  In the United States because of political stability police 
vetting has been relatively tempered with the exception of the infamous Mollen and Knapp 
commissions in the NYPD, which culled less than 3% of officers after the revelation of wide scale 
corruption and several scandals (Fyfe, 2006; Kutnjak-Ivkovic 2012).  A recent attempt at police 
vetting in Mexico which required police to pass subject tests, background checks and polygraphs 
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saw a majority of police failing yet retaining their jobs in the police force, including the police 
involved in the 2014  massacre of 43 students in Guerrero state which received international 
coverage.254 255  Purging police is difficult for many reasons including restrictions and regulations 
under civil service law, police organization and police union intransigence, insufficient staffing of 
police, and high crime.  David Bayley notes that in addition to these issues, police vetting during 
or following armed conflict is particularly susceptible to accusations of being politically charged 
and partial or favouring one group over another as in El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala (Bayley 
2005; 55).  Following armed conflicts, jobs in police are often a political spoil as in the case of 
Kosovo where over 55% of police officers were former Kosovo Liberation Army combatants 
(Bayley 2005; 57).  Police personnel policy as a part of enhancing accountability is even more 
complicated in countries with strong authoritarian legacies, hybrid regimes, pervasive corruption 
networks, and weak rule of law.  What makes the case of Ukraine’s police personnel policy unique 
is that it has allowed civil society a substantial role in determining the cadre and culture of police 
organizations by selecting and vetting individual officers to serve in the National Police of 
Ukraine. Large scale vetting of police is also associated with transitions from authoritarianism 
(Bayley 2005; De Grieff 2007).  Transitional justice takes different forms, but in many post-
communist countries transitional justice has been referred to as lustration and typically involves a 
ban on individuals who served in the communist party, former state security services, or 
communist party organizations such as KOMSOMOL.  These campaigns often focus on 
intelligence, state security, political and bureaucratic spheres rather than police (Czarnota 2007; 
152).  Zetocha (2014) notes that following most regime changes the emerging regime seeks to 
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reform and consolidate their control over the new security services, both to reap political benefits 
from dismantling institutions associated with the former repressive regime and to ensure the 
stability of their security forces.  He argues that the extent to which new regimes are able to shape 
security institutions depends on the nature of the previous regime, the nature of the transition, and 
the availability of skilled and specialized personnel with sufficient capacity and skills to replace 
those purged, and the presence of security threats (Zetocha 2014).  The regime of Victor 
Yanukovych was becoming increasingly authoritarian and consolidated and had been described as 
“sultanistic” as early as 2012 by Ukraine scholars (Kuzio 2012, Kudelia 2012).  The 2015 
Ukrainian “Law on Lustration” bars individuals who served more than one year in the Yanukovych 
administration or who worked in the state administration during the Soviet Period (Civic Lustration 
Committee 2016).  The larger process of public lustration has encountered much resistance, but 
police lustration was handled separately though the process of “re-attestation”.   
 Re-attestation in Ukraine has two legal foundations that govern the process.  The first is 
Interior Ministry Decree №1465 passed on November 18th, 2015.  This document details the 
regulations and procedure of re-attestation including who will be subject to re-attestation, the 
creation of commissions, and their competence and powers.  Re-attestation is also mentioned in 
the Law on National Police which was passed in 2015.  Article 57 of the Law on National Police 
states that: “Assessment of police officers is held to evaluate their general proficiency, professional 
competency, personal qualities, academic level, physical fitness and career prospects based on an 
in-depth and comprehensive review.”  Article 57 of the Law on National Police also stipulates that 
attestation commissions are set up by police chiefs and assessment of police officers is required in 
the event of promotion, demotion, or dismissal of officers.  Re-attestation consisted of several 




The Militsiya officers taking the exam need a score of over 70% on subject matter tests to pass to 
the next round and many police failed this testing.  Former Militsiya officers were then required 
to submit a financial disclosure form listing any assets owned by themselves or their family.  Each 
candidate then was interviewed by a re-attestation commission which reviewed their financial 
disclosure, disciplinary and internal personnel records (when provided by internal affairs -DVB).  
Commissions then interviewed the individual, on average for less than 15 minutes, about their past 
work history including any incidents, discipline or complaints, their understanding of police work, 
and their motivations for wanting to work in the new National Police.  Because commissions often 
lacked the necessary background files on individual Militsiya officers, they would often improvise 
extemporaneous methods for quickly learning about the candidate through google searches and 
social media. If commission members found discrepancies or inconsistencies in their 
documentation or testimony they could recommend the individual to submit to a polygraph test 
which in many cases revealed lies and other undisclosed issues.  One attestation observer stated 
that in Mykolaiv several police officers admitted to serious offenses during their polygraph exams, 
ranging from accepting bribes and planting evidence to the torture of suspects.  Polygraphs in other 
cities also revealed serious crimes (Peacock 2016).  Commissions voted by simple majority 
whether to dismiss, promote, demote, or reinstate the officer in the same position.  Officers were 
able to appeal their dismissal or demotion through the attestation appeals commission which 
occurred in regions and also in Kyiv.    
Re-attestation began in December 2015 in Kyiv city and Kyiv Oblast where approximately 
11,000 police were re-attested.  In Kyiv city, of 7,028 police officers attested 771 were dismissed 




individuals256). Re-attestation commission members were originally selected by the National 
Recruiting Center of the National Police of Ukraine, an independent organization set up to handle 
recruitment for the NPU HR Department with the assistance of the US Embassy and ICITAP.  The 
NRC with the approval of the Chief of National Police Khatia Dekanoidze originally selected the 
re-attestation committee members from activist and professional networks, many of which were 
human rights monitors.  Re-attestation commissions were generally between 5-8 members and 
attempted to balance members from the MoI or NPU with civil society representatives, but did not 
require strict parody or formulas for representation like police commissions.  According to NRC 
staff and re-attestation commission volunteers, there were many logistical and administrative 
problems in the early days of attestation including difficulties in finding and identifying police 
officers, high turnover on the commissions due to volunteer attrition (volunteers worked from 
9AM to dusk 6 days a week without pay), and difficulty in getting the necessary documents needed 
to review the officer’s candidacy.  This information included the officers disciplinary and 
personnel files, financial disclosure form, or information from an anonymous complaint system 
set up to register public complaints about individual officers.  Many re-attestation commission 
members expressed that many times they had to make a ruling on an individual officer with little 
to know information and interviews with officers lasted on average fifteen minutes.  Civil society 
commission members quickly found a way to supplement the information (or lack of information) 
provided to the commission and began researching candidates through social media and internet 
searches on their smartphones and computers.  In many cases these informal and on the spot 
searches by public commission members resulted in the discovery of discrepancies in the 
candidate’s statements.  In several cases, candidates who disclosed no assets was found with many 
                                                            





pictures of cars, expensive jewelry, and other unexplainable assets on their social media profile.  
Other individual’s social media profiles disclosed support for separatist activity that also caused 
the re-attestation commission to rule against them.  Staff and volunteers involved in the process of 
re-attestation speak of attestation happening in two different stages.  The first wave included Kyiv 
city and Kyiv Oblast, Khmelnitsky, Rivne, Volyn, Odesa and Mykolaiv.  This first wave, despite 
initial logistical complications, was generally regarded as independent and free of corruption by 
activists and observers of the process and led to a fairly large amount of former Militsiya officers 
being dismissed.  After Mykolaiv where 382 of 2,032 police officers were dismissed including 
45% of senior management in March of 2016, the Interior Ministry called for a temporary halt in 
re-attestation pending review. 
Phase II: Changes after Mykolaiv 
Before Mykolaiv, re-attestation was done by region and all tiers of police, (senior 
management, middle management, and street level police) was reviewed by the same 
commissions, one region or city at a time. According to the Law on the National Police, the head 
of the oblast police picks commission members along with the HR department from NPU, MoI 
advisor, and with technical advice from ICITAP.  After March re-attestation was conducted by tier 
and according to several sources involved in the process the police and MoI changed their 
representatives on the re-attestation commissions to more senior people who had more influence 
on the commissions after a high amount of police were dismissed in the first six cities.257  In 
addition to a concerted effort by the MoI and political forces to influence the composition of 
committees, activists also admit that the presence of independent and legitimate NGO’s was also 
                                                            





scarce outside of major cities and admit that civil society is generally weaker in the regions.  
NGO’s with strong business or political affiliations, known in Ukraine as “pocket NGO’s” have 
proliferated in recent years according to experts (Minakov 2015).    Activists involved in attestation 
claim that there was a concerted effort to marginalize independent civil society members and to 
pick commission members who would be dependent on local or national political and economic 
powers.258  The procedure for being accepted as civil society representative for the re-attestation 
commissions required individuals to receive a letter stating their membership in an NGO and to 
gain approval of the territorial police chief.  In some regions activists claim that civil society 
commission members had family or business ties to police unions or police organizations. In 
Zhytomyr, Igor Fadeev, (Nickname “Moscow”) a former organized crime figure notorious for 
racketeering and violence during the 1990s appeared as a representative on an attestation 
commission as a representative of the public.259  After the change in civil society committee 
member selection after March 2016, the number of officers dismissed began to drop substantially, 
even in major cities with strong civil society such as Kharkiv (4.7%) and Lviv (4.6%).  
Final Results and Criticism 
 In October of 2016 re-attestation finally concluded and of 63,135 officers who were subject 
to re-attestation, 5,256 or 7.7% of former militia officers were dismissed260.  While 14% of 
individuals failed attestation, 4,766 were demoted, and 25% of top leadership was replaced.  
Sources in the NPU and MoI claim that many thousands more police officers have either resigned 
or were dismissed before or outside of the process of re-attestation but no firm numbers exist to 
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verify this claim.  Re-attestation was subject to criticism from several angles including police who 
challenged the legal foundation and procedural fairness of re-attestation, members of the human 
rights community and NGOs who thought re-attestation didn’t go far enough, and international 
donors.  Many civil society re-attestation committee members also resigned after the rule change 
in March, claiming that re-attestation was a farce after Mykolaiv and that political influence and 
corruption was rampant in re-attestation.  Activists from “Narodni Tyl” (people’s front) and Auto-
Maidan resigned in protest from the re-attestation commissions in June 2016, arguing that the 
introduction of more MoI officials was resulting in commissions that lacked independence, were 
dismissing very few officers, and that many were being reinstated by the courts.  In June of 2016 
One activist from Automaidan was told the Kyiv Post: “We believe the new mechanism of vetting 
has destroyed the main criterion of its success – its independence from the old police system,”261 
In order to investigate these claims of political dependence of attestation commissions, the 
author of this dissertation conducted an original survey of 152 civil society NGO commission 
members (out of a total of approximately 400 recorded commission volunteers) in September 2016 
to ask them about their experiences serving on re-attestation commissions.  On average over half 
of public commission members thought that the number of police that should have been dismissed 
through attestation should have been over 30%, compared to the 7.7% of officers actually 
dismissed.  Nevertheless, 59% of public re-attestation commission members thought that the NPU 
commission members were fair and honest in their conduct on the commissions. Surprisingly, 
when asked about the conduct of other civil society commission members the percentage of survey 
respondents that thought that their behavior was fair and honest dropped to 45%, indicating that 
                                                            






serious distrust existed between various representatives of civil society on the re-attestation 
commissions.  The results of the survey found that over 60% of survey respondents though that 
the process of re-attestation has greatly (12.95%) or somewhat (47.48%) improved the overall 
professionalism of police in Ukraine, as opposed to only 20.14% of commission members who 
thought that attestation had no impact (ICITAP 2016).  Respondents were asked on a sliding scale 
from 1-5 whether they would be willing to go through a similar process of vetting themselves, and 
the average response was 4 out of 5 indicating that a majority of the sample had more faith in the 
integrity and fairness of the process.  When asked about their trust in the NPU, nearly 56% of 
public re-re-attestation commission members said that they trusted the police.  2.86 percent of 
respondents said that they “fully trust” the police while 52.86% reported that they “tend to trust” 
the police, compared to the national average of 46% from a May 2016 National Survey (KIIS 
2016).  These figures may indicate that attestation commission public representatives, on average, 
have more trust in police than the general public in Ukraine after participating in the process of 
vetting. 
This survey which covers approximately one third of the total population of civil society 
representatives who served on re-attestation commissions, indicates that while most commission 
thought that the number of officers dismissed should have been higher, they rated the process as 
fair.  Many members of the commission also confessed to the author that although they know that 
although many militsiya officers before their commissions were guilty of corruption and other 
malfeasance continue to work in the National Police of Ukraine, the paucity of materials, the time 
constraints, and the burden of individually reviewing nearly 70,000 police officers caused many 
to appreciate the complexities of a massive police vetting campaign and to temper their 




police and were aware of widespread corruption and malfeasance, they could not bring themselves 
to punish individual officers without evidence.  While commission members did concede that there 
were instances where others on the commission, either representatives of the MoI or NPU or 
representatives of “pocket NGOs” did conspire to keep an officer, even in light of evidence of 
transgression or gross incompetence, the results of the survey indicate that the problems of re-
attestation, as understood by the volunteers who contributed countless hours of their time was 
essentially a logistical and legal problem. 
While both recruitment and re-attestation appeared to similar mechanisms, (namely, 
commissions comprised of members of the public and police or MoI representatives), they had 
different legal and procedural foundations which produced different dynamics in their respective 
processes.  The rules and procedures for recruitment were clearly defined and outlined in the Law 
on National Police.  Recruitment of the first wave of approximately 2,000 Patrol Police began in 
early 2015, over half a year before the passage of the Law on National.  Despite the initial absence 
of a firm legislative mandate, the process was transparent and rigorous in its standards for 
selection, testing and training candidates for the Patrol Police and was outlined, conducted with 
substantial support from international donors (mainly ICITAP) and oversight from civil society.  
The major actors in this beginning of recruitment were ICITAP and reformers from Georgia in the 
newly created NPU who had a higher degree of autonomy from the MoI in their operations.  During 
re-attestation, however, Georgian technocrats and international programs became the junior 
partner as the MoI exerted a high degree of control over the inputs, including how much 
information to release about officers who were subject to re-attestation, and over outcomes, 




 A key distinction between police recruitment commissions and re-attestation commissions 
was also the form of selection of commission members.  Both recruitment commissions and re-
attestation commissions allowed for civil society representation on their commissions, but the 
criteria for selection were different.  The Law on National Police Article 51 section III clearly 
states that police recruitment commissions consist of: “two representatives of the pubic 
recommended by Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights from among persons 
with impeccable reputation, high professional and moral qualities commanding respect among the 
public.” Civil society representatives on territorial police commissions are selected by the 
respective oblast (regional) council.  Representatives of civil society on Re-attestation commission 
did not have a fixed number on the commissions, were approved by the local or national chief of 
police as opposed to the Parliament Commission for Human Rights or local government.  Through 
the National Recruitment Center, foreign and local representatives without connections to the 
police were involved in both recruitment commissions and re-attestation commissions, however 
after the rule change following Mykolaiv in March 2016, the MoI took on a much greater role in 
deciding who would serve on the commissions. 
 Among the critiques by those who thought that re-attestation did not do enough to purge 
former Militsiya officers was the charge that MoI officials who prepared the decree for re-
attestation (1465) and the Law on National Police built in ambiguity to allow dismissed officers to 
appeal.  In particular, UMDPL, a Ukrainian human rights organization argues that section 4 item 
16 of MoI decree 1465, which stipulates the assessment criteria for decision making on individual 
officers incorrectly includes performance reviews written by the officer’s superior.  UMDPL 
argues that since these performance reviews were nearly universally positive and a rubber stamp, 




of dismissed officers to successfully appeal their termination in court with a high chance of 
reinstatement (UMDPL 2016).  Oleksandr Banchuk of CEPR also noted that time constraints in 
the Law on National Police allowed many police officers to be reinstated through the courts, as 
they argued that attestation was supposed to be formally concluded within three months of the 
passage of the Law on National Police.262  The prospects for public oversight of was much more 
complicated for re-attestation than recruitment.  Since the recruitment of new Patrol Officers 
followed civil service law, the names of all candidates hired were published to ensure the 
competitiveness and transparency of the process.  In contrast, the MoI and NPU refused to publish 
the names and total number of officers purged through re-attestation, citing legal (civil service) 
and individual privacy concerns.  This made it difficult for activists and monitors to confirm 
whether officers recommended for dismissal by the commission were actually dismissed, or 
whether they were transferred to another department or reinstated by the courts.  Furthermore, 
many officers that would be subject to attestation were transferred to other divisions of the National 
Police such as the Protection Police (the private guard service), Transport Police, or other areas 
that would not be vetted.  The National Police of Ukraine did publish the final figures for re-
attestation in October 2016, however due to the numerous accounts of officers being retained or 
reinstated despite dismissal by re-attestation commissions, and the absence of information on the 
fate of individual officers, even these figures were viewed sceptically by experts and the public263.  
While difficult to measure or document, political pressures undoubtedly played a role in 
complicating the process of attestation.  In an interview shortly after her resignation in November 
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2016, Khatia Dekanoidze acknowledged interference by the presidential administration in the 
personnel policy and also commented on some of the challenges of attestation: 
We are often criticized for not firing by everyone, while the other half reproaches us for 
dismissing professional staff ... But there were several reasons that hampered the staff 
renewal.  One of them was the formation of police commissions, which are responsible for 
personnel selection, and which did not work for a long time. The reality is that they included not 
only the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also representatives of the regional 
administrations, local councils and so on, but they were not yet ready because of local elections, 
[also] local politicians interfered and so on. As a result, we established police commissions only 
at the end of August.264 
 
 While the end results of attestation may not have been satisfying to either police or the 
public, there is the argument that the process, while flawed, was a necessary and crucial step 
towards creating a legitimate police force.  Others have suggested that while attestation may have 
given indirect amnesty to many police for crimes committed before, pulling officers before public 
commissions represents a watershed in accountability, a sign to police that from now on they are 
going to be held accountable to the public.  The process of police vetting in Ukraine offered 
valuable lessons about the prospects for transitional justice in a highly patrimonial institution.  The 
inclusion of civil society in the vetting also offers valuable insights about both the valuable role 
and the limitations of civil society’s role in this process.  Most importantly the institutionalization 
of the process of public participation and oversight in police personnel policies represents a new 
form of control for Ukrainian society in which they can advocate for meritocratic reform in the 
National Police  
Promotion, Management and Organizational Reforms 
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 Police supervisors, particularly mid-line supervisors, have an important effect on the 
attitudes and job performance of their subordinates.  The decision of who to promote to leadership 
within a police organization is critical to determining the character of a police department.  Survey 
data from a study of the Ukrainian Militia has found that police often times have strained 
relationships with their supervisors because of supervisor incompetence, rigidness and informality, 
authoritarian discipline styles, and gender insensitivity (Beck et al. 2004).  Maki Haberfeld notes 
that political and budgetary pressures as well as time constraints often cause police organizations 
to hastily conduct recruitment and selection, so they must compensate with better training 
supervision and discipline (Haberfeld 2012; 8).  This requires scaffolding reforms that create 
changes in the middle and upper levels of leadership in a police organization to create a better 
leadership cadre.  While the appointment of the Georgian police technocrats to some the highest 
leadership roles in 2015, and later the selection of the Chief of Police and other leadership posts 
through public commission aims toward this goal, there was a serious need in the National Police 
of Ukraine to create a professional and reform-minded cadre of middle level police management 
and leadership at the regional level that can further organizational reform.  At the same time, 
personnel deficits and the political connections of police leadership made establishing a new 
leadership much more challenging than new hiring.  Due to personnel limitations and the relative 
inexperience of new police at the line-officer level, the creation of this new mid-level police 
management will necessarily come from a combination of newer police recruits as well as former 
Militia officers through a combination of careful selection and leadership training.   
 Implementing a meritocratic system of career advancement in an organization long plagued 
by patronistic personnel decisions is a very challenging task in the post-Soviet sphere (Taylor 




around the world.  Breaking extensive political influence over police leadership and promotion, 
while maintaining accountability of police to elected officials is a balancing act.  
Promotion and Leadership Selection  
 One of the areas of police reform which best exemplifies the political competition over control of 
police is promotion and leadership appointment powers.  For obvious reasons, political elites both 
national and local seek to build networks of loyalists in police, the procuracy and courts.  There 
are several mechanisms by which police leadership is selected and police officers are promoted in 
the National Police of Ukraine. According to the 2015 Law on National Police, all promotions 
within the police which require a competition are subject to review by police commissions as 
stipulated in Article 51. To date police commissions have only been used for new police 
recruitment and have not exercised oversight over internal promotions.   
A second process is through ongoing attestation, which allows for a lower level of public 
oversight as membership on commissions is determined by the Interior Ministry. Most of the 
attention given to the attestation process focused on the number of former Militia officers 
dismissed, the final results of the Ukrainian police attestation process indicate that 4,766 police 
were demoted from their position and 4,479 police officers were promoted during the process265.  
In conjunction to the thousands of officers that did not pass attestation, the combination of 
promoting and demoting over 9,000 officers has undoubtedly had some effect on breaking power 
verticals and clientelist networks in the police organization.  Yuri Sirotyuk, a member of Kyiv City 
Council from the Svoboda faction argues that the attestation commissions are not allowed to 
promote as promotion and hiring of new police is the exclusive purvey of the police commissions, 
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and that these promotions conducted by attestation commissions before the establishment of police 
commissions are illegal.266 
 Also, there are promotions made by “police assessment” (Article 67) which require 
promotions be approved through assessment commissions established by Chiefs of Police.  The 
standards for promotion are based on articles 81 and 82 of the Law on National Police.  In addition 
to educational requirements for all ranks above private, there are service length requirements 
(called “time in grade”) which regulate which ranks can be attained.  The following list is the 
minimum service requirement for several special ranks.  Under article 84 there is also an 
accelerated promotion in half the time in grade at the discretion of a commander. 
Police Corporal – 1 year; 
Police Sergeant – 3 years; 
Police Junior Lieutenant – 1 year; 
Police Lieutenant – 2 years; 
Police Senior Lieutenant – 3 years; 
Police Captain – 4 years; 
Police Major – 4 years; 
Police Lieutenant Colonel – 5 years. 
 
 In addition to these methods, there was an attempt to develop a new generation of police 
commanders called “Knights of Honor” «рыцарей чести» which former Chief Khatia 
Dekanoidze started in late 2015 with help from ICITAP, Agriteam, MP Mustafa Nayyem, and the 
staff of the Kiev School of Economics.267   Police officers from all over Ukraine were selected for 
the program by the attestation commissions, screened using polygraphs and the MIDOT integrity 
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test, and personally interviewed with Dekanoidze and ICITAP personnel.  The goal was to create 
a “golden reserve” from Patrol Police, investigators, and operators which would serve as the cadre 
of future police leadership in order to break institutional practices and power verticals through 
developing new managers.268   The program provided training in management techniques, decision 
making, and analysis through a training program that ran several weeks at the Kyiv School of 
Economics.   Nearly thirty officers completed the program in February 2016 following training in 
Kyiv by academics, managers, and international instructors.  According to an ICITAP source, the 
commissions often had difficulty in finding former Militsiya officers that had clean records and 
were interested in serving in management.  The committees were unable to nominate a single 
officer from the Odesa region.  Many of the program graduates refused their new assignments in 
internal affairs (DVB) and only one third went into senior management.  The prospects of a second 
wave of Knights of Honor died when Dekanoidze resigned as Chief of Police in November 2016. 
 In contrast to the rest of the National Police which had a bloated leadership, Patrol Police 
consisted of over 90% new personnel, the leadership and management corps had to be built from 
scratch.  Many Patrol Police officers were transferred to become middle management in other 
cities after only months of service.  Certain talented leaders have been selected for leadership 
positions from early in their career due to their aptitude showed in training and performance.  For 
example, Yuri Zozulya who was hired as a Patrol Officer in summer 2015 in the first wave of Kyiv 
Patrol, then was made Chief of Patrol in L’viv by fall 2015 and later Chief of Patrol in Kyiv by 
January 2016.269  The desire to quickly develop a new generation of leaders in Patrol Police led to 
many cases of recently hired and relatively inexperienced police officers being quickly promoted 
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and transferred to various cities throughout Ukraine.  Many countries have institutional 
requirements in their police forces that commanders and police officers are rotated regularly every 
few years, such as India.  This policy of personnel transfer to various regions in a country has the 
benefit of redirecting talent to where it is most needed and preventing the formation of unhealthy 
relationships between police and local figures or criminals.  However, the tradeoff of this program 
is that it can mean that police do not develop strong relationships with and ties to the communities 
which they are entrusted to serve.  While the recruitment of Patrol Police has occurred locally, 
since the NPU is a centralized police institution, commanders can come from any part of Ukraine 
and are posted based on the needs of the local command. 
 A final component affecting police personnel policy at all levels in Ukraine is the ongoing 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO).  Patrol Police are not directly 
involved in fighting the war, but there are a fair number of veterans, approximately 8% any of the 
in the Patrol Police.  Much of the upper leadership of the National Police of Ukraine are veterans 
of the ATO including Chief of Patrol Police Oleksandr Fatsevich, and former Chief of Criminal 
Police Vadim Troyan. Some sources within the police have suggested that the leadership has 
attempted to implement a policy of “penance” (ochyschennie) by which former Militia officers can 
redeem themselves through serving in the ATO, however no data exists to determine how common 
this practice is or what percentage of officers in the entire NPU have been mobilized.  Collectively 
the effects of deliberate personnel policies such as new recruitment and selection, training, 
leadership development, attestation, and the indirect effects of the conflict have undoubtedly 




 Leadership Selection 
 Despite the real efforts made to depoliticize police personnel policy at the lower levels, 
political interference in selection of police management at the higher levels remains.  This is 
because the selection of police leadership, particularly territorial police Chiefs, is decided by the 
Chief of Police, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the President.  This combination over the 
appointment power of local police leadership creates major political competition over control of 
local police.  Former Chief Dekanoidze complained that both Interior Minister Avakov and the 
Presidential administration interfered on numerous occasions in her attempts to appoint or dismiss 
regional chiefs.  The 2015 Law on National Police formally grants the NPU independence from 
the Interior Ministry, but in fact preserves MoI oversight into the appointment of regional chiefs 
and central leadership of the NPU.  Article 21 of the law says that Deputy Chiefs of Police (of 
which Ukraine has six), are appointed and removed from office by the Minister of Internal Affairs 
of Ukraine upon the recommendation of Chief of Police.   Article 15 section 6 of the law states 
that “Chiefs of territorial police forces are appointed and removed from office by Chief of Police 
upon consultation with the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.”   Similarly, article Article 81 
of the law says that the President can award police officers special rank and appointment to local 
territorial chief.   
This gives both the President and the MoI significant leverage in both proposing and approving 
candidates for the central and regional leadership of the NPU.  This has resulted many Avakov 
loyalists such as Vadim Troyan and Ilya Kiva serving in top positions in the NPU.  Another 
example is the appointment of Kyiv Chief Kryschenko, another Kharkov native, who is thought to 
have close ties to Avakov.  Many have speculated that current National Police Chief Serhiy 




selected by a transparent and independent commission including foreigners.270271  Dekanoidze 
claimed that the Presidential Administration interfered in personnel policy on several occasions 
272  She stated that the Presidential Administration forced her to accept Anton Shevtsov as head of 
police in Vinnitsa region (Poroshenko’s home town).  Shevtsov was later fired sacked under 
pressure after video evidence was revealed that he was celebrating the Russian occupation in 
Crimea in May 2014, two months after the formal annexation by Russia. She argued that due to 
political interference and personnel shortages she was largely unable to change the top leadership 
outside of the Patrol Police.273  Dekanoidze wrote “against the backdrop of personnel shortage, 
very often we were forced to be guided, first of all, by the presence or absence of alternative 
personnel. And it is very difficult to find people who meet these positions and could cope with the 
task.  Because in [these] few years we have not created a staff reserve”.274  Dekanoidze’s 
comments underline the difficulties faced in rebuilding a police leadership in the face of massive 
personnel shortages and political competition over control of police leadership.  This section has 
shown how despite the creation of new mechanisms and institutional paths to create transparency 
and oversight over the selection of police leadership through police commissions, attestation 
commissions, and management training programs, the efforts of political forces including the 
Interior Minister and the President have still attempted to dominate the staffing of local police 
chiefs.  While police and attestation commissions were able to have a positive effect in new hiring 
                                                            
270 Nataliya Trach. "Serhiy Knyazev appointed National Police chief." Kyiv Post. February 8th, 2017. 
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/serhiy-knyazev-appointed-national-police-chief.html 
271 "Three candidates for the post of head of the National Police." Censor.net. February 6th, 2017. 
https://censor.net.ua/news/426599/nazvany_tri_pretendenta_na_doljnost_glavy_natspolitsii 
272  “Khatia Denkoidze: The Presidential Administration interfered in the Politics of Police Personnel”.  Argument.ua.  November 
23rd, 2016.  Available at:  www.argumentua.com/stati/khatiya-dekanoidze-administratsiya-prezidenta-vmeshivalas-v-kadrovuyu-
politiku-politsii 







of entry level police officers, political competition over leadership positions proved too powerful 
to see a sustainable reform of leadership selection.  The next section shows how personnel reforms 
have been more successful in isolated pilot projects that have held competitive competitions for 
all positions. 
Holosiivsky Model Station Project 
 An ambitious new attempt to create insulated personnel reforms came from a joint NPU-
ICITAP program in 2017 called the ‘Model Police Station’.  The project designed a complete 
ground up reform of the police station for one of Kyiv’s largest districts, the Holosiivsky district, 
home to 200,000 people and the largest police district in Kyiv.  This project which began in late 
2017 would create an entirely refurbished and re-equipped police station, competitive exams and 
selection commissions for all 650 positions, retraining for all personnel selected, new electronic 
recording procedures, management and organizational techniques including reform of 
investigative and operational divisions into detective squads275.  The United States provided 3.5 
Million dollars in assistance to the project through ICITAP to support reform through 
“organizational restructuring of the police stations in Kyiv City, rigorous selection of personnel, 
as well as implementation of new police operating procedures and practices in order to improve 
police services”.276  In addition to administering the personnel process and retraining, these funds 
will equip officers with new tablets, portable printers, video and audio recorders, laser rangefinders 
and digital radios.  The reform envisions several major changes to the organizational and 
management practices of the police station including: expanded public reception and office hours 
and an electronic visitors queue system, a unified electronic document system, a digital time 
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management personnel system for effectively tracking officers work, the shift from a 24 to a 12 
hour workday, and, perhaps most importantly, comprehensive video surveillance of all areas of 
the police station, including interrogation rooms.   In order to adhere to Ukrainian law, the National 
Police had to create 300 new positions which it can fill by competition, and then subsequently 
liquidate the existing positions, transferring those who are currently in those positions to other 
areas of the National Police.  As of December 2017, independent commissions including three 
foreigners and several civil society representatives were selecting the management positions for 
the Holosiivsky district police station.  In February 2018, the existing commission and the newly 
selected management will screen candidates for all of the lower positions including mid-level 
supervisors, investigators, operatives, district inspectors and patrol officers.  In April the new staff 
of the Holosiivsky District police department will begin working eight hour shifts after which they 
will receive another eight hours of in-service training daily at the police station to familiarize them 
with their new positions.277    While this reform is in its infancy, it represents an alternative model 
of police reform, one in which selection and staffing of stations is turned over to outside actors 
including civil society and international partners.  Unlike the larger strategy of diffusion of new 
personnel throughout the National Police, this pilot project has attempted to completely reform 
one small police department with an entirely new staff.  Minister Avakov says that in the future 
the Holosiivsky pilot project will serve as the model for the reform of all 654 territorial police units 
throughout Ukraine, however the results of the Holosiivsky model project will likely not be 
apparent until early to mid-2019. 
                                                            





 This section will cover education reforms since 2014 and the political competition over 
control of new and existing institutions.  There are essentially three institutes of police education.  
The first is the National Academy of Internal Affairs (NAVS) which is an autonomous and 
powerful system that has 7 campuses throughout Ukraine and over 18,000 students.  The largest 
academies within the NAVS system are in Kharkov, Kyiv, and Dnipro with smaller campuses 
throughout the rest of Ukraine.  NAVS offered secondary education and advanced degrees was 
used to train most Police investigators and the Criminal Police and offers degrees in law, criminal 
justice, and psychology.  The second system was the far less prestigious “police institute” or 
uchylische system which was operated by the Interior Ministry but provided shorter training for 
former State Automobile Inspectorate, Neighborhood Inspectors, and the previous Patrol Post 
Service (PPS) before the creation of Patrol Police in 2015.  In 2015, most of the uchylische 
institutes were turned over to the Department of Patrol Police, but the MoI still controlled about 
half of the institutes throughout the country.  The newest educational institute is the Patrol Police 
Academy which began operating in late 2017 and has been established as an entirely separate and 
independent educational institute under the Department of Patrol Police.  While the Patrol Police 
Academy is still small, is it slated to grow and take more resources from the NAVS and Uchylische 
systems.  
Issues in Ukrainian Police Training and Education 
 The Ukrainian Militsiya had two career tracks, an officer’s track and a basic track.   
Candidates for the basic Militsiya track were required to be 18 years old, have a high school 
diploma, and pass a background check.  Candidates for the officer career track needed to pass 




requirements (Das 2006).   Those in the basic track generally trained for six months at a police 
institute or vocational school (uchylische), and gained the rank of private before starting their 
careers as Traffic officers (DAI), Patrol Militsiya (PPS), or neighborhood inspectors 
(Dilnichi) (Das 2006).  Those who entered the police through the MoI University system 
typically had a legal degree, studied for four or five years, and began their career with the rank 
of lieutenant working as an investigator or manager in one of the other services (Das 2006; 
Peacock and Cordner 2016; 80).   
 There are several underlying problems with the Ukrainian policing and education system.  
The first issue, as previously mentioned, is systemic corruption in the police education system 
which compromises the quality of education and resources, elevates and maintains corrupt 
personnel, and acculturates new police recruits into corrupt and patronistic systems before they 
begin working on the street.  A second issue is the quality of instruction, which is often unchanged 
from Soviet times, excessively theoretical, and often not relevant to the circumstances faced by 
Ukrainian police on the street (Makeyevka 2012; 102).  Critics further argue that the operating and 
maintaining the six higher education institutes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs around the 
country is inefficient, excessively lengthy, is a strain on the state and ministry budget, and creates 
labor shortages in the police.278  A third issue is that there is a division between professional 
training of police and higher education in law and other specialized fields at Universities of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.279  For certain positions in the police such as Patrol officer or 
neighborhood inspector, candidates can be hired from outside of the police and trained in police 
professional training institutes known as “uchylische”; however for other positions the applicant 
                                                            






must have graduated from a Ministry of Internal Affairs National University.  In addition to 
training police officers these MoI National Universities train lawyers, psychologists, forensic 
scientists and even have business programs.  Many of these universities also have criminological 
and police research institutes. This division between professional training institutes and MoI 
university systems creates several issues.  First, there is an inefficient division of resources 
between the parallel education systems, and criminal investigators must finish a 5-year higher 
education at an MoI National University to begin working, meaning that replacing them is 
exceptionally difficult and labor intensive.  Second, unlike most police departments in the United 
States and in many other countries, it is impossible to promote from Patrol to other departments 
without passing through the MoI higher education system.  This means that unlike in the US, the 
overwhelming majority of criminal investigators have never worked in Patrol Police or in street 
level position which give them crucial insight into both criminal activity and the duties of other 
police officers.  There has been a debate for years in Ukraine regarding the value of having the 
Ministry of Interior running institutes of higher education and National Universities.280  While 
some argue that the education provided by MoI universities is sub-par, excessively theoretical, 
militaristic, prone to corruption and could be better delivered in universities open to the public; 
others have raised concern about what would replace this educational system and fear that it could 
lead to a decrease in officer capabilities and a poorly educated police force unfamiliar with 
Ukrainian law (Makeyevka 2012; 102).  A final issue with the current police higher education 
system in Ukraine is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs offers a free legal higher education at 
National Universities with the expectation that their students will work in the police for at least 
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three years281, however many graduates opt to pursue higher paying work in other fields.  This 
means for the resources and efforts that the MoI does expand on training criminal investigators, 
many of them never work a day in the police, which thus creates perpetual shortages in personnel 
and subsequently higher criminal caseloads.  According to another expert the NPU has tightened 
enforcement of the police service requirements for MoI university graduates starting in 2017, 
requiring cadets to verify that they have sought employment in the National Police. 
Training Reform 
 The Ukrainian Militsiya had received international support for education and training 
programs since the late 1990’s from American and European partners (Das 2005; Kenney 2002; 
2003).  The first US police training program began in 1995 under the ACCTA and “The early 
projects included U.S. provision of courses in Ukraine on the investigations of financial crimes, 
drug trafficking, international organized crime (e.g., auto theft, practical case initiative, 
investigative techniques) and democratic and community policing initiatives” (Kenney 2003; 4) 
From the beginning of the police reform process in Ukraine, reform of the education system was 
a primary focus282.  Mustafa Nayyem and other deputies argued that the division of police 
education between professional and specialized training was inefficient and should be replaced by 
a unified academy system.283  For the initial wave of Kyiv Patrol Police which began working in 
July 2015, an entirely new curriculum and condensed training program was developed by the MoI, 
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reformers, and international partners.  Peacock and Cordner detail the extensive role that 
internationals and domestic civil society played in this process: 
Active duty US and Canadian police conducted train-the-trainer sessions to prepare more than 
110 Ukrainian trainers for patrol tactics and unarmed self-defense. Much of the classroom 
training for the newly hired patrol police was provided by Ukrainian lawyers, human rights 
workers, and similar non-police instructors paid by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe Project Office in Kyiv and a Canadian non-governmental organization 
(NGO).  (Peacock and Cordner 2016; 84) 
 
Although the initial wave of Patrol Police was set up during a very tight schedule and received 
considerably less academy time than other officers, there was a focus on attempting to improve 
the content and relevance of the curriculum, a major concern in police education (Skogan and 
Frydl 2004; 138).  A recent report notes that the marked decrease in the length of training, from 
several years to ten weeks, led to criticism that it would cause an increase in crime, particularly as 
the old Militia was ordered off of the streets and the new recruits had limited exposure to more 
experienced officers (French Office for the Protection of Refugees 2017; 16)   The curriculum of 
the Patrol Police was substantially modified both in content and in format.  Many of the subjects 
included such as preventing domestic violence and community policing were never part of basic 
police training before in Ukraine.  The new training for Patrol Police included dozens of hours of 
training in new areas such as anti-corruption, tolerance, combatting human trafficking, and many 
other areas (see the appendix for a full breakdown of Patrol Police curriculum).   Since 2015, over 
18,000 Patrol Officers have received new training which consists of 728 academic hours over 80 
days, mostly at MoI universities.  This approximately four-month period will be lengthened to six 
months once the new National Police Academies begin operation in late 2017.  The cadets are 
tested in nine subject areas: 1) Human Rights and Constitutional Law 2) the Foundations of 
National Police Activity 3) Administrative Responsibility 4) Criminal Law and Process 5) 




complex role-playing games) and 9) Final Comprehensive exams.  Comprehensive exams consist 
of five components, 3 of which are theoretical.  The first three are drafting the procedural 
documents for a case of administrative infraction 2) registration of an accident; 3) the legal basis 
of detention.  The two practical comprehensive exams are in tactical training and firearms training.  
Cadets can retake exams in the first eight areas one time, if they do not pass during the second 
attempt they are culled.  Students are not allowed to retake any part of the comprehensive exam.  
While physical fitness is a component of the selection process and cadets undergo substantial 
physical training in the academy, physical training does not count towards a cadet’s grade.  
Typically, 5-10% of cadets in a given class fail to complete basic Patrol Police training.  In contrast 
to the previous pedagogical model which was usually a one-sided lecture by the instructor, the new 
curriculum dedicated significant time in each module to practical skills or scenarios as well as 
classroom discussion and lectures.  In addition to new content, training reform relied heavily on 
the use of non-police or MoI personnel to deliver instructions. Police training is offered by a 
diverse array of instructors including lawyers, academics, human rights experts, international 
experts, combat veterans, and police.  In most training locations 30-40% of instructors are police.  
This had the dual benefit of improving the quality of lectures by bringing in outside experts, and 
allowing both police and the Ukrainian civil society or expert community an opportunity to interact 
with each other in a non-hostile and cooperative forum.  The same can generally be said for foreign 
instructors in their interactions with the police.  James Sheptycki (2002) argues that one of the 
greatest benefits of international police exchanges and training programs is the international 
diffusion of a “constabulary ethic” wherein certain international police ‘best practices’ and norms 
begin to take root in host societies.  One downside of foreign training of Ukrainian police is that 




For example, former Patrol Police officer Bodgan Patskan stated that trainings developed by the 
US in relation to traffic stops cannot be used on the street where Ukrainian police are heavily 
restricted in the procedural grounds on which they can stop a vehicle.284  
 In conjunction with improvements to basic training for Patrol Police, many Patrol officers 
and other police received supplementary training on a variety of topics including community 
policing, preventing domestic violence285, crowd control286, dealing with drug users287, police 
tactics and other subjects from a variety of international police trainers.  These trainings represent 
the international best practices and are tailored to Ukrainian needs.  The programs typically employ 
a “train the trainer” format, where internationals train Ukrainians who then deliver the training to 
their fellow officers in the local language. 
 As a requirement of attestation many former Militia were required to undergo “in-service” 
training as part of their transformation into National Police.  This in-service training is the first 
time that most Ukrainian police have been required to go for continuous training or to recertify 
their skills.  The in-service training was tailored to particular police positions and departments and 
varied widely, although on average they lasted between two to three weeks.  Passing in-service 
training was also a requirement for receiving the higher wage increase that accompanied the 
transformation of the militia into the National Police following attestation.  For former officers 
who underwent in-service training to become Patrol Police, approximately 4,100, they underwent 
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98 hours of training in 13 subjects.  Much like the basic training, in-service training relied heavily 
on civil society, lawyers, and academics to teach course material to police.  
 For all of the latitude given to the Patrol Police in developing new curriculum and methods 
of training in conjunction with foreign partners and civil society, they faced stiff resistance from 
the National University of Internal Affairs system (NAVS).  Despite the formal independence of 
the National Police from the MoI, the MoI remains in firm control of the powerful NAVS system 
which has seven campuses, thousands of employees, and tens of thousands of students.  Mustafa 
Nayyem notes that in addition to tremendous resources in terms of budget, facilities and personnel, 
the NAVS has tremendous political power within the police as nearly all police leadership are 
alumni of the NAVS system and most have ongoing relationships with powerful university rectors.  
Georgian and American advisers as well as Ukrainian civil society had argued for the elimination 
of the NAVS system and for the resources and personnel to be transferred to the NPU from the 
beginning of reform.  For a moment it appeared that the NAVS system might be transferred to the 
control of the NPU and during 2015 the NAVS actually stopped taking new students but by 2016 
began accepting new admissions.  The NAVS not only successfully resisted attempts to limit its 
resources or powers but refused to cooperate with new Patrol Police training and often denied 
Patrol Police access to classrooms and facilities during 2015 and 2016.  As pressure mounted from 
the Patrol Police and their political backers, the NAVS ended up ceding more territory and facilities 
to the Patrol Police and in 2017 transferred control of a building in Kyiv that would be used as the 
future home for the Patrol Police Academy. 
Patrol Police Academy  
The length and quality of Patrol Police training increased throughout 2015 and 2016 as 




without a permanent staff or location as they were dependent on MoI facilities.  This is because 
the National Police lacks the legal authority to establish its own educational institutions, which 
leaves it heavily dependent on the Interior Ministry for use of its existing National Universities or 
professional training institutes, instructors, financing, and approval of curriculum.  The NAVS had 
often been a reluctant partner in cooperating with the NPU on training and has been reticent to 
relinquish control of its National Universities, which are a major source of influence over the 
National Police as well as a source of illegal rents through student bribes and sinecures for patrons 
(Friesendorf 2017).  Since the start of reform various plans have emerged that imagine different 
roles for MoI universities in the training of Patrol Police. Conflicting plans were announced by the 
Interior Minister Avakov and former National Police Chief Dekanoidze in 2016, and some experts 
have even called for abolishing MoI National University systems altogether.288  Prevailing issues 
with the current training system for Patrol Police include antiquated or inappropriate training 
facilities, inconsistent curriculum and training methodology in different sites, the lack of 
infrastructure and equipment to provide proper trainings, and the lack of permanent full time 
dedicated professional training staff.  According to an expert from the Ukrainian think tank “The 
Institute for the Future” who was involved in reform of the Prosecutor’s Office, the MoI was 
cautious not to repeat the mistakes made in the education reform of the Prosecution service.  He 
noted that in 2015 critics pushed for and secured the dissolution of the National Academy of 
Prosecutors, however have yet to replace it due to political and bureaucratic infighting and budget 
issues over staffing, qualifications, and curriculum.  Overnight the staff of the National Academy 
of Prosecutors was decreased from 500 to 50 instructors and they subsequently lost the capacity to 
                                                            




train the new prosecutors that Ukraine desperately needs.  Because of resistance by the MOI, much 
of the training has been organized and conducted ad hoc by international donors. 
Plans began in 2016 to develop a Professional Training Center (PTC- later called Patrol 
Police Academy - PPA) which would centralize and standardize Patrol Police training throughout 
the country with support from law makers such as Mustapha Nayyem.289  An early concept called 
for a division between vocational “Professional Training Institutes” (uchylyshche), which would 
handle initial police training, and a “National Police Academy” which would have dealt with “post-
graduate” police specialization, professional development, and retraining.290  This plan was 
ultimately rejected and a final plan emerged in 2017 which called for a series of Patrol Police 
Academies (PPA) in the five largest cities (Kyiv, L’viv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro) that would 
manage all Patrol Police basic, in-service, and eventually promotional training and continuing 
education.  This plan was agreed upon by the MoI and NPU as well as major stakeholders including 
the US State Department’s Bureau of International Law Enforcement (INL), ICITAP, and 
Canada’s Agriteam who provided considerable funding and technical assistance.  The primary 
goals of the PPA will consolidate and standardize all basic Patrol Police training, in-service 
training, continuous training, promotional trainings, and leadership and management training.  In 
addition to these tasks the PPA will also work on improving the development of training programs, 
designing improved curriculum, implementing modern training standards, and training instructors.  
Other goals of the PPA will be to facilitate e-learning throughout the NPU, English language 
training for Patrol Police, monitoring and analyzing the training process, identifying emerging 
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training needs for Patrol Police, and organizing international cooperation projects.291   The PPAs 
are to be funded and subordinate to the NPU and the director will be selected by the Chief of Patrol 
Police, but they will receive the facilities on a sublease from the MoI.  The first Patrol Police 
Academy began operating in Kyiv in November 2017 with a staff of approximately 150 and an 
initial class of 100 students.  All staff including management, trainers, administrators, and the 
monitoring unit will be required to go through competitive open public commissions which include 
members of civil society and foreigners. 
   On September 19th 2017, Vadym Lisnychuk, a decorated ATO veteran and the former 
Chief of Kharkiv Patrol Police, was appointed as the head of first Police Academy following an 
open competition and commission vote.  The goal for the first Kyiv PPA was to initially 
accommodate 500 new cadets starting in early 2018.  According to the NPU the medium-term goal 
for the first year is for the PPA to train 3,600 Patrol Police cadets in basic training, through 4-
month training periods and 3 class cycles a year.  The long-term goal is for training capacity to 
increase from 4 to 6 months with two annual cycles of basic training, as well as thousands of 
officers receiving two-week in-service training and one-week continuous training at various PPAs 
throughout Ukraine.  Because of a lack of resources and continued political resistance from the 
NAVS and its backers, the Patrol Police Academy began operating in 2018 but had much smaller 
class sizes and fewer facilities than anticipated.   
There are future plans for an expansion of Patrol Police Academies throughout the country 
and for them to become the will eventually become the primary training facility and entry point 
for all Ukrainian police.292  Chief Knyazev has suggested that moving towards a system where all 
                                                            
291 ICITAP Document  




police recruits begin their careers in Patrol will not only improve the character of policing and 
increase police officers empathy with the public, it will also reduce police officer attrition 
throughout the National Police.  To date the Patrol Police Academy has had success in establishing 
a state of the art curriculum and teaching environment but has been severely curtailed in its 
expansion by strong resistance from the powerful NAVS system and its institutional backers.  The 
result has been a compromise where the Patrol Police Academy has launched on a much smaller 
scale than initially anticipated, and exists as an insulated pilot project alongside the continuation 
of the NAVS system.  The future of the Patrol Police Academy will depend on whether its 
supporters can muster sufficient political support for expanding the Academy to the rest of the 
country and taking over more resources from the NAVS.  This battle is yet another representation 
of the political struggle over the control of law enforcement where new institutions often are 
created to supplant existing institutions, but regularly exist alongside them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how attempts to professionalize the police through 
improvements in recruitment, selection, training, vetting, and supervision have proceeded since 
2014.  While these areas of reform have certainly been some the deepest (in terms of involving the 
largest number of officers and resources) they have also faced substantial obstacles and challenges.  
The first major issue is balancing public expectations for reform with the realities of limited labor 
supply, insufficient budgets, entrenched bureaucracy, and constricting legal framework.  While 
Patrol Police has largely been well received by the Ukrainian public and has much higher approval 
ratings293 than both the former Militia and other current units of the National Police (Razumkov, 
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KIIS 2016; 2017, IRI 2017), its bold pace may have set unreasonable expectations in society that 
similar deep reforms were imminent in the rest of the National Police and would be enacted in 
short order.  The “shock therapy” (Cordner and Peacock 2016) model of reform by which DAI and 
PPS were quickly pulled off the street and replaced by newly trained recruits just simply wasn’t a 
possibility for other units of the NPU.  For example, the Criminal Block and the Organs of Pre-
Trial Investigation represent nearly twenty-five thousand police officers and most positions have 
legal requirements for education that are often earned through MoI university programs which can 
last as long as five years.  Contrary to the popular myth that all former police were fired in Georgia 
following the 2004 reforms, most officers outside of patrol and GAI such as criminal operatives 
and investigators continued working after reform (Devlin 2010; Light 2015).  Another major 
complication for reform was sustaining financial commitment to the police budget.  While all 
institutional reforms will usually require additional budgetary investments, Ukraine’s police 
reform began and the least precipitous time where there was a massive decrease in economic 
growth and the state budget due to the ongoing financial crisis.  Furthermore, the ongoing conflict 
requires Ukraine to simultaneously update and increase investment in its armed forces, including 
providing wage increases and professional contracts for the Army and the National Guard.  
Personnel shortages were another mitigating factor.  The long-term inability of the Militsiya and 
now the National Police to attract and maintain personnel has been a major factor limiting how 
many officers could realistically be purged during attestation.  Politicians and police management 
undoubtedly feared further exacerbating the personnel shortages in the police and in turn 
contributing to even higher caseloads, longer investigations, and less officers on the street.  
Without an available labor force to replace them, deep cuts to the police force would have 




new police positions undoubtedly played a role in mitigating personnel reforms as political forces 
attempted to subvert formal rules of attestation, new recruitment (outside of Patrol) and central 
and regional commander appointments.   Given these structural constraints how were the reforms 
in the Patrol Police, the Patrol Police Academy (PPA) and the model police station possible, and 
what further reforms can be expected in the less than fortuitous circumstances? 
While the attempts at these reforms in the NPU as a whole has been impressive, the 
establishment and operation of the Patrol Police clearly stands out from the rest of the NPU as an 
“island of success” (Geddes 1996).  During her resignation speech in May 2016, Eka Zguladze 
warned that reforms in the Patrol Police could be reversed or undone if not expanded to the rest of 
the police.  Zguladze noted “Islands of success will drown in an ocean of corruption, nihilism and 
bureaucracy if we don't build bridges between them and create a continent.”294  Maintaining the 
political will for expanding reforms beyond the Patrol Police will be the critical test of Ukrainian 
police reform.  Barbara Geddes (1994) and others (Gonzalez 2014) have noted that politicians have 
strong incentives to not pursue bureaucratic reform and civil service reforms similar to the ones 
conducted in the NPU.  She argues that politicians will only pursue this type of reform when they 
view the electoral costs of continuing to use public jobs as patronage as higher than the political 
gains for doing the same (Geddes 1994).  Following the Euromaidan in Ukraine and the complete 
delegitimization of the Militsiya, it can be argued that these particular conditions were in place 
which allowed for a partial, though not total reform of the police bureaucracy.  Thus, while deep 
institutional reform is extremely necessary in the entire NPU, the lesson of Patrol Police is that 
                                                            






reformers may have more success in establishing, cultivating and then expanding insulated 
institutions within larger more problematic institutions.   
Another factor in the success of the Patrol Police was undoubtedly the international 
assistance given to the Patrol Police project, and the establishment of the new police academy and 
the model police pilot project.  The extensive financial and technical assistance provided in these 
areas gave western donors substantial leverage in ensuring that these institutions were established 
through a fair and transparent process that followed a meritocratic bureaucratic logic.  While many 
recent attempts at western state building have ended in the inability to create functioning 
institutions, Elton Skendaj writes that the successful reform resulting in efficient and meritocratic 
new National Police and customs service in post-independence Kosovo was only possible because 
of international assistance which insulated these nascent industries from the rampant political 
competition and patrimonialism of other bureaucracies (Skendaj 2014).  Skendaj writes that the 
billions of dollars of aid provided to post-war Kosovo gave the United Nations and other 
international organizations (such as the OSCE) unprecedented leverage in insisting that the new 
Kosovar Police and Customs Services established a meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
process.  Meanwhile the courts and central administration in Kosovo continued to be follow a 
personnel policy based on nepotistic and political factors.  This resulted in a system where the 
police and the state customs administration were much more effective as well as more trusted than 
their other bureaucratic counterparts where international actors could not demand meritocratic 
personnel policies.  He writes that contrary to the hypothesis that local ownership leads to better 
state building “the construction of effective state institutions requires the insulation of 
bureaucracies from political and societal actors as well as an emphasis on meritocratic recruitment 




dynamic between projects with heavy western assistance and conditions such as the Patrol Police, 
the new academy, and the model police station, and other parts of the National Police which are 
subject to political capture.  The results of this distinct personnel policies may lay the future 
framework for profoundly different bureaucratic institutions within the National Police. 
In certain respects, the reform of Patrol Police can be viewed as a less than extraordinary 
response to political pressure caused by police scandal and regime change (Zetocha 2014; 
Gonzalez 2014; Sherman 1978).  Scandal is a powerful and common catalyst for police reform 
(Walker 2008, Gonzalez 2014; Sherman 1978).  However, the most interesting component of 
professionalization reforms in Ukraine are that they have institutionalized reforms as processes, 
codified into law, made them transparent, and have largely been followed and adhered to by the 
police.  Viewed in this way, establishing competitive civil service tests, public commissions for 
hiring, promotions and vetting, and incorporating civil society into the primary and continuing 
education of police officers throughout the NPU represents a serious accomplishment and a 
behavioral restraint on practices of patrimonialism.  That these new processes and institutions have 
met resistance and attempts at political manipulation should be of no surprise to those familiar 
with the practices of states like Ukraine with patrimonial bureaucracies and rampant informalism 
(Polese 2016; Hale 2014).  Rather, the fact that these processes have endured and expanded is 
testament to the fact that they have increased both lateral and horizontal accountability of the police 
and “tied the hands” of those that would turn back from reform (Moncada 2009).  The 
implementation of competitive civil service tests and promotional exams, public commissions 
which oversee new hiring, promotions and vetting, and outside participate in police training and 
education have introduced new rules into the police organization which will counteract the long-




pathways of corruption.  Any institutional arrangement can only be understood to be effective and 
in force when the parties involved recognize that it is in their behavior to comply with rather than 
to cheat the system.  The fact that civil society is able to hold the police accountable to new 
procedures and rules that did not exist before 2015, and to gain a response from police 
administration and public officials should be understood as a testament to the very real power and 
institutionalization of the new personnel policies and practices in the National Police.   
 Overall, it appears that at the government’s political will for deep reform in the Ukrainian 
government seems to have decreased since 2014 (Carnegie 2017), but developments in 2017 show 
that the catalyst for continuing police reform and expanding it beyond Patrol Police has come in 
part from these new personnel policies and processes.  A foreign advisor remarked that Patrol 
Police have become a victim of their own success as many of the brightest and most talented Patrol 
officers are transferred into other departments of the police in order to support reforms295.  The 
National Police’s efforts to recruit nearly 4,500 police in the final months of 2017 and to overhaul 
education will also have a positive effect on reforms throughout the National Police.  Most 
promotions and all new hiring will require public commissions to review the candidate and make 
a final say on the decision. Perhaps most importantly, the decision to require all future police 
officers to begin their careers in Patrol will serve to diffuse the values and customs of Patrol Police 
to other police departments in the coming years.  While these and other future proposals will still 
be dependent on external factors including fiscal limitations and resistance from vested powers, 
the processes described in this chapter have made serious progress towards implementing 
transparent, fair, accountable and sustainable processes by which reformers can continue to push 
for improvements and reforms throughout the National Police of Ukraine. 
                                                            








Chapter 6: Accountability Reforms 
Introduction 
 Ukrainian civil society has twice mobilized to overthrow a political regime in a decade, but 
as Lucan Way (2014) notes, Ukrainian civil society has much less successful at holding institutions 
accountable and ensuring the implementation and stability of reforms after revolutions. This 
chapter looks at the universe of reforms that attempt to increase police accountability for corruption 
and human rights abuses.  This analysis is conducted by looking at the creation or reform of several 
institutions and practices responsible for providing oversight in these areas including the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsman, the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), and the newly 
created State bureau of investigations as well as oversight by civil society groups and the media.  
This chapter also looks at both institutions within the police providing internal oversight and 
control including the Internal Affairs department also known as “DVB” (Department Vnutroshnoi 
Bezpeka) the Department of Human Rights Provision, as well as outside institutions including the 
Prosecutor General’s Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the State Bureau of 
Investigations.  Implementing police accountability for corruption and human rights abuses was a 
major demand of the public after the scandal of the Euromaidan, but unlike personnel reforms or 
certain criminal justice reforms, the creation and reform of oversight institutions received much 




due to corruption schemes and the political competition over powerful institutions such as the 
Prosecutor and anti-corruption bodies.  While there was substantial pressure for reform from police 
scandals of corruption and abuses as well as pressure from civil society, the relative lack of 
attention and pressure from international actors and the inability to maintain a reform coalition has 
meant that there has been insufficient pressure on political elites to overcome the forces of 
corruption and political competition in order to reform these institutions.  The sole exception to 
this has been the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, which received broad public 
support, extensive international assistance, and institutionalized a large degree of civil society 
oversight.  This chapter shows that political elites have been very reluctant to reform oversight 
institutions, and that even when there is political will to create new institutions, these institutions 
are often captured by competing political interests.  This chapter explores the difficulties of 
addressing corruption and human rights abuses by looking at institutions and practices both within 
the police department and without. 
Reform Area: 
Police Corruption Reform of Internal Affairs (DVB) 
Anti-corruption hotline 
Body cameras 
Law on Police Disciplinary Status 
Prosecutor General’s Office 
NABU 
State Bureau of Investigations (Eventually) 
Attestation 
Human Rights abuses Police Ombudsman 
Law on Police Disciplinary Status 
Prosecutor General’s Office 
National Preventative Mechanism, 
State Bureau of Investigations (eventually) 
 
What is police accountability? 
  Accountability reforms are premised on the belief that within a democratic system, police 
must be accountable to “multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms” (Bayley 1997; Stone 
and Ward 2000).  Mainwaring argues for a definition of accountability as a state institution which 




(Mainwaring 2003). The categories of police accountability examined in this chapter are 
accountability for preventing and punishing two types of police misconduct, corruption and human 
rights abuses.  Because of the tremendous powers invested in police officers, the effective control 
of their activities and powers by state and social actors is a necessary, if often elusive, goal.   
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic defines police corruption as “police officer’s actions, omissions, or 
attempts to do so that result in abuse of their official duties and are motivated in significant part 
by gain.” (Kutnjak Ivkovic 2005;17).  In Ukraine, police corruption takes many different forms 
and the specific forms of corruption depend on the job of the police officer and the corrupt 
opportunities it provides and what type of oversight is needed.  For example, the reform of traffic 
police and the establishment of Patrol Police is credited with virtually eliminating the formerly 
common practice of soliciting bribes from drivers (Peacock and Cordner 2016).  In addition to new 
personnel with higher standards of ethics and increased salaries, technologies such as body 
cameras and electronic payment increased the risks of soliciting bribes.  In other departments of 
the police such as the Criminal Block which have more access to serious criminal enterprises there 
are more serious forms of corruption.  In certain corruption includes activities police cooperate 
with existing criminal organizations by providing protection, known as “roofing” (kryshovanie), 
selling classified information to criminals and businesses, participation in business raids and 
hostile takeovers (raiderski zakhvat).  There are many cases of police corruption where police 
independently operate criminal enterprises such as narcotics, auto theft or prostitution rings.  Police 
Investigators have unique forms of corruption that are primarily based around the threat of opening 
criminal cases against innocent persons to extract bribes or acquire business assets or by closing 
legitimate cases against guilty persons in exchange for economic benefit.  Both procedural forms 




corruption ties between local prosecutors and police investigators and political elites.   Under the 
Yanukovych regime, nearly all these forms of corruption from bribe collection to cooperation with 
organized crime and the selling of justice services was controlled in a vertical pyramid where 
officers would contribute a portion of their illicit gains to their supervisors who would pay their 
political patrons.  In exchange for the money provided by police corruption schemes, political 
patrons could provide police with protection and career advancement.  With the unexpected ouster 
of Yanukovych and his pyramids and notable turnover in both the political sphere and senior law 
enforcement, these corruption pyramids have been reforming and have become much more 
decentralized creating both opportunities for combatting corruption as well as predation in new 
and in new spheres which would have previously been off limits to criminals and law enforcement. 
The extent of cooperation between police, criminals, businessmen and law enforcement in 
Ukraine has traditionally been very high as many current and former political, business and law 
enforcement elites had criminal backgrounds beginning in the 1990s.  Alexander Kupatadze writes 
that the connection between the underworld and the “upper-world” (of politicians and law 
enforcement) varies greatly depending on the region.   
“For instance, local politicians in the Western Ukraine rural and agricultural district of 
Chernivtsi, bordering Romania, are more likely to forge alliances with smuggling networks, 
while those in industrially developed Dnepropetrovsk are most likely to get involved in networks 
of financial and economic crime” (Kupatadze 2012; 91). 
 
  
The regional component of corruption is very important as many of the wealthiest oligarchs 
and political elite have connections to major agricultural holdings, natural gas, or industry located 
in distinct regions of Ukraine.  At the highest levels of grand corruption, politicians are more 
interested in gaining the cooperation of police investigators, prosecutors, and other law 




while selectively prosecuting their rivals and competitors.  This can be witnessed by the filing and 
dropping of criminal corruption charges against political elites which rarely result in criminal 
prosecution or conviction but are instead used to coerce political or economic concessions out of 
rivals or to defend corrupt interests that they feel are being threatened.  In addition to the 
availability of corrupt resources, (which varies greatly between and within police agencies) other 
factors influence which police corruption are a weak rule of law, and societies’ approval or 
participation in corruption (Sherman 1979; Stefes 2006; Kutnjat Ivkovic 2010; Polese 2016).  This 
final point about societies participation in corruption has important implications in a system like 
Ukraine, where pervasive corruption is entrenched in the culture and many people prefer to pay 
bribes rather than wait for delayed and poorly provided public services (Polese 2016).  For 
example, in 2016 a taxi driver in Odesa complained to the author that he preferred paying bribes 
to the Militsiya (in Russian ‘to solve’ a problem ‘poreshat problema’), which would allow him to 
park and pick up passengers in prohibited areas rather than receiving a ticket from the new Patrol 
Police.  Some of the recent efforts to control corruption have come from the requirement of 
financial declarations of police through attestation and the lustration law, new anti-corruption 
institutions, increased internal police supervision through technology and automation and 
increased anti-corruption enforcement through police internal affairs (DVB)296.  The public has 
also gained new opportunities to document, broadcast and report police corruption through social 
media, video recording technology on cellphones and dash cams, and new reporting mechanisms 
through a 24/7 police corruption hotline.   
 Another major concern about police activity is human rights violations which include 
physical abuse such as torture and excessive force, and violations of constitutional rights and due 
                                                            




process such as violating legal procedure during arrest, fabricating charges or evidence, and illegal 
detention.  Much of the debate around police accountability has been framed as a false choice 
between crime control and controlling police misconduct, with police organizations and unions 
arguing that increased scrutiny and discipline over police use of force or investigation techniques 
will directly limit their ability to control crime (Bayley 2005; 73; Stone and Ward 2000).  Human 
rights abuse during the investigative process such as coercing confessions, fabricating evidence, 
or denying an arrestee the right to legal council may be motivated by corruption or economic 
motivations to extort money from the individual (Stefes 2006).  These same behaviors could also 
be motivated by lack of training or resources and institutional pressure to expedite investigations 
and close cases (Hinton and Newburn 2009; Amnesty 2015).   
Although they will be discussed separately in this chapter, human rights violations and 
police corruption are not  mutually exclusive, and indeed many times corruption increases human 
rights abuses (Stefes 2006).  For example, Ukrainian authorities argued that elite-level grand 
corruption was a major cause of human rights violations by police during the Euromaidan. 
“As emphasized by Serhiy Horbatyuk, deputy prosecutor general and head of the special 
unit created within the General Prosecutor’s Office to investigate Maidan-related violence, 
corruption is regarded as the root cause of the violence.  The violence, in turn, is regarded as an 
attempt by the perpetrators to hide their economic crimes and to preserve their power in order to 
continue their criminal enterprises” (Bachmann and Lyubashenko 2017; 308). 
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, different accountability mechanisms in Ukraine have 
focused specifically on segments of police malfeasance, such as torture, corruption, or abuse of 
force, rather than examining the intersectionality of these issues. 
Law Enforcement Accountability in Ukraine 
The movement for gaining greater public accountability over law enforcement in Ukraine 




police for violations of legal rights under the Soviet legislation, but also appealed to universal 
political rights such as freedom of expression which were not allowed under the authoritarian 
system.  In the post-independence period police accountability has developed in a staggered and 
inconsistent fashion.  In response to the slow development of civil society and independent media 
in Ukraine and following several large scandals such as “Kuchmagate” and the Orange Revolution, 
political leaders have attempted reforms to bring police under greater social and state control 
(Harasymiw 2003).   
During the Yushchenko administration, several initiatives including the Police 
Ombudsman’s office, and the Human Rights Monitoring Department (UMDPL) to monitor the 
rights of pre-trial detainees in police custody and pre-trial detention.  This unit existed as a formal 
department within the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior from 2007-2010 but was  Perhaps the greatest 
accountability form to address human rights abuses was the passage of the 2012 new Criminal 
Procedure Code which was strongly advocated for by the US Embassy in Ukraine and the 
European Union.297  The new CPC of 2012 was considered a model reform in that it made trials 
more adversarial, introduced more opportunities for jury trials and plea bargains, reduced pre-trial 
detention, and addressed police misconduct such as unregistered detentions, refusal to register 
crimes and coerced confessions (Solomon 2015; UMDPL 2017; Chistyakova 2012).  Although the 
passage of the CPC was heralded as a model reform at the time and received praise from the United 
States, the Council of Europe, and the human rights community, Ukrainian police and prosecutors 
found many ways to adapt to the new law while retaining old practices.  For example, the CPC 
requires that criminal suspects be charged within several hours of being apprehended, but in many 
cases courts are not operational before this time period expires.  Many have argued that this short 
                                                            




length requirement for arraignment has led to an increase in illegal detention and non-registration 
as police refuse to register suspects who they will not be able to arraign in time.  This is just one 
example of the obstinacy of entrenched practices human violations in police activity.   
Following the Euromaidan there was a substantial push to overhaul police and other justice 
systems including the courts and public prosecutor’s office, as well as to create new institutions 
that would be specialized on investigating and prosecuting corruption and human rights abuses.  
This reform pressure came the scandal of the Euromaidan, a highly organized civil society, and 
some support from the international community.  The pressure from these sources turned out to be 
insufficient to provoke lasting political will to enact accountability reform due to the 
overwhelming force of corruption and political competition.  In the attempts to reform existing 
institutions such as the courts and the Procuracy, corruption links between political elites and 
senior officials in these institutions allowed them to escape institutional overhaul.  For example, 
over 90% of prosecutors were reappointed after vetting and very few senior judges were removed.  
This is because political elites allowed these institutions to oversee their own vetting and to 
produce largely farcical forms of attestation with little to no public oversight.  Unreformed courts 
and prosecutors not only prevents effective oversight of law enforcement, but in many cases 
undermines the basic activities of law enforcement as police are unable to obtain convictions 
because defendants often bribe judges or prosecutors to close criminal proceedings.  Dekanoidze 
and other top police officials have expressed their frustration during police reform at the refusal of 
prosecutors and judges to cooperate in pursuing legitimate cases that were brought before them.  
Unlike with police, the failure to reform courts and prosecutors is that foreign partners were not 
involved in these reform processes and thus had little ability to insist on transparent reforms, real 




extremely powerful and have the ability to open criminal cases against powerful individuals.  In 
spite of the larger story of reform failure in the criminal justice system, several institutions made 
significant progress in reform including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the 
Department of Internal Affairs (DVB).  In both these success stories, the critical distinction was 
western support, and in the case of NABU, civil society oversight.  The next section will look at 
the attempt to create and reform institutions that provide accountability for human rights 
violations, followed by accountability for police corruption.  In the description of these institutions, 
the case will be made that the failure of many of these institutions to overcome the forces of 
corruption and political competition was based in the inability to sustain reform coalitions, and to 
cooperate with foreign donors and civil society in implementing transparency and oversight 
mechanisms to ensure the compliance of corrupt patrimonial institutions to trasparency.   
Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) 
 The Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights was created in 1998, but Taras Kuzio 
argues that the first commissioner Nina Karpachova was politically dependent on former President 
Kuchma and was highly inefficient during her 14 years in the role and was under constant pressure 
to resign by the Ukrainian human rights community (Kuzio 2015; 480). The Current 
Commissioner, Valeriya Lutkovska, was appointed to the position in 2012.  The Ombudsman and 
the Secretariat are responsible for upholding human rights protections found in the Ukrainian 
constitution, national legislation, and international treaties on human rights.  The Parliamentary 
Human Rights Ombudsman can work on legislation regarding human rights, overseeing state 
institutions, and receives direct appeals from Citizen’s.  In 2010 the Parliamentary Ombudsman 




being the MoI with 4,153 appeals from citizens.298  According to their Midterm report- in 2012 
the Ombudsman launched 7,184 investigations in 2013 and 8,746 investigations in 2014 
(Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights 2015; 11). In 2012, the Ombudsman was 
granted new tasks including protecting personal data, ensuring access to public information, 
ensuring antidiscrimination and operating the National Preventative Mechanism (Ukrainian 
Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights 2015). 
National Preventative Mechanism 
In 2006 Ukraine adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and in 2012 they finally adopted 
a National Preventative Mechanism (NPM) to monitor places of detention.  The NPM is under the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) and has the authority to make 
unannounced visits to places of detention throughout the country where they may interview 
prisoners and law enforcement officials, review documents, and inspect the conditions of places 
of detention.299  The NPM uses the “Ombudsman +” model, where the NPM deputizes local human 
rights activists to conduct inspections of places of detention in regions throughout Ukraine.  The 
NPM stresses that its work is not punitive but preventative, as it does not conduct investigations 
and has no powers to sanction police.  Rather, the NPM believes that the constant possibility of an 
unannounced inspection will work as a deterrent against human rights abuses and torture.  One 
activist who participate as an NPM monitor in the regions have reported finding appalling 
conditions and the presence of torture tools with blood on them in commander’s desks and office 
safes.  The NPM can check both police precincts, and police remand centers (ITT) and torture 
often occurs in both, including the failure to record arrestees, and the transfer of inmates from 
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SIZO (under the control of MOJ) back into police custody (ITT) in order to extract a confession.300  
The participation of the public has been crucial to securing the independence of the NPM, but with 
less than 100 monitors for Ukraine’s population of 45 million, this type of inconsistent oversight 
is unlikely to prove much of a deterring as long as the scale remains limited.  According to a recent 
conference on the role of Ombudsman institutions in Ukraine, the panel found that the 
parliamentary commission fails to provide effective oversight of all security institutions and their 
suggestions are not followed or implemented by the NPU  (DCAF/Razumkov 2017)  Furthermore 
the commission found that public complaints are not taken seriously or often times are not 
recorded, the internal police mechanisms for investigating human rights complaints are not 
independent form police management and are ineffective, and police officers often face abuse from 
their own supervisors (DCAF/Razumkov, 2017(A); 16).  The efforts of the Parliamentary Human 
Rights Commission and the NPM are valiant, but insufficient to bring about real accountability for 
human rights abuses caused by law enforcement.  While the NPM is considered to be politically 
independent in that it has cooperation from civil society and transparent oversight, unannounced 
checks to places of detention are insufficient be able to bring about real accountability for human 
rights abuses without effective criminal prosecution of the officers involved in human rights 
abuses.  
Prosecutor General’s Office  
Reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) has been particularly slow and few 
observers consider it successful.  Immediately after the Maidan the new authorities passed a new 
Law on the Procuracy in 2014 which called for vetting, lustration, and removing the power of 
“general oversight”.  Victor Shokin was named prosecutor General in 2014 but quickly became a 
                                                            




target for civil society and international actors, including receiving direct criticism from then US 
vice-President Joe Biden.  The process of vetting the Procuracy was largely left to the old guard, 
who opted to reappoint over 84% of prosecutors in a non-transparent system that was heavily 
politicized.  William Pomeranz wrote that by early 2016 it had become apparent that: “The failure 
to swiftly empower new prosecutors– and to leave virtually all of Ukraine’s 18,000 prosecutors in 
their current jobs – naturally calls into question President Poroshenko’s commitment to fighting 
corruption” (Pomeranz and Neserenko 2016; 3).  Victor Shokin was eventually pressured to resign 
under mounting pressure from civil society and the west and was replaced by Yuri Lutsenko from 
the BPP, who required Parliament to pass a bill granting him a waiver to become Prosecutor 
General because he lacked the requisite legal education.  The reluctance to fire corrupt former 
officials and the appointment of party loyalists like Lutsenko to key positions has ensured that the 
procuracy will remain corrupt and politically dependent. Unsurprisingly, the Prosecutor General’s 
Office remains one of the least trusted institutions in Ukraine (Razumkov 2016; IRI 2017 p187).  
The PGO has also been criticized by both Ukrainians and foreign observers for its failure to 
prosecute security forces for their role in the violence on Euromaidan and high-ranking officials 
of the Yanukovych regime.   
Due to the failure to conduct proper vetting and create political independence, the 
Ukrainian Procuracy has failed to hold Ukrainian law enforcement accountable by prosecuting 
human rights violations.  Ukraine’s police have long been accused of gross human rights violations 
of persons under arrest such as false imprisonment, refusing to record crimes, fabrication of 
criminal charges against innocent persons, coercing confessions and testimony through torture, 
violence, and other abuses of power (Chistyakova 2012; UMPDL 2016; KhPRG 2016).  The 




conditions were somewhat improved under the new 2012 CPC), quantitative indicators of police 
performance, poor investigation skills and methods, extremely high caseloads, communist legacies 
of violence, the opportunity to extract bribes and pressure business rivals, and an overall 
environment of impunity for officers (Martynenko 2013; Krapyvin 2016; Volkov 2012).  The 
Prosecutor General’s Office is supposed to investigate and prosecute human rights violations, due 
process violations and illegal violence by police but they rarely do so, typically citing lack of 
evidence (Chistyakova 2012) Below, I discuss some of the particular issues of human rights 
violations such as illegal detention, torture, and physical abuse and how they are (or most often 
are not) investigated by the Procuracy.   
 Section 208 of the Ukrainian CPC stipulates the conditions under which police can detain 
and arrest an individual without a judicial warrant such as being caught in the act, the testimony 
of a victim or eyewitness, or a totality of physical evidence at the scene of the crime.  Police must 
then draw up a protocol which specifies the place, time, date, evidence found and grounds of 
apprehension and any pleas and must notify the prosecutor to obtain procedural approval for the 
arrest (Ukrainian CPC Article 208; Belousov 2017; 88).  Once arrested, the suspect’s information 
must then be entered inter the Universal Registry of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPI)301 and they 
must be brought before a judge to be arraigned within 72 hours.  According to article 278 (3) of 
the CPC, upon arresting a suspect the police investigator then requires a notice of suspicion from 
the prosecutor, which the prosecutor may deny on procedural grounds of legal insufficiency.  
Because of caseloads in the hundreds, prosecutors often do not return the notice of suspicion before 
the 24-hour deadline, after which the detainee must be released from police custody.  According 
to article 278 (3) of the Ukrainian CPC the apprehended person must receive a notice of suspicion 
                                                            




within 24 hours, or they are subject to release.   If the prosecutor denies the investigator the notice 
of suspicion, then the Investigator can be held criminally liable for false imprisonment [Article 
146. Illegal confinement or abduction of a person] (Belousov, 2017 90).   
This creates an important discrepancy between actual and procedural detention; where 
many suspects are physically detained, but not legally under arrest, and therefor lacking legal and 
other protections and rights.  Since police and investigators face penalties for “bad arrests” they 
have high incentives to not record arrests at the moment of detention, but only after they receive 
approval from the prosecutor for “good” arrests.  Chistyakova writes that the period between 
apprehension and formal arrest when detainees are stripped of formal rights and status is used to 
exert psychological pressure on individuals to confess (Chistyakova 2012; 145).  During this 
period where detainees “don’t exist on paper”, they are held illegally at police precincts and she 
argues that “the very fact of falling into this ‘gap of uncertainty’ proves for some so 
psychologically disabling that it is often sufficient to make the detainee confess (Chistyakova 
2012; 145).  In addition to the threat of criminal responsibility for false arrest, officers are beholden 
to rigid quantitative indicators which reward arrests and punish investigations where charges are 
dropped or an individual is acquitted.  Finally, the officer may delay the registration because they 
are personally convinced of the individuals guilt but cannot collect the needed evidence or 
testimony within the legal window and therefore engage in “noble cause corruption” (Reiner 
2010).  This trend of ‘informal arrests’ does not seem to be decreasing after the start of police 
reforms in 2015 and may in fact be increasing.  Yuriy Beluosov, an expert on criminal law and 
prosecution in Ukraine writes that 
 “In 2016, the number of apprehensions decreased by over one third (32%!) in comparison with 




cause is that a significant portion of actually apprehended persons became “invitees”, “persons 
brought to the precinct” and “witnesses”.” (Belousov, 2017 91).  
 
  The number of criminal proceedings under article 371 remain very low, in 2013- just 32 
cases were registered and 9 were sent to court with an indictment and in 2016, 59 cases were 
registered with only 13 sent to court (Ukraine PGO; Beluosov 2017; 231)  The Prosecutor 
General’s Office does publish monthly statistics on five types of crimes by law enforcement 
including torture (Criminal Code Article 127), abuse of authority (Article 364), excess of authority 
(Article 365), neglect of official duty (Article 367) and compelling a person to testify (Article 373), 
but the PGO does not publish statistics for article’s 374 and 375, which concern denials of a 
suspect’s access to defense counsel.  Upon hearing of these crimes by law enforcement the 
prosecutor should enter them into the UPRI.  The Ukrainian CPC of 2012 makes evidence obtained 
through human rights violations inadmissible, including through torture, denial of a right to 
defense, or obtaining testimony from a person not advised of their rights (Beluosov 2017; 219).  
Article 127 of the Criminal Code is the most serious charge, and carries a penalty of up to 10 years 
in prison, but is rarely proved.  In 2013, 44 offenses by the MoI (police) were registered and 5 
were sent to court with an indictment, whereas the number of torture reports decreased to 13 by 
2013, but 6 were sent to court.  As of September 2017, there were 15 charges of torture listed 
against MoI personnel, 7 of which were sent to court with proceedings (PGO).  
In contrast to torture, Criminal Code Article 365 “Excess of authority or official powers” 
specifically subsection 2 which covers police violence is a common accusation recorded by the 
PGO.  In 2013 2,808 cases were recorded by this number had decreased to 1,263.  Usually the 
preceding sent to court are less than 30 per year.  As of September 2017, 828 offenses were 
registered in the URPI and 25 were sent to the court with indictments.  Writing in 2012, Yulia 




In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Prosecutor's office refused to open a case because of 
the lack of evidence that a crime had been committed (Yakubovich 2011). Second, when 
evidence of illegal violence is difficult to deny and a decision is made to open an investigation, 
the actions of perpetrators are defined not as 'torture' but as 'exceeding authority and official 
powers' or 'intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm' In 2010, the majority (70 per cent) of 
prosecutions were for 'exceeding authority' (Amnesty International 2010). These offences carry 
significantly lesser punishment than torture (Sydorcnko 2010). (Chistyakova 2012; 146). 
This means that the real level of torture is almost certainly much higher than what is 
recorded by the Prosecutor General’s Office under Article 127, as much of Article 365 is likely 
reclassified as torture.  Indeed, the PGO’s statistics should be understood as a very low estimate 
of the actual scope of police human rights abuses as many crimes are unrecorded by police and 
prosecutors and victims are unaware of how to report, feel discouraged about any possible remedy, 
or potentially fear retaliation by the police.  Yuriy Beluosov writes “In our view, the number of 
proceedings registered by prosecution authorities in relation to gross human rights violations and 
the number of proceedings sent to court with an indictment do not reflect the scale of human rights 
violations committed by law enforcement officials” (Beluosov 2017; 244).  A recent survey study 
by the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group estimated that 96,000 people were victims of 
police torture in 2017302, although this is almost certainly a gross overestimate, the extent of police 
torture is much higher than the cases filed with or pursued by the Prosecutor General’s Office.  
Therefore, the PGO provides little deterrent to human rights abuses by law enforcement officers 
in Ukraine.  Before 2012 criminal data was compiled by the MoI, but now is compiled by the PGO 
and the State Statistical Service, but is still dubious.  For example, the number of arrests under 
article 208 decreased 32% from 2013-2016 (13,916 to 9,437) despite an increase in crime caused 
by the ongoing armed conflict and economic crisis beginning in 2014 (Beluosov 2017; 90).  
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In the rare case that the Prosecutor’s office opens criminal proceedings against a police 
officer, it has usually been on political grounds rather than legal grounds.  One of the most high-
profile cases regarding police in recent years was the case of the “BMW teens” in Kyiv shortly 
after the launch of the reformed patrol.  During the night of February 7th 2016, Patrol Police were 
engaged in a high-speed vehicle pursuit with a BMW full of teenagers speeding in the opposite 
lane in oncoming traffic.  Patrol Police officers opened fire and ultimately killed an unarmed 
passenger.303  The Patrol Police officer involved was immediately charged with premeditated 
murder by the prosecutor’s office in a move that many see as retaliation for police investigation of 
corruption in the PGO.  A recent news article quoted former National Police Chief Khatia 
Dekanoidze as saying “Police reform is the only reform that is visible, that is a real reform for 
Ukrainians,” she said. “So, when prosecutors went after those defending the lives of ordinary 
Ukrainians, “it looked like The Inquisition.”304 The charges called for by the Prosecutor resulted 
in the first ever public demonstrations in Ukraine in support of police, an event previously 
unthinkable in a country where law enforcement had been so thoroughly delegitimized305.    
This section has demonstrated that despite an abundance of criminal complaints regarding 
human rights abuses by the police including torture and false detention, the procuracy has been 
unwilling to prosecute human rights abuses committed by law enforcement.  This is largely 
because of institutional ties between the police and prosecutors and low levels of accountability of 
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prosecutors to the public.  The only recourse that the public has for pressuring prosecutors is 
through elected officials, who are far too reliant on prosecutors and law enforcement to require 
them to actively enforce human rights law.  The successful criminal prosecution of human rights 
violations committed by law enforcement personnel is necessary for creating real police 
accountability, the Ukrainian Prosecutor has recently lost the ability to bring criminal charges 
against state actors.  This is because the 2012 Criminal Procedure Code and the 2014 Law on the 
Procuracy (as well as the 1996 Constitution) stipulate the Procuracy is not supposed to be directly 
involved with pre-trial investigations of state bodies, which should be handled by the recently 
created State Bureau of Investigations, which gained the jurisdiction over all crimes committed by 
state officials, including law enforcement after the 5th year anniversary of the CPC on November 
20th, 2017. 
State Bureau of Investigations: Failure to Launch 
The attempt to create an independent investigative agency tasked with taking over pre-trial 
investigation from the PGO and investigating corruption and human rights abuses by state officials 
dates back more than a quarter century to the early years independence in the 1990’s (Monastyrski 
2017; 126). The concept of the new investigative agency was premised on the American FBI and 
envisaged the transfer of pre-trial investigation away from the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) 
to an independent body is required by the 1996 constitution, as well as both the European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (RPR).  The SBI was 
first created by presidential edict in 1997, but this was shortly declared unconstitutional for lack 
of a legal basis in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, and political infighting prevented the creation 
of the SBI for another two decades (Monastyrski 2017). The SBI is a central executive agency that 




from political influence.  The SBI will have a central office and seven regional offices throughout 
Ukraine in L’viv, Khmelnitsky, Kyiv, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Melitopol and Kramatorsk.  Officials 
plans require that the agency will have a staff of approximately 1,500, all of which must have a 
higher legal education and that no more than 49% of future employees may have previous work 
experience in the PGO or other investigative agencies (RPR 2016).  The future staff will have a 
highly competitive salary of 29,000 UAH (1,076 USD) per month which is 20 times the minimum 
wage (RPR 2016). 
The draft law on the State Bureau of Investigations was drafted by experts from the Center 
for Political and Legal Reforms and drafted in August 2013, before the Euromaidan (Krapyvin 
2015; 30).  The revised draft law was introduced to Parliament by Andrii Kozhemiakin, the chair 
of the Parliamentary Committee on Affairs concerning Law Enforcement on April 10th, 2014 
(№3042-д).  The goal of the law was to create an agency with operational and search powers, the 
power of pre-trial investigation, and crimes connected to torture by state officials, but the original 
draft failed (Krapyvin 2015; 30).  SBI was also a demand of the US and the EU who saw corruption 
as a major source of instability, particularly for foreign investment and Ukraine and in harboring 
international organized crime, however the foreign support and leverage over the process of 
creating SBI has been significantly lower than for other institutions such as the NABU and NAZK 
(Krapyvin 2015; Monastryski 2017).  This is likely because the SBI is largely a recreation of the 
PGO, where western partners have little leverage.  The Europeans and Americans have had poor 
a poor working relation with the Ukrainian PGO and have argued against recreating the 
independent police powers of the Procuracy, favoring the western system which has a clear 
division between pre-trial investigation by police and prosecution by states attorneys.  The 2012 




than comply with the CPC the creation of the SBI is an attempt to warehouse the Prosecutor’s 
investigative personnel in a new institution. 
 After years of waiting in November 2015 the Cabinet of Ministers approved a resolution 
on The State Bureau of Investigations (Derzavne Buro Rozsliduvan) which came into effect in 
March 2016.  Article 216 of the 2012 Criminal Procedure Code also establishes the State Bureau 
of Investigations as the sole agency with jurisdiction for crimes including official malfeasance, 
military crimes, crimes against justice (torture, coerced confession, miscarriage of justice), grave 
general crimes, and certain corruption crimes306 (2012 Ukrainian CPC; RPR 2016).  This mandate 
clearly empowers the SBI to investigate malfeasance by state authorities, and (in theory) eliminates 
the conflict of interest in investigations as SBI is not dependent on the Police for pre-trial 
investigations. At the same time, the broad scope and mandate to review high level corruption, 
malfeasance, and crimes against justice mean the new organization can pose substantial threats to 
current and former political elites. According to the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code, the SBI 
needed to be operational by November 20th, 2017 (the fifth-year anniversary of the adoption of the 
2012 Criminal Procedure Code) in order to have jurisdiction over crimes committed before this 
date307 yet by early November 2017 no director or staff had been selected due to disagreement by 
members on the Competition Commission who select the candidates as well as issues regarding 
verifying the administration of polygraphs for candidates.308  On November 8th, 2017, days before 
the deadline of the expiration of the PGO’s jurisdiction over these crimes, acting Prosecutor 
General Yuri Lutsenko declared that the 15,000 cases waiting to be investigated by the SBI will 
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instead be investigated by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and other law enforcement organs.  
He blamed the delay to launch the SBI on the political design of the selection commission "The 
selection commission formed by higher institutions has not coped with its work for a long time. 
From my point of view, exclusively for political reasons, I cannot name any legal reasons for such 
a sad result, or rather, its absence."309  Many speculated that the transfer of these cases to the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau was both an attempt to create amnesty for officials who would 
be subject to investigation (which they know NABU could not conduct) and another attempt by 
the PGO to further hamstring the NABU which already has hundreds of cases per investigator. 
Experts also note that the appointment process for SBI, like nearly all recruitment done by 
open competition and public commissions since 2014 is subject to political competition and legal 
challenge under existing Ukrainian legislation (Monastyrski 2016).  This challenge may come 
from candidates not chosen for the position, political leaders upset with the results of the 
competition, or outside forces seeking to stall the start of the SBI.  In late 2016, experts from the 
Reanimation Package of Reforms group raised concerns about the lack of transparency in 
independence of the competition process for the future Bureau director of the SBI, who will serve 
a 5-year term.310  “Taking into account the fact that political groups already control the PGO, the 
SBU, and the MIA, it is the SBI together with the NABU and the SAP that should become an 
outpost of investigation of corruption crimes and official malfeasances” (RPR 2017). A 
competition panel of nine, three representatives of the president, three of the Government and three 
of Parliament will make a recommendation to the President who will then appoint the Director.  
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Members of the RPR as well as others (UMDPL Digest 3) raised concerns about two members of 
the selection committee, specifically Ivan Stoyko (selected by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) 
and Vladyslav Bukhariev (selected by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) have failed to provide 
evidence their diplomas of higher legal education.  These same sources raised concerns that the 
failure of these two members to provide the necessary proof of their secondary legal education can 
jeopardize the legal standing of the bureau and any future decisions. 
Candidates for the future director were required to a polygraph and background check, and 
of 50 candidates 20 were shortlisted by early 2017 (RPR 2016). According to RPR, the Panel is 
mostly dominated by the two largest political parties from the coalition government, Petro 
Poroshenko Bloc and Narodnyi front, and lacks independent public representatives.  With five 
votes the panel can recommend a candidate to the President for Appointment, but the commission 
nearly failed to do so before the November 20th deadline of the fifth anniversary of the 2012 CPC 
(RPR).  As of early 2017 the finalist  candidates for director of SBI have been the Main Military 
Prosecutor, Anatoli Matios with 89 points (out of 100), Aleksey Gorashenkov with 69 points 
(rumored to be the favorite of the Presidential administration) and Victor Ostrayanski, the head of 
the NGO Movement for Development of Zaporozhe, with the highest score of 95.311  The process 
stalled for most of 2017 however, as the board was unable to agree on the certification for an 
official to administer the polygraph, which was only decided in October 2017.  Originally, 
Poroshenko favorite Oleksiy Goraschenko was expected to win the competition for SBI director, 
but he was eliminated by a scandal in early November 2017.  On November 16th, 2017, Roman 
Truba was appointed to be the first director of the State Bureau of Investigations with Olga 
                                                            





Varchenko and Oleksandra Buryak as deputy directors.312  Truba was a long time Prosecutor who 
had previously worked in the L’viv region and was most recently in private practice.  Lawmaker 
Mustafa Nayyem has warned that Truba is politically dependent on deputies from the People’s 
Front, specifically Sergei Pashynsky who he regularly confers with.   
Although the commission took a year and a half to decide on a candidate- activist turned 
politician Mustafa Nayyem has filed suit to cancel the results of the commission (re Appointment 
of Truba and deputy directors) and exclude two members of the commission, Vladislav Bukharev 
and Yevgeny Deidey, who do not have the required legal higher education.313  In December of 
2017 Two bills were submitted, one created by activists and experts and another created by the 
Cabinet of Ministers, but the ‘activist’ bill, drafted by Nayyem and other lawmakers was submitted 
to the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement first on December 26th 2017.  This bill 
№7450 of 2017314, called for several changes including changing the appointment process of 
investigators from the Selection Commission (thought to be staffed with politically compromised 
individuals) to a new commission which consists of one third of the members of the Citizen’s 
Control Council (Radi Hromadskoho Kontrolyu).  The bill also called for eliminating automatic 
quotas on recruiting investigators from the NPU and PGO, as well as independent authority to 
conduct wiretaps, operational-search activity, and improved logistics for SBI units the regions.315  
It is highly unlikely that this bill will gain the requisite votes to require these personnel changes in 
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time to affect the SBI.  Now that the leadership is selected the middle management and lower 
positions will be filled by the new leadership and the institution is expected to be operational by 
October 2018. 
 Due to the issues with the credentials of the selection committee and the time restraints 
created by the 2012 Criminal Procedure Code, various proponents of the SBI have argued that the 
current process for establishing the SBI should be abandoned and started anew.  Some experts, 
such as those from UMDPL and CPLR (Banchuk), argue that the SBI process is already flawed, 
corrupt, and subject to challenges that would undermine the entire organization, therefore it is 
better to begin anew.  They cite the lack of progress in the nearly 2 years since its adoption, and 
the legal and procedural limits created by the expiration of the SBI’s mandate under the 2012 CPC 
(and the low prospects for swift legislative action to correct these amendments)316.  Still, others 
such as Denis Monastyrski argue that, while flawed, the process should continue as there is no 
reason to expect future political will or expediency in passing a new law on the SBI or amending 
the criminal procedure code.317  Mustafa Nayyem raised concerns that the SBI is being influenced 
by political forces before it has been formally created.  In February of 2018 Nayyem spoke on the 
floor of Parliament:   
“The State Bureau of Investigations – this body has become political today. As far as I know, Mr. 
Truba [SBI Director Roman Truba] constantly consults with representatives of the People’s Front, 
namely Mr. Pashynsky [deputy head of the People’s Front faction Serhiy Pashynsky]. Another 
colleague of ours, Mr. Vinnyk [BPP MP Ivan Vinnyk] regularly advises Mr. Truba on political 
issues. Our colleague, Mr. Hranovsky [BPP MP Oleksandr Hranovsky] works from the other 
side,”.318 
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The creation of the SBI is complicated at several levels.  First, nearly all political leaders 
are fearful of a potential independent investigator that can investigate serious misconduct and 
corruption at the highest levels.  Second, political leaders fear the prospect of the creation of a 
powerful law enforcement organ that can be used to upset the tenuous political balance.   The use 
of law enforcement and security services against political opponents has been a reoccurring theme 
in Ukrainian politics since independence, including by President Kuchma (Levitsky and Way 
2010), through political infighting by Orange leaders during the Yushchenko years (Hedenskog 
2010), and especially after the election of Victor Yanukovych in 2010 (Kuzio 2012; Kudelia 2014).  
The current coalition government of BPP and Narodni Front has a fragile grip on power and 
tensions between the two have increased in 2016 and 2017.  It is not by coincidence that the Interior 
Ministry which control the National Police and the increasingly powerful National Guard is under 
the control of the Interior Minister from Narodni Front, while the SBU (Security Services) and 
General Prosecutor’s Office (PGO) is under control of the Petro Poroshenko Block (BPP).  The 
creation of the SBI could upset this delicate balance and inject new uncertainty into the tenuous 
political climate.  Furthermore, the SBU and the Prosecutor General as well as the National Police 
would lose jurisdiction over pretrial investigation of state officials and pre-trial investigation, and 
also resent increased scrutiny and oversight.  Due to the SBI’s mandate over law enforcement, 
particularly illegal detentions, torture, abuse and crimes committed by law enforcement during 
mass protests, it is not surprising that is has received little support from either law enforcement or 
political forces who are concerned about their relations with law enforcement and rising crime 
rates.    Finally, both external donors and the Ukrainian public have failed to consistently push for 
the creation of the SBI in the way that they have for reform of police or NABU, likely because the 




cynicism (Carnegie 2017).   According to Dennis Monastyrski, a legal expert at the Ukrainian 
Institute for the Future and a member of the Selection Commission, public support and political 
attention to the SBI has been minimal since its enactment in 2016, and it has failed to receive the 
same critical international support and leverage requiring insulation as the Patrol Police and the  
National Anti-Corruption Bureau NABU.319  Western donors have not been interested in the 
establishment of the SBU because they have less leverage over the development and disagree with 
a prosecutorial police system.  This is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the establishment of 
the SBI is ripe for political competition and patrimonialism, it lacks the insulation provided by 
western donors that was critical in the establishment of the Patrol Police and the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau. 
Human Rights Department and Police Ombudsman’s Office 
Several departments have been created within the National Police since reform to address 
the issues of human rights abuses, particularly in places of detention.  During the Yushchenko 
administration the Human Rights Monitoring Department was created in 2008 to monitor the 
actions of Ukrainian police in accordance with internal regulations, national law, and human rights 
norms.  After the election of Victor Yanukovych in 2010 the MIA the new Minister eliminated 
this department on short notice, and many of the personnel created a private NGO called Ukrainian 
Monitors for arrestees, human rights, and the activities of law enforcement organs Rights 
(UMDPL) which independently provides report and analysis of law enforcement in Ukraine.320 
This department seems to have been reformed in the Spring of 2017 by the Interior Ministry in 
order to “to monitor, study and analyze the problematic issues related to violations of human rights 
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in the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ….in accordance with international standards in 
the field of law enforcement activities”321. The new department will be headed by Tetyana 
Kovalchuk, deputy Interior Minister. 
In 2016, then Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze announced the creation of a Police 
Ombudsman which would be responsible for ensuring observance of human rights in police 
facilities, as well as educating the police and public on human rights practices.322 The 
Ombudsman323 is also known as “The Department for Provision of Human Rights” (Управління 
забезпечення прав людини Національної поліції України– УЗПЛ) and also has a training role, 
and provides human rights trainings to law enforcement throughout Ukraine. This program was 
set up with assistance from the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM) which 
assisted with strategic advice and training of personnel324.  In addition to inspecting places of 
detention the Human Rights department can advocate for changes in police practice.  For example, 
in conjunction with activists from the Group ‘Police Under Control’ the department helped to 
secure the closure of small detention rooms in Kyiv’s metro system that were being used to detain 
drunks325.  It is unclear to what extent this department will duplicate the functions of the National 
Preventative Mechanism and the MoI’s human rights monitoring department, and whether police 
will be more effective or independent in their investigations of places of detention than will NPM 
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officials and activists.   A series of conferences on oversight of the civilian security sector held by 
the Geneva DCAF and the Ukrainian Thinktank, “Razumkov Center” argued that the mandate and 
powers of the human rights departments created within the NPU and MiA should be clearly 
outlined in legislation rather than internal legislation, and should not overlap with the powers of 
the Parliamentary Ombudsman or the NPM (DCAF 2017 A &B).  Furthermore, they argued that 
the departments should be more proactive in pursuing investigations initiated by public complaint.  
Finally, they argued that dual subordination has the potential to create institutional confusion. 
“Currently, the Human Rights Department is directly subordinate to the head of the National 
Police. A ‘double subordination’ to both the head of the National Police and the Parliamentary 
Commissioner could provide a certain degree of independence for the Human Rights 
Department. However, such a ‘double subordination’ bears the risk of creating more 
bureaucracy and confusion in terms of reporting lines”. (DCAF 2017A). 
 Indeed, the proliferation of hastily planned civil oversight lacking a legal basis, a strategic 
plan, institutional transparency to the public is a common concession to public pressure rather 
than part of scandal-reform cycles that occur throughout the world (Ungar 2011).   When these 
institutions duplicate the functions of other oversight institutions they can even decrease the 
overall accountability by confusing complainants and withholding information from other 
agencies. 
Accountability for Police Corruption 
NABU 
 The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), while solely concerned with Law 
Enforcement, will also have oversight over matters of high level corruption and its rapid 
establishment and success provides an interesting contrast to the failures of the SBI.  NABU has 
jurisdiction over corruption crimes in excess of 689,000 UAH (approximately $25,000 USD) 




(DVB) or the newly created SBI.  NABU was created after the failure of the National Anti-
Corruption Committee, created under the Tymoshenko government in 2009, was largely 
considered to be a failure due to its inactivity and lack of political independence.  The launch of 
NABU has generally been regarded as a success by both Ukrainian and international observers 
following considerable pressure from the IMF and Western donors for insulation from political 
influence.  The law creating NABU was adopted in October of 2014 (№1698-VII.) and followed 
swiftly by two Presidential Decrees (217 and 218 of 2015) and the appointment of Artem Sytnyk 
as the director of NABU.  Sytnyk, a former Prosecutor, quickly hired a staff of 541 (of the 
maximum legal amount of 700 personnel) through a competitive and transparent process (NABU 
2017; 38).  According to the most recent bi-annual NABU report in February 2017 NABU has 264 
open proceedings, 69 indictments and 12 convictions in less than 2 years of operation.  In addition, 
NABU has recovered 601.94 million UAH, 7.41 million Euros, 80.16 million USD as well as 
property and business titles from corrupt individuals and organizations (NABU 2017; 12).  Many 
of these investigations have been based on the new electronic state procurement system (E-Zorro) 
and the required electronic public declarations for all civil servants and elected officials in Ukraine.  
Furthermore, NABU is at the forefront of transparency, answering over 15,000 requests from 
individuals and NGO’s in 2016, and is accountable to the Civil Oversight Council, a five-member 
organization elected by online vote which oversees NABU’s activities including personnel 
decisions (NABU 2017; 29).  Despite the early success of NABU, observers are concerned over 
the lack of political will and delays in creating the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor and the 
Special Anti-Corruption Court, both of which will be essential to independent and effective 
corruption prosecution in Ukraine.  In summer 2017, President Poroshenko seemed to back away 




protests sparked by his former ally and previous president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili have 
demanded the creation of the special Anti-Corruption Court, in addition to lifting parliamentary 
immunity and reform of the healthcare system as core demands.326  
What factors explain the difference in success between the establishment and success of 
the SBI and NABU?  The most likely explanation is that NABU was a higher priority for western 
donors who demanded that NABU be established and recruited via a meritocratic process.  Also, 
NABU was institutionalized and operational much earlier than the SBI, when momentum for 
reforms and pressure from international lenders and donors was greatest.  Despite the fact that 
NABU has not primarily focused on law enforcement as part of its investigations (likely due to the 
fact that NABU is primarily interested in grand corruption rather than petty corruption), it has 
taken on politically sensitive targets including state owned enterprises, high ranking state officials, 
and most recently the Interior Minister’s son.327 The transparent establishment, political insulation, 
and civilian oversight of NABU show that the establishment of a law enforcement organization 
with a sensitive mandate is possible in a highly corrupt environment.   
Policies and Organizational Changes 
One of the first steps in Ukrainian police reform began with the liquidation of notoriously 
corrupt and abuse units such as Berkut and GUBOZ (State Directorate for Combatting Organized 
Crime) in 2014 and OBNON (Department for Combatting Narcotics Crimes) in 2016.  Though 
these units have formally been disbanded, experts note that most of these personnel continue to 
work in the National Police and that the work has been assumed by other units in the Criminal 
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Block of the National Police (Krapyvin 2017)328 In January 2017 the NPU announced the abolition 
of the tax police, a notoriously corrupt institution involved in racketeering and extorting businesses 
and wealthy individuals.  While the abolition of the tax police is an important step, a recent report 
argues that other security agencies have quickly moved to “fill the void in terms of rent-seeking” 
left by the abolished tax police (Chatham House 2017 p46).  In November of 2017, Ukrainian 
lawmakers signed into effect the unfortunately named, “Mask-y show stop” law.  Recall that in 
Ukraine, the ‘Mask-y show’ is a practice used by law enforcement to raid businesses with special 
police forces who are usually wearing masks.  During these raids they often seize crucial 
documents or computer servers of the business on the grounds of tax evasion and demand 
repayment for the return of the equipment.  In December, a new law came into effect to address 
the issues which aims to protect businesses during police raids by requiring that those subject to a 
raid receive a specific receipt of all items vouchered that will be entered into the UPRI.  It also 
requires for all searches to be filmed in order to be admissible in court, and further bans the removal 
of hard disks, computers and phones except in limited circumstances prescribed by law.329  In spite 
of this law, a ‘Maski-Show’ style raid was conducted at opposition media company ‘Vesti’ in 
February 2018.330 
By far one of the most important reforms made by the police administration was Khatia 
Dekanoidze’s decision to vastly reduce the amount of police-detention (ITT) centers in Ukraine.  
In 2016 the number of ITT detention centers was decreased 2.5 times from 340 to 144 and staff 
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was cut by nearly 40%.331    Technology has also played a central role in increasing police 
accountability.  Many Patrol Police are fitted with body cameras that record interactions with 
citizens and new methods of electronically registering fines for traffic and parking offenses greatly 
limit opportunities for corruption and new police stations will have electronic monitoring of 
interrogation rooms and detention centers.  Ukraine has also been attempting for years to introduce 
automatic “fixation” (traffic violations cameras) and several bills are in Parliament to this effect.  
Automatic recording of traffic violations was struck down by Ukraine’s Supreme Court in 2010.  
Advocates argue that Ukraine is the only country in Europe without automatic fixation of traffic 
violations and that under the current CPC without the necessary technology, police are unable to 
hold traffic violators accountable.332  Advocates hope that the launch of a new highway Patrol 
Police will improve the situation of road safety in Ukraine.  On Thursday December 21st the Rada 
approved a package of amendments to legislation (№5364) that would allow for the use of video 
fixation and sending tickets by mail to drivers.333   The system will begin working in Kyiv in 2018.  
Road safety remains a major concern in Ukraine and Interior Minister Avakov claimed that the 
number of Ukrainians killed in traffic accidents in 2016 was four times larger than the number 
killed in the war in Donbas.334  Scandal also created the conditions for a bill on reform of traffic 
fines to move forward in the Parliament in late 2017.  Following a highly publicized incident in 
which a 20-year-old motorist in Kharkiv hit pedestrians, killing six and injuring five, the 
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Verkhovna Rada moved to implement new rules increasing fines for traffic violations and illegal 
parking.335336 
The 2015 Law on National Police for the first time ever exhaustively detailed and the 
specific use of force allowed by officers of the National Police including physical coercion 
(unarmed force-Article 43) coercive measures (Article 44), special means and impact munitions 
(Article 45) and firearms (Article 46).  Samuel Walker notes that state of the art use of force 
policies are one of the most important accountability reforms and are standard practice in all US 
Department of Justice Consent Decrees (Walker 2014).  Furthermore, the Law on National Police 
also requires that police officers immediately render emergency medical aid to persons subject to 
police force (Article 43, Section 4), a standard not currently required by any US police 
departments.  The NPU has also been working with international advisors, particularly from the 
US based ICITAP to implement a new use of force policy into the bylaws for Ukrainian police, 
and better internal reporting systems for police management.  Currently the investigation of use of 
force incidents is largely left to the Prosecutor, and the internal affairs department (DVB) may or 
may not choose to initiate an investigation into use of force, although critics note that internal 
affairs is primarily focused on corruption and administrative infractions by police officers.   
 The NPU has also formally committed to reforming the abuse of qualitative indicators as 
a management tool, a practice that experts argue has led to refusal to report crimes, coerced 
confessions, violations of due process, and other human rights abuses (Chistyakova 2012; 
Krapyvin 2016).  These quantitative measures [this topic was covered in length in Chapter 4] are 
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known in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union as the ‘stick system’ or ‘tally system’ 
(polochnaya systema) (Paneyakh 2014).   The 2015 Law on National Police 2015 Law on National 
Police dictates that the main criterion for assessing work of police is the level of public trust in 
police, conducted by an independent sociological service (Section 3 Article 11).  The issue has 
been that the National Police still has not agreed on who will administer this survey and what 
methodology will be used to determine public trust and approval.  Experts such as Yevhen 
Krapyvin from UMDPL have warned that without input from civil society and the expert 
community, the use of public opinion polling will either be ineffective or can entrench the human 
rights abuses allowed under current quantitative measures.  The Reanimation Package of Reforms 
participated in drafting a resolution on approving a new methodology for measuring the level of 
trust, however RPR and others argued that the first working group excluded civil society so the 
MiA created a second working group in October 2017 that included more outsiders including 
academics and professional sociological poll services337 (Ukrainian Law Enforcement Reform 
Digest No. 2 & 3; 2017).  
Department of Internal Security (Internal Affairs) 
The Department of Internal Security (Department Vnutrishnoy Bezpeki)338 was created in 
1992 to combat rising involvement of law enforcement in criminality.  Previously, DVB had also 
been accused of criminality and extorting local police in order to not enforce sanctions and open 
investigations339.  It was formally reorganized in 2011 and again reestablished by Ministry Decree 
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№887 and internal NPU order in late 2015.340  According to the official website of DVB, the main 
task two tasks of DVB are.   
1. The development and implementation of measures for the internal security of the 
National Police of Ukraine.  
2. The detection, prevention, and suppression of criminal offenses and corruption, prepared 
or committed by employees and departments of the National Police of Ukraine which 
obstruct them from the performance of their official duties.341 
 
The central activities of the DVB are prevention, detection, and suppression of illegal activities as 
well as analysis and implementation of policy and enforcement of internal discipline.   The NPU 
relies heavily on DVB to be involved in the process of candidate investigation vetting police in 
order to prevent infiltration by criminals and foreign agents in the NPU.  The DVB is also 
responsible for the detection of threats to law enforcement, their relatives, and departmental 
property.  Although members of the KhPRG participated in drafting the decree342 reforming DVB, 
they wrote a memo criticizing the final Ministry resolution establishing DVB on the grounds that 
the interregional status is inconsistent with the Law on National Police, the role of subordination 
between the DVB, NPU, and the MoI, the legal authority to conduct pre-employment checks on 
prospective candidates, and the failure for a concrete mechanism for investigating human rights 
abuses by police.343   
 The Head of DVB is appointed by the Chief of NPU with the approval of the Interior 
Minister and November Fall 2015, Chief of Police Khatia Dekanoidze called on the former head 
of Georgia’s Patrol Police and National Police, Giorgi Grigalashvili to lead the department.344  
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Grigalashvili was granted Ukrainian citizenship by President Poroshenko to take the position but 
resigned in April of 2016 and was replaced by his deputy, Yevgeny Koval.  According to 
Grigalashvili there was a large turnover in the staff of DVB during his tenure and the department 
was staffed with the highly experienced and qualified candidates with higher education hand 
selected by him.  After 2015 DVB was removed from dual subordination to the regional police 
directorate (GUNP) and the Chief, and instead became an ‘interregional’ territorial organ of the 
National Police which answered solely to the Chief of National Police.  He noted that this increased 
independence and autonomy in picking his staff allowed the department to become much more 
active and to dramatically increase the number of investigations and eventual convictions.  The 
DVB Can initiate investigations based on claims from the public or police personnel about police 
misconduct and often conducts operations with General Inspection of the National Police.   These 
cases can then result in internal discipline or can be forwarded to the Prosecutor General’s Office 
for criminal conviction.  In a 2017 interview Dekanoidze stated that the Prosecutor General’s 
Office often refused to cooperate with DVB in the prosecution of corruption related crimes.    She 
stated that although Ukraine’s DVB initiated 1,000 cases in the year that she was chief, only 203 
cases were pursued by prosecutor because of a lack of cooperation and inaction by the largely 
unreformed prosecutor’s office.345  
 Despite poor cooperation between DVB and the Prosecutor’s Office, DVB increased its 
cooperation with NABU and the State Security Service (SBU) since 2015.  Under Ukrainian 
legislation, the DVB lacks the powers of ‘operational search activity’ (covert activity) so it is 
limited in investigations, but during the tenure of Grigalashvili the department adopted new 
                                                            





methods of working with the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) and NABU for operational 
activity such as searches and electronic surveillance.  The department is also limited by Ukrainian 
legislation which does not allow police to entice officers into corruption through ‘sting’ operations 
or ‘integrity checks’ that would entrap corrupt police, so instead they have to rely on police 
informants within the police and public tips.  The NPU has created and heavily advertised a 
corruption reporting hotline which has received thousands of tips.  The DVB also played an 
important role in sharing intelligence with commissions during attestation regarding the history 
and criminality of former Militsiya, however due to privacy and civil service laws, only members 
of the National Police were able to view this data on police records and investigations.   Despite 
the secretive nature of internal affairs departments and the reluctance to release general data on 
their work including amount of investigations, discipline, and prosecutions, the DVB is quite 
active on social media and publicizes the details of many of its raids including officers, crimes 
committed and photographs.  The DVB has been involved in several high-profile cases recently 
including firing the Chief of Police for the Dnipro Region in May 2017346, police running a 
protection racket of a brothel347.  In September 2017 the DVB in conjunction with the SBU and 
PGO arrested the head of the Protection Police, Police General Budnik on charges of accepting a 
large bribe, but the General was later reinstated by a court the following month348.  One criticism 
of the DVB is that is it principally concerned with corruption and internal administrative offenses 
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and is not concerned with investigating human rights abuses by police, but eventually this function 
could be taken over by the SBI.  Others have speculated that the use of highly publicized 
‘spectacle’ cases of corruption is merely a publicity stunt and fails to scratch the surface of 
systemic corruption in law enforcement.  Grigalashvili noted that the measure of the effectiveness 
of DVB should not be focused on the amount of punitive measures it enacts, but rather prevention.  
He notes that the key to combatting corruption is the removal of incentives and opportunities to 
corruption through prevention mechanisms, better monitoring, increased use of technology, and 
better compensation and job security for police officers.  The extensive reforms conducted in DVB 
became a political possibility because of the infusion of new outside leadership and the political 
independence of DVB. 
New Law on Police Discipline Status №4670 (2017) 
 Another major development in increasing police accountability was the passage of the Law 
on Police Disciplinary Status which regulates discipline procedures for police.  Critics argued that 
the previous internal police disciplinary regulation from 2006 has several major shortcomings 
including allowing for broad impunity, not allowing any process for public involvement, no 
procedure for allowing officers to disobey an illegal order (Krapyvin 2017).  Furthermore, the 
current system allows for supervisors to manipulate subordinates through the threat of arbitrary 
punishment which the officer has no right to challenge.  These sanctions can include the 
withholding of pay, transfer to undesirable assignments, and other punishments.  A similar system 
exists in the Prosecutor’s Office where these actions are a major source of pressure on prosecutors 
by their supervisors to maintain “good” stats and to influence politically sensitive cases.  Chain of 
command responsibility is a major issue in Ukraine’s police, and activists argue that to improve 




supervisor responsibility for subordinate’s actions.  They argue that because supervisors are held 
accountable for the actions of their subordinates, misconduct is rarely reported because those 
responsible for reporting (ie Management) would also be sanctioned.349  
 In November 2016 The Ukrainian Parliament approved a reading of the amendments to 
bill No. 4670 “On the Disciplinary Statue of the National Police” with 248 votes350.  The law had 
been developed with input from experts from the Reanimation Package of Reforms and the human 
rights community participated in the drafting of amendments to a second bill, after the first was 
criticized.  These included allowing for a public complaint procedure, including a list of mitigating 
or aggravating circumstance for disciplinary responsibility, and a list of procedural rights and 
guarantees for police subject to disciplinary procedures.351 Perhaps most importantly the 
amendments allow for the creation of disciplinary commissions that may include members of the 
public, although these commissions have been established (Article 15).  Other experts argue that 
it failed to meet European standards for police discipline and that its vagueness and lack of codified 
protections for police officers will not stem the issue of police impunity and illegal orders by 
superiors (Banchuk 2017).352 The law was finally passed in April 2018 and will allow for 
disciplinary commissions which may (but are not required to) include members of the public.  This 
reform has not yet been implemented but could be a major step towards both protecting the rights 
of police officers and improving police accountability to the public. 
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 This chapter has examined recent attempts to improve police accountability for public 
safety and controlling police malfeasance through the creation of new institutions, reform of 
existing institutions, and adaptation of internal and external practices.  Since the Maidan, activists 
have increasingly exercised social control over police through a variety of means by recording 
police interactions, monitoring of individual officer’s financial declarations and social media, and 
even practices adopted from other countries such as ‘cop watch’.353  Civil society has been 
effective at winning small victories in having certain police officers or commanders removed, 
however societal actors lack the scope and resources to implement sustainable accountability 
which will have to come from independent state institutions.  The case of accountability reforms 
shows that despite the creation of new institutions such as the SBI, in the absence of political 
insulation these institutions are quickly repurposed for political infighting and future use as 
administrative resources against political opponents.  Poor working relations between the 
Prosecutor’s Office and the National Police as well as the trend towards politicization of the SBI 
means that external oversight through state institutions and courts is unlikely in the near future.  
Prosecutorial data does not show a significant change in the scale of or investigation of human 
rights abuses by law enforcement (Beluosov 2017).  Within the police, the most important 
accountability reform has been the reform of internal affairs (DVB) which was only possible 
because of a outside leadership change prompted by Georgians and political insulation.  Despite 
DVB’s relative success, poor cooperation by Prosecutors and procedural limits on operative 
activity needed to conduct their own investigations keeps internal affairs from being as effective 
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as possible.  With the exception of the Human Rights monitoring department there are no internal 
police initiatives to handle human rights abuses.  As is common in police organizations around the 
world, internal police accountability is generally focused on corruption rather than human rights 
issues.  Most importantly the failure of the State Bureau Investigation to launch due to political 
competition and attempts to capture the nascent organization through staffing have ensured that 
there will be little effective prosecutorial oversight of serious police misconduct for the foreseeable 
future. This chapter has demonstrated that corruption has often blocked most accountability 
reforms and, in the cases, where new institutions are created, particularly powerful institutions 
such as the State Bureau of investigation, there have been subject to political capture and 
competition that has delayed their launch.  The only success case of creating oversight has been 
the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, which has political insulation and oversight by civil society, 
but lacks the ability to effectively prosecute high level corruption in the absence of an independent 
anti-corruption prosecutor or high corruption court.  The failure of accountability reform to 
seriously reduce corruption or human rights abuses by law enforcement should not be surprising 
given the low political will for institutional reform in Ukraine today.  This situation may change 
in the future in the event of another scandal or perhaps following a political upheaval.  As this 
chapter has shown, while these stimuli can create the window for institutional reform, for reforms 
to become sustainable they require support from international actors, insulation and oversight by 






Chapter 7: Community Relations Reforms 
Intro 
 The relationship between police and the public is an essential part of legitimate democratic 
government.  This chapter will discuss police community relations by looking at the weakness of 
community policing reform efforts in Ukraine and by considering the relationship between the 
police and the public.  Community police reform in Ukraine has arisen out of pressure from local 
civil society and community organizations and to some extent international support for promoting 
greater contact between the Patrol Police and the public but has failed to be become a major priority 
for the police or political leaders.  Community policing reforms are often proposed as effective 
measures to combat rising crime and low levels of public trust in policing.  Furthermore, unlike 
other reforms discussed in previous chapters, promoting community policing is less politically 
sensitive because it does not require attacking patrimonial staffing, corruption networks, or 
unpopular legislation.  There are also less veto players in implementing community policing since 
it rarely requires major legislative reform and typically does not threaten elite interests.  As this 
chapter will show, the failure to implement large scale community policing reform is less a matter 
of corruption, insecurity or political competition but is instead the inability to generate sufficient 
will of political elites and police leadership to reorient police strategy.  The inability to generate 
and sustain reform coalitions is in turn a result of low levels of public trust in the police and low 
levels of legitimacy, which are based in the long legacy of corruption, abuse, politicization and 
other forms of police malfeasance. This chapter demonstrates that while the biggest barrier for 
generating the will for political elites and police leadership is the lack of a reform coalition and 
uncertain political dividends for investing in community police reform, for the public the greatest 




feelings of insecurity by Ukrainians.  The quantitative data and statistical analysis in presented in 
the section of this chapter demonstrates that if political leaders, the MoI and the National Police 
were to seriously invest in community policing programs, they could go a long way towards 
combatting public perceptions of insecurity and rebuilding public trust in Ukrainian police.  The 
next section introduces the brief and largely unsuccessful history of community police reform in 
Ukraine. 
Community Policing in Ukraine 
 Community Policing is a philosophical approach towards policing which emphasizes 
increased communication and cooperation between police and communities, identifying and 
addressing local concerns, proactive approaches towards crime, and maintaining a visible police 
presence in communities.  Community policing varies largely in its implantation but at its core is 
a set of policing practices such as increasing foot patrols, increased informal contacts with citizens, 
focusing on prevention, and holding community meetings with citizens.  Over its history Ukraine 
has had several attempts at community policing dating back to the Soviet period and in the 
independence period. The largest community policing program in Ukraine’s history was 
Khrushchev’s “Druzhiniki” (friend) program which sought to rebuild public trust in Soviet police 
after the terror of the Stalin years and a series of major police scandals (Shelley 1996).  1960’s 
“Druzhiniki”354 program of the 1960’s organized citizen volunteers to participate in civilian led or 
joint patrols with police to combat ills such as public consumption of alcohol, unruly youth, or 
illegal street trading (Shelley 1996).  This program mobilized hundreds of thousands of Soviet 
citizens to take part in patrols, but it faced both compulsory involuntary recruitment often through 
work places, neighborhood associations or Communist Youth leagues (KOMSOMOL), and 
                                                            




frequently targeted political crimes rather than crimes which affect community safety.   This 
program was largely abandoned after Khrushchev left office.    
The next serious attempt to implement community policing in Ukraine came from a British 
Council funded “context driven community policing” experiment in Kharkov in 2002.  This 
program was started as a research and pilot project as a collaboration between the Kharkov 
National University of Internal Affairs (NAVS) and the British Council in Kyiv to study the 
suitability of community policing in the Ukrainian Context (Beck & Chistyakova 2003).  The 
program largely consisted of a reorganization of two police district offices in Kharkov to reorient 
their personnel towards proactive patrolling, the establishment of neighborhood watch schemes, 
setting up public meetings, implementing a strategy of “target hardening” and burglary reduction, 
and the development of school liaisons and a public outreach campaign (Beck & Chistyakova 
2003).  While the report was optimistic in the potential for improving public trust and safety 
through community policing and improved public cooperation, it was largely abandoned after the 
study was concluded and never implemented beyond Kharkov.  Like many pilot project, once the 
initial public relations benefits had been reaped and the foreign funding ended, the police and MoI 
reverted to their previous way operating. 
 After the Euromaidan community policing again was proposed as a possible solution to the 
crisis of legitimacy facing Ukrainian policing, particularly by Ukrainian civil society groups and 
international actors.  Community policing was mentioned as both a goal and strategy of reform in 
MoI official plans, proposals by civil society, and in the Law on National Police (MVS 2014; 
KhPG 2014).  The most substantial increase in community policing efforts has been the revamp 
of the Patrol Police who increase citizen contact exponentially compared to their predecessor the 




number of emergency calls to Ukraine’s 102 service reached an all-time high in 2015 after the 
launch of Patrol Police and there was a large increase in citizen contacts through foot patrols as 
well as bicycle patrols for the first time ever in large Ukrainian cities.  Still, Patrol Police has been 
limited to 32 of Ukraine’s largest cities and has not meaningfully affected the relationship between 
police and the community outside of these areas.  The ill-fated “Sambir” program sponsored by 
the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) mentioned in Chapter 1 which sought to redeploy 
Militsiya personnel in the regions to become more responsive was abandoned by summer 2017.   
 Inside of the Patrol Police the largest effort to increase community policing has been the 
creation of the “Community Policing Department” within the Patrol Police that administers the 
school policing program in Ukraine.  This school policing program was developed with American 
and Canadian advisors and was based off the Canadian “school resource officer” model which 
seeks to provide schools with access to police services but also to introduce children to law 
enforcement from a young age.  This department currently has less than 100 personnel throughout 
all of Ukraine but has been successful in raising the profile of Patrol Police amongst youth given 
its limited scope.  Outside of the Community Policing department which has largely been focused 
on its school program, there has been no systemic effort to implement other community policing 
programs on the part of the National Police.  There are still no official forums between police and 
community boards or local government and the meetings seem to occur ad-hoc rather than through 
a systemic plan.   
 Instead, civil society organizations, often with financing and grants from international 
NGO’s such as the International Renaissance Fund (IRF) and the International Research Exchange 
Council (IREX) have supported smaller programs to educate the public about police reform and 




Patrol Police have cooperated in these programs in most cities, but they have failed to develop 
their own initiatives and have treated community policing as a lower priority than maintaining 
emergency response. 
Local civil society organizations, usually human rights organizations but sometimes 
advocacy groups for women or disabled people or local neighborhood associations have instead 
taken initiative in conceiving of and designing community policing organizations.  These local 
civil society groups in turn petition international funders for grants to implement these programs.  
The International Renaissance Foundation had annual competitions since 2015 for local 
organizations working on community policing projects.  In 2016 they supported a local 
organization in Kyiv that was working on educating drivers about incorrect parking by leaving 
placards in the window that said, “Next time, I’ll park by the Rules”.355  A local organization in 
Vinnitsa received a grant to educate police about the needs of the local deaf community, and in 
Kovvel local activists partnered with Patrol Police to address the local issue of stray animals 
roaming the streets.  Whereas IRF has largely decentralized its approach to local activists to 
identify their own priorities for community policing, IREX and the INL have attempted larger 
national programs. 
In 2016 IREX in conjunction with the US State Department’s INL Office and the IDLO 
funded a public outreach program called “My New Police: Community Support to Ukrainian 
Police Reform” to raise awareness about the new police reform and build public support.  The 
program organized events where they offered local communities a presentation about the goals of 
the reform, asked them about their greatest community issues, and had Patrol Police 
                                                            





representatives present to meet the community.  The program boasted 203 events at 46 libraries 
throughout Ukraine.  The meetings drew over 7,760 Ukrainians and 558 police officers over 
several months.  Following the information campaign, IREX has attempted to implement 
neighborhood watch programs in high rise apartment complexes that cooperated with Patrol Police 
and district officers (Dilnichi).  This program began in Vinnitsa in Spring 2017 and saw a series 
of meetings between residents and the police to discuss local issues about crime, unsafe driving, 
and public disorder in their communities.  IREX took the lead in organizing these events and 
planned to expand the program throughout Ukraine, but without the active commitment of the 
NPU and the MoI to prioritize community policing it is unlikely that these programs will expand 
beyond pilots. 
Several factors impede the development of community policing in Ukraine including low 
political will from political elites or police officials, unclear and vague reform plans, the deficit of 
police personnel which makes adding non-essential services like community policing difficult, and 
strong public distrust of the police.  The next section explains in detail the source of this distrust 
using quantitative data from a massive Ukrainian survey in 2016 about attitudes toward the police 
and tests several hypotheses both from policing literature and from Ukrainian politics literature 
about public attitudes towards the police. 
Community-Police Relations 
 Public attitudes towards the police (ATP) give insight into how the public evaluates the 
quality of policing, what needs to be improved, and indeed the quality of the state that they live in 
with a strong relationship between support for the police and support for the legal and political 
order (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Caparini and Marenin 2004).  Government’s typically conduct 




government and to stave off calls for greater institutional oversight and change (Sherman 1978).  
In addition to increasing state legitimacy and lawful behavior by citizens (Tyler 2003) police 
reforms that increase the level of public trust can lead to cooperation between police and the public 
through reporting of crimes and participation in community policing programs, both of which 
should further increase the ability of the police to provide essential protection services. 
   Ukraine’s decision to prioritize police reform following the Euromaidan social movement 
in 2014 was a result of both public outrage at rampant corruption and violence against protesters 
by Ukrainian law enforcement, and an attempt to show the Ukrainian public that the government 
can implement western-style reforms (Friesendorf 2017).  While Ukrainians and outside observers 
have been generally disappointed in the slow pace of reforms since 2014 (Carnegie 2017), the 
launch of a new Patrol Police (following the Georgian experience of 2004) and other changes in 
the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) have been described by some as the “first real institutional 
reform success in the country” (Peacock and Cordner 2016; 86).  
 This chapter explores the evolving relationship between the public and the police in 
Ukraine by looking at what factors effect public trust in the National Police Ukraine, and how 
public trust in the police might be improved through continued reforms and the emergence of 
community policing programs in Ukraine.  To explore these issues, this chapter looks at survey 
from a 2016 nation-wide survey of public attitudes towards the police in Ukraine.  This survey, 
conducted in May of 2016 less than a year after the start of police reform (summer/fall 2015) was 
the largest (N10,250) and only police specific survey to cover all of Ukraine’s 24 administrative 
regions (Oblasts)356.  The survey asked respondents about their levels of trust in the National Police 
of Ukraine and their predecessor (the Militsiya), questions about what they had heard and what 
                                                            




they expected from reform, socio-demographic questions (language of comfort, age, gender, 
education, etc.), questions about their perceptions of safety in their neighborhood, and questions 
about their recent experiences with police.  This survey was largely based on western crime 
surveys, such as the British Crime Survey, which assume that attitudes toward police is a result of 
specific attributes of the respondent, performance of the police in providing order and security in 
their community, and experiences of the police (Beck and Chistyakova 2004; Taylor and Sunshine 
2009).  Given the contentious nature of politics in Ukraine and often sharp divisions between 
territorial, linguistic, and generational groups in Ukraine; this survey study in Ukraine might 
provide insight into whether the same variables thought to affect attitudes towards the police (ATP) 
in a Western context work the same way in Ukraine.  In other words, do Ukrainians base their 
evaluations of the police based off perceptions of police performance in their communities and 
experiences with the police, or are their attitudes formed by personal characteristics such as 
demographic and regional factors?  The survey results may also provide important insights not 
only into Ukrainian’s attitudes towards the police, but their expectations and evaluations of one of 
the few tangible post-Euromaidan reforms. 
Background 
 Ukraine’s law enforcement structures have historically been very unpopular with the 
Ukrainian public due to authoritarian legacies from the Soviet Union and Tsarist times, rampant 
corruption and predation on Ukrainians for bribes, involvement with organized crime, abuse and 
surveillance of protesters and political opponents, involvement in political prosecutions, and the 
general inability to provide adequate protection and justice for victims of crime (Beck 2005; 
Chistyakova 2011; Foglesong and Solomon 2001 69-70; Shelley 1998).  Several major scandals 
have further diminished the public’s trust in Ukrainian law enforcement and these scandals have 




Ministry Officials (MoI) were accused of assassinating an independent journalist, Georgi 
Gongadze, on orders of former President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) (Levitsky and Way 2010).  
Other major scandals include the death of 20 year-old student Ihor Indylo in police custody in Kyiv 
in 2010 (Amnesty 2011) and the brutal gang rape of a woman by police357 in Vradiyivka (Mykolaiv 
Oblast) in 2013 which resulted in furious villagers storming the local Militsiya precinct.  Public 
opinion of police reached its Nadir following the Euromaidan where an estimated 80 protesters 
were killed, mostly by law enforcement. A 2014 poll found that only 3-5% of the Ukrainian public 
trusted the Militsiya (up from 0.8 percent after the Euromaidan) and only 3% of police officers 
trusted the government.358  In the early days of the new government in Ukraine, plans were laid 
for reform of law enforcement including the establishment of a New Patrol police, recertification 
(vetting- known in Ukraine as “re-attestation”) of all former Militsiya personnel, and cooperation 
with civil society in police recruitment, training, and oversight (Peacock and Cordner 2016).  
Technocrats who had overseen Georgia’s police reform were invited to form the new National 
Police of Ukraine and thousands of young Ukrainians without prior law enforcement experience 
were recruited into the new Patrol Police which began operating in Kyiv in July, 2015.  By early 
2016, Patrol Police had been established in 32 cities throughout Ukraine, including in the conflict 
zone (“ATO”) in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.   
 Beyond its symbolic value, public trust in police plays a central role in the reform of the 
NPU and the 2015 Law on National Police, which created police, article 11 states that “3. The 
level of public trust and confidence in the Police will be the main criterion for the assessment of 
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https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine--rape-police-arrested/25035492.html 
358 2014 poll by Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine- cited in Ukrainian Ministry of Internal 





performance of its forces and units.”359    Initial reactions to the new police were extremely positive 
with over 82% of Kyiv respondents expressing satisfaction and public emergency calls up 70% 
within the first few weeks of Patrol (Peacock and Cordner 2016; 84).  In April and May of 2016, 
the first wave of a National Police Survey was administered throughout Ukraine by the Kyiv 
International Institute for Sociology (KIIS).  The survey asked respondents about their views of 
the Militsiya, the newly established NPU, their experiences of safety in their neighborhood, and 
their experiences of contact with the police in the last year.  The survey found that the public still 
largely distrusted the Militsiya and that less than 19% of Ukrainians trusted the Militsiya fully or 
partly, that nearly 44% of Ukrainians trusted the National Police fully or partly.  Whereas 70% of 
Ukrainians distrusted the Militsiya, fully or partly, only 26% of Ukrainians said they distrusted the 
National Police, although nearly 32% of Ukrainians were unable to answer how much they trusted 
the NPU.  The survey also found that whereas Ukrainians and Russians speakers trusted the 
Militsiya at similar rates (with Russian speakers ‘somewhat’ distrusting police at a higher rate than 
Ukrainian speakers), trust in the NPU was noticeably higher among Ukrainian speakers less than 
a year after the start of reform.  51.5 percent of Ukrainian speakers expressed full or partial trust 
in the NPU whereas only 43.95 percentage of Russian speakers felt the same.  Trust in the NPU 
was much higher in the cities in Western Ukraine, than in Eastern Ukraine, although Ukraine’s 
regions are linguistically diverse with Western cities speaking more Ukrainian and Eastern cities 
and Kyiv (in Central Ukraine) being dominated by Russian Speakers.    
                                                            
359 The law also stipulates that the level of public trust “is assessed by independent sociological services” although the procedure 
for selecting this service has still not been established in Ukraine. More on this at: UMDPL Law Enforcement Reform Digest 




 Figure 7.1 
 
The survey also showed that there were generational differences in perceptions of the police, 
whereas younger generations had more trust in the NPU than older generations, more elder 
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 These descriptive insights into the results from the first wave of the National Police 
Survey from 2016 raise questions about what can be causing some of the different levels of 
public trust in the National Police of Ukraine.  Below I provide a brief review of two literatures 
which may be useful in approaching these questions.  The first literature is Ukraine specific and 
grounded in other political and social science research in Ukraine.  This literature argues that 
many of the fault lines on public attitudes in Ukraine are based on regional, linguistic, and 
generational differences.  The second literature is the ‘attitudes toward policing’ (ATP) literature 
which is born out of western approaches to studying public opinion of police in the west.  After 
introducing both of these literatures, variables from both will be explored in a regression analysis 
to better understand which variables may account for public trust in police in Ukraine.   
Literature Review 
 Public Opinion in Ukraine 
 Ukraine is often described as a crossroads and is noticeable for its political, linguistic, and 
ethnic diversity.  The reasons for this diversity are the historical patterns of migration and 
colonization by Russians (and later the USSR), Polish, Lithuanian, and Turkic forces and its 
contemporary intersection between Europe and Russian spheres of influence.  While ethnic 
Ukrainians are the majority in every region of Ukraine (except for Occupied Crimea), Eastern and 
Southern regions of Ukraine tend to be more Russo phone while Ukrainian language is more 
dominant in Western and Central Ukraine (Yekelchyk 2015).  Ukrainian scholars have long noted 
divisions between different regions of Ukraine in terms of national identity, linguistics, political 
party preferences, regional political alliances (Russia or the European Union), and attitudes 
towards western based reforms, democracy and liberty (Arel 2014; Kuzio 2012; D’Anieri 2011, 




thought to affect Ukrainian attitudes; region, language preference, and generation, which were 
captured in the 2016 National Police survey. 
Region 
 During the vote for independence in 1991, over 90% of Ukrainians nation-wide voted for 
independence from the Soviet Union, however since independence, Ukraine’s politics have largely 
shown a significant regional divide with different regional power bases emerging in the west and 
Central and the south and East of the country.  One reason for this could be historical paths as parts 
of Western Ukraine were previously part of the Polish, Romanian, and Austro-Hungarian empire 
and some (Galicia) had traditions of (relatively) liberal government were only incorporated into 
the USSR after 1945.  Some have made the argument that these historical differences have created 
different political characters and indeed recent survey data from 2013 finds much higher rates of 
support for censorship, ‘strong arm’ politics, planned economy, and Soviet nostalgia in Eastern 
and Southern provinces compared to Western and Central Ukraine.360   
 Another reason for regional divisions could be economic differences as Ukraine’s west has 
an economy based on agriculture and labor migration to Europe whereas Ukraine’s Eastern 
provinces have historically had economies based on heavy industries such as coal, steal, machine 
building and trade with Russia.  These industries have relied on subsidies from the Ukrainian 
budget to stay economically viable, and many argue that this reliance on lobbying the central state 
has led to popular support for paternalism and corruption in the heavily industrial east (Kuzio 
2016; Yekelchyk 2015).  Popular politics in Western and Central Ukraine have centered around 
European integration and promoting the Ukrainian language and culture whereas parties 
                                                            






supporting Russian language ‘rights’, greater state paternalism and subsidies, and closer ties with 
Russia have done better in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Levitsky and Way 2010; Kuzio 2012).   
For example, Victor Yushchenko won a plurality of the vote in central and western Ukraine in 
2004 whereas Victor Yanukovych won the presidency in 2010 with a majority of support in the 
East and south through his Party of Regions.  Taras Kuzio writes that while previous Eastern based 
Ukrainian leaders such as Kuchma and Kravchuk had pursued pro-Ukrainian policies, 
Yanukovych exacerbated regional tensions when he began a campaign of ‘Russification’ by 
elevating Russian language, downplaying Soviet atrocities, and promoting “anti-Americanism” 
(Kuzio 2012; 30-32).  Regional differences go beyond electoral politics, and Lucan Way and Olga 
Onuch found that a disproportionately large percentage of protesters who participated in the 
Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution were from Western Ukraine (Way 2015; Gatskova and 
Gatskov 2015; 687).   Despite these regional differences, since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and the beginning of the Donbass conflict, support for Putin in Ukraine has plummeted and 
the Opposition Block- (the successor to Victor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) has performed 
abysmally both in elections and in public polling (Yekelchyk 2015).  More recent public opinion 
data shows increase in support for democracy, liberalization, and European integration throughout 
Ukraine (IRI 2017), possibly due to cohesive effects of the conflict in promoting Ukrainian 
identity.  Still, electoral performance of the governing parties and approval ratings of government 
officials have been consistently lower in Eastern than in Western Ukraine, (although approval of 
elected officials remains low throughout the entire country).  In addition to regional divisions, 
there are great differences between Ukraine’s urban centers and rural communities due to 
improved economic and educational opportunities, better infrastructure and a higher quality of 




Ukraine have higher educations, higher incomes, and are more supportive of civil society and the 
Euromaidan than are rural residents (Gatskova and Gatskov 2015).  Ukraine’s police reform has 
also largely skipped rural parts of Ukraine, with the launch of Patrol Police in large cities and 
Oblast Centers, law enforcement has changed little in rural communities.  The insights into the 
salience of regional politics allows us to formulate our first two hypotheses which will be tested 
in the next section. 
H1A: Eastern Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust in the National Police than those in 
other regions of Ukraine. 
H1B: Ukrainians in larger settlements will have greater levels of Trust in the National Police. 
Language 
 While closely related to region, language is an important factor in Ukrainian politics.  
Beginning with Kuchma and accelerating with the Yanukovych presidency, language rights 
became a highly salient issue in Ukrainian politics.  Dominique Arel writes that language politics 
in Ukraine are highly symbolic, with Western Ukrainians associating heavily Russo phone areas 
in Southern and Eastern Ukraine with the Soviet Union, imperial Russia, and “Russification”, 
while Russo phone Ukrainians resent perceived attacks on the language of comfort (Arel 2014).  
Yekelchyk writes that in the post-Soviet period, language has been the “new rallying cry” of 
Ukrainian politics: “West of the Dnipro River, the Ukrainian language became shorthand for both 
Ukrainian nation building and Western-style democracy, whereas east and south of it, the defense 
of the Russian language became associated with nostalgia for a paternalistic Soviet state…” 
(Yekelchyk 2015; 73).  Others have contended this linguistic or regional argument as 
overgeneralizing the importance of these factors and neglecting the heterogeneity within regions 
(Riabchuk 2015).   For example, Ukraine’s capital Kyiv is estimated to be more than 80% Russo 




opposition against both presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych.  Using a survey experiment in 
Ukraine during 2014, Timothy Frye found that while voter language and ethnicity did have an 
impact on hypothetical candidate vote choice for Ukrainians, that policy towards Europe had a 
much larger effect on voter choice than the language or ethnicity of the hypothetical candidate 
(Frye 2015).  This insight from Frye raises the possibility that policy preferences are more salient 
than language and ethnicity and that what appears to be group voting may simply be the effects of 
limited choices in candidates.  While there is a high correlation between Eastern Ukraine and 
Russian Language in our survey sample (.73), there are many Russian speakers or bilingual 
Ukrainians in Central and even Western Ukraine.  Due to the salience of language in Ukrainian 
politics, the second hypothesis is thus: 
H2: Ukrainian speakers will have more positive views of the government and reform, and 
therefore will express more trust in the National Police of Ukraine. 
Generation 
 Generational effects are also at play in Ukraine, with substantially different political 
preferences among older and younger generations.  For example, previous research has argued that 
the oppressive political and social systems of the Soviet Union created a “homo Sovieticus”361 a 
deindividualized person with a paternalistic attitude that is easily controlled by the state (Gatskova 
and Gatskov 2014).  Unlike former generations socialized in the USSR who were unable to travel 
freely, consume a relatively free media and international news, and participate in political action, 
there is reason to think that Ukrainians born or coming of age in independent Ukraine may have 
substantially different political attitudes and values.  Riabchuk found that: “Higher education and 
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is primitive in respect of her needs, in sense that she is satisfied with the very minimum needed to maintain existence. This 
sociocultural identity was formed in the process of socialization by a large network of state institutions and structures.” 




younger age predictably correlate with pro-Western orientations, whereas lower education and 
older age correlate with the Soviet nostalgia and Slavophile anti-Occidentalism.” (Riabchuk 2015; 
149).  Youth groups, such as ‘Pora’ during the Orange Revolution of 2004, were heavily involved 
in social movements in Ukraine, although others note that younger Ukrainians have had a hard 
time translating success in social movements into meaningful electoral representation (Gatskova 
and Gatskov 2015). Despite the active involvement of youth movements in Ukrainian 
independence and the Orange Revolution, as well as during the Euromaidan, Ukrainian youth seem 
to view state institutions and formal politics with a degree of cynicism (Diuk 2013).   Survey data 
found that while Ukrainian youth showed more favorable views towards democratic government 
than older generations, they still appear to value economic security higher more than civil liberties 
and civic rights (Diuk 2013; 191) Gatskov and Gatskova write that all Ukrainians are relatively 
cynical about the prospects for political change:  
“It is a widespread consensus in the public discourse and social science that Ukrainians, not least 
because of the fruitless ‘‘orange revolution,’’ have tended to pessimism regarding future 
prospects and nostalgia for the Soviet past. They clearly have preferred the authoritarian order to 
what they often think of as ‘‘liberal disorder.’’(Gatskova and Gatskov 2015; 686). 
 
While political cynicism is high throughout the post-Soviet region, Ukrainians had lower 
expectations of their governments than Azerbaijanis or Russians (Diuk 2013; 191-192).    
Nevertheless, the post-Soviet generation, while guarded in their expectations, may be more 
optimistic about the prospects of reform than older generations.  Survey data found that they were 
more likely to be supportive of the Euromaidan movement in 2014, whereas older Ukrainians and 
pensioners were less supportive (Gatskova and Gatskov 2014).  In western studies of police, youth 
also typically express lower levels of trust in the police because of the higher possibility of being 




conservative with age (Decker 1981).  The Kharkiv Crime survey from 2000 found that males 
aged 18-29 had the lowest level of trust in the Militsiya (Beck and Chistyakova 2003; 42). 
 Ukrainians positions towards the Euromaidan have interesting implications for attitudes 
towards police.  One the one hand, police and other law enforcement were at the frontline facing 
down protesters in the bloody clashes that resulted in the collapse of the Yanukovych government, 
therefore one might expect those who support the Euromaidan to hold more negative attitudes 
towards the police.    On the other hand, if one approaches Ukrainians attitudes towards the police 
in 2016 as shaped, at least in part, by their attitudes towards the government and optimism about 
reform of institutions (rather than actual values of the institutions), then one can conceive of a 
positive relation between support for democratic reforms, Euromaidan and European integration 
and trust in the “new” police.  This allows for the formulation of two hypothesis (H3A and H3B) 
regarding age and trust in the National Police of Ukraine. 
H3A Younger Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust towards the police than older 
generations because younger generations are more likely to be subject to punitive police actions. 
H3B Younger Ukrainians, socialized in an independent Ukraine, will have more trust in police 
because of their support of the Euromaidan, western integration, and democratic reforms. 
 
 Given that public trust in the Militsiya was generally low across all regions of Ukraine, but that 
attitudes towards the newly reformed National Police of Ukraine were the highest in Central and 
Western Ukraine, (where support for the Euromaidan, democratic reform and European integration 
is also highest), it is likely that regional, linguistic, and generational variables all have effects on 
Ukrainian’s attitudes towards the police.  Having now examined some of the major topics in public 
opinion in Ukraine, we now turn to the literature on ATP which is used to evaluate public 




Attitudes Toward the Police 
 This section will briefly review the theoretical literature on ATP that examines what factors 
shape public attitudes toward the police.  ATP grew out of a concern about increasing the 
legitimacy of policing following race riots in the 1960s in the US and the failure of reactive 
‘professional’ policing to deal with increasing crime.  Below I consider three sets of variables that 
have been used to explore attitudes towards police. 
Demographic Variables  
One of the most common explanations for public attitudes towards the police are 
demographic factors including race, gender, age, income, occupation, employment status, whether 
or not they are home owners, and education level (Decker 1981; Johnson 1993; DOJ 2003).  
Existing research finds that respondents over the age of 40 are generally express more trust in 
police, women trust the police than men, whites trust the police more than minorities, and 
homeowners more than renters (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Johnson 1993; Skogan 2003; Tyler 
2003).  Wesley Skogan in his study of community policing programs in Chicago during the 1990’s 
also found that survey respondents with higher income, more years in the neighborhood, who were 
older and who were homeowners were more likely to approve of police than poorer residents, 
younger residents, and minorities and were more likely to participate in community policing and 
that meetings had a “strong middle-class bias” (Skogan 2003; 61-62) Decker finds that there is a 
positive relationship between attitudes towards the police and age, with older people generally 
more satisfied than younger respondents (Decker 1981; 82).  He also found that race and age were 
more important variables for ATP than gender and socio-economic status (Decker 1981; 85).     
Despite the higher rate of criminality among men, Decker found that there was little 




women view the police more favorably than men (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; 157).  Women 
also express higher levels of fear of victimization and are more likely to be victims than men 
(Johnson 1993; 29). It is logical that residents of a community who are younger, more 
socioeconomically disadvantaged, and are members of minority groups would generally have 
more negative attitudes towards the police because these are the groups most commonly on the 
receiving end of police action.  Robert Reiner (2010; 123) calls low status groups such as vagrants, 
unemployed, alcoholics, youth, minorities and others ‘police property’ because they are typically 
the subjects of police control, and are simultaneously more likely to be victimized by both the 
police and other criminals.  Nevertheless, middle and upper-class support for the police is not 
unconditional and higher income residents may have negative attitudes towards the police due to 
higher expectations of public service provision which are often not met.  For example, Tabitha 
Johnson states that contrary to popular myth, higher income residents are actually more likely to 
call the police than are low income residents, possibly because they have higher expectations of 
service (Johnson 1993; 3).  Similarly, Bridenball and Jesilow (2008) argue that increased education 
decreases support for police among the public in certain cases.  While real differences exist 
between socio-demographic groups in their attitudes towards the police, one criticism of the use 
of demographic variables in analyzing attitudes towards the police is that even if demographic 
characteristics are a statistically significant factor in ATP, police do not have control over socio-
demographic variables so the information may not lead to relevant policy options for police 
administrators (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; 152).  The effects of age on attitudes toward police 
may function considerably differently in Ukraine than in western contexts because of the divides 
between generations coming of age in the Soviet Union and those who came to age in independent 




did record information on gender, language, education, occupation, age groups, and the size of the 
settlement that the respondent lived in.  From this information, variables for gender (female), 
language (considered above in H2), education, and whether or not the person was a pensioner were 
created as ‘demographic variables.’ From these variables several hypotheses can be tested. 
H4A Ukrainians with higher education will have more trust in the NPU than others. 
H4B Females will have similar rates of trust in the NPU. 
H4C Pensioners will have lower levels of trust in the police than other Ukrainians. 
 
Environmental Variables 
A second group of variables used in analyzing public attitudes toward the police are what 
I call ‘environmental variables’362 related to the resident’s perceptions of crime, insecurity, and 
disorder in their communities as well as experiences of criminal victimization and neighborhood 
culture363 (Decker 1981; Reisig and Parks 2000).  These questions are based on the premise that 
residents in a community form their level of trust or approval of the police based on their 
perception of how safe they feel, actual victimization, and the level of disorder in their 
neighborhood (DOJ; Decker 1981; Johnson 1993; Skogan).  These factors are considered 
separately from police experiences by respondents because environmental effects such as being a 
victim of a crime or perceiving that one lives in an unsafe area do not necessarily mean that the 
person has interacted with the police.  Many crimes are never reported, even by victims, and 
respondents may choose not to call the police for a variety of reasons including fear of retaliation, 
or disbelief that the police will be able to help, or a perception that the crime is not serious, or 
cultural customs that discourage reporting or cooperating with the authorities (McCarthy et al 
2015).    
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Environmental variables can be based on personal experiences such as being the victim of 
a crime (victimization) or subjective perceptions about the level of danger and disorder in their 
neighborhood (insecurity).   The subjective attitudes typically ask questions about the respondent’s 
personal feeling or perception of their personal level of safety in their community and city, often 
at different times such as day or night, or whether there are certain areas that they avoid.  The 
notion that citizens form their attitudes towards police based on their perceptions of neighborhood 
conditions is sometimes called the “Quality of Life” model (Reisig and Parks 2000; 610). Reisig 
and Parks found in their study that quality of life variables had a more significant effect on ATP 
than sociodemographic variables, neighborhood effects, or police experience (2000; 610, 625).  
Citizen’s perceptions of disorder play an increasingly important role in survey data on policing 
due to the popularity of community policing and broken windows policing and its emphasis on 
order and norm maintenance in communities as the basis of police authority and legitimacy 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982).  Surveys often ask questions about particular types of disorders or 
crimes and how big of an issue the respondents think that these are.  For example, a survey may 
ask about the problem of homelessness, trash or graffiti, and how much of an issue it is for them 
personally.  Resident’s perceptions of insecurity and actual rates of crime and victimization are 
distinct, and resident’s may be more concerned about their own insecurity or more likely to be 
actually victimized based on several factors including demographics, lifestyle, or neighborhood 
(Decker 1981; Johnson 1993; Skogan 2003).  There are two-hypothesis about how insecurity and 
disorder effects police attitudes toward the police.  The first hypothesis is performance based and 
holds that as the public feels less safe, their attitudes towards the police will be more negative 
because they hold the police responsible for failing to provide enough service and order in their 




affect the public’s perception of policing services, and residents in high crime and high disorder 
areas are more likely to disapprove of police (Decker 1981; Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; 164).   
A contrary hypothesis is that as the public feels more unsafe and feels that crime and 
disorder are more serious issues in their community, they may be more likely to approve of police 
or certain police actions because they feel that the need for police protection is more acute and 
they are willing to forgive certain police misconduct in favor of safety and order.  For example, in 
Johnson’s 1993 study of Chicago residents, groups with higher ratings of the police such as whites 
and older persons also reported perceiving crime as more of a problem than minorities or persons 
under the age of 39 (Johnson 1993; 29).  Although distinct from overall approval of the police, 
survey studies have found support for oppressive police tactics in high crime areas in the 
developing world and particularly in the former Soviet Union (Nield 2003; Ungar 2011; Beck and 
Chistyakova 2012).  Environmental variables such as feelings of insecurity and victimization are 
the basis of a fourth set of hypotheses. 
H5A Respondents who report being victims of crime in the last year should be less likely to trust 
in the National Police 
H5B Respondents who report feeling safer should have higher levels of trust in the National 
Police, whereas respondents who feel unsafe should have lower levels of trust in the police. 
Police Experience Variables  
 In the ATP literature one of the most important factors thought to affect public attitudes 
toward police has been police contact (Rosenbaum et al. 2005; 345). Research shows that less than 
20% of the public has contact with the police in a year, but the quality of that contact has an 
important impact on ATP, and feelings of legitimacy of police organizations and even states 
(Reisig and Parks 2000; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Tyler 2003).  Police contact generally is 
differentiated by whether the contact is formal or informal (sometimes called voluntary or 




2003).   Formal police contacts or police-initiated contacts can include being questioned by the 
police as a suspect, or punitive enforcement actions such as being arrested, or being issued a fine.  
Formal contact with police can be the result of being the victim or witness of a crime, and may be 
initiated by either the police or the community member. Informal contacts with the police can 
include informal casual conversations between local police and community residents or business 
owners about community issues or more structured contacts such as participation in a community 
policing forum.   
 Informal contacts between police and the public are thought to increase the public’s trust 
in police.  Understandably, survey respondents with formal or involuntary contacts, especially 
when they are suspected of a crime, have lower approval ratings of the police, and some previous 
research finds any contact with police, whether voluntary or involuntary, results in the public 
having more negative attitudes towards the police (Johnson 1993; Decker 1981; Bridenball and 
Jesilo 2008; 159).  Research has found that victims are often the least satisfied of all citizen 
initiated police contacts (Decker 1981; Johnson 1993; 6).  This may be because police have been 
notoriously inept at dealing with victims in a sensitive manner, and individuals often report feeling 
revictimized by perceived rude police conduct or indifference.   For example, Rosenbaum et al 
(2005; 359-61) found that resident-initiated police contacts (such as requesting assistance) and 
vicarious experiences (reports of other’s experiences with police) which were negative, both 
produced negative attitudes towards police.  New research on the concept of procedural justice364 
shows that when police treat people with dignity and respect and act in a transparent and neutral 
manner, then they can increase the public’s understanding of the legitimacy of police and the 
organization.  This is true not only for victims, but even for targets of enforcement activity or 
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community residents.  Research by Tyler (2001) finds that the quality of treatment by police is 
often times more important than police performance or the outcome of police actions (National 
Academies 2004; 302).   
In contrast with formal contacts by with police, informal contacts are thought to improve 
public attitudes towards the police and are a central component of community policing.  Increasing 
informal contacts between police and the community are thought to build trust and support for the 
police by improving dialogue and familiarity between community members and law enforcement.  
Related to informal police contacts is the notion of increasing community familiarity with local 
police.  Studies also find that respondents who know the name of their local police officers have 
more generally positive views of the police.  Bridenball and Jesilow (2008; 174) found that the 
two most causal variables in their analysis of respondent’s attitudes towards police were police 
contacts and perception of neighborhood problems. A 2002 survey from Los Angeles provides 
further support for the police contact hypothesis and finds that informal police contacts, a central 
component of community policing, improve the public’s approval of police even when accounting 
for other factors such as neighborhood perception of crime and disorder and formal (involuntary) 
contacts with police. (DOJ 2003).  In their study of British survey respondents Stanko and Bradford 
found that confidence was most effected by police engagement with the community, followed by 
effectiveness, and then perceptions of disorder (Stanko and Bradford 2009; 327).  These police 
experience variables allow us to test our final two hypotheses: 
H6A Respondents who have called the police in the last year will have higher levels of 
trust in the police 
H6B Respondents who know their local district officer will have higher levels of trust in 
the police. 
 
The next section explores these topics using statistical analysis to measure the effects Ukrainian 





 This section provides a statistical analysis of the factors considered in the literature review 
to see what effects, if any, they have on the Ukrainian public’s level of trust in the National Police 
of Ukraine.  The variables considered were included because they were included in the survey and 
do not require imputation or inference from other datasets and they are present either in previous 
studies of Ukrainian public opinion, or western studies of attitudes towards the police.  The survey 
was designed by the staff of former Chief of Police, Khatia Dekanoidze, and a team of Canadian 
Advisers and is based at least in part on results from a series of surveys conducted between 2000 
and 2003 by the British Council and the National University of Internal Affairs known as the 
“Kharkiv Crime Survey”365 (Robinson 2005; Beck and Chistyakova).  The Kharkiv Crime Survey 
was the basis of a 2000-2003 community policing program funded by the British Council but the 
community policing project was never expanded beyond Kharkiv and did not continue there.   The 
study found relatively low levels of trust in the police, little contact between police and 
communities, and a high level of insecurity among many residents (Beck and Chistyakova 2003). 
While ATP was designed for a western context, aside from the Kharkiv Crime Survey there is no 
independent tradition of public opinion studies on post-independence Ukrainian policing366, (the 
topic of crime was considered a ‘state secret’ during the Soviet period) and there has been no 
national survey to cover all regions of Ukraine (Beck and Chistyakova 2004; Shelley 1999).  Thus, 
the combination of Ukrainian context specific variables such region, linguistic preference and, 
generation, region with ATP variables such as other demographic factors, environmental variables, 
and police experiences allow for the most robust study to date of how Ukrainians view the police 
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across all regions of the country.   The combination of all of these variables allows for the 
comparison of the relative effects of these variables on the outcome, trust in police, which may 
provide insights into the process of post-Euromaidan state building in Ukraine.   
Variables 
 Three dependent variables are considered to show how Ukrainians trust in the police may 
have changed with reform.  The original survey asked Ukrainians about their trust in the Militsiya 
and in the National Police using a 4 point Likert scale ranging from 1 “completely distrust” and 2 
“rather distrust” to 3 “rather trust” and 4 “completely trust”.  Approximately 11 percent of 
respondents were unable to answer as to their level of trust in the Militsiya and approximately 32 
percent were unable to state how much they trusted the National Police of Ukraine less than one 
year after reform.  Because of the high rate of non-response on the dependent variable of “Trust in 
the NPU and because the data was in interval form, the variables were re-coded as categorical 
variables Trust in the Militsiya, Trust in the NPU and Distrust in the NPU in order to perform OLS 
regression.  All were coded as dummy variables with the two most similar answers (completely 
and rather trust and completely and rather distrust) combined into one score while all other scores 
are coded as zero.  This allowed for a separate examination of the effects of the following 
independent variables on attitudes toward trust in the Militsiya, Trust in the NPU, and Distrust in 
the NPU. 
 The first independent variable considered was Settlement Type which was included as a 
factor variable with villages as the base.  The second group considered was Age groups including 
five categories which allow for greater distinction between generations 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-
59, and 60+.  The first two categories can be conceived of as the post-Soviet generations in that 




educated and socialized in independent Ukraine, having been 9 when Ukraine became independent 
in 1991.  The age group 60+ was used as the bas of the factor variable for age group because the 
separate category “Pensioner” provides an appropriate substitute for 60+ whereas no other 
occupational categories provided similarly appropriate substitutes for other age groups.  The 
categories of Female, Ukrainian Language, College Education and Pensioner are all relatively 
straightforward “dummy variables” where 1 means a positive value and zero is the absence of that 
value, allowing for a clear display of the effects of the variable. 
   The variable “Eastern Ukraine” is a dummy variable which codes respondents from the 8 
Eastern Oblasts (Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporozhe, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Lugansk and 
Kharkiv; N 3,323 or 32% of the total sample of 10,250).  These Oblasts were selected because 
they all voted for Victor Yanukovych by a margin of greater than 50% in the 2010 Ukrainian 
Presidential Elections.  The variable Crime Victim, Contacted Police in the Last Year and Know 
your District Officer were all dummy variables where 1 signifies a positive response to the 
question.  Finally, the variable safety was created from the question “How safe do you feel in your 
city/ town/ village?”. Like the variable for Trust, responses for this question were originally in 
interval form  on a 1-4 Likert ranging from “I do not feel safe at all” 1, to 4 “I feel completely 
safe”.   Similar to the variable for Trust, the variable for safety was recoded as a binary variable 
with 1 including “I feel rather safe” and “I feel completely safe”, and all other answers counted as 
zero.  The following regression output shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on 
changes in the dependent variables of Trust in the Militsiya, Trust in the NPU, and Distrust in the 
NPU.  The coefficients are displayed first and the standard errors are displayed in parenthesis under 
the coefficients.  the t-effects are noted in asterisks next to the coefficients (see the key at the 




coefficients mean a positive relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable, whereas negative coefficients signify a negative relationship between the two variables.  
Regression Output (Table 7.3) 
Independent Variables Trust 
Militsiya 
Trust NPU Distrust NPU 
Settlement Type    
Village 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) 
Town with the population under 50 thousand 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Town / city with the population over 50 thousand 0.01 0.01 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Oblast' center 0.01 0.14** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age Groups    
18-24 0.05** 0.12** -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
25-34 0.00 0.04+ -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
35-44 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
45-59 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
60+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) 
Female 0.05** -0.01 -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ukrainian Language -0.02+ 0.15** 0.10** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
College Education 0.03** 0.06** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Pensioner 0.04* -0.00 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Eastern Ukraine367 0.05** -0.01 0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Crime Victim -0.01 -0.02 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Safety 0.10** 0.19** -0.17** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Contacted Police in Last Year 0.03** 0.07** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Know Your District Officer 0.05** 0.05** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                                                            






Constant 0.05* 0.15** 0.30** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Observations 9,915 9,886 9,886 
R-squared 0.03 0.10 0.06 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01    
Results  
 The results show support for several of the hypothesis generated from both Ukraine specific 
variables and ATP variables.  The largest effects on trust appear to be caused by higher feelings of 
safety, Ukrainian language, and younger age groups.  The effects of each variable will be 
considered in order of the hypothesis posed (for a complete list of all hypothesis consult the 
appendix).  H1A: Eastern Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust in the National Police than 
those in other regions of Ukraine.  Hypothesis H1A finds strong support from the regression 
analysis.  Residents in Eastern Ukrainian Oblasts were both significantly more likely to trust the 
Militsiya than average Ukrainians and were significantly more likely to express distrust in the 
National Police of Ukraine.  This difference is unlikely to be due to ethnic or linguistic differences 
between police and local communities in Ukraine as Patrol Police are recruited from their home 
region and other departments of the police have seen little new hiring.   H1B: Ukrainians in larger 
settlements will have greater levels of Trust in the National Police. Hypothesis H1B also found 
strong support with Ukrainians in Oblast Centers having the highest trust in the Police.  This is 
likely a result of the fact that Patrol Police were launched and highly visible in most Oblast Centers 
by the Spring of 2016 and thus were one of the most visible sign of reform in the country.  An 
interesting caveat to the variable Settlement Type is that there was less trust in small and medium 
sized towns as measured against the base of village, likely meaning that more can be done to 
improve policing in smaller cities.  H2: Ukrainian speakers will have more positive views of the 
government and reform, and therefore will express more trust in the National Police of Ukraine. 




have trusted the Militsiya than Russian speakers and much more likely to trust the National Police 
than Russian Speakers.  Surprisingly, the results were also significant for distrust, when holding 
for all other variables, which likely means that Russians had higher rates of non-responses (58% 
compared to 40% for Ukrainian speakers) and a harder time expressing their level of trust towards 
the National Police.  H3A Younger Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust towards the police 
than older generations because younger generations are more likely to be subject to punitive 
police actions. H3B Younger Ukrainians, socialized in an independent Ukraine, will have more 
trust in police because of their support of the Euromaidan, western integration, and democratic 
reforms. Given the generational effects hypothesis from H3A and H3B, there was significantly 
more evidence for H3B, the Ukrainian specific hypothesis.  While younger demographics such as 
age groups 18-24 and 25-34 still likely have higher rates of criminality and involuntary contacts 
with the police, these cohorts also have significantly different perceptions and expectations of the 
state than older generations who came of age during the Soviet period.  The strong effects 
particularly in the 18-24 age group on Trust in the Police show that youth are the age group that 
trusts the police most, with slightly less trust from those 25-34.  This may be due to the more jaded 
character and life experience of older generations.  The relative cynicism of older Ukrainians may 
be due to some of the disappointing results of each phase of great political change: economic 
deprivation in the ‘wild’ 1990’s following independence, political stalemate and stagnation during 
the Yushchenko years following the ‘Orange Revolution’, and armed conflict, territorial 
encroachments, economic crisis and mired reforms of the post-Euromaidan period.    
With respect to the demographic variables H4A-H4C, interesting patterns emerge.  H4A 
Ukrainians with higher education will have more trust in the NPU than others.H4B Females will 




than other Ukrainians. Higher education was found to be significant in increasing trust in both the 
National Police and the Militsiya, consistent with findings in western societies.  Pensioners (aged 
60 and up) in Ukraine tended to have higher trust in the Militsiya but lower trust in the National 
Police.  The benefit of examining pensioners it fills in the gap left from Age Groups 60+ which 
was used as the base in the factor variable Age Groups.  The results show that the National Police 
need to do more to gain the trust of older age groups in Ukraine.    The results for Gender HB4 
were also interesting and found that females actually had both significantly greater levels of trust 
in the Militsiya and significantly lower levels of trust in the National Police than did males.  This 
gender gap in trust in the police may be caused by several factors including the prevalence of 
gender-based violence in Ukraine (discussed in the conclusion.)   
Hypothesis H5A and H5B show strong effects on the level of trust in the NPU as well.   H5A 
Respondents who report being victims of crime in the last year should be less likely to trust in the 
National Police. H5B Respondents who report feeling safer should have higher levels of trust in 
the National Police, whereas respondents who feel unsafe should have lower levels of trust in the 
police. The strongest effect of all variables tested was safety, which proved to be a highly 
significant variable with a coefficient of .19 for trust in the National Police.  The variable was also 
significant, although to a lesser degree, for trust in the Militsiya.  This likely means that in addition 
to the other factors examined, one of the leading causes of public trust in Ukrainian policing are 
the degree to which Ukrainians feel safe in their community.  This means that in the future public 
trust in the police can be improved by increasing feelings of safety, but that there are substantial 
differences in the amount of security felt by Ukrainians.  Crime victims were understandably less 
trusting of the police than non-victims.  Finally, the police experience variables H6A and H6B also 




H6A Respondents who have called the police in the last year will have higher levels of trust in 
the policev 
H6B Respondents who know their local district officer will have higher levels of trust in the 
police. 
 Having contacted the police in the previous year was associated with more trust in the 
Militsiya and more trust in the Police as was knowing one’s district officer by name and face.  
Although data was not collected on whether these contacts were formal or informal, the positive 
relationship between the positive attitude of trust and the two variables likely means that many of 
these contacts were informal, or at the least not overtly punitive or coercive.  The significant effects 
of increased police contacts also give hope that Ukrainians who have had contact with the police 
are more likely to trust in the police, although the similarly positive relationship between the effects 
for trusting the Militsiya and trusting the National Police could potentially mean that there is some 
self-selection, meaning that the groups most likely to contact the police already trust the police.  
Nevertheless, as calls for service grow and informal policing contacts increase through outreach 
campaigns and community policing, these insights give optimism to future increases in public trust 
in Ukraine’s police. 
Lessons for Ukraine and Community Policing Initiatives 
 The results of this regression analysis provide several lessons for how Ukraine might 
increase public trust in its National Police.  The first, and most obvious, is by working to increase 
public safety particularly in the regions of Ukraine where resident’s report feeling unsafe.  Indeed, 
much of the regional effects noted may be caused by insecurity and low feelings of safety.  The 
figure below (figure #3) shows a descriptive statistic from the same 2016 National Police survey 






 It is worth noting that with the exception of Kyiv and Cherkasy, the regions noting the 
highest levels of insecurity are all in Eastern Ukraine.  Eastern regions of Ukraine have a long 
history of having higher rates of violent crime and organized crime (Kuzio 2014) and data from 
Ukraine’s Prosecutor General typically finds higher levels of violent crime in Eastern regions368.  
Alexander Kupatadze writes that the Donbas in particular has a violent history stemming from 
1990’s privatization, “Unlike other parts of the country, where the redistribution of spoils was 
relatively peaceful (Leshchenko and Revenko 1999; Åslund and McFaul 2006), in Donetsk 80 per 
cent of property changed hands after shootouts, explosion, and organized criminal activities 
(Moskal 2005)” (Kupatadze 2012; 102).  The proximity of eastern Oblasts to the conflict also 
means that they will inevitably experience higher flows of displaced persons, soldiers, and 
weapons than the rest of the country.  While reducing public feelings of insecurity is easier said 
than done, improved policing through more visible patrols, quicker responses, and more 
                                                            















(legitimate) criminal convictions would likely go a long way in increasing feelings of safety and 
trust in the National Police.  In 2015 the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) assisted in 
the implementation of a new ‘rapid reaction’ program to improve responsiveness in smaller cities 
by consolidating rural police units (Friesendorf 2017).  The program was started in Sambir (L’viv 
Oblast) where it relied on former Militsiya personnel in the cities that Patrol Police had not yet 
reached.  The program was expanded to other Oblasts in 2016 where it was expected to increase 
visibility and decrease response times in the regions and cities that wouldn’t find establish Patrol 
Police.  The Sambir ‘rapid reaction model’ was the European Union’s response to Patrol Police 
and attempted to reorganize and retrain regional police but the program was abandoned by 2017.   
 A recent example of how insecurity might be reduced is through Neighborhood Watch 
programs that have recently sprung up in of Vinnitsa, Khmelnitsky Lutsk (Rivne Oblast), 
Chernivtsi, and Boryspil (Kyiv Oblast).  These programs take advantage of informal social 
networks in Ukraine’s housing blocks to organize formal committees of tenants to come together 
to solve community safety concerns and increase communication with local District Officers and 
Patrol Police.  The program, funded by the International Research and Exchange Council (IREX), 
has been successful in increasing dialogue between police and tenants (particularly elder tenants), 
improved trust on the part of communities and police officers, and in some cases increased 
perceptions of safety by local residents.  The program has been specifically successful in targeting 
public order issues which Ukrainians rank as some of their greatest concerns such as illegal 
parking, unruly drunks in public places, and other public order related issues.  One limitation is 
that neighborhood watch programs have intentionally been attempted in western cities where 
social capital is higher, and have not been attempted in Eastern and Southern cities.  Kyiv has also 




ask questions of police and other municipal authorities.369  So far, the platform has been effective 
at addressing community issues such as traffic violations, illegal parking, stay dogs, and illegal 
dumping. 
 Given the gender gap public trust in the police between men and women, another area of 
focus for the National Police should be gender issues. Domestic violence is a major issue in 
Ukraine, with over 100,000 cases of domestic violence abuse recorded annually by Ukraine’s 
Interior Ministry.  One goal of police reform in Ukraine has been the hiring of more female 
officers, and nearly a quarter of the new hires since 2014 have been females (Peacock and Cordner 
2016.)  It is believed that police forces with more female officers are better equipped to address 
issues of domestic violence and gender-based violence.  In addition to Gender based violence, 
human trafficking both from and within Ukraine is also a major issue in Ukraine.  In 2015 the 
OSCE conducted trainings of 4,200 Ukrainian police officers to train them on the detection, 
prevention and response to domestic violence and human trafficking.  Another recent program 
called “Polina” was created through cooperation of the NPU with the Ukrainian NGO “La-Strada” 
and piloted in Kyiv, Severnodonetsk, and Odessa.  The “Polina” project monitors at risk families 
and dispatchs mobile groups of police officers including district inspectors and investigators as 
well as social workers and physicians to react to domestic violence, particularly for families with 
a documented history of domestic abuse.370 
 An NGO based in Dnipro, “Dnipro Gender Club” (Genderni Klub Dnipr’), developed a 
women’s self-defense course with the Patrol Police.  The course received hundreds of applications 
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from women in Dnipro to participate in the course and has trained dozens371.  In addition to 
fundamentals of self-defense based on martial arts tactics, the women also receive advice from the 
Patrol Police about the legal limits of self-defense under Ukrainian legislation.  Unlike many cities 
in the US, Ukraine has no procedure for mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases and all arrests 
require women to formally accuse their partners, a task which can often deter victims from 
reporting abuse.  The goal of this program is that in addition to empowering women to prevent 
themselves from becoming victims of gender-based violence it will create greater trust in the police 
by women and greater reporting of gender-based violence.  In 2017 the program was expanded to 
other cities in Ukraine including Zhytomyr, Poltava Vinnitsa and L’viv.    
 Another promising arena for improved future relations between the Ukrainian public and 
their police is on the issue of Road Safety.  Surveys conducted throughout Ukraine find traffic 
safety and illegal parking as one of the biggest public concerns (KIIS 2016b; 2017).  After Georgia, 
Ukraine leads Europe in deaths caused by automotive accidents, many of them related to drunk 
driving.  Ukraine’s roads are notoriously dangerous because of poor maintenance, a lack of police 
on the highways and roads, and legislation which allows impunity for drunk driving and reckless 
driving and Interior Minister Avakov claimed that the number of Ukrainians killed in traffic 
accidents in 2016 was four times larger than the number killed in the war in Donbas.372  High 
profile traffic tragedies have also created the political for a bill on reform of traffic fines to move 
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forward in the Parliament in late 2017.373374  Arresting someone for drunk driving is even more 
problematic as all requests require a witness and breathalyzers alone are inadmissible.  Under 
article 35 of the Law on National Police the police must witness a traffic violation in order to stop 
the car.  Former Patrol Police Officer Bogdan Patskan states that during many traffic sotps 
Ukrainian drivers rarely comply with police directives and refuse to furnish identification all the 
while questioning the legality of the stop375.  This means that even if police stop a vehicle where 
the driver is clearly drunk, they are unable to arrest the driver without gathering the signature of 
two “witnesses”376.  This Soviet practice which was meant to promote transparency in prosecutions 
instead allows for widescale impunity for drunk driving as police are often unable to find 
volunteers in the middle of the night who are willing to attest to a person’s sobriety.  In 2016 less 
than 100 persons were prosecuted for drunk driving in Ukraine.    
  One of the most innovative community policing programs was launched by activists of the 
group “Pitbull Kyiv” in the capitol.  The mission of Pitbull Kyiv is to raise awareness about the 
dangers of drunk driving through direct action, education, and outreach.  In 2016 Pitbull began 
organizing volunteers for ‘raids’ where they help police identify, follow, and at times apprehend 
drunk drivers.  Volunteers meet in a central location and are dispatched in teams to Kyiv’s most 
popular bars and nightclubs where they look out for extremely intoxicated patrons leaving the club 
for their automobiles.  The activists then call the direct line of a Patrol officer or central Patrol 
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Dispatch and follow the person until the police arrive.  Once the vehicle has been stopped, the 
Pitbull activists serve as witnesses to the person’s inebriation, thus closing the loophole which 
allows for impunity in the absence of a witness.  This volunteer group has surged in numbers and 
has been very successful in raising the issue of drunk driving on social media and national news.  
Their goal is both to end impunity through cooperation with the police and direct action to bring 
about a cultural change about drunk driving and road safety in Ukraine.  Recently, Pitbull has 
expanded their activities in Kyiv and is cooperating with the police on the issue of illegal parking 
in downtown Kyiv, this will also require cooperation with the newly formed Kyiv Municipal Guard 
which will have authority over parking violations as well as several other public order issues377. 
Conclusion 
While Ukrainian police reform still has a very long way to go in order to gain the trust of 
the public, there is a degree to which public attitudes of the police are independent of police 
actions.  Branko and Bradford note that large scale social change, much like the changes occurring 
in Ukraine post-Maidan, can have a major effect on public perceptions of the police:  
[Moreover], there is much evidence to suggest that expressions of concern about crime 
relate less to actual fears of victimization and more to broader concerns about society and the 
direction of change in modern life---and it is these later concerns that have important influences 
on opinions of the police (Jackson and Bradford, 2009; Jackson and Sunshine, 2007378). 
(Branko and Bradford 2009; 325) 
 
 Furthermore, low trust in the Ukrainian police is also undoubtedly caused by factors not 
captured in this survey such as previous victimization by Ukrainian police, low level of faith in 
state institutions, and anomie (Gatskova and Gatskov 2014).  However, the evidence from the 
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survey shows that trust in the National Police is significantly higher than trust in the Militsiya, 
although future surveys will show whether this increase in trust can endure.  Under optimal 
conditions it would be difficult to improve trust in police after so many years of police misconduct, 
but Ukraine currently faces poor structural conditions for improving trust in the police as there is 
rising crime caused by the conflict in Donbas and poor economic performance, shrinking budgets, 
sustained corruption and low will for reform in the current political climate.  Nevertheless, 
Ukrainian police and civil society should work together to build projects in the meantime that 
address legitimate security concerns of every day citizens. 
 A recent poll in Kyiv found that over two-thirds of respondents were willing to take part 
in community meetings with police and there was a high correlation between trust and willingness 
to participate.    Ultimately, police reform will depend on large structural changes in the National 
Police, overhauls of legislation including the criminal code and the CPC, reform in other justice 
institutions, recruitment of several new waves of police, improved training, effective oversight, 
and many other factors.  In the short run however, the best chance for Ukraine to improve trust in 
its police, and thus the legitimacy of both the police and the state, may be to increase informal 
contacts with citizens and to work together with communities on tangible and pertinent security 











Chapter 8: Conclusion 
What reform was possible, and how?  
 This dissertation took on the task of understanding why certain are more sustainable than 
others during a period of political instability.  The causes of police reform considered and reviewed 
in this dissertation were international pressure, state-building, political upheaval, scandal, and the 
role of civil society; all of which can contribute to generating political will for enacting, 
implementing and sustaining police reforms.  At the same time, these forces are mitigated by 
political competition over the control of law enforcement, systemic corruption, and insecurity 
caused by the ongoing conflict and high crime.  Insecurity has been responsible for preventing or 
delaying the enactment of demilitarization, decentralization, investigative reforms and extensive 
purges of corrupt and abusive former Militsiya personnel.   As the regression analysis in Chapter 
7 indicates, the failure to provide adequate security is the factor most associated with distrust of 
the National Police when controlling for all other factors.  At the same time, extensive corruption 
has made the implementation of oversight and accountability difficult, continues to undermine the 
professional corps of the police, and is undoubtedly one of the reasons that the public had so little 
trust in the Militsiya, and now the National Police of Ukraine.   
 Political competition over law enforcement, in turn, negatively effects all areas of police 
reform (with the possible exception of public-police relations379).  Political competition over 
control of law enforcement is directly responsible for convincing political elites to maintain high 
a highly centralized police force, militarized units within the police, to delay or resist the passage 
of procedural reforms needed to improve criminal investigation.  Competition over law 
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enforcement is also a central factor in ongoing political interference in the hiring and promotion 
of police, the maintenance of a parallel Interior Ministry educational system, and the inability to 
create a system of effective external oversight to increase police accountability.  The consistent 
politicization of law enforcement institutions and policies mean that elected officials refuse to 
cooperate to provide the resources and implement the changes needed for successful reform of law 
enforcement for several reasons.   
 First, as Barbara Geddes notes, politicians have uncertain horizons and even reforms that 
provide collective goods have uncertain electoral benefits, therefore politicians favor short term 
and visible projects (Geddes 1994).  This can explain the emergence of reform of the Traffic and 
Patrol Militsiya into the Patrol Police (which could be established in a short amount of time and 
had high visibility) rather than the Criminal Block which would take years and had uncertain 
benefits. 
 Second, because law enforcement institutions are central to the political balance in 
Ukraine, yet have historically been divided between competing political factions, politicians need 
to simultaneously maintain the allegiance of law enforcement and prevent them from defecting to 
other political camps.  Therefore, demilitarization, anti-corruption and serious anti-accountability 
reform, all of which would have reduced the powers and privileges of the police, were 
circumscribed by the need to maintain allies of law enforcement who may defect if it sees these 
areas threatened.  With the exception of the Patrol Police and NABU (insulated by foreign donors), 
the creation of new law enforcement institutions such as the SBI have been subject to politicization 
from their inception with parties competing for staffing of their political patrons and allies.  This 




as a zero-sum game, where the creation of new organizations that would threaten the political 
balance face stiff competition. 
 Finally, political instability and the constant threat of a revolution from below has also 
mitigated the possibilities for substantial overhaul of law enforcement.  Ukrainian politicians have 
to be weary not only about law enforcement institutions becoming loyal to their rivals but must 
also ensure that they maintain significant control over the public order control of law enforcement 
in a climate of political instability.  While the current administration has been able to maintain a 
majority in government for nearly four years (despite the exit of coalition partners Samopomich 
and Batkivshina in Spring 2016), they must be all too aware that two of the three previous 
administrations were removed via mass mobilization where the security forces defected in mass.  
In other words, political instability and risks from protest activity which has become increasingly 
violent seriously mitigates the possibilities for reform of law enforcement by convincing police 
and political elites to maintain large and militarized public order police.  This prevents both the 
demilitarization and decentralization of police and also makes sure that political elites will not 
push too hard for reforms (such as oversight and accountability) that could cost them the loyalty 
of police.  In a recent interview, Yevhen Krapyvin explicitly spelled out the calculation and balance 
between tempered reforms and maintaining the political allegiance of police commanders. 
“After all, small pilot projects and experiments bring fast reputational dividends. In short 
political cycles, this is a clear and desirable goal. But systemic changes would necessarily lead to 
the destruction of existing corruption schemes and the usual practices of work, and therefore - to 
the dissatisfaction of the middle managers and the exit of the old vertical police from the control 
of the Minister [of Interior]”380 
 
                                                            





Thus, the centrality of maintaining forces that are both capable of containing mass public 
mobilizations and loyal enough to do so are of the utmost importance to the political leadership. 
While the police and National Guard have been much more constrained and professional at 
handling political protests than their predecessors, it is not by accident that the National Police, 
and the National Guard which is directly responsible to the Interior Minister, continue to respond 
to protests.  Furthermore, the mobilization of vigilante groups and veterans ahead of the 2019 
elections presents a serious threat to the stability of both the current administration and future 
administrations by greatly increasing the chances of violent confrontations with law enforcement. 
 The example of Patrol Police, DVB, and NABU has shown that the only way to overcome 
this constant politicization of law enforcement has been through insulation of law enforcement 
personnel policies conceded to under foreign leverage and secured and monitored by domestic 
civil society oversight.  This has led to the success of the Patrol Police, Internal Affairs (DVB), 
the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the successful establishment of the Patrol Police 
Academy and the Holosiivsky Model Police Station as merit-based bureaucracies.  These new and 
reformed institutions have become politically independent, meritocratic, and much more effective 
than their predecessors; although their true potential is circumscribed by obstruction of unreformed 
law enforcement, prosecutors and courts.  New mechanisms for oversight also create the possibility 
for a deepening of reforms through transparent personnel policies, public information about 
policing, and public representation in certain areas.  Police commissions have been established 
transparently and have incorporated true independent oversight in some regions, yet have become 
politicized or captured in others cities.  The future development of police commissions will likely 
depend on the strength of local civil society to pressure for representation and transparency in these 




public trust and security in local communities throughout the country, yet despite over two decades 
of experiments in community police pilot programs, a unified strategy for implementing 
community policing in Ukraine has still not been developed or implemented.  The preliminary 
success of several local community policing initiatives discussed in Chapter 7 may mean that local 
and organically developed citizen security projects are more effective at increasing public trust 
and security than centrally planned community policing programs.   
 In mid-2018 the record of police reform in Ukraine has a mixed record and an unclear 
future.  On the one hand, overhaul of the thoroughly corrupt, inefficient, and reviled Patrol and 
Traffic Militsiya and the hiring of 18,000 new and competitively recruited Patrol Police with high 
levels of trust is a remarkable achievement in a highly corrupt and intransigent reform 
environment.  On the other hand, the inability to address or implement sustainable reforms in the 
other 80% of the police force, including implement the necessary legislation, systems of oversight, 
and funding is disappointing, yet has been partly explained in this dissertation.   
 The final chart in this dissertation looks at all of the reforms covered over these seven 
chapters and articulates the different causes of reforms, the mitigating factors, and their outcomes.   
Reform Stimulus Mitigating Factor Reform 
coalition? 
Insulated? Outcome 
Demilitarization Public Pressure,   
State building 
International support 
Political competition,  
Insecurity, Conflict 
Strong No Hybrid system, failed 
to eliminate many old 
units 
Municipal police Political upheaval, 
 Some civil society 
Political competition, fears of 
local separatism 






Crowd Control  Scandal International 







Creation of Patrol 
Tactical Group TOR 
Detective Merger International pressure, 
civil society 
Politicians fears of 
insecurity, bureaucratic 
resistance 
Weak N/A Pilot programs, failed 





Civil society  
(expert community) 
Political competition, elite 
fear of insecurity through 
policy backfire 
Weak N/A Passed in first reading 
June 2018 
Public Trust as 
measurement  
Civil society (expert 
community) 
international  
bureaucratic resistance, use 
of crime stats by political 
leaders 





support for Savchenko, 
Civil Society 
Backfire through release of 
violent criminals 
Weak and then 
strong response in 
rejection 
No Savchenko’s law 
overturned, some 
decrease in use of ITT 
by Dekanoidze 
Patrol Police State Building, 
International Support, 
Civil Society 






Political competition over 
control of commissions 




No- but has 
public 
oversight 
Sustainable but subject 
to political capture 
Attestation International Pressure, 
scandal 
Political competition over 
staffing, insecurity and 
concern over staff shortages  
Initially yes but 






Largely considered a 
failure or a farce due to 
political capture and 
low level of dismissals 
185 
Police Education International Support Competition over control, 
strong resistance from NAVS 
universities 
Medium Patrol Police 
Academy 
PPA is sustainable 
Hybrid system, 






some civil society 
Resistance by MoI Low domestic 
coalition 
Yes Sustainable to date 
NABU Strong international 
pressure, scandal, state 
building, political 
upheaval 
Resistance by corrupt 
officials,  








prosecutor and court 
State Bureau of 
Investigation 
International Support, 
Civil Society, Scandal 
Heavy competition over 
staffing and control 
Weak None Delays in creation, 
politically captured 
DVB Strong international 
pressure 





pressure, local civil 
society 
Little interest from elites or 
public 
Latent potential N/A Failure but has 
potential for future 
program expansion 
Going forward, there are three possible scenarios for the future evolution of Ukrainian 
policing.  The first and most optimistic is that the insulated ‘pockets’ of reform created in the Patrol 
Police and other units of the police expand and diffuse to the rest of the National Police.  In 2018, 
Chief of NPU Serhiy Knyazev committed to a tentative plan of placing all police which are outside 
of the Criminal Block, including Neighborhood Inspectors and local public order police in the 




organization and management, and may require non-patrol officers to undergo another round of 
vetting or retraining, yet no firm plan has emerged for how this will be implemented.  In the 
meantime, the Patrol Police academy will begin to train approximately 4,000 new police per year 
and to provide refresher and continuing education to thousands of other Police as it becomes 
operational in other cities throughout the country.  Similarly, if the Holosiivsky Model Police 
District project produces positive results and is expanded throughout the nation, this could 
overhaul the inefficient and corrupt personnel and management systems and contribute to a much 
more professionalized police service throughout Ukraine.  This most optimistic scenario will 
largely depend on the continuation of western support and diplomatic pressure for insulation and 
more reforms, a political coalition with at least moderate political will for reform and continued 
public pressure to expand reforms beyond Patrol.  Geddes warns that reforms which are tied to 
individual leadership are fragile and unstable (1994; 80), and others have noted that reforms which 
are dependent on foreigners are unsustainable (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006; Marat 2013).  The most 
important factor in sustaining reforms will be continuing to build and maintaining reform 
coalitions through horizontal accountability mechanisms which invest society in reforms through 
oversight, transparency, and participation and which “tie the hands” of future leaders from 
reversing reforms (Moncada 2009; 438). 
 A second scenario is the continuation of a hybrid system where pockets of efficiency such 
as the Patrol Police continue to exist alongside unreformed and corrupt organizations.  While this 
has been the status quo for over two years, there is reason to think this scenario could not survive 
forever.  First, without subsequent reforms in other areas of the police, prosecutors, and courts, 
Patrol Police and other reformed units will be unable to effectively provide public safety and hold 




former Patrol Police officer have stated that one of the greatest contributors to attrition is a sense 
by many in the Patrol Police that their work is in vain and is being undermined by other law 
enforcement, prosecutors or courts381382.   If reforms fail to expand beyond Patrol Police, the police 
will be unable to improve public trust and handle insecurity and the public will likely decrease its 
trust and support for Patrol.  As early as 2016, former Deputy Interior Minister Eka Zguladze 
warned of this in her resignation speech, “Islands of success will drown in an ocean of corruption, 
nihilism and bureaucracy if we don't build bridges between them and create a continent.”383 This 
hybrid scenario is most likely if the coming elections produce another government with a weak 
parliamentary coalition that is forced to share power over the Interior Ministry and Prosecutor’s 
Office. 
 Finally, the most pessimistic scenario is that the ‘insulated’ islands of reform are reverted 
back into the patterns of corruption, ineptitude and abuse of their predecessors sooner than later.  
Building insulated ‘islands’ of reform can sometimes be like constructing sandcastles in a political 
high tide, and Geddes notes that several insulated bureaucracies in Brazil and other countries were 
re-politicized despite decades of efficient independence (Geddes 1994).  A significant decrease in 
western assistance could leave these islands of success without the resources and political cover 
to protect themselves and they may lose their political independence.  Similarly, a change in 
government resulting in government with either an excess or a dearth of political power may also 
devastate insulated law enforcement institutions.  A concentration of political power would allow 
for a rebuilding of a power vertical in law enforcement à la Yanukovych (Motyl 2012; Kuzio 
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2012).  Conversely, if the new government is even weaker than the current administration it may 
lack the ability to effect any change on the police and may find itself in a position where it is forced 
to staff police with political allies rather than based on merit.  Geddes reminds us that the politically 
weaker that incumbents become, the more they need to buy the political support with key positions 
in the bureaucracy, thus undermining the capacity of the bureaucracy (Geddes 1994).   
 This dissertations argument is that the grand irony of pluralism, political competition, and 
increased civil society activity in Ukraine is that it has both contributed to and prevented many 
areas of police reform.  While observers both within and outside of Ukraine expected the 
Euromaidan and increased democratization to result in comprehensive reforms of the state 
(including police) after 2014 there are reasons to think that political instability may have the 
opposite effects.   In describing the relation of political instability to state-building reforms, Geddes 
notes: 
“Frequent alternations between authoritarianism and democracy seem to provide the worst of all 
possible contexts for building state capacity.  Competence tends to suffer during transitions both 
to and from military rule.  Islands of competence nurtured for decades can be destroyed during a 
few months by presidents engaged in chaotic struggles to defend themselves against overthrow.  
At the other end of the cycle, redemocratization brings in its wake hungry parties eager for the 
spoils they have been denied during the years of military rule.” 
(Geddes 1994; 23). 
 Barring the unlikely event of early elections, at the time of writing this dissertation there 
is still over 18 months before the 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Ukraine.  It 
cannot be doubted that these elections will have important implications for Ukraine, although it 
is premature to make accurate predictions about what these effects will be.  Having summarized 
the research and primary arguments of this dissertation, I now turn to a concluding discussion of 




Discord, competition, and unclear institutional relations 
International Assistance in comparative perspective 
 In Ukraine, US, Canadian and EU support programs to police differed widely in their 
approach and strategy.  Whereas the Americans and Canadians favored taking the lead on projects 
in which they had substantial control and leverage over the reforms, the EUAM preferred one off 
training projects such as investigator reform, ‘quick reaction’ reforms (“Shvirig” aka Sambir 
model) and retraining of district officers.  Four years into reforms, despite a budget three times the 
size of the US assistance mission, EU reforms have failed to accomplish many of the key 
objectives.  Perhaps Europeans were less comfortable with imposing conditions on the Ukrainians, 
or had a harder time retaining staff for long periods of time. 
 The European Union Advisory Mission listed five key priorities in its reform of law 
enforcement including: Human Resource Management, Criminal Investigation, Public Order, 
Community Policing, and Delineation of Competencies.384  The EUAM lists as its concrete 
accomplishments advising on the 2015 law on NPU, the launch of the 'Sambir police model', 
community policing training, the detective merger program (starting in Boryspil), development of 
the MoI Human Rights directorate, and several trainings on improving relations between police 
and prosecutors.  Many of these programs failed to be implemented in more than a few cities 
beyond the initial pilot including the Sambir model which was abandoned in 2017 and the detective 
merger program which was never rolled out across Ukraine.  Certain trainings of community 
policing may have had a marginally positive effect on officer behavior but are unlikely to have 
drastically changed the day to day behavior of police officers in the absence of broader structural, 
procedural and personnel reforms.  The inclusion of dialogue police, based on the Swedish model, 
                                                            





is still in operation, but these officers are too few to significantly diffuse protest tensions and have 
little ability to influence the National Guard who is under a different command structure and still 
active in protest policing. These programs were engineered to address important issues in 
Ukrainian law enforcement and were given substantial resources and personnel, yet by and large 
they failed to significantly change the system because they were unable to require compliance from 
police and lawmakers in sustaining these reforms. 
 US and Canadian reform programs have been much more successful, although limited in 
their scope to the Patrol Police (until 2018 with the Holosiivsky Model Police Project which 
expanded reforms to other units of the police).  Rather than rely on technical advising and trainings, 
US police assistance programs preferred to create parallel structures where the donors provided 
the majority of the funds, but were able to dictate the conditions of the process.  Central to the 
success of the Patrol Police, and to the design and set-up of the Patrol Police Academy (PPA) and 
the Holosiivsky Model Police Station have been a steadfast insistence on new staff selected by a 
meritocratic procedure which includes independent voices such as foreign advisers and Ukrainian 
civil society.   
Competition between Prosecutors, Old Guard and New Cops 
 In addition to producing competition at the political level, police reform has produced 
competition and rivalry between various law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts.  The launch of 
Patrol Police created an institutional rift between former Militsiya Inspectors, District Officers and 
Operative Officers and new Patrol Police who mostly came from non-law enforcement 
backgrounds.  Patrol Police officers criticized the former Militsiya ‘old guard’ for being resistant 




incompetent, and frequently lost or misplaced forms, and damaged police vehicles385 (CPT Report, 
US State Department Report, French Report, p18).  The relationship has improved somewhat since 
then as Patrol Police has been operation for over two years in certain cities and many Patrol Police 
have been transferred to work in other areas of the police and in the event that District Inspectors 
are subordinated to Patrol.  According to one of the most recent polls by TNS- 53% of Ukrainians 
have trust in the Patrol Police compared to 43.5% in the National Police.386  
 Perhaps more detrimental to the core mission of the police are the poor working 
relationships between Police, Prosecutors and courts.  This dissertation has provided several 
examples of sabotage and obstruction by the Prosecutor General’s office of police and NABU 
investigations.  NABU and the Prosecutor General’s Office have increasingly clashed and tensions 
seem to be rising in 2018 between the two agencies.387  While the National Police and NABU 
typically have a better working relationship than either with the PGO, during the recent drama 
over the arrest of Minister Avakov’s son, police attempted to block NABU officers from 
apprehending Oleksandr Avakov at his home.388   
 The short to medium reform prospects for the PGO and the court system are also bleak, as 
efforts to implement vetting, lustration, and accreditation of personnel have largely failed.  
Ukraine’s current Prosecutor General is Yuri Lutsenko, a central Ukrainian politician and the 
former Interior Minister under Yushchenko.  Ukrainian civil society and its expert community 
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staunchly opposed the appointment of Lutsenko as Prosecutor General on the grounds that he 
lacked the pre-requisite legal education (although Parliament provided a special waver for 
Lutsenko).  The appointment of Lutsenko to this post can be understood as yet another transparent 
case of quid pro quo over staffing of key positions in power ministries in exchange for political 
support.389  Without independent leadership the Prosecutor General’s Office is highly unlikely to 
reform or to improve its relations with the National Police in the short to medium term.   
Unclear reform Goals: Sailing without a Charter 
 One of the most consistent criticisms of Ukraine’s reform efforts to date by the expert 
community has been the lack of coordinated and comprehensive plans for reform, including 
specific actions to be taken and a methodology by which to measure progress and success.  As this 
dissertation has demonstrated, plans for reform emerged from a variety of sources including civil 
society groups, international diffusion (primarily from Georgia), the expert community, 
international advisors, members of parliament, and within the MoI and NPU, although most of 
these reforms have failed to materialize or have proved to be unsustainable.   
 With the exception of the projects which have substantial western funding such as Patrol 
Police, The Patrol Police Academy, and to a lesser extent the Holosiivsky Model Police Project, 
reform of police seems to have largely fallen from the political agenda in 2018.  In contrast to 
earlier Cabinet of Minister plans from 2015 and 2016 which included a host of reforms to law 
enforcement, the current Cabinet’s plan has little mention of police, with the exception of 
improving road safety through expansion of Highway Patrol Police.390  In November of 2017, the 
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Ministry of Interior’s mid-term action plan for reform entitled “Strategy 2020”391 was unveiled 
and has already been criticized for being extremely vague392.  The brief report is full of goals such 
as “counteracting criminality”, “ensuring the human rights and freedoms”, “promoting the 
implementation of European integration policy in the field of internal affairs”, yet includes no 
concrete policies, legislation, ministry decrees, or any mention of changes in the system of funding, 
structure, or organization of the National Police.   
 Perhaps even more troubling is that in addition to the absence of concrete future plans for 
reform, three years after the start of reforms a comprehensive methodology for assessing the 
performance of police has not been measured.  Despite the requirement in the 2015 Law on 
National Police for evaluating the police based on the criteria of public trust, all current studies 
have been developed and funded by either international donors or domestic sociological services 
in uncoordinated attempts.  While the law does require that the polls be taken by an independent 
service, the MoI has failed to set up the funds or mechanism by which this would occur, and as the 
discussion at the conclusion of Chapter 7 noted, abstract public trust in the police may not be the 
best way to evaluate the work of law enforcement.  That a transparent and intelligible methodology 
for evaluating the level of reform and the ongoing activities of law enforcement has not emerged 
should also not be surprising.  Despite the perennial promises of police reform following scandals 
and crises, most police reform programs are often full of language on ideals and values of reform 
but vague enough on the benchmarks, measurements and ultimate goals to give police 
organizations sufficient political cover when they ultimately fail to meet those goals (Walker 2014; 
Kane and White 2012; Soffner 2010). 
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Police and the Public in Ukraine 
 In the end, the success or failure of police reform in Ukraine will largely come as a result 
of its ability to improve its relationship with the public through controlling malfeasance and 
misconduct, providing service, protection and justice, and in regaining the trust of the Ukrainian 
public.  This final section considers the relation between the police and the public in two variants, 
the public at large, and organized civil society.  As Chapter 7 has shown, the police have substantial 
room to improve their relationships with many communities and demographics in Ukraine, 
although overall trust in all state institutions is very low throughout Ukraine.393   Perceptions of 
the effectiveness of law enforcement reform and the effectiveness of the government will 
necessarily be intertwined, and decreasing support for the government and public institutions may 
also see the public decrease its support for police and further institutional reforms.   Deep seated 
Ukrainian cynicism, distrust of state institutions, and poor government performance may see the 
recent gains in public trust among police returned to previously low levels. 
 The relationship between police and organized civil society is another important area to 
monitor going forward.  Organized groups from the expert community have assisted in drafting 
reform plans and legislation, while activist groups have participated in police vetting, training, and 
cooperated in community policing programs.  The relationship between the police and these 
‘benevolent’ civil society groups has deteriorated since 2014 as these groups have becoming 
increasingly critical of reform stagnation, political uses of law enforcement, and ongoing police 
criminality.  While these groups provide an important critical role by exposing issues and 
recommending solutions, there is a risk that the police may become less willing to cooperate with 
                                                            





these groups in the future.  Armony (2004) reminds us that not all associational activity is 
beneficial to democracy and the increasing role of vigilante groups has both undermined the states 
monopoly on violence and created confrontations which further diminish the public’s image of the 
police.    
  While associational activity has expanded dramatically in Ukraine since the Euromaidan, 
this activity may not necessarily contribute to improving relations between the police and the 
public.  Mikhail Minakov writes that Ukrainians have relatively low levels of civic activism 
because of paternalistic attitudes and a lack of independent leadership of civil society groups.  He 
adds “Furthermore, the [Ukrainian] people tend to be suspicious and distrustful towards the 
activities of civic initiatives and NGOs, as they are often accused of being paid up or linked to 
politicians”.394  The rise of the Druzhinki and their increased provocations and clashes with the 
police and National Guard give rise to serious concerns about the political stability of Ukraine 
heading into elections.   
Reforms in Political Uncertainty 
 Nearly four years to the day after the Euromaidan revolution, events in mid-February 2018 
provides a colorful mosaic of the challenges to reform of law enforcement, implementing a rule of 
law, and democratization in Ukraine at a critical juncture.  On February 12th, 2018, political 
opponent Mikhail Saakashvili was violently arrested in central Kyiv and deported to Poland by 
officers of Ukraine’s Border Guard Service and the National Police395.  On February 14th, 2018, 
former Mayor of Odessa, Genadii Trukhanov, was arrested by NABU in February of 2018 for the 
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embezzlement of over 100,000,000 UAH ($4,000,000 USD) meant for local roads and repairs.  
NABU requested bail be set at 50,000,000 UAH but a court released him without bail.396  During 
the proceedings, representatives of the Odesa “Druzhiniki” came to the Solomensky district court 
in Kyiv in support of Trukhanov and provoked violent clashes with police and the National Guard, 
resulting in the hospitalization of four members of law enforcement397.  These three events in the 
course of a week give ominous examples of the three greatest threats to the further development 
of democratic reforms of Ukraine’s law enforcement in the near future.   
 First, the willingness of politicians to use law enforcement to arrest and marginalize 
political opponents was demonstrated by Saakashvili’s deportation.  This does not mean that all 
law enforcement will obey illegal or quasi-legal political directives in the future, and there are 
good reasons to think that reformed sections of law enforcement would resist such claims, but the 
case demonstrates that politicians are not afraid of attempting to use law enforcement against their 
opponents.  Second, the arrest and release of Trukhanov by a Kyiv court shows the substantial 
barriers to implementing the rule of law, even when independent and efficient law enforcement 
agencies properly execute their duties.  Finally, the increases use and mobilization of violent civil 
society groups, such as the Druzhinki, represents a fundamental threat to the state’s monopoly on 
the use of force, and Ukraine’s fragile democracy.  Ukraine’s success in navigating these and the 
other challenges described in this dissertation will determine the future of its law enforcement 
institutions, the rule of law, and the political system in Ukraine in its fourth republic. 
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Terms and organizations 
   
 ACCRONYMS 
Agriteam- Canadian Consulting Firm specializing in state building and good governance 
BPP- Block Petro Poroshenko 
CPC Criminal Procedure Code 
DVB- Internal Affairs (Department Vnutrini Bezpeki) 
EUAM- European Union Advisory Mission 
GUNP -State Directorate of National Police (Regional) Gosudardvenye Upravlenye NatsPolitsiya 
GUBOZ- State Directorate Against Organized Crime 
ICITAP- International Investigative Training Assistance Program- American police training and 
technical advice program under the US Department of Justice 
IRF- International Renaissance Fund 
ITT- Pre-trial detention (sometimes called by its Russian acronym “SIZO”).   
KhPRG- Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 
NABU National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
NAZK National Agency on Corruption Prevention 
NPM- National Preventative Mechanism- Charged with Inspecting Places of Detention to prevent 
Torture 
NPU- National Police of Ukraine 
NGO- Non-Governmental Organization 
OBNON- Department for Combatting Narcotic Crimes 
PGO- Prosecutor General’s Office 
RPR- Reanimation Package of Reforms 
SBI- State Bureau of Investigations 
SBU- Ukrainian Security Services Sluzhba Bezpeka Ukrainii  
Verkhovna Rada- Ukrainian Parliament 
UMDPL- Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors  
URPI- Unified Registry of Pre-trial investigations  Єдиний реєстр досудових розслідувань 
(ЄРДР) 
AGRITEAM Canadian IGO working on development 
CEPR Center for Economic and Policy Research 
DVB – Department of Internal Security 
EUAM – The European Union Action Mission in Ukraine 
GSU- Main Investigative Department 
iMORE Index for Monitoring Reforms 
IREX International Research Exchange Council 
MOI/MIA/MVS Interior Ministry/ Ministry of Internal Affairs 
NABU National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
NPU National Police of Ukraine 





RPR Reanimation Package of Reforms- a civil society watchdog group 
SBI State Bureau of Investigations, handles  




Structure of Organizations 
 
 










1. Head and deputies 
2. Department of support of the Head and Deputies. 
3. Criminal Investigation Department (as part of the criminal police). 
4. Criminal Intelligence Department (as part of the criminal police). 
5. Department to combat crimes related to trafficking in persons (as part of the criminal police). 
6. Emergency Department (as part of the criminal police). 




8. Department of identifying hazardous materials and environmental crimes (as part of the 
criminal police). 
9. Department of Preventive activities. (district police and crowd control) 
10. KORD . ‘Special operation police’ 
11. The Department of Business "Corps operational and sudden action" (as part of the police 
special purpose). KORD 
12. Work device Ukrainian Interpol Bureau (Department of the rights). 
13. The Central Investigation Department. 
14. Department of Analytical and rapid response. 
15. Department of information support and coordination of the police "102". 
16. The legal department. 
17. Department staffing. 
18. The Department of Communications. 
19. Department of financial software and accounting. 
20. Internal Audit Department. 
21. Department of Property Management. 
22. The Department of Communications and telecommunications. 
23. Department of documentary support. 
24. regime and technical protection of information. 
25. The Department for International Cooperation. 
26. Management of human rights. 
27. Department explosive service. 
28. Department of the special police. 
29. Department of Dog Training activities. 
30. Special Communication Department. 
31. Department of lustration. 
32. Sector for pensions. 
 
Interregional Departments 
1. Department of Patrol Police  
2. Anti-Narcotics Department (in the Criminal Police Division)  
3. Department of Internal Security “DVB” (in the Criminal Police Division) 
4. Department of Cyber Police (in the Criminal Police Division) 
5. Department for the Protection of the Economy (in the Criminal Police Division)  
6. Department of Security Police (Department of Security Police) 
  









SBI Selection Committee 
From the Government 
1. Natalia Sevastyanova First Deputy Justice Minister, 
2. Denis Monastyrsky,   Assistant Professor of Khmelnytsky University of Management 
and Law  
3. Ivan Stoika. Advisor to Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov  
From Parliament,  
4. MP Vladislav Bukhariev ("Motherland"), 
5. MP Yevgeny Deyday ("Narodni Front"),  
6. MP Mykola Palamarchuk ("Petro Poroshenko Block"). 
From the President  
7. Roman Maidanyk professor of Taras Shevchenko National University  
8 Viktor Samokhvalov, professor of Taras Shevchenko National University  




Patrol Police Basic Cirriculum 
Basic Training Course for Patrol Police 
1. Subject: Fundamentals of Constitutional Law. Rule of Law (6 hours) 
2. Subject: Human rights. Freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
European Human Rights Court case-law (6 hours) 
3. Subject: Anticorruption legislation (4 hours) 
4. Subject: Professional ethics and code of conduct (4 hours) 
5. Subject: Tolerance and non-discrimination in police work (8 hours) 
6. Subject: Effective communication (12 hours) 
7. Subject: Stress management (4 hours) 
8. Subject: Community policing (6 hours) 
9. Subject: Preventing domestic violence (4 hours) 
10. Subject: Countering human trafficking (4 hours) 
11. Subject: Occupational Health and safety (20 hours) 
12. Subject: Traffic rules and road safety (8 hours) 
13. Subject: Organizational and legal framework for the activity of the National Police (14 hours) 
14. Subject: Administrative responsibility and administrative offence proceedings (38 hours) 
15. Subject: Criminal law basics (22 hours) 
16. Subject: Narcotics, psychotropic drugs and their analogs. Signs of drug intoxication (4 hours) 
17. Subject: Criminal procedures in police work (12 hours) 
18. Subject: Detection of forged documents (4 hours) 
19. Subject: Police officer’s actions at the incident scene (6 hours) 
20. Subject: Police preventative activities (8 hours) 
21. Subject: IT in police work. Information security (8 hours) 
22. Subject: First aid (14 hours) 
23. Subject: Service document management (4 hours) 
24. Subject: Firearms training (80 hours) 





1. Subject: Foundations for National Police activities (16 hours)  
2. Subject: IT and working with databases in patrol (10 hours) 
3. Subject: Using radio communication and video recorders in patrol work (6 hours) 
4. Subject: Service documentation and processing administrative offences paperwork in patrol work 
(16 hours) 
5. Subject:  Discipline training  (12 hours) 
6. Subject:  Traffic rules (22 hours) 
7. Subject: Traffic Accident Management (30 hours) 
8. Subject:  The patrol service documentation (20 hours) 
9. Subject:  First premedical aid  (20 hours) 
10. Subject: Legal basis for detention (8 hours) 
11. Subject: Crowd control (6 hours) 
12. Subject:  Identifying, preventing and combating crimes related to drugs in the patrol  (10 hours) 





Criminal Code of Ukraine: Crimes Perpetrated by Law Enforcement  
 
Article 365. Excess of authority or official powers 
1. Excess of authority or official powers, that is a willful commission of acts, by an official, which 
patently exceed the rights and powers vested in him/her, where it caused any substantial damage 
to the legally protected rights and interest of individual citizens, or state and public interests, or 
interests of legal entities, - shall be punishable by the correctional labor for a term up to two years, 
or restraint of liberty for a term up to five years, or imprisonment for a term of two to five years, 
with the deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a 
term up to three years. 
2. Excess of authority or official powers accompanied with violence, use of weapons, or actions 
that caused pain or were 
derogatory to the victim's personal dignity, - shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of 
three to eight years with the deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain 
activities for a term up to three years. 
3. Any such actions as provided for by paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article, if they caused any grave 
consequences, - shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years with the 
deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term up to 
three years. 
 
Chapter XVIII. CRIMINAL OFFENSES AGAINST JUSTICE 
Article 371. Knowingly unlawful apprehension, taking into custody or arrest 
1. Knowingly unlawful apprehension or unlawful taking into custody, - shall be punishable by 
deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term up to 
five years, or to restraint of liberty for a term up to three years. 
2. Knowingly unlawful arrest or detention, -shall be punishable by restraint of liberty for a term of 
three to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. 
3 Any such acts as provided for by paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article, where these caused any grave 




Committed for mercenary motives or any other personal benefit, -shall be punishable by 
imprisonment of a term of five to ten years with the deprivation of the right to occupy certain 





• Kyiv Oblast Police Commission https://kv.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/218374 
• Zaporizhian Oblast Police Commission https://zp.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/category/143271 
• DVB Website https://www.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/1820018 
• Order of Conducting Departmental Investigation, approved by the Order №230 of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine of 12 March 2013 
• http://police-experts.info/en/2016/12/29/concept_100_day_quality_en/#more-836 
• UMDPL HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORK OF UKRAINIAN POLICE– 2014 Volodymir 
Batchaev Chapter 7. Corruption in internal affairs authorities: general overview, 
amendments to legislation, Prevention mechanisms p124-148 http://police-
experts.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/HR-2014_police_final.pdf 
Ch 7 Hypothesis Appendix: 
H1A: Eastern Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust in the National Police than those in 
other regions of Ukraine. 
H1B: Ukrainians in larger settlements will have greater levels of Trust in the National Police. 
H2: Ukrainian speakers will have more positive views of the government and reform, and 
therefore will express more trust in the National Police of Ukraine. 
H3A Younger Ukrainians will have lower levels of trust towards the police than older 
generations because younger generations are more likely to be subject to punitive police actions. 
H3B Younger Ukrainians, socialized in an independent Ukraine, will have more trust in police 
because of their support of the Euromaidan, western integration, and democratic reforms. 
H4A Ukrainians with higher education will have more trust in the NPU than others. 
H4B Females will have similar rates of trust in the NPU. 
H4C Pensioners will have lower levels of trust in the police than other Ukrainians. 
H5A Respondents who report being victims of crime in the last year should be less likely to trust 
in the National Police 
H5B Respondents who report feeling more safe should have higher levels of trust in the National 
Police, whereas respondents who feel unsafe should have lower levels of trust in the police 
H6A Respondents who have called the police in the last year will have higher levels of trust in 
the police 
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Surveys 
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 2016.  Report on the results of the survey 
«Police and Community» in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and Kharkiv February-March 2016 
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2015. “Report on the Survey of the law 
enforcement authorities performance in Kyiv” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 
(September 2015)  
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2016 “Report on the Public Opinion Survey 
about Effectiveness of the Law Enforcement Authorities and Performance of Patrol 
Police in Kyiv: (Wave 2)” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (January 2016) 
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2017 “Report on the Results of the Survey about 
the Performance of Police in Kyiv” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (April-May 
2017).  
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. “National Police in Ukraine (Wave 1) Survey 
Report Part 1” (April-May 2016). 
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January 2016 (2nd wave)” January 2016 [ 
• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology “Report on the Results of the Survey about the 
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• International Republican Institute “Third Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey. 
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• International Republic Institute “Third Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey: 20 January–
12 February, 2017” Center for Insight in Survey Research.  (2017) Available at: 
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• International Republic Institute: “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine September 
28 – October 7, 2016”  International Republic Institute (2016) 
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